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This thesis intends to discuss some legal issues of utility privatisation and
regulation. The starting point is that the sale of electricity, gas, telecom
and water companies is a special case: utilities are indispensable and must
be regulated after the disposals. The thesis will concentrate on two countries
in Europe: the UK and Hungary - these countries have privatised more utilities
than other European governments. The discussion will make six general points
which may be summed up as follows:
1./ So far as the utilities sector is concerned, privatisation is NOT the
antithesis of nationalisation: the state does not withdraw from the provision
of telecommunication, electricity, gas and water services after privatisation.
The Secretary of State is a key decision-maker and seems to interfere with
the running of utility companies.
2./ The main forms of government interference post-privatisation are /i/ regulation,
/ii/ residual government stakes, /iii/ Golden Shares, /iv/Government Appointed
Directors and /v/ liberalisation of utility services.
3./ Privatisation legislation provides that disappointed utilites or their
customers may apply for judicial review. The thesis will argue that judicial
review is NOT the best dispute resolution technique in Britain: as a main rule
judges do not intend to be involved in the regulatory game.
4./ It is an open question how the overall success of a privatisation project
shall be assessed. There are a number of transactions which do not live up
to expectations. The thesis will consider some of them and will try to explore
what alternative privatisation techniques would have been available.
5./ The English and Welsh electricity sector has been reorganised five years
after the initial disposals: ten regional electricity companies have been taken
over. The thesis will analyse the "Big REC Race" in detail.
6./ Utility privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe will be on the agenda
in the near future. The thesis will discuss the sale of the Hungarian gas
distribution companies - the main question here will be how utility privatisation
may be transplanted to Central and Eastern Europe. This part of the thesis will
make a number of comparative points.
Preface
This Preface will discuss the following points:
Whether this thesis may be criticised for being 'too little, too late';
The structure of the thesis;
Why the term 'privatisation' is not defined; and
Time limit.
I./ Utility privatisation - 'too little, too late' ?
The idea of submitting a thesis on the privatisation of public utilities in 1998 may
come in for criticism: it is too little, too late.
Too little:
Privatisation 1 has been one of the most popular research topics over the last two
decades. Libraries hold hundreds, if not thousands, of publications on disposal of
state-owned assets; privatisation research centres operate throughout the world; and
there are periodicals (e.g. Privatisation International) focusing on privatisation
exclusively. Compared with this pile of publications, this thesis seems to be 'too little'
indeed: (a) it is NOT a general treatise on privatisation; and (b) it is NOT truly
international. It may be useful to explain points (a) and (b) in some detail:
As to point (a)
This thesis does not discuss privatisation in general terms; it intends to focus on
disposals in the utilities sector. Why utilities only ? and why not something else ?
First of all, the term 'utilities' or 'public utilities' should be defined. Two definitions
are available:
(1) The 'public service' approach -
Utilities are public services that are provided for everyone. Electricity, gas, roads,
trains, airlines, and seaports are examples.
(2) The 'obligation to supply' approach -
Definition (1) suggests that all public services are utilities. Is this approach
correct? One may argue that all utilities are public services, but NOT all public
services are utilities. Compare electricity and roads. Both of them are public
'There seems to be some uncertainty as to how this word should be spelled: privatization or
privatisation. This thesis will use the latter.
11
services: everyone may use electricity at home and can drive on motorways. Yet
these two services are not quite the same. If you purchase a small cottage in a
remote area of Scotland you will get a supply of electricity: the local electricity
company MUST connect your cottage to the electricity main. But the Highway
Authority would be under NO obligation to construct a new motorway between
your cottage and M9.
The point here is that either you have the right to demand the supply of a public
service or not. The electricity company is under a statutory obligation to supply
you: the Highway Authority is not. While both of them provide public services,
you have an enforceable right against the electricity supplier only: this is the
obligation to supply customers on request. 2
Thus the term 'utilities' may be defined by reference to the 'obligation to supply'.
One may argue that utilities are public services the provision of which are
subject to statutory supply obligations. Four public services satisfy this
condition for the time being: electricity, natural gas (as opposed to LPG),
telecommunication, and water. According to Definition (2), only these industries
are utilities.
This thesis will follow Definition (2): hence it will discuss the privatisation of the
electricity, gas, telecommunication and water services.
Secondly, the 'why utilities ?' question should be answered.
Compared with 'ordinary' transactions, the sale of electricity, gas, telecommunication,
and water companies is a special case; and there are three reasons for this:
(1) Indispensable
The 20th century has been the century of utilities: it was only during the last
eighty years that the electricity, gas, telecommunication and water networks
reached virtually every household in Western Europe. As Phillips LJ noted in
Regina v. Director General of Telecommunications, ex parte British
Telecommunications pic. (QBD), LEXIS, 20 December 1996, " . . almost
everyone in the United Kingdom must be a user of telecommunication services in
one form or another." Every family depends on utilities for daily living today: the
supply of electricity, gas, telecommunication, and water is an essential service in
our society. ^
(2) No choice
If you are not sure whether your local butcher stocks mad cow disease-free
steaks, then you may go to another butcher of your choice. As a rule, butchers,
2See, Chapter 1., Part I., /A/, point 2., and /B/, point 2. below.
3Kerr J. in In the Matter of Applications by Sherlock and Morris for Judicial Review (QBD),
LEXIS, 29 November 1996.
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supermarkets, fishmongers and the like are competing for consumers. And how
about the electricity, gas, telecommunication, and water companies ? They were
MONOPOLY suppliers in the era of nationalisation; hence they had no real
competitors. It should be noted that not all monopolies are utilities. Certain non-
utility industries were also turned into monopolies in Britain: train and coal are
examples. As will be discussed in Chapter 2., competition was not regarded as
appropriate in the era of nationalisation. There has been a shift from
'monopolisation' to competition in Europe: this tendency has reached the utilities
sector recently. Chapters 2. and 4. will argue that competition is not absolutely
unknown in the utilities services today. You may select your electricity, gas, and
telecommunication supplier from a list of competing companies. But, and this is
the point here, at the time of privatisation the utility industries were not
competitive: as a rule, customers had no choice.
(3) Regulation
As a rule, the sale of public utilities and the reform of economic regulation
intertwine. Compared to 'ordinary' retail businesses, utilities do raise a number of
special questions: how much may a supplier charge for gas/electricity ? Under
what circumstances may a water company refuse to supply you with fresh water ?
Who should settle disputes between customers or would-be customers and
utilities?
At privatisation these issues were not new, of course. The nationalised
telecommunication, electricity, gas and water boards had ready-made answers to
all these questions. Yet the designers of privatisation believed that some of those
answers should be reconsidered prior to offering utilities for sale. Hence existing
regulatory arrangements were reformed in Britain and a new regulatory regime
was introduced in Hungary. There is little doubt then that a thesis on the
privatisation of public utilities must discuss the issue of post-privatisation
regulation.
The three points mentioned above (i.e. (1) indispensability; (2) no-choice; and (3)
regulation) distinguish utility projects from other privatisation transactions. It is one of
the main themes of this thesis that points (1) - (3) pose certain questions that do not
arise in the case of 'ordinary' transactions. And this is the answer to the 'Why
utilities?' question: a thesis concentrating on the disposal of utilities must address
some specific issues a general treatise on privatisation might have missed.
As to point (b)
This thesis will not give a world-wide coverage of utility privatisation. It will
concentrate on two countries: the UK and Hungary. The reasons for this may be
explained briefly.
IV
Little explanation is needed for discussing the British privatisation programme. During
the long reign of the Conservative party (1979 - 1997) privatisation was unstoppable
in Britain. The facts are well known: telecommunication (1984), gas (1986), water in
England and Wales (1989) and electricity (1990 - 1991) were all sold to the private
sector. Thus Britain has more experience with utility privatisation than any other
countries in Europe.
Compared with the UK, privatisation had a belated start in Central and Eastern
Europe: the disposal of state-owned assets was not on the agenda until after the late
1980s - early 1990s. The timing was perfect. Privatisation was running out of steam in
the Western part of Europe; investors and advisors were vying for opportunities
elsewhere. Hence this region made up for time lost quickly: privatisation proceeds
rocketed in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. Hungary was ahead of
other countries in this part of the world. The first privatisation deals in that country
were completed as early as 1989 and a privatisation agency was up and running by
1990. The Hungarian privatisation programme entered its most radical phase in 1995:
foreign investors were invited to purchase majority stakes in the country's electricity
and gas distribution networks. No Central and Eastern European country has
followed suit as of today: no other government has privatised energy distribution
systems in the region. Thus British experience with privatising utilities may only be
compared with that of Hungary in the Central and Eastern European region.
To conclude, this thesis intends to research a tiny area of privatisation: it will be
concerned with the sale and regulation of public utilities in Britain and Hungary. Is
not this topic too restricted, or 'too little' ? Perhaps not. I believe that a Ph.D.
candidate may not dream of a better subject: utility privatisation (i) is important (see
Kerr J.'s point above) and (ii) has not received sufficient academic attention in the
past. The latter point will be explained a little further below.
Too late
Utility privatisation is a closed chapter in Britain: as was mentioned above, electricity,
gas, telecommunication, and water companies were privatised between 1984 and
1996. Whether the order of disposals - i.e. 1./ telecommunication (1984), 2./ gas
(1986), 3./ water^ (1990), and 4./ electricity (1991 - 1992) - was accidental will be
discussed in the Conclusion.
The sale of public utilities is at a quite advanced stage in Hungary: the national
telecommunication company (MATAV) was privatised in 1994, the electricity and
gas^ sectors in 1995. Is not it 'too late' then to submit a thesis on utility privatisation
now ? Certainly not, and there are three reasons for this:
4England and Wales ONLY.
5See Chapter 6. above.
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(1) Legal analysis of utility privatisation ignored
It was mentioned above that privatisation is a quite well researched subject: books,
reports, articles etc. discussing the sale of state-owned companies are not in short
supply. It is less well-known, perhaps, that the vast majority of these publications
comes from economists or from politicians. For example, Vickers and Yarrow
concluded in Privatization: An Economic Analysis (1988) that, as far as
economic efficiency is concerned, privatisation is not necessarily superior to
public ownership. Dennis Swann raised further doubts about the economic
rationale for privatisation in The Retreat of the State (1988). Politicians were in a
hurry to challenge economic facts: privatisation 'propaganda' books were
published. Oliver Letwin: Privatising the World (1988) or Cento Veljanovski:
Selling the State (1987) are examples.
Compared with economics and politics, legal issues of privatisation were all but
ignored. Privatising Public Enterprises (1991) by Cosmo Graham and Tony
Prosser was the first major publication from legal academics. This book is a
British - French comparative study; it deals with administrative and constitutional
law issues. There is no doubt that 'Privatizing Public Enterprises' established itself
as one of the most authoritative publications on the subject.
Unfortunately, not many legal academics followed the example of Cosmo Graham
and Tony Prosser. Leading textbooks (for example, Gower's Company Law, de
Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, or O'Hood Phillips
Administrative Law) devote not more than one or two paragraphs to privatisation;
neither the English nor the Scottish law reports contains a separate heading for
privatisation. Why do not lawyers publish more on privatisation ? One of the
problems may be that it is not quite clear who should discuss privatisation:
practising or academic lawyers ? On the one hand, practising lawyers know the ins
and outs of privatisation: they have no time, or do not bother, to write up their
experience. On the other hand, privatisation may not be an ideal research topic for
academic lawyers: the disposal of state-owned companies raises practical (as
opposed to theoretical) questions.
This thesis will seek to offer the best of both worlds: it will try to build a bridge
between legal practise and academics. When I started on writing this thesis I had
no privatisation experience. The lack of practical knowledge turned out to be the
biggest stumbling block. I was lucky enough to be offered a consultancy post with
Clifford Chance in 1992; subsequently I joined N.M. Rothschild & Sons Ltd.
(1994). Both of these firms were advising the Hungarian government in
connection with the restructuring and privatisation of the country's gas sector.
Chapter 6. and the Conclusion draw on my privatisation experience. It is hoped
that this 'bridge' between academics and practice will help to gain a better
understand ofutility disposals.
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(2) Points never tested
It was mentioned above that privatisation and regulation intertwined in the UK
and Hungary. The fact that the introduction of a new regulation regime must
precede utility privatisation was generally accepted in both countries. Yet an
important question was omitted, perhaps: How closely linked regulation and
privatisation are exactly ? May the existing system of regulation be reformed
without privatisation ? Unfortunately, neither the British nor the Hungarian
government considered whether 'old' utilities may be subjected to 'new'
regulation without privatisation. As will be discussed below, public utilities were
sold off straightaway after the setting up of new regulatory regime. For example,
the first 'modern' utility regulator, OFTEL, was established under the
Telecommunications Acts 1984; the first tranche of British Telecommunication
shares was offered for sale in the same year. The Gas Act 1994 called for the
setting up of the Energy Office in Hungary^: the country's electricity and gas
companies were privatised in 1995. Perhaps a historic opportunity was missed in
both countries: public utilities might have been subjected to a new style of
economic regulation (like RPI-x) BUT retained in the public sector.
(3) Transplantation ofutility privatisation
Utility privatisation is a piece of industrial history in the UK. Yet there are
countries which are expected to start the disposal of electricity, gas,
telecommunication, and water companies in the near future. Russia, the Czech
Republic, and Romania are examples. It will be one of the main themes of this
thesis that these countries should analyse the relevant British and Hungarian
projects prior to offering utilities for sale. There are so many lessons to be learned;
the Conclusion will set out the most important issues would-be vendor
governments may wish to consider.
To sum up, it is not 'too late' to submit a thesis on utility privatisation. First of all, it is
open to debate whether this topic has received sufficient academic attention in the
past. Secondly, the British model of utility privatisation and regulation may be
transplanted into a number of Central and Eastern European countries in the near
future. Thus it may be the right moment to finalise a British - Hungarian comparative
analysis on the sale of electricity, gas, telecommunication, and water companies.
II./ Structure of the thesis
This thesis contains six Chapters. Each Chapter has (i) a general Introduction, (ii) a
number of Parts discussing specific issues in detail, and (iii) a Conclusion. Some
6See Chapter 6., point 1.5.
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comparative points concerning the transplantation of utility privatisation are re-stated
in the final Conclusion.
The six Chapters may be divided into two groups:
The first three chapters will make general points:
Chapter 1. will compare economic regulation in the era of nationalisation and
after privatisation. The discussion will focus on (i) price control, (ii) obligation
to supply, and (iii) consumer protection. It will conclude that privatisation was
not a fresh start in the UK; so far as regulation is concerned, privatisation may
be seen as the continuity of nationalisation. This Chapter will also argue that
the idea of government 'control' was not buried after privatisation. Actually,
the Secretary of State may, and does, interfere with the regulation of
privatised utilities.
Chapter 2. will explore the issue of post-privatisation interference further. It
will be argued that the UK government had a number of legal mechanisms for
controlling privatised companies: (i) residual government stakes, (ii) so-called
Golden Shares, and (iii) government appointed directors are examples. This
Chapter will analyse why techniques (i) and (iii) disappeared in Britain; and
why Golden Shares (point (ii) above) are so popular in the post-privatisation
phase. The legal nature of this control mechanism will be examined next; then
the discussion will go on to discuss the reception of Golden Share in Hungary.
Furthermore, this chapter will argue that the liberalisation of the UK utilities
sector was a government-managed process: it was the competent Secretary
and State (as opposed to the Directors General) who phased in competition in
the electric, gas, and telecommunication industries. Details of this process will
be discussed in Part IV. of this Chapter.
Chapter 3. will be concerned with the judicial review of regulatory decisions.
The main point here will be that, although there might be more applications
for judicial review in the future, the judiciary will not meddle with the
regulation of privatised utilities: successful applications for judicial review will
be more the exception than the rule. The last Part of this Chapter will present
an economic model ofmaking applications for judicial review: it will conclude
that, compared with judicial review, arbitration may be a better dispute
resolution technique.
The last three chapters will focus on concrete projects:
Chapter 4. will analyse how the success of privatisation may be assessed. It
will be argued that the achievements of privatisation shall be tested against its
objectives. The Introduction will conclude that there were three objectives in
Britain: (a) maximizing revenue; (b) extending share ownership; and (c)
improving economic performance. In examining objective (a) it is
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indispensable to refer to certain non-utility projects. It will be argued that the
'maximizing revenue' objective was ignored in the case of the (i) British Coal
-
, (ii) Plant Breeding Institute - , and (iii) trust port - projects. Part II. will
address the 'extending share ownership' objective. The discussion will
conclude that privatisation did not change the basic pattern of shareholding in
Britain. Finally, Part III. will be concerned with the 'improving economic
performance' objective. The main point here will be that it was competition
(and not privatisation) which had the biggest impact on the performance of
privatised utilities. Privatisation without liberalisation and restructuring will not
meet the 'improving economic performance' objective.
Chapter 5. will address post-privatisation restructuring in the English and
Welsh electricity sector. It will be argued that the structure of this industry was
rearranged spontaneously between 1995 - 1996. The government retained
time-limited Golden Shares in the regional electricity distribution companies:
once these shares expired the 'Big REC Race' was inevitable. And, finally,
Chapter 6. will concentrate on the privatisation of the Hungarian gas
distribution companies. Parts I. and II. will be concerned with pre-privatisation
reforms, restructuring and the like. Post-privatisation experience will be
discussed in Part III. This Chapter will make a number of comparative points
in connection with utility privatisation projects in other ex-CMEA countries.
HI./ No definition
The term 'privatisation' is not defined in this thesis and this is for the following
reasons.
Privatisation is a quite flexible concept: for example,
(a) the sale of council houses;
(b) the contracting out of garbage collection; and
(c) the relaxation of licensing arrangements in the energy industry
are all labelled as 'privatisation'. What do points (a) to (c) have in common ? Nothing:
local councils sell flats to tenants in the first example, but no ownership is transferred
to the private sector in examples (b) and (c). The state or a local council ceases to
provide a public service in example (b), but this is not necessarily the case as far as
licensing in the energy sector (example (c) above) is concerned. The fact that, for
example, private petrol stations may be licensed does not imply that the state will
withdraw from the retail petrol business: state-owned and private stations may and
will compete after liberalisation. Thus the word 'privatisation' may not be defined
easily: it refers to a number of activities which do not seem to have anything in
common.
Yet some academic writers disagree; they believe that privatisation may be defined in
general terms. Four definitions may be quoted here:
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According to Cento Veljanovski,
To privatise is to render private or to bring into the private sector. . . .
[privatisation is] the withdrawal of the state from the production of
goods and services.^
Brian McBeth writes that
Privatisation entails change of ownership. Most people agree that
privatisation takes place if property is transmitted wholly or partially
from ownership of the state into that of the private sector.**
A publication from The World Bank argues that
Privatisation can generally be defined as any measure resulting in the
transfer from the public to the private sector of ownership or control
over assets or activities.9
And, finally, Dennis Swann presents the following definition:
As an umbrella term, privatisation can best be defined as the
introduction into the public sector, or what has previously been the
public sector, of conditions which typify the private sector. ^
Although the four definitions quoted are as general as they could possibly be, their
validity may be questioned:
Veljanovski - definition
Privatisation may not reduce the level of state involvement in the production of
services at all. See the petrol station example above or the discussion on the
regulation of utilities in Chapter 1. below.
McBeth - definition
Privatisation does not entail change of ownership in the case of examples (b) and
(c) above. The contracting out of garbage collection, the relaxation of licensing
arrangements and the like belong to the 'non-divestiture subset' of privatisation.
7Cento Veljanovski: Selling the State (1987), page 2.
8Brian McBeth: Privatisation. A Strategic Report (1996), page 5.
9Pierre Guislain: Divestiture of State Enterprises (World Bank Technical Paper No. 186.) (1992),
page 1.
10Dennis Swann: The Retreat of the State (1988), page 2.
X
Guislain and Swann - definitions
The following example may help to explain why these definitions may not work:
The Hungarian government sold (a) two electricity distribution companies to
Electricite de France (EdF) and (b) two gas distribution companies to Gaz de
France (GdF) in 1995. EdF and GdF are not private investors: they are (a) 100%
state-owned utilities and (b) adamantly opposed to privatisation and liberalisation.
Yet the sale of electric and gas utilities to French nationalised enterprises was
privatisation: both the Hungarian and the French governments, investors, advisors
etc. referred to these deals as 'privatisation projects'. These transactions defy the
Guislain and Swann definitions: (a) no ownership or control was transferred from
the public to the private sector and (b) it is doubtful whether GdF/EdF will
introduce conditions 'which typify the private sector'.
Thus the four definitions quoted above do not seem to work: it is a futile attempt to
search for a general definition of privatisation.
One may be tempted to argue that utility privatisation is actually de-nationalisation:
what the state acquired either through purchase (UK) or through confiscation
(Hungary) is sold back to the private sector. As a rule, public utilities were all
nationalised in Europe: in Britain telecommunication was taken into public ownership
in 1896, natural gas in 1946, electricity in 1948, and water in 1974. So far as Hungary
is concerned, all the sectors listed here were nationalised between 1912
(telecommunication) and 1948 (communist take-over). It will be one of the main
themes of this thesis that this approach does not work. The term, de-nationalisation, is
misleading. As will be explained in Chapter 1., utility privatisation is NOT the
opposite of nationalisation. While the government does offer for sale shares in
telecommunication, electricity, gas and water companies, Ministers and Regulators
tend to 'fiddle' with the operation ofutilities after privatisation. It would be naive then
to claim that utility disposals simply 'undo' what was 'done' (a) between 1896 and
1974 in Britain or (b) between 1912 and 1948 in Hungary. Hence it may not be a
good idea to define 'utility privatisation' be reference to 'nationalisation'.
What may be stated in lieu of a proper definition is that utility privatisation is the
sale of state-owned shares to investors (including foreign states - see the
EdF/GdF examples above). Compared to ordinary disposals, utility
privatisation is a special case: the vendor (state) retains the right to interfere
with the operation of businesses sold (utility companies) for an unlimited period
of time (regulation).
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IV./ Time limit
The Labour Party was in opposition between 1979 and 1997: party members had
plenty of spare time to make declarations about the future of privatised utilities.
Initially, the Labour Party pledged to
return to public ownership the public assets and rights hived off by the
Tories, with compensation of no more than that received when the assets
were denationalised. 11
A number of less radical proposals were also made: for example, (a) 'stakeholderist
legislation' shall be introduced to cover such areas as two-tier boards^; and (b) the
timing of the liberalisation of the domestic gas market will be reviewed.^ It is not
absolutely clear at present whether the new government will remember these
promises; and, if yes, what steps (if any) will be taken.
It is beyond doubt that the Labour government will not seek to re-acquire public
utilities 'hived off by the Tories'. It is also clear that the new government is likely to
exercise greater control over the running of utility companies: regulation will be
reformed in Britain. The President of the Board of Trade made the following
statement in the House of Common on 30 June 1997:
I am announcing today an inter-departmental review of the regulation of
the utility industries. My aim is for the review to report to Ministers by the
end of the year.
[...]
The terms of reference for the review are to consider whether changes are
required to the system of regulation of the utility industries in order to
ensure open and predictable regulation, fair to all customers and to
shareholders, and which promotes the Government's objectives for the
environment and sustainable development, whilst providing sufficient
incentives to managers to innovate, raise standards and improve
efficiency.
The review will concentrate on the regulation of gas, electricity,
telecommunications and water in the context of the development of
competition in the regulated markets, and against the background of
general competition law, where we will be legislating in the autumn. It
will also consider whether there are lessons to be learnt from this and
other regulatory experience, to inform the development of regulatory
principles of general applicability.
"See, for example, British Telecommunication: Offer for Sale of Ordinary Shares (1984), page 6.
12The Sunday Times, 10 August 1997, Section 3, Business, page 2.
13Energy Utilities, April 1997, page 3.
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In short it is time to take stock to see how the existing framework can be
updated, modernised and refreshed.
Arms length independence of regulators will be preserved, although after
13 years we need to ensure that the balance between Ministers and
regulators is correct. Also, while the review will be examining the formula
for determining prices, it will not consider rate of return regulation.
[...]
Ministers will consider advice emerging from the review in the autumn. If
changes are contemplated, the Government will consult fully then. 14
This thesis will discuss most of the points mentioned in the announcement quoted
above. But it does not intend to address proposed amendments to public utility
regulation following the review announced in June 1997. Thus the law is stated as of
1 May 1997 (i.e. change of government in the UK).
14House of Commons: Hansard, 30 June 1997, Column 21.
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Chapter 1.
Prefix: 'cle-
Nationalisation and De-nationalisation
The entry 'de-' reads in the COLLINS COBUILD English Language Dictionary as
follows:
de- is sometimes added 1 to a verb, changing the meaning of the verb
to its opposite. EG. . . . nationalize - denationalize. 2 ... ^
Did the editors of the dictionary use a good example here ? Is denationalisation the
opposite of nationalisation ? These are the questions this Chapter tries to examine in
some detail.
Cento Veljanovski likes the nationalisation - denationalisation example; he argues that
"privatisation is the opposite of nationalisation.' - Similarly, Brian McBeth writes that
privatisation "is the opposite of nationalisation when the state buys assets from private
owners".^ This chapter will try to offer an alternative interpretation: it will contend
that, as far as regulation is concerned, denationalisation is the continuity of
nationalisation. Part I. will describe briefly economic regulation (a) in the era of
nationalisation and (b) after privatisation. The two systems of regulation will be
compared in Part II.; the analysis will conclude that much the same regulatory
principles operate today as during nationalisation. Finally, Part III. will argue that both
public enterprises and privatised utilities are supposed to be run at arm's length from
the government. In practice, however, ministers tend to wield more political influence
than the legislator reserved for them.
It may be useful to address an introductory question: may nationalisation and
privatisation be compared ? It follows from the "Incomparables cannot usefully be
compared"^ - maxim that only one form of economic regulation is comparable with
another. Were the nationalised industries subject to economic regulation which is
comparable with the post-privatisation regulatory system ? Commentators are divided
on this point. Ray Rees Esq., a professor of economics, writes that regulation is the
main alternative to public enterprise^. His point is that regulation and public
ownership are alternatives and as such do not co-exist. Similar views are expressed in
a publication from The World Bank:
'Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (1990), page 359.
2Cento Veljanovski: Selling the State (1987), page 2
3Brian McBeth: Privatisation: A Strategic Report (1996), page 5.
4Zweigert and Kotz: Introduction to Comparative Law (1992), page 31.
5Ray Rees: Public Enterprise Economics (1984), page 7. Italics added.
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. . . public monopolies were not regulated prior to divestiture, precisely
because they were public and somehow expected to pursue the public
interest. 6
Professor Cento Veljanovski also asserts that the economic regulation of public
utilities is "a relatively new phenomenon in Britain.He analyses the history of the
British privatisation programme on the understanding that "with privatisation comes
regulation"^: regulation is a 'by-product' of utility privatisation. The above quoted
sources appear to suggest that nationalised industries were not regulated. If that point
were correct no comparative research may be pursued here.
Yet studies on British industrial history show that the introduction of economic
regulation preceded privatisation: monopoly suppliers had been traditionally subject to
some form of regulation.9 The British Electricity Authority noted in a HC paper that
electricity prices had been regulated through the various Acts and Orders under which
the undertakings operated.^ The gas industry had similar regulatory arrangements:
maximum price for gas was set in the individual Acts of Parliament authorising the
establishment of local gas companies. 1 1 Sir Norman Chester writes that statutory
control of gas and electricity charges "had been in existence for a very long time and
[after nationalisation] the Minister of Fuel and Power was only exercising a well-
recognised function."^- Christopher Foster notes that the earliest examples of
economic regulation date back to the 18th century. The scope of enterprises subject to
regulation extended to toll roads, canals, water, railways, gas, electricity, and
telephony "from soon after their commercial exploitation" 13 A. I. Ogus goes further
and points out that the first signs of economic regulation could be traced back as early
as the Tudor and Stuart periods. 14 Thus monopolies had been regulated well before
they were taken into public ownership. Regulatory principles changed after
nationalisation; but, and this is the main point here, regulation was not abolished. The
question whether regulation is older than privatisation may be concluded with the
following comments from Professor Tony Prosser:
It would of course be quite wrong to suggest that the public
corporations established as a result of the nationalizations of the late
1940s and afterwards were unregulated by law; a number of important
6Pierre Guislain: Divestiture of State Enterprises (The World Bank Technical Paper, number 186)
(1992), page 17.
7Cento Veljanovski: Op. cit., page 144.
8Cento Veljanovski: Op. cit.. Introduction, page xii.
9C.D. Foster: Privatisation, Public Ownership and die Regulation of Natural Monopoly (1992),
Part 1.
10British Electricity Audiority: First Report and Statement of Accounts HC 336 1948-49, page 62,
point 321.
uFor a Scottish example, see: Burgh of Hamilton: A Century of Gas Supply (1831 - 1931) (1931),
pages 20-21.
12Sir Norman Chester: The Nationalisation of British Industry (1975), page 717.
13C.D. Foster: Op. cit., page 17.
14A. I. Ogus: Regulatory Law: Some Lessons from the Past (1992) Legal Studies 12 pages 1 - 19.
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statutory and indeed common law principles were of importance to
their operation.
Hence the proper interpretation of events would be to claim that the Conservative
party inherited a regulatory regime which was not to its taste; the Thatcher
government reshaped regulation prior to the sale of utility companies. That reform
represented "a considerable institutional innovation in Britain"^; however it was an
institutional reform and not the introduction of regulation.
To sum up, the birth of economic regulation predated privatisation by centuries in the
UK. Public utilities had been subject to economic regulation from the time of their
commercial exploitation. Utilities remained regulated during the years of
nationalisation. If it is so, that system of regulation may be compared with the post-
privatisation regulatory regime.
Part I.
Two Systems of Economic Regulation Described
As a rule, three features determine the nature of any system of utility regulation: (i)
Price Control, (ii) Availability of Services, and (iii) Consumer Protection. ^ Thus the
discussion below will cover these issues IAJ in the era of nationalisation and then IBI
in the post-privatisation regulatory regime.
IAJ Nationalisation
A.l Price Control
Contrary to general belief, nationalisation statutes did not grant ministerial control
over tariffs^. The general theory underlying the drafting of nationalisation measures
was "that Ministers should not get involved in fixing the prices charged by the
Boards." in theory, Area Gas Boards, British Railways, the National Coal Board,
statutory water companies, and the like were their own masters in setting tariffs.-9
The lack of legislative provisions, however, did not free nationalised industries from
ministerial intervention. As a rule, ministers did not give formal instructions to the
boards; rather the chairmen were 'persuaded' to take this or that action.-1 This
I5Tony Prosser: Law and the Regulators (1997), page 41.
16Cosmo Graham and Tony Prosser: Privatizing Public Enterprises (1991), page 6. Italics added.
I7See, for example, John Moore: British Privatisation - Taking Capitalism to the People In: H.M.
Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme (1995), page 72.; and Matthew Bishop, John Kay and
Colin Mayer (eds): Regulatory Challenge (1995), pages 5-8.
18Select Committee on Nationalised Industries: Ministerial Control of the Nationalised Industries
HC 371-i 1967-8, paragraph 368. [hereinafter: HC 371-i 1967-68]
19Sir Norman Chester: The Nationalisation of British Indrustry (1975), page 701.
20See, for example, Section 37(8) of the Electricity Act 1947; Section 53(4) of the Gas Act 1948; or
Section 2. of Public Utility Transfer and Water Charges Act 1988.
21The method of 'persuas'°n' is discussed in William Ashworth: The State in Business (1991),
pages 84 - 85.
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procedure was labelled as the 'early warning system'.-- Informal consultation became
the rule later: the government declared in the 1961 White Paper that "ministers must
always be consulted about any proposed substantial price change."--* Different
industries had consultations with different 'sponsoring departments': tariff increases
were not co-ordinated. The lack of co-ordination was evident, for example, in the
'Danish bacon' scandal of 1949.-4 the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries
noted the "the application of pricing policies to the various industries appears to have
been ad hoc rather than in conformity with any common principle."-3
Thus two points characterised price regulation after nationalisation: (i) Ministers
exercised "powers not given them by statute"26; and (ii) the early warning system
operated on an ad hoc basis.
Against those shortcomings, a major achievement should also be noted:
nationalisation was the most important step towards rationalisation of tariffs in the
electricity and the gas sectors. According to D. J. Bolton, more than six hundred
authorised undertakings supplied electricity in 1938; between them they used 102
different tariffs.He argued for the introduction of uniform electricity tariffs as
follows:
Different types for different purposes, no doubt, there must be, and
different values perhaps, when costs vary appreciably; but if most of
London, for example, can be served with two gas prices there should
be no need for a hundred odd electricity prices. No wonder the laymen
gives up in disgust any attempt to understand it, and concludes that
electricity differs from everything else not in what it is but in how it is
run.
Nationalisation would have been an ideal occasion for tariff unification. When the
hundreds of undertakings were re-organised into fourteen area boards-^, the 'hundred
odd electricity prices' could have been replaced with standard tariffs. While
standardisation of tariffs was one of the primary goals of the 1947 legislation3®, no
nation-wide flat rates had been introduced in the electricity sector. According to the
22HC 371-i 1967-8, paragraph 374.
23William Ashworth: The State in Business (1991), page 85.
24Denmark and the UK were negotiating the long term prices of Danish bacon, butter, and eggs.
The Danish delegation asked the UK partners to indicate the likely trend of British coal and
iron/steel prices. The British negotiator told the Danish government that there was no indication of
any increase in the price of coal. The inevitable happened: import coal prices were increased by
more than 10% within a week. Source: Sir Norman Chester: Op. cit., pages 723-724.
25HC 371-i 1967-8 paragraph 370.
26Ray Rees: Public Enterprise Economics (1976), page 5.
27D.J. Bolton: Costs and Tariffs in Electricity Supply (1938), Preface
28D.J. Bolton: Op. cit., pages 205 - 206.
29First Schedule to the Electricity Act 1947.; or Electricity Supply Industry in the UK. A
Chronology (1982), page 42. The fifteenth entity was the North of Scotland Hydro Electric Board
which operated under a separate Act of Parliament of 1943.
30Section l(6)(d) of the Electricity Act 1947.
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British Electricity Authority, complete national uniformity of charge was neither
practicable nor desirable.31 In practice, different Area Boards paid different tariffs to
the Authority; and the same Area Board charged different tariffs to different
consumers. It was Section 37. of the Electricity Act 1947 which explicitly provided
for such price differentiation: actually, the application of the same charge per unit on
all consumers would have been contrary to the Act.3- Similar developments
happened in the gas industry: under the 1948 Gas Act twelve area boards had been
established; different boards fixed different prices by reference to parts of their
areas.33 No uniform standing charge was introduced either: it depended on the size of
the consumer's house-^.
The Court of Session analysed the legality of price differentiation in the British
Oxygen - litigation. 3 5 The basic facts of this case may be summarised as follows: The
South of Scotland Electricity Board charged a cheaper tariff for high-voltage supply
and a higher tariff for low-voltage supply. The Board increased the basic charge of
electricity on two occasions; the same 'fuel variation clause'-*6 was applied to both
categories of supply. British Oxygen, a high-voltage consumer, averred that the
electricity board exercised undue discrimination against high-voltage consumers:
different variation clauses should have been applied to the different categories of
consumers to reflect differences in the costs of electricity generation. The court
accepted this argument in principle; the final judgement declared that where an Area
Board showed an undue preference contrary to the Electricity Act 1947 aggrieved
consumers may bring an action to recover the excess or overcharge.
An additional point should be noted here: the court expressed its willingness to
participate in the regulatory game. Lord Justice Clerk (Thomson) declared that the
Court is competent to ascertain the amount of overcharge and argued that
It is the sort of thing that the Courts do daily in all kinds of cases. [. . .]
The inquiry as to what, had the defenders obeyed the statute, would
have be a fair charge is one which the Court can conduct on material
relevantly put before it. 37
Chapter 3. will argue that this judicial attitude to regulatory issues is a piece of legal
history in Britain; judges seem to give price regulation a wide berth nowadays.
To summarise, electricity and gas tariffs were rationalised but no nation-wide flat tariff
was introduced after nationalisation.
31British Electricity Authority: First Report and Statement of Accounts HC 336 1948-49, page 70,
point 362.
32British Oxygen co. Ltd. v. South of Scotland Electricity Boards and ors. 1958 S.L.T. 113., at
126.
33Third Schedule to the Gas Act 1948: Code of Provisions Relating to Gas Supply, Section 17(2).
34London Electricity Board v. Springate [1969] 1 W.L.R. 524
35British Oxygen co. Ltd. v. South of Scotland Electricity Boards and ors. 1955 S.L.T. 306.,
1956 S.L.T. 278, and 1958 S.L.T. 113.
36See Part II., Cost pass-through above.
37at 124.
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A.2 Availability of Services
Public corporations, being the 'high custodians of the public interest'-^ were not
expected to make surpluses. A wide variety of so-called 'social obligations' did a lot to
make sure that the industries would not do so. Goods and services in this category
were usually unremunerative from a commercial point of view. Nonetheless the
nationalised industries produced or provided them because of their social content^.
The primary source of social obligations was the statute books. The Electricity Act
1947 and the Gas Act 1948 imposed a statutory duty on the electricity and gas
enterprises to supply rural areas and to respect amenity interests^. In the case of gas,
Section 8. of the 'Code of Provisions relating to Gas Supply' explicitly provided that
customers shall be supplied on request. Similarly, the electricity Area Boards were
required "to carry out an efficient and economical distribution of those [i.e. electricity]
supplies to persons in their area who require them."41 It is the 'obligation to supply'.
As was mentioned in the Preface, this obligation is truly peculiar to the utilities sector.
The following example might help to explain what the 'obligation to supply' actually
means:
If you own a small restaurant, you may refuse to serve certain customers:
notices like 'No football fans', 'No bow ties' are examples. Provided that your
notices comply with 'generally accepted standards'^ it is quite likely that
nobody will challenge your 'business policy' - disappointed would-be patrons
will go somewhere else for a meal.
The situation is completely different in the case of public utilities. A utility may
not issue notices. As a rule, existing customers shall be supplied; would-be
customers shall be connected and supplied. If a request for supply is not
honoured, the would-be customer may take the utility to court; and it will be
up to the utility to justify the non-provision of services. Regina v. Director
General of Gas Supply, ex parte Smith and another (QBD), LEXIS, 31
July 1989 (see Chapter 3.) and Woodcock (see below) are examples.
Comparing the restaurant with the utility company, two points should be
underlined:
1./ You will not be taken to court if football fans are not served in your
restaurant. If a request for supply is refused, the utility MUST explain why a
customer has been (a) disconnected or (b) not connected.
2.1 You may change your 'business policy' at any time: new notices may be put
on the door as and when you think fit to do so. The utility may not amend the
38Lord Morrison of Lambeth: Socialisation and Transport (1933), page 157.
39HC 371-i 1967-8, paragraph 687.
40Ibid, paragraph 693.
41Section 1(2) of the Electricity Act 1947.
42While it is hard (if not impossible) to define what 'generally accepted standards' mean , there is
no doubt that notices, like 'No nigger', 'No lesbian couples' etc., are beyond the limit of such
standards.
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rules on, and exception to (see below), the obligation to supply. As was
remarked above, such rules are set forth in Acts of Parliament; it is for the
legislator (and NOT for the utility) to re-define supply obligations.
The general obligation to supply was qualified after nationalisation. The Electricity
Boards could refuse an application for supply provided that the extension of the
network to certain rural areas was not "practicable"^. As far as the gas industry is
concerned, the area boards were obliged to satisfy (i) all "reasonable" demands for gas
if (ii) it was "economical" to do so.44 Hence different let-out clauses applied in
different industries.
Two reported cases concerning supply obligations may be mentioned here. Dunn J.
found in Woodcock v. South West Electricity Board [1975] 1 W.L.R. 983 that the
obligation did not extend to an unlawful occupier. A Scottish Sheriff Court ruled that
the duty to supply did not amount to a duty at common law to maintain an
uninterrupted supply of gas. 45
The main points to conclude here are as follows: (a) gas and electricity boards were
generally obliged to supply customers under the nationalisation Acts; (li) the
obligation to supply was subject to different conditions in different industries; and (iii)
enterprises were not obliged to maintain an uninterrupted supply.
A.3 Consumer Protection
Promoters of the British nationalisation programme argued that consumers would
benefit from the taking into public ownership of telecommunication, gas, electricity
and water companies. To put it bluntly, nationalisation tried to convert public utilities
into non profit directed entities. Nationalised industries were expected (i) to provide
services to the public and (ii) to think only of customers but (ii) NOT to seek to earn
profits. Thus consumer councils were established under the relevant nationalisation
Acts with the declared intention to look after the interests of consumers. Yet two
points should be considered in connection with consumer protection:
(i) Both the structure and the titles of the consumer councils varied from industry
to industry. As the Consumer Council noted "... a whole variety of consumer
organisations of one sort or another was established"46 For example, two
councils were set up under the Coal Act 1946; the Industrial Coal Consumers'
Council and the Domestic Coal Consumers' Council.47 Statutory consultative
machinery had a different structure in the electricity and gas industries: one
43Section l(6)(b) of the Electricity Act 1947.
44Section 1(1)(9) of the Gas Act 1948.
45John C. Dalziel (Airdrie) v. Burgh of Airdie 1966 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 39. A comparative
comment: suppliers are generally obliged to maintain a safe and uninterrupted supply on the
Continent. See, for example, Section 387. of the Hungarian Civil Code (Act IV. of 1959).
46Consumer Council: Consumer Consultative Machinery in the Nationalised Industries (1968), page
1.
47Section 4 of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946.
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consultative council was established for each area board^S A third model was
introduced under the Post Office Act 1969: a national council (Post Office
Users' National Council) and three country councils were established. The
operation of those councils was also supported by some 200 Post Office
Advisory Committees which were concerned with postal and
telecommunication matters at local level.49 yhjs system of consumer
protection was a jungle for the consumer: it was quite difficult to find the
competent agency.
(ii) The general public did not know much about the consumer councils. The
principal problem here was that "the councils have done little to publicise
themselves."50 A survey from the Consumer Council revealed that 12% only
of the sample was aware of the electricity councils in 1968;51 and the
electricity councils were not among the least known consultative bodies. 52
The situation did not change much by 1976: the newly established National
Consumer Council reported that consumer councils were literally unknown to
the majority of the public. Local municipalities handled more consumer
complaints than the consumer protection agencies.53
Why was no action taken to improve the notoriously dismal operation of consumers
councils ? Keif-Cohen offers a blunt, but perhaps correct explanation: "Nationalisation
was not intended to benefit the consumers. "54 Nationalisation Acts were not
amended, although members of the Parliament received rather critical reports about
the work of consumer agencies55. Without statutory changes recommendations from
the National Consumer Council and from the Select Committee remained potential
solutions only.
To summarise, consumer protection received much publicity as an argument in favour
of taking monopolies into public ownership. But the nationalisation Acts failed to put
in place an operative system of consumer protection. The performance of consumer
agencies had been unsatisfactory; nonetheless, no reform followed.
48Select Committee on Nationalised Industries: Relations with the Public HC 514 1970 - 71, pages
xviii - xix, and xxiv. [hereinafter: HC 514 1970-71]
49See: HC 514 1970-1, pages vi - xxxi. and Brian W. Harvey, The Law of Consumer Protection
and Fair Trading (1982), Chapter 4.
50Acton Society Trust: Relations with the Public (1953), page 21.
5'Consumer Council: Consumer Consultative Machinery in the Nationalised Industries (1968), page
32.
52Consumer Council: op. cit., page 50.
53Consumer Council: Consumer Consultative Machinery in the Nationalised Industries (1968); HC
514 1970 - 71; and National Consumer Council: Consumers and the Nationalised Industries (1976).
54R. Keif-Cohen: Twenty Years of Nationalisation (1969), page 266.
55HC 514 1970 - 71 and National Consumer Council: Op. cit.
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B.l Price Control
The Conservative government, influenced by classical liberal think tanks such as the
Centre for Policy Studies, condemned statutory price control in principle. But some
control over certain tariffs, such as telephone, gas, railways, was thought to be
desirable in order to tackle "the twin evils of monopoly - high prices and high
profits"®®. Thus utility charges remained controlled after privatisation.
Probably the most widely understood point about the utility privatisation programme
in Britain is that tariffs are calculated by reference to a price formula. An average
newspaper reader might also be aware that the formula mentioned is linked to the
Retail Price Index (RPI). Yet should a member of the public try to find the formula
that venture would be no less circuitous than the quest for the Holy Grail in the tales
ofKing Arthur.
As a rule, privatisation Acts do not seem to say very much about price formulae.
Broad principles as to pricing policy are set forth in the statutes®7, but statutory
references are made neither to the actual formulae nor to the applicable regulatory
lags. ^ 8 The point is that the RPI-X price cap is not enshrined in the legislation®9;
hence the RPI-X method has "no formal legislative status"®®.
As a rule, restrictions on price increases are incorporated into the licences®'. A
licence has two basic functions: (i) it authorises a company to carry out certain
activities; and (ii) it sets forth terms and conditions for the licence holder. The price
formula is one of the licence conditions; perhaps the most important one.®2 The
future profitability of public utilities mainly (if not exclusively) depends upon the
applicable price regime; that point alone would justify their being in the statute book.
Why is it not the case in Britain ?
56Cento Veljanovski: Selling the State (1988), page 156.
57For example, Section 14 of the Gas Act 1986; Section 18 of the Electricity Act 1989. The
Telecommunications Act 1984 does not contain separate sections on fixing of tariffs.
58For example, Section 44(2) of the Electricity Act 1989 provides that the Director General may
"from time to time" fix maximum prices.
59National Audit Office: The Work of the Directors General of Telecommunications, Gas Supply,
Water Services, and Electricity Supply HC 645 1995-96, page 22., point 3.23. [hereinafter: HC
645 1995-96]
60Anthony I Ogus: Regulation (1994), page 311.
61See, for example: Condition 24 of the Licence Granted by The Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry to British Telecommunications under Section 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1984.
Different rules apply in the gas industry after the coming into force of the Gas Act 1995. See: HC
645 1995-96, page 11., point 2.19.
62Price regulation is certainly the most detailed issue in die licences. For example, in the gas
industry the authorisation of British Gas Corporation contains 16 conditions in total; condition
number 3. (Restrictions of Gas Prices to Tariff Customers) alone makes up around 25% of the
entire document. The Department of Trade and Industry: Authorisation issued to British Gas
Corporation (1986), pages 8-20.
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One possible reason for putting the price formula in the secondary legislation was that
draftsmen were keen to reserve some leeway for regulators. As the prospectus of
British Gas pic. put it,
Unlike the statutory rights and obligations, the conditions of an
authorisation can, in general, be modified without further legislation,
so ensuring a degree of flexibility to cater for changing
circumstances. 63
Yet flexibility is not necessarily a good idea. If a given price formula may be amended
easily then investors may fear that prices will follow political considerations. That
system of price regulation would not be more satisfactory than the early warning
system described above64: timing and level of price increases were unpredictable.
Thus the privatisation Acts seek to curb the discretionary power to amend licence
conditions: this point will be explored further under Chapter 3. point 3.1 (ii)(a) below.
The main rules may be summarised as follows: the Directors General may only amend
licences (a) with the agreement of the licensee; or (b) following a report from the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission on a reference made to them.65 The same
rules apply to the modification of price formulae.
The main point to be concluded here is that price regulation is not the domain of
legislation in Britain. Price formulae are published in the licences and not in the Acts.
This arrangement intends to create a flexible legal environment; licence conditions
may be modified without legislative approval. To avoid too much flexibility, the
power to amend licences is subject to statutory restrictions.
The last issue in connection with price regulation is the structure of tariffs. It was
discussed above that nationalisation did not introduce nation-wide flat rates in the
electricity and gas industries: different area boards charged different tariffs. The
privatisation Acts wound up the electricity and gas boards is it to say that price
differentiation disappeared in Britain 9
An introductory point should be made here. The idea of nation-wide flat tariffs seems
to be incompatible with principles of 'good' pricing policy in the post-privatisation
phase. While it is open to debate what 'good' pricing policy actually means, it is
beyond doubt that utility tariffs shall be cost-reflective after privatisation: tariffs should
cover reasonable costs. It follows from the principle of 'cost-reflective' pricing that
different regions in the UK will pay different prices for electricity and gas: (i) different
regions are supplied from different fields/stations and (ii) the cost of transmission
varies from region to region. The logical approach would be then to claim that the
63British Gas: Offer for Sale of Ordinary Shares (1986), page 32.
64See point A. 1. above.
65HC 645 1995-96, page 11., point 2.19. A different procedure applies in the water and sewerage
industry: the Director General may determine new price limits without needing formally to amend
the licence. See: HC 645 1995-96, page 12., point 2.21.
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farther away a given area is from Scotland, the higher gas transmission cost will be
charged.
Yet this is not what happened in the gas sector. British Gas pic. charged the same
tariff for domestic customers in London, Cardiff, Edinburgh and other major cities in
1995.66 Hence one may argue that UK natural gas tariffs were not really cost-
reflective after privatisation: transmission costs were not taken into consideration.
Professor Graham predicted in 1996 that the British gas industry will move away from
'postalised pricing'.67 He was correct; the liberalisation of the UK gas sector has
scrapped uniform tariffs in the industrial sector. As will be argued in Chapter 4.,
domestic customers may enjoy the benefits of competition from 1998 onwards. As a
result, a handful of charges may be quoted for the supply of the same flat in Britain.
To conclude, privatisation and liberalisation did not unify gas prices in the UK:
compared to nationalisation, a wider range of tariffs are available today. More tariffs
will follow after the full liberalisation of the domestic gas market. The introduction of
uniform tariffs is not on the agenda in the UK gas sector for the time being.
So far as electricity is concerned, the starting point is that there were no postalised
tariffs in this sector after privatisation. Different regional electricity companies
[hereinafter: REC] charged different tariffs after 1990 (i.e. year of flotations); and
there were two reasons for this:
(a) Price Formulae
OFFER set different 'X' values for different RECs before privatisation. Thus
the same RPI-X - style formula produces twelve different price bands in the
case of the RECs in England and Wales. There are another two price groups
in Scotland.
It should be noted that the 'different 'X' for different companies' point was not
relevant in the case of the gas sector. As will be highlighted in Chapter 4.,
British Gas pic. was privatised as a de facto monopoly: the same company
supplied the whole UK. While British Gas pic. was sub-divided into region
units for corporate governance purposes, the initial price formula was set for
the company as a whole.
(b) Transmission Use of System Charge
The National Grid divided the country into a number of areas for transmission
purposes; each area has a so-called Transmission Use of System Charge
(hereinafter: TUC) expressed as GBP/Kwh. TUC is higher for those areas
66The Digest of UK Energy Statistics (1996) page 117, table 58.
67Professor Cosmo Graham: Universal Service: A Comparative Perspective In: Centre for the Study
of Regulated Industries: Access Rights and Affordability (1996), page 65. and
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which have insufficient power generation capacity, while TUC is low in those
areas which are net power 'importers'.^
The point here is then that, unlike in the gas sector before liberalisation, electricity
prices vary from region to region in Britain: (a) different RECs have different price
formula; and (b) the National Grid pic. charge different TUCs for different
transmission areas. This is why domestic consumers pay different prices for electricity
in different parts of the UK.69
The main points concerning price regulation in the post-privatisation phase may be
summarised then as follows: (i) Detailed rules on tariff regulation do not form part of
the privatisation legislation: price formulae are set forth in the licences. The regulators
are under no statutory obligation to continue the application of RPI-X price caps, (ii)
Privatisation Acts did not introduce complete national uniformity of charges. Different
suppliers charge different tariffs: there are no nation-wide, uniform utility tariffs in
Britain.
B.2 Availability of Services
Those who tried to block the sale of public utilities argued that transferring gas, water,
electricity, railways etc. companies into the private sector would adversely affect so-
called 'social obligations'. The National Consumer Council argued that "access to
water, fuel, light and so on is a basic 'right' in a modern society"^. John Ernst writes
that
Universal access to clean water and safe and reliable supplies of energy is
generally recognized as one of the fundamental quality-of-life benchmarks
in late twentieth century society.^
Consumer pressure groups were particularly concerned with the future of unprofitable
services (rural gas/electricity services, unprofitable coach routes and railways lines
etc); they feared that "privatisation could lead to consumers in rural areas, presumed
to be more costly to serve, having to pay higher prices."7- To tackle these problems,
it was essential to guarantee that 'social obligations' would not vanish after
privatisation. Thus the legislator provided that privatised utilities should supply
consumers on request. For example, if the owner or occupier of any premises
('relevant premises') serves a connection notice on a water undertaker the water
company is obliged to connect a service pipe to Relevant Premises with one of the
68I am grateful to Professor David Newbery (Cambridge University) for drawing my attention to
TUC.
69Digest of UK Energy Statistics (1996), page 117., table 58.
70In the Absence of Competition (1989), page 10.
71John Ernst: Whose Utility ? (1994), page 37.
72OFGAS: A framework for Effective Competition (1994), point 12.5.
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undertaker's water mains.73 Similar arrangement apply in the case of the electricity,
gas, and telecommunication industries. Lord Justice Dyson remarked in Norweb Pic.
v. Dixon (QBD), [1995] 3 All ER 952 that
. . . save in certain narrowly defined circumstances, if a consumer
requests the supply of electricity, the supplier is obliged to supply. 74
What are those 'narrowly defined circumstances' ? For example, British
Telecommunication is obliged to provide telecommunication services which satisfy all
reasonable demands, "to the extent that it is practicable to provide them"7fy An
authorised gas supplier must satisfy all reasonable demands "so far as it is economical
to do so"76. In the electricity industry a request to supply may be refused if "it is not
reasonable in all the circumstances for him [i.e. distribution company] to do so."77
Provisions quoted above appear to be modelled upon the nationalisation statutes;
actually, the same terms qualify the general obligation to supply under the Gas Acts of
1948 and of 1986.78 As far as electricity industry is concerned, Lord Justice
Dyson noted in Norweb v. Dixon (QBD) [1995] 3 All ER 952 that
there were no provisions of the Electricity Act 1947 relied on in
Willmore which were materially different from the 1989 Act [i.e.
Electricity Act of 1989],79
Supply obligations did not cause problems in the era of nationalisation: as was
mentioned above, nationalised industries were not profit directed enterprises. Thus the
obligation to supply remote areas, high cost customers, etc. did not bother
nationalised utilities. But the economic consequences of the obligation to supply came
to the forefront at privatisation. Privatised utilities, unlike their nationalised
predecessors, are profit-oriented companies. Thus utilities may want to get rid of high
cost, low user customers, if possible. Is there a conflict here between (a) profit motive
and (b) supply obligation ? Yes, according to Professor Prosser. He argues that (i)
73Section 45 of the Water Industry Act 1991.
74at 959-G
75Conditions 1. and 2. of the Licence issued to British Telecommunications pic. See, also, British
Telecommunication: Offer for Sale of Ordinary Shares (1984), page 17. The net cost of universal
service obligation was between £50m and £120m in 1993 in the telecommunications industry. The
latest statistics set the figure between £90m and £150m. See: The Financial Times, 8 December
1994. and Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries: Universal Service Obligations: A Policy
Review (1996), page 78.
76Section 4(l)(a) of the Gas Act 1986.
77Section 17(2)(c) of the Electricity Act 1989.
78In bodi cases the duty to supply is limited to (i) reasonable demands; and (ii) the obligation only
applies of the supply is 'economical'. See Section 1(1 )(9) of the Gas Act 1948 and Section 4(1 )(a) of
the Gas Act 1986.
79The Times, February 24, 1995. Reference is to Willmore and Willmore (trading as Lissenden
Poultry) v. South Eastern Electricity Board [1957] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 375.; the court mled that the
Board supplied electricity pursuant to the statutory obligation to supply, and not under a contract
between Willmore and the Board.
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regulators have no clear guidelines how to regulate because (ii) the government went
too far in acknowledging the right of access to utility services. The best possible
guideline, maximisation of economic efficiency, occupies only a secondary role. As a
rule, the universal right of access to services seems to be the overriding goal of utility
regulation in the UK.^O This conflict of duties will be examined under point B.3.
below.
The courts interpreted the legal mechanism underpinning 'the universal right of access
to utility services' in the following cases:
R. v. Director General of Gas Supply & Another, ex parte Smith & Another
(QBD), LEXIS 31 July 1989,
Green v. Yorkshire Electricity Group Pic. (Chan. Div.), LEXJS, 19 November
1991,
• Norweb Pic. v. Dixon (QBD), [1995] 3 AH ER 952,
Gwenter v. Eastern Electricity Pic. (CA), LEXIS 7 February 1995, and
• In the matter of Applications by Sherlock and Morris for Judicial Review
(QBD), LEXIS 29 November 1996.
The main points of the cases listed above may be summarised as follows:
Suppliers are under a statutory (as opposed to contractual) obligation to supply
customers. 81 A utility must give a supply to potential new customers, unless (i)
the supplier can point to a statutory let-out clause^; or (ii) the giving of a supply
would put the utility "at a risk of being prosecuted for a criminal offence". 83
Should a utility breach this statutory duty aggrieved customers may claim
damages. 84
An existing customer may be disconnected if, and only if, certain statutory
conditions, as defined in the relevant Public Supply Codes^, are fulfilled. 86 The
most likely reasons for disconnection are (i) arrears and (ii) meter tampering. A
utility may refuse to reconnect a customer "until the matter has been remedied. "87
- i.e. arrears have been paid and/or a new meter has been installed at the cost of
the customer.88 As a rule, the courts want utilities to restore the supply as soon as
80Tony Prosser: Privatisation, Regulation and Public Services, in Juridical Review (1994), pages 6-
13.
81 Norweb - case; and also Harman J. in Green.
82See the discussion above.
83 Harman J. in Green.
84Gwenter - case.
85See, for example, the Public Gas Supply Code, Schedule 5. to the Gas Act 1986, as mended, or
the Electricity (Northern Ireland) Order 1992.
86Waite LJ in Gwenter.
87 Schedule 6, paragraph 4 of the Electricity (Northern Ireland) Order 1992.
88See, for example, Sherlock - , or Smith - cases.
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practically possible: the preferred solution seems to be the installation of a pre¬
paid meter.&9
The above discussion concerning the obligation to supply after privatisation may be
summed up then as follows: (i) Privatised utilities are generally obliged to supply
consumers on request, (ii) This obligation is subject to different let-out clauses in
different industries, and (iii) Utilities are under a statutory duty to provide services.
B.3 Consumer Protection
According to privatisation propaganda, regulation is for the benefit of consumers; the
main purpose of the entire regulatory regime is to protect the interests of the
consumers. 90 Yet consumer protection does not seem to be a particularly well
elaborated aspect of the privatisation Acts. To illustrate that point the statutory
standing of consumer agencies will be examined below.
Strictly speaking, only the gas industry has a consultative council established under an
Act of Parliament'5 1. Consumer bodies also exist in the water and electricity
industries; but they were set up by the Directors General^- and are not recognised
under the privatisation Acts. Thus Aileen McHarg correctly notes that "the absence of
any rationalisation of consumer representation in the industries" is the most obvious
aspect of the privatisation Acts. 93
Why does it matter whether customer agencies are statutory bodies or not ? As a rule,
Directors General are under no duty to take account of representations submitted by
NON-statutory bodies: that is the case, for example, in the water sector for the time
being. Should the OFWAT National Customer Council [NCC] be made into a
statutory body, then the DG of Water Services would be under a duty to consider
representations from NCC.94 it is of special importance then whether the existing
customer protection agencies will be transformed into statutory bodies.
The worst record for consumer protection is in the telecommunications industry. The
users' councils had been abolished just prior to the sale of British Telecommunication
pic.95; issues of consumer protection had been remitted to the Director General. This
arrangement is unsatisfactory: remitting consumer protection functions to the
Directors General may create a kind of 'conflict of interests'. On the one hand,
regulators are under a statutory duty "to ensure that companies are able properly to
89Sherlock - and Gwenter - cases.
90For example, see the speech of M. Jack MP: Utility Regulation - A Political Perspective (1996),
page 1. or OFWAT: Issues Involved in Regulation of Privatised Water Utilities (1992).
91Section 2(1) of the Gas Act 1986. and see also: Aileen McHarg: The Competition and Services
(Utilities) Act 1992: Utility Regulation and the Charter In: [1992] P.L. 385, at 395.
92Section 2(1) of the Electricity Act 1989; OFWAT: Water Supply, Sewage Disposal and the Water
Environment (1994), page 6; and Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries & Price Waterhouse:
Regulated Industries The UK Framework (1996), page 15, Point 2.4.6.
93Aileen McHarg: Op. cit., at 395.
94Press Notice PN 32/97 published in: Util Law Rev. 9(1) Jan - Feb 1998, page 21.
95Section 49(4) of the Telecommunications Act 1984.
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carry out and finance their functions."96 On the other hand, the Directors General
should protect the interests of customers. What shall a diligent regulator do if a utility
wants to increase charges, while customers complain that charges are
disproportionately high ? There is no 'good' solution here. The best option would be if
the regulators did not try to pursue conflicting statutory duties. For example, the
Director General of Water Services has recommended in a submission to the
government that the protection of customers shall be made his single primary dufy97:
the other statutory duty (i.e. the companies shall be able to carry out and finance their
functions) shall be abolished. It remains to be seen whether the Labour government
will consider this submission; and, if yes, what steps will be taken to resolve this
'conflict of duties' outlined above.
A laudable attempt was made to standardise and strengthen the rights and duties of
the Directors General in 1992.98 Competition and Services (Utilities) Act 1992
introduced identical procedures for dealing with consumer complaints in the
telecommunications, gas, electricity, and water industries.99 But the practical
importance of the Competition and Services (Utilities) Act 1992 is limited: the remit
of the 1992 Act is restricted to (i) standards of performance and (ii) consumer
complaint procedures. Other, perhaps more important, aspects of utility regulation
have not yet been harmonised. The 1992 Act could be referred to as a model should
the legislator intend to unify regulatory procedures further. * 99
As far as consumer protection is concerned, the unification of regulatory procedures
should not be the most pressing issue. There are other problem areas: for example, the
right of customers to seek specific performance. The point here is that the public
seems to be less well served today than in the era of nationalisation. It may be useful
to give a simple example here:
A construction company asks the local council to link up the ends of home
drains and street gutters with an existing main sewer. The local council informs
the construction company that sewers within a development area should be laid
by the developers. How may this dispute be settled 91
Two questions shall be considered here:
96Recent Publications, Water In.: Util. Law Rev., 9(1) Jan - Feb 1998, page 21.
97Ibid, pages 20-21.
98Aileen McHarg: Op. cit., at 385 - 396.
"According to A. McHarg, total uniformity was not achieved; the water and telecommunication
industries are subject to different duties than the gas and electricity sectors. See: Aileen McHarg:
Op. cit., at 390.
lOOwhether standard procedures should apply to all regulatory offices is an open question. For
example, A. McHarg argues that it would have no practical merit. See: Aileen McHarg: Op. cit., at
395.
101T. Docherty Ltd. v. Monifieth Town Council, 1971 S.L.T. 13.
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(i) Whether the construction company should sue (a) the service provider or (b)
the regulator ?
(ii) May the court order the specific performance of the statutory duty to
provide water and sewage services ?
The proper answers to these questions under the nationalisation Acts were as
follows:
There were no regulators, thus the service provider was the respondent; and
The Court of Session had authority to order the specific performance of a
statutory duty. 1
As far as privatisation legislation is concerned, no simple answers seem to be
available. First of all, it is an open question whether customers should sue the
regulated utility or the competent regulator. According to de Smith's Judicial Review
of Administrative Action, the proper course of action would be to bring proceedings
against the regulatory body. 103 But judicial review was sought against a utility
(Northern Ireland Electricity) In the Matter of Applications by Sherlock and
Morris for Judicial Review, Lexis, 29 November 1996. Kerr J. did not strike out
the application as premature, although the applicants failed to seek help from OFFER
(subsequently re-named as OFREG). Thus it is questionable now whether customers
may seek remedy from the court directly or should appeal to the regulator first.
Assuming that de Smith is correct, i.e. customers should sue the competent regulator,
the discussion on 'specific performance' may be summed up as follows: the court may
not order the specific performance of statutory duties if the respondent is the regulator
(as opposed to the utility). As will be discussed in Chapter 3. below, the preferred
form of remedy is certiorari: the courts are reluctant to grant mandamus or
declaration.
The final point here is then that, compared with the era of nationalisation, customers
will find court orders less useful today. As a main rule, the courts may not order the
specific performance of statutory duties under the privatisation legislation. Thus
customers were better protected when Dochertv was decided in 1971.
To sum up the above discussion, the currently existing consumer protection regime
inherited some well-known hiccups from the past. Different industries have different
patterns; the statutory standing of consumer bodies is far from being uniform. Leaving
aside the Competition and Services (Utilities) Act 1992, the legislator did hardly
anything to harmonise procedures of the regulatory offices. So far as specific
performance of statutory duties is concerned, customers were in a better position
under the nationalisation Acts.
102See the speech of the Lord President (Lord Clyde) in Dochertv.
103de Smith, Woolf & Jowell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Sweet & Maxwell (1995),
para. 3-046.
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Part II.
Two Systems of Regulation Compared
Having summarised the main characteristics of the two systems of economic
regulation, it would be appropriate to make some comparative points now. The
comparison will follow the three conventional headings, i.e. Price Control,
Availability of Services, and Consumer Protection.
1./ Price Control
Ministers had statutory power to set prices (tariffs) neither in the era of
nationalisation nor after privatisation. As a rule, the legislator delegated the right
to fix tariffs to the utilities. Yet members of an elected government have a natural
interest in pricing policy. The ultimate question here is how ministers may
influence, or indeed control, the level of tariffs without having statutory powers to
do so. The detailed analysis of this point is reserved for Part III. below.
Neither nationalisation nor privatisation opted for the introduction of nation-wide
flat tariffs. Area boards charged different tariffs in different parts of their service
areas. Similarly, privatised electricity and gas suppliers may fix different prices
today for different classes of consumers or in different parts of their licensed
territories.
2./ Availability of Services
As a rule, the ownership of utilities is irrelevant to their being obliged to provide
services. Both nationalised and privatised suppliers shall provide gas, electricity,
water and telecommunication services on request.
'Universal services' obligation was not quite universal under the nationalisation
Acts: the duty to supply was subject to statutory exceptions. The legislator used
fairly general terms, like 'practicable', 'reasonable', or 'economical', to qualify the
obligation to supply. The situation is very much the same today: let-out clauses
were carried forward from the nationalisation Acts. The most obvious example is
the gas legislation: the Gas Act 1986 simply repeats the wording of the 1948 Act.
Lord Justice Dyson noted in Norweb that, as far as the obligation to supply is
concerned, the Electricity Act 1947 was not materially different from the 1989
Act. An electric company may be forced to make a supply under both statutes. 1^4-
104See: Regina v. Director General of Electricity Supply, ex parte Redrow Homes The Times,
21 February, 1995.
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3./ Consumer Protection
Although both industrial policies pledged to treat consumer protection as an issue
of special attention, very little had been done in practice to protect the average
gas/electricity/telecommumcation/water consumer. A whole variety of consumer
organisations had been established in the coal, transport, electricity, and gas
industries after nationalisation. Perhaps the only common characteristic of these
consumer consultative bodies was that they had limited statutory power. The
overall operation of the consumer councils was disappointing in the era of
nationalisation; yet privatisation Acts did not reform consumer protection.
Actually, the situation changed for the worse so far as the complaint jurisdiction of
consumer bodies is concerned.
During nationalisation consultative committees could directly represent their case
to the Minister who had the power to take action if he thought fit to do so.1^
After privatisation consumer bodies are effectively sealed off from the Secretary of
State. The authority of consumer councils is limited to referring a matter to the
Directors General^ or t0 advise and to make a report to the Director1 ^. As
will be argued in Part III. below, the Secretary of State is the most powerful
officer in the regulatory regime; it is regrettable then that consumer protection
bodies have no access to her/him.
For the time being, the single industry regulatory offices act in a dual capacity: on
the one hand, the offices are economic regulators; on the other hand, they are
supposed to be involved in consumer protection matters. These two kinds of
activities may not always run in the same direction. Contradictory expectations
create an unenviable situation for the Directors General: whatever action the
regulator intends to take, (s)he is bound to give priority to one of these interests at
the expense of the other. The post-privatisation regulatory system would have a
better record if the consumer protection jurisdiction of the Directors General were
taken away.1 ^
The final conclusion is then that basic principles of economic regulation did not
change over the last fifty years. Acts of Parliament do not set forth detailed rules on
price regulation; services are to be provided universally; and a variety of bodies try to
represent consumers with limited success. Thus, as far as principles of utility
105R. Keif-Cohen: Twenty Years of Nationalisation (1969), pages 268. - 269. and Consumer
Council: Consumer Consultative Machinery in the Nationalised Industries (1968), page 11.; and
also Acton Society Trust: Relations with the Public (1953), page 19.
106Section 32(6) of the Gas Act 1986 and Section 29(3) of the Water Industry Act 1991
107Sections 1. and 2. of the Electricity Act 1989.
108The National Consumer Council is in favour of separating consumer protection from utility
regulation. See: Aileen McHarg: Op. cit., footnote no. 62.
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regulation are concerned, privatisation is the continuity of nationalisation: beneath the
glamour of a new institutional set-up the same old ideas reign.
Dissimilarities between the two systems may be spotted in technical details;
especially so in the field of price regulation. It was mentioned abovethat pricing
policies did not follow pre-established rules during the years of nationalisation:
ministers controlled tariffs on an ad hoc basis. Timing of price changes were
unpredictable; the level of tariff increases represented what the government regarded
as politically acceptable.
This system of price regulation was perhaps the biggest stumbling block to
privatisation. As a general rule, if future pricing policy is uncertain, potential investors
either (i) underprice utility shares; or (ii) do not purchase shares at all. Prior to the
partial disposal ofBritish Telecommunication pic. the government sought independent
advice on price regulation. It was Professor Littlechild, for the time being the Director
General of OFFER, who recommended the introduction of RPI-X formulae.
According to Professor Graham and Prosser, Professor Littlechild believed that the
primary purpose of regulation was "to protect the consumer from the adverse effects
ofmonopoly power." 1 ^ gut the kind of price regulation he recommended seems to
benefit more the utilities than the customers; this point shall be explained in detail
here.
As was discussed above, nationalised enterprises had the right to fix tariffs under the
relevant Acts of Parliament. Yet in practice they could do so only with the consent of
the Secretary of State: the government supervised the level of charges. Technical
points, like (i) this kind of regulation was not enshrined in statutes and (ii) decisions
on tariff increases were made on an ad hoc basis, did not matter to the average
consumer: for her/him the only question was whether she/he had to pay more for
telephone calls, gas, electricity, and water or not. The same approach should be
correct today: from the point of view of the consumer it is irrelevant whether the
government consents to new prices on a case-by-case basis or tariffs are increased
pursuant to a formula. On the other hand, regulated utilities have three reasons to
prefer the RPI-X formula to the 'early warning system':
Timing of price review is known in advance
The RPI-X formula sets prices for some years in advance. Regulatory lags vary
between three years in the electricity transmission industry to ten years in the
water supply industry. ^ 1 It was argued above that nationalised industries could
109See Parti., A.l
110See comments in: Cosmo Graham and Tony Prosser: Privatizing Public Enterprises (1991), page
186.
11'Ray Rees and John Vickers: RPI-X Price-cap Regulation In: Matthew Bishop, John Kay and
Colin Mayer (eds): The Regulatory Challenge (1995), page 375. The Director General of OFWAT
actually reviewed prices in year 5 after privatisation, hence there is a fdive-year regulatory lag in
the water supply industry.
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never be sure about the effective date of tariff increases. ^ No such uncertainty
exists after privatisation: price changes follow automatically the retail price
index. With the help of a simple inflation forecast a regulated utility can
foretell the level of future prices up until the date of the next periodic review.
Unexpected developments may happen, of course: the Directors General may
initiate internal price reviews before the end of the current regulatory period ^4.
Yet the regulators attempt to avoid internal reviews if possible; especially so after
the 'botched' electricity distribution price review of 19951
Thus, compared to the era of nationalisation, regulated utilities can forecast the
future level of prices with more confidence now.
Cost pass-through
With the exception of the telecommunication industry, privatised utilities may pass
through certain costs to the customers.^6 Jhe pass-through factor in the
formulae is meant to cover costs over which the regulated companies have no
control: the costs of fuel in electricity generation, or gas purchase prices in the gas
supply industry are well-known examples. The concept of 'pass-through' is as
simple in principle as complicated in practice. Professors Graham and Professor
Prosser noted in 1991 that it was hard to see how British Gas pic. could be a
"passive price taker" where it was the dominant buyerJ ^ The Gas Consumers
Council summarised practical problems with cost pass-through as follows:
Of practical concern is the pass-through of costs of new gas as this
automatic cover reduces the incentives for BG to negotiate the
cheapest price for new contracts. There may even be an opportunity
for British Gas to pay over the odds for gas to keep out competitors
as the higher price can be passed on automatically to tariff
customers. 1 ^ ^
As far as nationalisation is concerned, cost pass-through was a political issue.
While long-term supply agreements usually made provisions for a 'fuel variation
charge' 119, the government restricted the operation of pass-through clauses in the
112See the Danish bacon - scandal under Part I., A. 1 above.
113Cosmo Graham and Tony Prosser: Op. cit., page 195.
114It happened, for example, in the Telecommunications and gas supply industries. See: Centre for
the Study of Regulated Industries & Price Waterhouse: Regulated Industries: The UK Framework
(1996), pages 20. and 27.
115See, Chapter 5., Part II., B./
116Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries & Price Waterhouse: Op. cit., pages 20., 27., 39.,
and 48.
117Cosmo Graham and Tony Prosser: Op. cit., page 194. It is to be noted that the cost pass-through
factor in the British Gas licence was amended in 1992. See: Duncan O'Neill: Regulated Industries:
The UK Gas Industry (1996), page 41.
118Gas Consumers Council: Annual Report (1990), page 3. Italic added.
119See, for example, British Oxygen - case in Part I., A.l. above.
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1970s. For example, coal fired power stations were supplied by British Coal under
long-term contracts 120^ the British Electricity Generating Board could not
automatically pass through costs to the area boards. Professor Pryke writes that in
the electricity industry the "unit costs had shot up, due to the steep increase in the
price of fuel, but there was no compensating increase in charges due to the
Government's policy of price restraint." 121
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission was hostile to the idea of pass-
through: the Commission warned that price variation mechanisms between the
National Coal Board and the Central Electricity Generating Board might be
"devices for passing on costs which might have been avoided". *22
Yet draftsmen of the licenses did not remember that warning: the passing on
certain costs to consumers is a standard mechanism now. Hence, compared with
nationalised boards, utilities appear to be better protected against raising
procurement costs in the post-privatisation phase.
Efficiency gains
Efficiency was of secondary importance before privatisation. To quote the
celebrated words of Sir Norman Chester: "Efficiency was not a subject which had
loomed at all large in the literature of nationalisation." 1--* This is not to say, of
course, that there was no growth in labour productivity. 124 But neither the
Labour nor the Conservative government urged the industries to cut costs and
tighten up efficiency: "... the Government was trying to keep men at work . . .
and the Boards could not, as the Steel Corporation found, rely on the support of
Ministers if they tried to cut employment and raise productivity. "*25 jn addition
to general employment policy, a practical point should also be mentioned:
employees were not rewarded for improving efficiency. For example, the
electricity industry reported productivity gains of 249.7% for the period between
1961/62 and 1981/82.126 Regrettably, this improvement was not reflected in the
'salaries and earning tables' for the same period. Thus employees had no financial
incentives to cut costs. Thus neither the government nor the industries were really
concerned about efficiency gains in the nationalisation period.
120See British Coal Corporation v. South of Scotland Electricity Board 1988 S.L.T. 446
discussed in Part III. below.
121Richard Pryke: The Nationalised Industries (1981), page 38.
122The Monopolies and Mergers Commission: Central Electricity Generating Board HC 314 1980-
1, page 165., point 7.29.
123Sir Norman Chester: The Nationalisation of British Industry (1975), page 1047.
124Richard Pryke: The Nationalised Industries (1981), Table 13.1., page 238.
125Ibid, pages 261 - 262.
126Electricity Consumers' Council: Labour Costs, Salaries and Earnings in the Electricity Industry
(1982), Table 14., page 12.
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Public utilities went out of their way to increase internal efficiency after
privatisation. 1-7 They had a good reason to do so: the regulator may not claw
back efficiency gains realised between two price reviews. 1-^8 Improved efficiency
is actually the main source of soaring profit: for example, Anglia Water reported
GBP58.7m net profit in 1988 and GBP171.3m in the first business year after
disposal (1991). Scottish Hydro-Electric pic. made net profit of GBP60.3m in the
last business year in the public sector (1991), and GBP122.7m the year after
(1992).1-9 Jhe tables below intend to demonstrate that there was no
corresponding increase in the number of units supplied. It was efficiency gains
which generated hefty profits.
Anglian Water^0
Year Water
supplied
Number of
employees
Length of
water
mains
1988 1,165m
litres/day
5,181 31,063 km
1991 1,230m
litres/day
4,663 32,000 km
TABLE 1. Efficiency gains: Anglian Water
Scottish Hydro Electric pic. ^ 1
Business year Output
(kWh)/member
1990/91 3.8 million
1991/92 4.2 million
TABLE 2. Efficiency gains: Scottish Hydro Electric
The final conclusion here is that it is not the customer only who may benefit from the
RPI-X price scheme. Privatised companies seem to operate in a 'utility-friendly'
environment: (i) the timing of tariff changes may be predicted, (ii) certain costs may
be passed through to the customers, and (iii) efficiency gains may be retained in full. It
is doubtful how the mentioned arrangements actually protect the consumer "from the
127For example, one reason for the take-overs in the electricity sector was cost saving. See: Ken
Bailey: A Bid too Far ? In: [1996] 7 Util LR. 134.
128HC 645 1995-96, page 28., point 3.44.
129Her Majesty's Treasury Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme (1995), pages 43 - 44.
130Source: Anglian Water: Amiual Report and Accounts 1987/88, and Anglian Water pic.: Annual
Report 1991.
131Source: Scottish Hydro-Electric pic.: Annual Report and Summary Financial Statement 1991-92.
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adverse effects of monopoly power."132- rea) jssue may be how t0 protect the
consumer from the adverse effects ofmonopoly regulation.
Part UI.
Ministerial Power Overflowing
One issue has been reserved for further discussion under point 1./ of Part II. above. It
was argued there that nationalisation and privatisation apply the same principles of
price (tariff) regulation: neither nationalisation nor privatisation statutes authorise the
Secretary of State to control prices ^3 While utilities may fix charges, certain
limitations, of course, apply: in the era of nationalisation the boards set prices with a
view to guarantee that the industries will 'break even1 taking one year after
anotherafter privatisation price increases may not exceed the RPI-X ceiling. Thus
nationalisation and privatisation Acts reflect the same legislative intention: ministers
should be kept out of price regulation.
The first part of the discussion below will attempt to show that this intention did not
actually bar members of the government from controlling prices in the nationalisation
period. Later it will be suggested that developments might follow a similar direction in
the post-privatisation regulatory regime: the Secretary of State may interfere in
regulatory matters.
3.1. Ministers and the nationalised industries
Draftsmen of the nationalisation Acts rephrased the Morrison-concept of public
corporation: the idea of arm's length control did not reach the statute books. For
example, the Midland Bank Review remarked in connection with the Coal Industry
Nationalisation Bill in 1946 that". . . the [National Coal] Board will be required to act
on lines approved by the minister."'35 Thus the idea of'arm's length control' did not
reach the statute book in Britain. Two questions should be addressed here:
What powers did ministers have under the nationalisation statutes ?
Why did the legislator abandon the idea of arm's length control ?
Both of these points shall be discussed in turn.
132Cosmo Graham and Tony Prosser: Privatizing Public Enterprises (1991), page 186.
133In connection with nationalisation see: Sir Norman Chester: Op. cit., page 701.
134The 'break even' principle is analysed in William A. Robson: Nationalized Industry and Public
Ownership (1960), page 282. and in L.J. Tivey: Nationalisation in British Industry (1966), page
70.
135Midland Bank Review, May 1946, page 8.
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Ministerial powers
Ministerial power over the boards may be analysed under two headings: (i) specific
powers and (ii) the right to issue general directions.
(i) Specific powers
Specific powers covered a wide range of questions from the appointment of board
members to the approval of training and educational programmes. The present
discussion does not intend to address all ministerial powers in detail 136; the
emphasise here is on finance and borrowings. Ministerial power in relation to these
issues is summarised in the table below^
Coal Industry Transport Gas Industry Electricity
Financial
requirement
to break even
on an average
of good and
bad years
to break even
taking one year
with another
to break even
taking one year
with another
to break even
taking one year
with another
Borrowing Minister may
make
advances; the
Board may
borrow with
the consent of
the Minister
the Board may
borrow with
the consent of
the Minister
and of the
Treasury
May borrow
with the
consent of the
Minister
May borrow
with the
consent of the
Minister
Stocks n/a with the
consent of the
Minister and
approval of the
Treasury may
issue British
Transport
Stocks
with the
consent of the
Minister and
approval of the
Treasury may
issue British
Gas Stocks
with the
consent of the
Minister and
approval of the
Treasury may
issue British
Electricity
Stocks
TABLE 3. Ministerial powers after nationalisation
Two points should be emphasized here: (i) The break-even principle did not allow
industries to make large and regular surpluses^; the nationalised enterprises were
not "profit-earning organisations" ^9 These points will be discussed below, (ii) The
nationalised enterprises could not borrow without the consent of the minister; stocks
136For a detailed analysis see: D.N. Chester: Op. cit. and Tony Prosser: Nationalised Industries and
Public Control (1986) pages 23-25..
137Source: D.N. Chester: Op. cit., pages 26-29.
138HC 371-i 1967-68, paragraph 165.
139See Lord Patrick's comments in British Oxygen - case, at 125.
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could not be issued without the approval of the Treasury. Hence the government
directly controlled the borrowings of nationalised enterprises.
(ii) General directions
In addition to the above mentioned specific powers, the minister also had the right to
issue general directions to the boards. For example, Section 3(1) of the Coal Industry
Nationalisation Act 1946 reads as follows:
Minister may, after consultation with the Board, give to the Board
directions of a general character as to the exercise and performance by
the Board of their functions in relation to matters appearing to the
Minister to affect the national interest, and the Board shall give effect
to any such directions. ^0
Although general directions were hardly ever used^l, it is this kind of power which
contributed to the collapse of nationalisation in Britain.
Farewell to the Morrison-concept
General directions were incompatible with the Morrison concept of public
corporations. As Professor Prosser writes, the original model assumed that the
minister was to keep out of the operation of largely autonomous industries; he "could
not interfere except where there was specific legal provision for him to do so." 142
Statutes of the 1930s honoured this principle: the minister could not address general
directions to the London Port Authority, to London Passanger Transport Board, or to
the Central Electricity Board. The introduction of general directions was "definitely a
post-1945 development". 143 But this 'development' destroyed the original model of
public corporation: first of all, (A) it turned working relations between the ministers
and the industries upside down; secondly, (B) it shifted away regulation from legalism
to negotiation between regulators and regulated. Both of these points should be
explored in detail.
(A) Ministers and the Boards
It was the financing of nationalised boards which prompted ministers to abandon the
idea of arm's length control. The starting point here is that the principle of'breaking-
even' significantly reduced the capability of nationalised industries to make provisions
140Further examples: Section 7. of the Gas Act 1948; or Section 5. of the Electricity Act 1947.
141According to Thornwill, two such directions were issued in the late 1950s. See: W. Thornwill:
The Nationalized Industries. An Introduction (1968), pages 36-37. It is interesting to note that the
Labour governments of 1945-1951 did not issue general directions at all. See: Tony Prosser:
Nationalised Industries and Public Control (1986), page 25.
142Tony Prosser: Op. cit., page 21. Italics added.
143D.N. Chester: The Nationalised Industries. A Statutory Analysis (1948), page 5.
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for capital expenditure. 144 Ironically, the nationalised industries found themselves
unable to finance new investments exactly when expansion of services was very high
on the political agenda. *45 Keif-Cohen argues that massive development programmes
"made self-financing impossible from the start. "146 As was mentioned above (point
(i), Specific powers), the industries 147 could either borrow from the minister or raise
money on the open market. Stocks issued by nationalised enterprises had been
guaranteed by the Treasury and were traded on the market as a kind of gilt-edged
securitiesJ 48
This system of financing was not to the taste of the government. A new regime was
introduced under the Finance Act 1956: nationalised enterprises had no direct access
to the UK financial market. 149 Future borrowings were to come from the Exchequer;
initially from the Consolidated Fund and after 1968 by loans from the National Loans
Fund.'50 Hence the industries had less financial independence under the new Acts
than under the original nationalisation statutes. The importance of this point cannot be
overstated: as Sir Christopher Foster writes
If there was one feature that distinguished post-war nationalization
from pre-war public ownership, it was that government controlled all
nationalized industry borrowing, on the ground that it necessarily
guaranteed the borrowing - a dogma which was to be of the greatest
importance both throughout the (post-war) period of nationalization
and in bringing about privatization. 1 ^ 1
In addition to the statutory control of borrowings, the government also introduced a
new generation of "non-statutory financial targets"^-: ministerial control was soon
extended to other aspects of finance, including (i) tariffs and (ii) major procurement
contracts.
Tariff control
Ministers exercised two kinds of non-statutory control in connection with tariffs:
(i) The minister might block price increases. As was mentioned above (Part II.,
Efficiency gains), the government placed various constraints upon price increases in
144William A. Robson: Nationalized Industry and Public Ownership (1960), page 65.
145R. Keif-Cohen: Twenty Years of Nationalisation (1969), page 215.
146R. Keif-Cohen: Op. cit., page 215.
147With the exception of the coal industry which was always financed from government resources.
148R. Keif-Cohen: Twenty Years of Nationalisation (1969), page 197.
149Michael G. Webb: The Economics of Nationalised Industries (1973), page 143.
150Select Committee on Nationalised Industries: Reports and Accounts HC 304 1957-8, Appendix
1. and Cmnd. 7131 (1978), section 90.
151C.D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (1992),
page 78.
152Electricity Consumers' Council: The Financing of the Electricity Supply Industry (1984),
Summary.
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the 1970s. 153 After the passage of the Counter-Inflation Act 1973 the government,
acting through the Price Commission, could veto tariff increases.
(ii) Sometimes it was the minister who fixed the level of tariffs. A report from the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission revealed that the government gave 'guidance'
to the electricity companies on pricing policy and also on specific tariffs. 154 por
example, such guidance was used to introduce the so-called 'differential charge' in
1948.155
There is little doubt that the British government preferred technique (i) to technique
(ii). Actually, governments of all political colours seem to opt for the former method.
The right to veto proposed price increases is a useful weapon to fight against inflation;
and it also saves the minister from preparing detailed price calculations. For example,
the Department of Water and Electric Energy may veto tariff increases in Brazil.'56
In Hungary, the government may veto price proposals prepared by the Energy
Office. 157
Thus British Ministers, like their opposite numbers in Brazil or in Hungary, rather
'blocked' than 'fixed'.
Procurement contracts
This issue will be illustrated here by reference to the South of Scotland Electricity
Board - litigation. ^8 The mam p0ints of the three cases quoted may be summarised
as follows: the parties executed an agreement in 1962 which bound the electricity
board not to take supply of coal from other sources than the coal corporation. 159 As
far as the contractual obligation of British Coal was concerned, the agreement merely
provided "that if the defenders ever sought a given tonnage, the pursuers [i.e. the coal
corporation] would make that known tonnage available to them. "160 The lifetime of
the said agreement was extended three times between 1970 and 1986.161 The coal
corporation had a good reason to stick to the agreement: mines in the vicinity of the
power stations had no other outlet. 162 gut what did the electricity board gain from
153Richard Pryke: The Nationalised Industries (1981), page 38. In connection with government
interference with pricing, see also: William A. Robson: Nationalized Industry and Public
Ownership (1960), pages 290 - 297; William Ashworth: The State in Business (1991), pages 52 -
53.; R. Keif-Cohen: Nationalisation in Britain (1961), page 219.
154The Monopolies and Mergers Commission: Central Electricity Generating Board HC 315 1980-
1, page 15., point 3.13.
155Sir Norman Chester: The Nationalisation of British Industry (1975), pages 711 - 712.
156Jose Riberio Pena Neto: Overview of the Brazilian Electricity Sector. Source:
http://www.energyonline.com/Restructuring/models/brizill.html
157See Chapter 6., point 1.5.
158British Coal Corporation v. South of Scotland Electricity Board 1988 S.L.T. 446; 1991
S.L.T. 302; and 1993 S.L.T. 38.
159Background to the coal - electricity generation agreements is analysed in: Electricity Consumers'
Council: The Financing of the Electricity Supply Industry (1984), pages 4-5., points 3.3. - 3.4.
160British Coal Corporation v. South of Scotland Electricity Board 1988 S.L.T. 446, at 448-1.
161at 447 F-H.
162at 447 -J-K.
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granting exclusivity in favour of the coal corporation ? Hardly anything; the price of
coal to be supplied was not fixed under the agreement.
Why did not the South of Scotland Electricity Board try to purchase coal from other
sources ? Two points should be underlined here:
(i) No alternative suppliers were available in Britain - interest in worked and
unworked coal was vested in British Coal under the Coal Industry
Nationalisation Act 1946.
(ii) The Scottish company may not approach foreign coal suppliers: the minister
instructed all the electricity boards not to import coal.
The main point from the South of Scotland Electricity Board - case is that the
government had an active interest in coal purchase agreements: the Scottish company
might not refuse to take coal from local mines, even though the British Coal offer was
not competitive. The story of the South of Scotland Electricity Board was not a one-
off example. The Electricity Consumers' Council noted in a report that there was
"direct intervention in the CEGB's coal purchasing policy.'4 63 A report from the
Monopolies and Merger Commission also confirmed that the government had an
active interest in procurement contracts. In connection with fuel purchase agreements
the Commission reported to the Parliament that
. . . the CEGB had agreed with the Department of Energy not to enter
into coal import contracts without first consulting the Department, that
the Secretary of State for Energy would decide if imports were
necessary and whether they would be handled by the CEGB or the
NCB.164
The CEGB - example and the idea of arm's length control may not be reconciled. The
point here is that ministerial control was stretched over and beyond the applicable
statutory bounds. Ministers controlled not only the borrowings of nationalised
enterprises, but also tariff policy and certain procurement contracts. For example,
under the Electricity (Scotland) Act 1979 the minister had statutory authorisation
neither to fix tariffs nor to block proposed tariff increases ^ 65 Section 2 of the Coal
Industry Act 1977 authorised the Secretary of State to make grants to the National
Coal Boards "for the purpose of promoting the sale of coal" to the electricity
generating boards. Yet the legislator did not envisage that the minister would
163Electricity Consumers' Council: Coal and the Interest of Electricity Consumers (Privatisation
Discussion Paper No. 3.) (1987), page 20., point 65.
164The Monopolies and Mergers Commission: Central Electricity Generating Board HC 315 1980-
1, page 161., point 7.15.
165Schedule 4 (Gas Supply Code), Section 12 of the Gas Act 1972; Section 23 of the Electricity
(Scotland) Act 1979. A historical comment: the minister had the right to block price increases under
the Gas Charges Order of 1942. Source: Sir Norman Chester: The Nationalisation of British
Industry (1975), page 710.
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eventually decide whether the CEGB may import coal or not. How could the minister
exercise powers not granted by Acts ofParliament ?
According to Professor Thornwill it was the right to issue general directions which
"led to the growth of a secondary area of non-statutory intervention by Ministers". He
argues that
It is not the case that Ministers have abused their statutory powers, but
rather that the statutory powers have enabled Ministers to extend their
influence beyond the area envisaged when the statutes were
enacted. 166
The right to issue general directions undermined the idea of 'arm's length' control.
Ministerial intervention under the shadow of general directions shifted nationalisation
away from the Morrison concept in the UK. The outcome is well known: nationalised
enterprises were declared to be inferior to private companies. Perhaps critics were too
harsh: it was not nationalisation generally which failed in the UK. The story of the
British nationalisation programme is the failure of a particular model of public
corporations. It was argued above that (i) government controlled all nationalized
industry borrowing, tariffs and procurement contracts via (ii) non-statutory
intervention. Points (i) and (ii) brought down nationalised enterprises in Britain. This
story is about the failure of a model which omitted a central element of Morrison's
idea: enterprises were NOT run at arm's length control from the government. Who
knows what would have happened had the Morrison-model been implemented in full.
(B) Informal procedures versus legalism
So far as post-privatisation regulation is concerned the main point from the above
discussion is as follows: non-statutory intervention had a decisive influence upon the
regulation of nationalised boards in Britain.
It was mentioned above that not many general directions were issued to the boards. Is
it right to claim then that such directions re-arranged relations between the boards and
the ministers ? If no directions were issued how could they possibly have any
influence ?
One of the golden rules of British administration is that open confrontations between
governors and governed should be avoided, if possible. Ministers and nationalised
enterprises followed the same approach. As Sir Norman Chester noted,
... a situation in which a Minister and a Board appointed by him had
to settle their differences by litigation seemed wholly inconsistent with
the harmony of relationships necessary for the smooth working of the
undertaking in the national interest.'"'
166W. Thornwill: The Nationalised Industries. An Introduction (1968), page 35. Italics retained.
167Sir Norman Chester: Op. cit., page 989.
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As a main rule, disagreements were negotiated after nationalisation; ministers tried to
'persuade' chairmen and vice versa. 168 jf this conciliation procedure failed, then the
minister might issue a general direction addressed to the rebellious board. In practice,
neither ministers nor boards found such directions particularly appealing.
As to Boards:
The nationalised enterprises were powerless against the sponsoring departments.
To avoid public humiliation, board members either (i) gave in to ministerial
pressure before the direction would have been issued or (ii) resigned. As Professor
Thornwill notes,
. . . the mere existence of the power to issue a direction rather than its
actual issue will be enough to enable the Minister to get his way. * 69
As to Ministers:
Professor Prosser notes that ministers rather preferred not to issue directions. He
points out that enterprises were obliged to publish ministerial directions in their
annual reports. ^6 This level of publicity had two, perhaps unintended,
consequences: general directions (i) would have showed that "relations between
minister and board had broken down"; and (ii) "would have given at least a clue to
the degree of responsibility of government for particular actions of the
boards." 1^1 Hence the issuing of directions was the very last resort which was "to
be used in exceptional circumstances".^-
Thus ministers and boards tried to avoid formal procedures; informal contact was the
preferred regulatory technique. 1^3 The final point here is that ministers and
nationalised utilities had a joint interest to avoid formal procedures. Informal methods
of regulation, like confidential discussions, persuasion, made formal directions
redundant. Thus regulation was "lying in the shadow of the law" in the era of
nationalisation.' ^4
168See Part I., A. 1. above.
169W. Thornwill: The Nationalised Industries. An Introduction (1968), page 37.
170See, for example, Section 8(2) of die Gas Act 1972.
171Tony Prosser: Nationalised Industries and Public Control (1986), page 24.
172Sir Norman Chester: Op. cit., page 1036.
173Tonny Prosser: Op. cit., page 24.
174Martin Stewart-Smith: Industry Structure and Regulation (The World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper, No. 1419.) (1995), page 26.
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3.2. The myth of independent regulators
John Moore, the then Financial Secretary to the Treasury, advertised privatisation as
follows: "Privatisation decisively breaks the political link. "175 As far as price
regulation is concerned, the government was particularly keen to keep this promise.
"To avoid undue risk to shareholders", a total of nine single industry regulatory offices
were established 176 In theory, the single industry regulators are independent of the
government.
The discussion below will attempt to offer a non-official view of the British regulatory
system. It will be argued that economic regulation is a game with at least two referees,
i.e. the government (acting through the Secretary of State) and the regulator.
Between the two of them the Secretary of State has more statutory power. In the light
of that point the independence of the regulators may be questioned.
The Comptroller and Auditor General starts his analysis of the regulators' statutory
powers with the following statement:
The government also have important continuing responsibilities for
regulating the economic activities of companies in the four industries
[i.e. telecommunications, gas supply, water services, and electricity
supply], 177
What is the relationship between those 'continuing responsibilities' and statutory
powers of the Directors General ? One would suppose that after privatisation the
regulatory offices will exercise all regulatory powers save those which might not be
assigned to a single industry regulator (for example, general competition policy). Yet
the division of statutory powers follows different principles under the privatisation
Acts. According to the findings of the Comptroller and Auditor General, the
Secretary of State has a number of responsibilities. 1 78 For example, he may
(i) grant or revoke licences;
(ii) issue regulations relating to the services or supply;
(iii) set or approve the standard of quality;
(iv) regulate connection charges. 1 79
175John Moore: Why Privatise? in: Privatisation and Regulation - the UK Experience (1986),
page 89.
176Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries & Price Waterhouse: Op. cit., page 14, point 2.4.1.
177National Audit Office: The Work of the Directors General of Telecommunications, Gas Supply,
Water Services, and Electricity Supply HC 645 1995-96, page 7, point 2.8.
178In the case of the gas industry, more dian 40 functions are listed on three pages. See: HC 645
1995-96, pages 201-204, point B.9.1.
179See replies from the Directors General to question B.9. In: HC 645 1995-96.
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If the above mentioned functions are reserved for the Secretary of State, what is the
regulator supposed to do ? On the face of it, there is no shortage of statutory powers
allocated to the Directors General. Principal functions include, among others,
(i) fixing maximum prices;
(ii) making references to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission;
(iii) determining certain types of disputes;
(iv) advising the Secretary of State on regulatory matters. 1 ^0
Before one would rush to conclude that the Directors General have no less
responsibilities than the Secretary of State, three additional points should be
considered:
(i) Power Constrained
As a rule, a Director General may not exercise all the above listed powers as and
when (s)he thinks fit to do so. One of the regulators, Professor Littlechild, noted that
the power of the Director(s) General "derives from or is constrained by the Secretary
of State." 181 This point will be demonstrated by reference to the 'modification of
licences' procedure. 182
Section 11 of the Electricity Act 1989 provides that"... the Director may modify the
conditions of a licence if the holder of the licence consents to the modifications".
Modification by agreement is an original jurisdiction of the Director; the Secretary of
State has no power to amend licences. 183 Yet the Secretary of State must receive a
notice about the proposed modification. Under Section 11(4) of the Electricity Act
1989, the Secretary of State may direct the Director not to make any modifications,
and "the Director shall comply with the direction". The Secretary of State may
exercise similar powers under Sections 12(5) (Modification references to Monopolies
Commission) and 13(6) (Reports on modification reference). As Phillips LJ remarked
in Regina v. Director General of Telecommunications, ex parte British
Telecommunication pic. (QBD), LEXIS, 20 December 1996, decisions of the
Directors General concerning the modification of licences are "subject always to the
overriding power of veto of the Secretary of State."
Another technique to curtail the power of regulators is to grant jurisdiction over the
same matter to (i) the Secretary of State and to (ii) the Directors General. For
example, either the Secretary of State or the Director General of OFGAS may notify
the Public Gas Transporter that a gas supplier is not entitled to make a 'special
180See replies from the Directors General to question B.3. In: HC 645 1995-96.
181S.C. Littlechild: Office of Electricity Regulation: The New Regulatory Framework for
Electricity in: Cento Veljanovski (ed): Regulators and the Market (1991), page 116.
182References are made to the Electricity Act 1989; the same points also apply in the case of the Gas
Act 1986, the Water Industry Act 1991, and the Telecommunications Act 1984.
183Cosmo Graham and Tony Prosser: Privatizing Public Enterprises (1991), page 191.
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customer payment1 claim. 184 The licence does not say what shall happen should the
two officers disagree; perhaps it goes without saying that the Secretary of State's
opinion will prevail.
Constraints on power creates both personal and professional dilemmas. Sir Bryan
Carsberg, the former telecommunications regulator, complained in the press about the
frustration he felt "in the shadow of the Secretary of State". 185 jn the gas industry
Ms. Clare Spottiswoode appears to pursue a pro-competition policy. Yet in a letter
addressed to the Editor of The Financial Times she lamented that she cannot actually
widen competition; "... such a move would require a statutory instrument by the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry". 186
(ii) Regulators ignored
The legislator did not have a blueprint for the division of responsibilities between the
Secretary of State and the Directors General. Privatisation Acts and secondary
legislation entrusted important regulatory functions to the Secretary of State. Three
examples will suffice here:
(a) Licensing
As a rule, it is the competent Secretary of State (and NOT the regulator) who
may issue licences in the telecommunication, electricity, gas and water
sectors. 187 por example, Section 6(1) of the Water Industry Act reads as
follows:
Subject to the following provisions of this Chapter, a company may be
appointed
(a) by the Secretary of State; or
(b) with the consent of or in accordance with a general authorisation
given by the Secretary ofState^°^, by the Director
to be the water undertaker or sewerage undertaker for any area ofEngland
and Wales.
Thus Colin Scott correctly notes that "the right to grant authorizations and to
set conditions is held by the Secretary of State". 189 Licences are the omega
184Section 10(3)(b) of the Standard Conditions of Public Gas Transporters' Licences (1996).
185The Financial Times. 29 November 1994.
186The Financial Times, 12 July 1994.
i87Tony Prosser: Law and the Regulators (1997), pages 97, 127, and 152.
188Italics added.
189Colin Scott: Privatization, Control, and Accountability In: Joseph McCahery, Sol Picciotto and
Colin Scott (eds): Corporate Control and Accountability (1993), page 243.
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and alpha of utility regulation; it is not clear then why ministers (as opposed to
regulators) were in charge of drafting the first generation of licences.
Legislators in other countries do not follow the British example: for example,
the Gas Act 1994 of Hungary provided that the Energy Office (and NOT the
Minister) shall draft the country's first utility licences. '^0
(b) Approval of Code of Practice
The Water Industry Act 1991 provides that rules concerning (a) general
environmental and recreational duties and (b) environmental duties with
respect to sites of special interests may be promulgated in Codes of Practice.
Pursuant to Section 5(1) of the said Act it is the Secretary of State (and not
the Director General of OFWAT) who may approve such Codes. He should
consult a number of bodies (e.g. the Environmental Agency, the Historic
Buildings and Monuments Commission) before making an order under
Section 5. But, and this is the point here, the Secretary of State is under no
duty to consult the Director General of OFWAT. Hence it would appear that
the legislator has forgotten about the regulator on this occasion.
(c) Liberalisation
The detailed discussion on liberalisation is reserved for Chapter 2.; the point
here is that the introduction of competition was a 'managed process' in
Britain. ^1 And who managed this process ? One would suppose that the
Directors General are "as well, or better, placed than anyone in this
country" *92 t0 decide when and how competition should be phased in. But
the British legislator disagreed: the Competition and Services (Utilities) Act
1992 empowered the Secretary of State to reduce monopoly thresholds in the
gas and water sectors. Clare Spottiswoode referred to this point in her letter
quoted above.
As far as the telecommunication sector is concerned, Tony Prosser points out
that "Government has had a key role in determining the amount of
competition". 193 por example, the government (as opposed to the Director
General of Telecommunications) lifted the ban on the number of
telecommunication licences in 1991.194
The electric industry is the exception here: it is the Director General of
OFFER who has control over the liberalisation of the domestic electricity
market. Why is the electric industry different from telecommunication, gas and
190For more details, see Chapter 6. below.
191Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries and Price Waterhouse: Regulated Industries: The
UK Framework fi996), page 18.
192Sir Ralph Gibson in: R. v. Director General of Electricity Supply, ex parte Scottish Power
(1997), LEXIS, 3 February 1997.
193Tony Prosser, op. cit., page 60.
194Competition and Choice: Telecommunications Policy for the 1990s, Cm. 1461 (1991).
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water ? The introduction of competition did not require legislative action here;
it was within the powers of the Director General of OFFER to reduce the so-
called 'franchise limits' in the licences. Had a statute been required, one may
not rule out that the Parliament would have empowered the Secretary of State
to oversee the liberalisation of the domestic electricity market.
To conclude, the Parliament empowered the Secretary of State to manage the
introduction of competition in the telecommunication, gas and water sectors. The
Directors General ofOFTEL, OFGAS and OFWAT would have been better placed to
carry out this job. Yet the legislator did not trust the regulators. Hence the
liberalisation of utility services remained a political (as opposed to regulatory) issue in
the UK.
(iii) General Directions
The Secretary of State may also give so-called 'general directions' to the Directors
General.
The question here is whether the existence of 'general directions' is a possible threat
to the independence of regulators. Perhaps not and this is for the following reasons:
• Privatisation statutes provide that 'general directions' shall indicate
"considerations to which the Director should have particular regard".195 But there
is no statutory requirement that the regulators must comply with such directions.
The situation would be different if the Secretary of State were entitled to issue
'instructions': Sir Thomas Bingham noted in R. v. Director of Passenger Rail
Franchising, ex parte Save Our Railways and Others (CA), LEXIS, 15
December 1996 that recipients MUST comply with 'instructions'. That is not the
case so far as 'general directions' issued under the privatisation Acts are
concerned: the regulator may disagree with the Secretary of State.
• General directions fit uneasily with general regulatory procedures. It was
mentioned above, that utility regulation is informal (as opposed to legalistic) for
the time being. If the Secretary of State wants a Director General to consider
certain factors, (s)he will not issue 'general directions'. It is more likely that the
regulator will be invited for an informal meeting or for a lunch.
To conclude, compared with the era of nationalisation, 'general directions' are less
important today: such directions (i) do not bind the regulators and (ii) fit uneasily with
the general pattern of post-privatisation regulation.
This is not to say, however, that 'general directions' may be disregarded in analysing
the relationship between ministers and regulators. The idea that the Secretary of State
may 'draw' the attention of the regulator to certain factors is reminiscent of
195See, for example, Section 34(3)(a) of the Gas Act 1986.
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nationalisation (see: point 3.1 (ii) above). If the intention was to break 'the political
link'196, the legislator should have deleted 'general directions' from the statute book.
What points should be summarised here ?
The following words were quoted from Mrs. Beckett, the President of the Board of
Trade in the Preface: the government "need to ensure that the balance between
Ministers and regulators is correct."'97 jhe above discussion has tried to argue that
the balance is certainly NOT correct for the time being. It is the Secretary of State
who holds the ultimate power in regulation. Thus the government may wield political
influence over regulation after privatisation; just as it actually did during the second
phase of nationalisation. It is an open question today whether the proposed review of
utility regulation will help the new government to find the 'correct' balance between
ministers and regulators.
Conclusion
The COLLINS COBUILD dictionary refers to 'nationalisation - denationalisation' to
show that the prefix 'de-' changes the meaning of a verb to its opposite. This Chapter
has tried to argue that denationalisation may not be a perfect example. The discussion
above has tried to show that privatisation may be seen as the continuity of
nationalisation. Two points support that argument:
Nationalisation and privatisation have the same, or very similar, regulatory
principles: price regulation is not set forth under the relevant Acts of Parliament;
utilities are generally obliged to supply consumers; and consumer protection is an
issue of secondary importance. Amendments in technical details (like, timing of
price review is agreed in advance; certain costs may be passed through) benefit
privatised utilities and not their consumers.
Ministers have retained important powers after privatisation: the licensing of
suppliers, the liberalisation of the UK gas, telecommunication and water sectors
are examples. Relations between ministers and regulated utilities will be informal;
negotiation is the name of the regulatory game. Law seems to be kept to the
sidelines.
Hence the editors of COLLINS COBUILD may have to look for a better example
than nationalize - denationalize to demonstrate that the prefix 'de-' changes the
meaning of a verb to its opposite.
196John Moore used this expression in his paper " Why Privatise ?" Privatisation and Regulation -
the UK Experience (1986), page 86.
197House of Commons: Hansard, 30 June 1997, Column 21.
Chapter 2.
Government and Privatised Utilities -
Interference and Competition
In an ideal world the present chapter would be very short or, perhaps, missing
altogether. In an ideal world government interference would be exceptional: the form
and likely direction of such interference would be predictable. Should that be the case,
would a thesis about the UK privatisation policy devote a separate chapter to this
issue?
This is not an ideal world: the British government does interfere with the operation of
privatised utilities. The main point from Chapter 1. is that politicians are the chief
'referees' in the regulatory game. The Secretary of State is the most influential
decision maker; Directors General of the regulatory offices are not truly independent
regulators. Interference via utility regulation is not the full story: government
interference may take a variety of forms. Informal telephone calls, letters addressed to
the CEO of a privatised utility, the power to appoint directors or other officers, the
right to approve certain corporate actions (winding up, disposal of certain assets etc.)
are examples.
The examples listed above may be divided into two groups: (a) Informal channels
(telephone calls, letters, and the like) and (b) Legal instruments (all the other
examples). The scope of this Chapter is limited to group (b): Informal channels will
NOT be discussed below. Furthermore, it should be noted that this Chapter will not
cover all legal instruments: Residual government stakes will be discussed first. Part II.
will deal with (i) the legal standing of 'Golden Shares' in Britain and (ii) the reception
of Golden Shares in Central Europe. Issues concerning the status of government-
appointed directors will be analysed in Part III. Finally, the introduction of
competition in the telecommunication, electricity, gas and water industries will be
analysed in Part IV. This Chapter will not discuss, for example, limits on foreign
shareholdings The reasons for this may be summarised as follows:
Ineffective - If foreign investors are really determined to acquire control,
"limitation on shareholdings" - rules will not bar them from purchasing shares.
The Hungarian gas sector is an example. As will be discussed in Chapter 6.,
Russian gas companies could not bid for Hungarian gas distribution companies at
privatisation: in addition, there are "limitation on shareholdings" - rules in place in
the post-privatisation phase. The intention was to keep Russian gas companies out
from the provision of energy services in Hungary. Yet two years after privatisation
Gasprom, the Russian gas giant, ran two out of five companies. Hence "limitation
on shareholdings" - rules may not work in practice.
Embarrassment - Further problems will follow if "limitation on shareholdings" -
rules are enforced. A company may find it particularly embarrassing "to require
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some foreign holders to sell because the limit had been breached."^ For example,
British Aerospace pic. and Rolls Royce pic. reported that . . some of those
investors who suffered have never renewed their interest."*" Hence "limitation on
shareholdings" - rules may put off both potential and existing investors.
EU law - The legality of "limitation on shareholdings" - rules is subject to some
debate within the EU. The trouble here is that limitation on shareholdings "...
leaves investors frorn^ European Union nations on the same footing as other
overseas institutions." According to the European Commission, this arrangement
is discriminatory and illegal: limits "must be scrapped for all members of the
European Union" . Unfortunately, many EU countries take no notice of what the
Commission is saying: France, Germany, and the UK did introduce "limitation on
shareholdings" rules. There is another point here: it is ironic that certain EU states
refer to the same EU rules when urging Central and Eastern countries to remove
restrictions on foreign investment. It is unclear why EU candidates should comply
with certain rules existing members are welcome to disregard.
To conclude, governments may be advised NOT to introduce "limitation on
shareholdings" - rules: (i) limits may not protect privatised companies from foreign
take-overs; (ii) it is embarrassing to enforce such limits; and (iii) limits on foreign
shareholdings are illegal under EU law. Why did the British, German, French,
Hungarian etc. governments opt for such limits ? The only possible reason is politics:
this thesis tries to steer clear of political arguments. Hence it may be a good idea not
to discuss the issue of "limitation on foreign shareholdings" further here.
Part I.
Residual Government Stakes
The starting point here is that the British government did not intend to retain residual
shares in privatised companies. As a financial journalist put it, residual government
shares "smack of a paternalistic Toryism which is clearly an anathema to free-
marketeers".^ The political intention was to sell the entire share capital of privatisation
candidates, if possible. This policy was by no means restricted to privatisation
candidates operating in the market sector. The government decided not to retain
residual stakes in a number of public utilities (e.g. British Gas pic, the Scottish
electricity companies) and in companies of strategic importance (e.g. British Airports
Authority).
It should be noted, however, that the government held residual stakes in the following
companies:
lrThe Sunday Times, Section 3., page 1., 5 January 1997.
2The Sunday Times, op. cit.
3The Sunday Times, op. cit.
4The Sunday Times, op. cit.
5The Financial Times, November 2 1989.
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Name of company
privatised
Date of first
privatisation
Percentage of
residual stake
British Aerospace pic. February 1981 48.4 percent
Cable & Wireless pic. October 1981 50.6 percent
Britoil pic. November 1982 49 percent
Ass. British Ports pic. February 1983 48.5 percent
British Telecommunication
pic.
November 1984 49.8 percent
Nat.Power/PowerGen pic. March 1991 40 percent
TABLE 4. Residual shares in Britain
Out of the six projects listed above five took place between 1981 and 1984, while the
electricity generators were sold in 1991. Thus the first phase of the British
privatisation programme was the golden age of residual stakes in Britain. By 1995 all
of the above listed stakes were sold off, while no government holdings were retained
in the case of subsequent privatisation projects.^ Hence residual stakes are a piece of
privatisation history in Britain. Yet government-owned shares play an important role
in Europe. As a main rule, European utilities are sold off in two or more rounds:
governments tend to retain majority holdings in privatised companies. Two issues
should be considered here: (i) What are the main reasons for retaining shares after
privatisation ? and (ii) Why did the British government get rid of its shareholdings ?
2.1. Reasons for holding residual stakes
The three most likely reasons for retaining residual stakes are as follows:
(1) Size of privatisation candidate;
(2) Timing of other flotations; and
(3) Desire to retain some control.
Points (1) - (3) will be discussed in turn below.
As to (1).
The unusual size of British Telecommunication pic. was a decisive factor in
H
structuring the telecommunication disposal of 1984. The total value of the
government's shareholding in BT was approximately GBP4 billion. The capacity of
the British financial market for all new equities was estimated to be in the region of
Privatisation International, January 1997, page 21.
The size of telecommunication giants usually has a decisive influence on the structuring of sales.
See, for example, the privatisation of Deutsche Telecommunication; or the sale of the Saudi
telephone company - the Financial Times, May 8 1998.
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8GBP2 billion per annum. Hence at least two business years would have been needed
to purchase up all BT shares. The financial community in London was doubtful about
the capacity of the capital markets to absorb such a huge offering.^ The fixed price
offer of 50.2% of British Telecommunication in November 1984 was meant to reflect
the capacity of the London financial market for new securities.' ®
As to (2)
The sale of National Power pic. and PowerGen pic. was scheduled for early 1991. It
was a period after the flotation of the twelve regional electricity companies (1990) but
before the proposed sale of Scottish Power pic. and Scottish Hydro-Electric pic.
(1991). The government sold all its shareholderings in the electricity companies and
was hoping to offer 100% of the two Scottish companies. Due to practical limitations
on the size of the market for electricity shares, the total disposal of National Power
pic. and PowerGen pic. was out of the question. The decision to offer 60% of each
company was reached with a view to avoiding the early saturation of the market.
As to (3)
Points (1) and (2) do not apply in the case of British Aerospace pic., Cable & Wireless
pic., Britoil pic. and Associated British Ports pic.: these companies were not 'too' big
(unlike BT) and the timing of flotation was not problematic (unlike in the case of the
Scottish electricity companies). Why then did the government opt for partial
privatisation of these companies ? In addition to points (1) and (2) mentioned above,
there is a third argument for creating government shares: it is the intention to retain
some control after privatisation. For example, Stephen Dow argued for the retention
of residual stakes as follows: he claimed in a study that the government should have
retained a shareholding in the electricity sector so as to have some influence over the
running of electricity companies in the transitional period [i.e. between privatisation
(1990/1991) and full liberalisation (1998)].'
Russian privatisation law is another example here. According to Emilia A. Simonelli
and M. Sidney Donica, the Russian government must sell residual shares within three
years from the date of the initial disposal. But this mandatory sale - rule would not
apply (i) if the company privatised is "extremely profitable" or (ii) if the government
8
John Moore: British Privatisation - Taking Capitalism to the People In: H.M. Treasury: Guide to
the UK Privatisation Programme (1993), page 70.
9Ibid, page 60. And also Committee of Public Accounts: Sale of Government Shareholding in
British Telecommunication pic. HC 35 1985-6, page xi.
10In the case of Indonesia, 388m shares were sold in December 1996. According to the government,
the size of the sale was determined by die size of the market. See: The Financial Times, 12
December 1996.
UStephen R. Dow: A Survey of Major Developments in the Post-privatisation phase of UK Gas and
Electricity Supply Industries (1996), pages 59 - 60.
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intends to retain control over the company. " The first rule is self-explanatory; it is
exception (ii) which should be considered in some detail. This point and Stephen
Dow's argument seem to raise the same question:
Does the creation of residual stakes guarantee that the government will 'have some
influence over the running of privatised companies ?
Before trying to answer this question it should be noted that, compared with Britain,
the 'desire to have some control' point is more relevant in Europe. As a rule, the
appetite for post-privatisation control techniques seems to be bigger on the Continent
than in the UK. That would not be a problem itself; but the introduction of different
forms of government interference has not been co-ordinated. As will be argued
below, two or sometimes three control mechanisms co-exist in Europe. In Italy, the
government retained a 52.75% stake in INA, an insurance company, after the first
round of privatisation.13 Partial privatisation seems to be the preferred technique in
France. The government shareholding in Renault was reduced from around 80% to
50% in November 1994. Yet the government refused to comment on full privatisation
of the French car maker.14 The latest privatisation plan from France is again a partial
disposal: an "about 20 %" stake in France Telecom is due to be offered for sale.^3 In
Poland the Ministry of Privatisation intended to sell a minority stake in Fampa, a
manufacturer of papermaking machinery, "for fear that the sale of majority control to
a foreign investor would be politically unpalatable."^ In the Czech Republic, foreign
investors were invited to acquire a 15.15% stake in Stavby Silnic aZeleznic (ZSSZ), a
1 7
construction enterprise, in June 1992. Hence European governments have a
number of residual stakes: do they have 'some influence over the running of privatised
companies ?
Consider the example of MATAV Rt., the Hungarian telecommunication company.
The government approved the sale of MATAV in 1993 on condition that the state
1 8shall retain a majority stake after privatisation. Thus investors were invited to
acquire "a significant minority stake" . Potential bidders indicated that they would be
happy with a minority stake provided that they could acquire certain management
12 • •
Emilia A. Simonelli and M. Sidney Donica: A Guide to Investing in the C.I.S. In: Journal of the
Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union Law Committee, Volume 2., Issue 1.,
Summer/Fall 1997, pages 16 - 64., at 31.
13The Financial Times, 28 and 29 November 1994.
14The Financial Times, 29 November 1994.
15The Financial Times, 11 November 1996. and also The Financial Times, 31 December 1996/1
January 1997.
16Susan L. Rutledge, Martin C. Stewart-Smith, Christina Kappaz, Maziar Minovi: Selling State
Companies to Strategic Investors (1995), page 4.
17Ibid, pages 78. - 79.
18The disposal of a minority stake in national telecommunication companies appears to be a trend all
over the world. For example, an 11 % stake was sold in Singapore Telecommunication in October
1993 (The Financial Times 23 May 1994.); a 25% in OTE in Greece (The Financial Times 14
November 1994.)
19 ....
Anna Canning: Privatisation and Competition in Hungarian Telecommunications (Discussion
Paper in Economics, No. 69/9.) (1996), page 11.
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rights under the shareholders' agreement. While details of the agreement are
confidential, it is understood that the successful bidder, a German - American
consortium, has the right to appoint (i) the chief executive officer and (ii) the director
of finance. To conclude, the Hungarian state retained a majority stake in MATAV
Rt., nevertheless it is the minority shareholder who run the company.
The main point of the MATAV story is that residual stakes do not matter: the fact that
residual stakes have been retained does not necessarily imply that the government will
be able to influence the running of privatised companies. The question is who controls
the board after privatisation: and it is not always the majority shareholder. The
Hungarian telecommunication company is an example. Thus Stephen Dow's
recommendation mentioned above should be treated with caution: the retention of
residual stakes may NOT guarantee that the government will 'have some influence
over the running of privatised companies.
2.2 Problems with residual stakes
As a rule, governments could be notoriously difficult business partners. Nationalised
enterprises in Britain were well aware of the fact that ministerial decisions did not
always follow commercial principles. Investors feared that government shares will be
voted to foster political goals. In connection with the primary offer of British
Telecommunication shares, a senior official from the Treasury summarised the main
concerns of potential investors as follows:
If we had instead offered it [i.e. BT shares] in a number of tranches
buyers would have been uncertain about the way the Government
might use the majority of shares that would have remained in its
hands.20
Hence the dilemma for the Tory government was how to dispel doubts concerning the
voting of residual stakes.
Investors might have expected guarantees under the general principles of Company
law in vain. The starting point here is that H.M. Government was one of the millions
of shareholders after the sale of the first tranche of shares in British Aerospace pic.,
Cable & Wireless pic., and the like. Traditional company law view holds that a
shareholder is free (i) to vote her/his shares in any manner she/he pleases and (ii) to
o i
transfer her/his shares to whosoever she/he pleases." In other words, shareholders
are "entitled to sell their shares, to vote their shares, to take any course they like in
99
general meeting without regard to any other person's right or position." Thus the
20
Committee of Public Accounts: Sale of Government Shareholding in British Telecommunication
pic. HC 35, 1985-6 page 3.
'For a recent discussion of die issue see the speech ofMacDermiott LJ in Russel v. Northern
Bank Development Corporation Ltd. and others [1992] BCLC 431.
22Harman J. in Re Unisoft Group Ltd. (No. 3.) [1994] 1 BCLC 609, at 622.
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government was under no company law duty to consider the interest of private
shareholders.
Investors would have been better protected under American company law. According
to Professor Gower, the US judiciary recognised as early as the 1950s that some
restrictions shall be placed on shareholders' freedom "to exercise their proprietary
rights in any way they like". The idea that "controllers owe fiduciary duties to the
99
minority" is a well-established principle in US company law." While the existence of
fiduciary duties had some influence in British academic circles" , the idea of'fiduciary
duties' owed to fellow shareholders is almost unknown in the UK. Clemens v.
Clemens Bros Ltd. and another [1976] 2 All ER 268 and Estmanco Ltd. v.
Greater London Council (Vac. Ct) [1982] 1 W.L.R. 2 are examples.
(a) Clemens - case
Foster J. ruled in this case that a shareholder was not entitled to exercise her
majority votes in any way she pleased. Her right was declared to be subject to
equitable considerations which might make it unjust to vote her shares in a
particular way.
The individual circumstance of Clemens were unique: the Ms. Clemens was a
majority shareholder and also a director of the company. This case is not a
terribly good reference; it may be easily distinguished. Hence the practical
importance ofClemens is limited.
(b) Estmanco - case
Sir Robert Meggary V.-C. found that the majority may have to consider the
circumstances ofminority shareholders in certain cases. He noted that
Plainly there must be some limit to the power of the majority to
pass resolutions which they believe to be in the best interests of
the company and yet remain immune from interference by the
courts."
Yet Clemens and Estmanco are more the exception than the rule: as was noted above,
the majority of British judges may not acknowledge that 'controllers owe fiducary
duties to the minority'. To conclude then, shareholders do not owe a fiduciary duty to
fellow shareholders under British company law.
23
Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (1992), page 605., footnote 67.
24See, for example. Maw on Corporate Governance (1994), page 8.
25
At 11-H.
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Thus fiduciary duties did not dispel uncertainties about the voting of residual stakes.
Hence the government offered two alternative guarantees: (i) Target Investment Limit
and (ii) Statements of intention. Both of them will be examined in turn below.
(a) Target Investment Limit
0 f\
Five privatisation statutes" empowered the Secretary of State to designate the upper
limit for government shareholding. The limit was to be set as a proportion of the
voting rights exercisable at general meetings. The main rule was that once the initial
limit is set, any new limit must be lower than the one it replaces. The Secretary of
97
State fixed target investment limits by order.
As on so many other occasions in the history of privatisation" , Target Investment
Limits were introduced on an ad hoc basis. The logical approach would have been to
set Target Investment Limits (i) in every partially privatised company (ii) at a level not
less than 25.01%, i.e. investors may not pass extraordinary resolutions without the
consent of the government. Yet this is not what happened in Britain. Out of the seven
companies listed above (see: Table 4.), the legislator did not provide for investment
limits in the case of (i) Cable & Wireless pic., (ii) Britoil pic., and (iii) Associated
British Ports pic. On the other hand, Target Investment Limits were set for companies
which were fully privatised."0 Furthermore, Target Investment Limits were fixed at a
senselessly low level: the government was entitled to retain stakes between 1.32% and
2.13% in the case of the English and Welsh electricity distribution companies."50 So
far as corporate governance is concerned, such a small stake may be ignored.
(b) Statements of intention
The Secretary of State issued two statements of intention in connection with the
future of residual stakes. As a rule, the statements of intention were set forth in a letter
addressed to the Chairman of the company to be privatised. The said letter was
published in the relevant sale prospectus, usually under the heading "Relationship with
HM Government". The wording of the two statements of intention slightly varied
from company to company; the most widely used statements were drafted as follows:
26British Aerospace Act 1980, Telecommunications Act 1984, Gas Act 1986, Electricity Act 1989,
and Coal Industry Act 1994.
27See, for example, Section 54(1) of the Gas Act 1986.
28See, for example, the retention of residual government shares above, or the introduction of
Golden Shares below.
29 • ,
British Gas pic. (Section 54 of the Gas Act 1986), English and Welsh electricity distribution
companies (Section 74 of the Electricity Act 1989).
30SI 1991/1199.
Statement I.
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HM Government does not intend to use its rights as an ordinary
shareholder to intervene in the commercial decisions of [name of
company]. It does not expect to vote its shareholding on resolutions
moved at General Meetings, although it retains the power to do so.^ ^
Statement II.
It [HM Government] will not sell or otherwise dispose of any of its
holding: (except under arrangements for the share bonus) before
[date] "*.... Before any such sales or disposals and the arrangements
therefor are made, HM government will take into account the views of
the Directors of the Company.JJ
Why did the goverment issue these statements ? The number one rule of privatisation
is that investors want to get control. They do not mind how many shares the
government intends to retain PROVIDED that the residual stake will not 'disturb' the
running of privatised companies. The disposal of MATAV, the Hungarian
telecommunication company (see above), is an example: the German - American
consortium was happy with a minority stake: they acquired full management control.
If residual government stakes are retained, investors will not bid for shares unless they
are protected against two 'disturbances': the government would (i) use its shares to
intervene in commercial decisions of the company; and (ii) sell its shares to a third
party. The two statements quoted above were issued to assuage fears by investors
(and their advisors): 'disturbances' (i) and (ii) will not occur.
The UK government took the statements of intention seriously: the Secretary of State
was reluctant to use her/his rights as an ordinary shareholder. But the voting of the
residual shares would have been in the best interest of the privatised company on
certain occasions. The story of British Aerospace pic. is a good example here.
Thorn - EMI initiated merger talks with British Aerospace pic. in May 1984. H.M.
Government held 48.43% of the issued share capital.^ The government tried to
make its position clear the following day. The Secretary of State announced that he
would not interfere; it was up to the other shareholders to make up their minds.
The neutral stance adopted by the government was in accordance with the statements
31
Actual wording from British Telecommunication: Offer for Sale of Ordinary Shares (1984), page
6.
32
The practical importance of setting a target date was emphasised before the Committee of Public
Accounts in connection with the primary offer of BT shares. See: Committee of Public Accounts:
Sale of Government Shareholding in British Telecommunication pic. HC 1985-86 35, page 3.
33
Actual wording from British Telecommunication: Offer for Sale of Ordinary Shares (1984), page
6.
Section 7(5) of the Industry Act 1972 contained a similar provision.
34The Financial Times, 16 May 1984.
35The Financial Times, 17 May 1984.
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o z:
published in the British Aerospace prospectus ; but this attitude created a state of
limbo. After five weeks of hesitation the company rejected the Thorn - EMI offer.
A new predator emerged in June 1985: GEC from the USA started merger talks with
British Aerospace pic. The government emphasized that it would support whatever
decision the company might take. Perhaps a better solution would have been to make
a declaration what the government actually thought about the GEC - BAe merger.
Had the government supported the GEC offer, then the takeover would have been
completed promptly; had the government voted its shares against the merger, the
predator would have had no choice but to back off.
The point here is then that statements of intention created an 'unnatural situation' in
Britain: the statements precluded the government from voting its residual shares. This
policy was not in line with ordinary business practice. As Keith Stuart Esq., the
chairman of Associated British Ports said,
It is an unnatural situation to have a major shareholder which cannot
exercise any control.^
Why would the holder of a 48.43% stake refrain from voting its shares at company
meetings ? Or why should the government pledge not to vote in opposition to a
resolution supported by a majority of directors"^ when it was known in advance that
the board will be dominated by private shareholders ? It is not clear how this
arrangement was supposed to protect the British public. It would have been quite
right for the government to take an active interest in the management of partially
privatised companies. Yet the two statements of intention analysed above barred the
government from voting its residual stake. Although the government was a major
shareholder after the primary offers, full management control slipped into the hands of
private investors. The new shareholders paid for around 50% of the shares but
acquired full control over partially privatised companies. This is one of the reasons
why the secondary offers were not really successful: investors may not wish to acquire
additional shares when they are already in control. The best example here is Britoil
pic: the share price was 215p/share in 1982, while the remaining 49% was sold for
185p/share three years later. 0 The Hungarian state did not do much better from the
sale of the national telecommunication company. The first 30.2% stake of MATAV
36
The Financial Times, February 5 1981. and also Committee of Public Accounts: Sale of shares in
British Aerospace HC 189, 1981-2, page viii.
37The Financial Times, 11 April 1984.
38
Associated British Ports Holding pic.: Offer for Sale of Ordinary Shares (1983), page 18.
39For a brief analysis about the financial results of the British secondary offers see: The Financial
Times, 25 February 1985.
40Her Majesty's Treasury: Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme (1993), page 11., point 51.
See:
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was sold for USD 875m in 1993, but the second tranche of 37% fetched USD 852m
only.41
To summarise, residual government shares did not quite work in Britain. Private
investors held slightly more than 50% of the issued share capital but had full control
over privatised companies. Associated British Ports pic. and British Aerospace pic. are
examples. Unfortunately, foreign governments did not learn from British privatisation
experience: residual stakes have been in Central and Eastern Europe. The disposal of
MATAV, the Hungarian telecommunication company, is an example. The final point
here is that the state was the long-term loser from partial privatisation projects both in
the UK and in Hungary: (i) the government held residual shares but could not really
control partially privatised companies; and (ii) investors paid less for residual stakes
than for shares sold in the primary offers.
It is no surprise then that the Treasury announced in 1984 that the government
4.9
intended to sell its minority holdings in several quoted companies. " This policy was
implemented without delay: the government sold its residual stakes in Associated
British Ports pic. (1984), British Aerospace pic. (1985), and Britoil pic. (1985).
According to The Economist, the UK government held equity shares in thirty three
private sector companies in 1992, out of which only three stakes (British
Telecommunication pic., National Power pic., PowerGen pic.) were of significant
size.4"^ These holdings were privatised in 1993 and in 1995 respectively. No residual
shares were retained in the latest projects (Rail Track pic., British Energy pic.).
According to Privatisation International, H.M. Government holds shares in British
Telecommunication pic. and in Mersey Docks & Harbour Co. at present.44 Thus
residual stakes disappeared in Britain.
Part II.
Golden Shares
As was mentioned above, the British government tried to sell existing stakes from
1984 and did not retain significant residual holdings in newly privatised companies.
The decline of residual stakes coincided with the introduction of a new post-
privatisation control mechanism, the so-called Golden Share. It became the preferred
form of government interference: there were some forty Golden Shares by 1993,4^
The discussion below will attempt to analyse the legal nature ofGolden Shares.
Golden Shares are very simple in principle: instead of holding huge chunks of shares
after privatisation, the state should retain one special share per company only. Rights
41
Anna Canning: Privatisation and Competition in Hungarian Telecommunications (Discussion
Paper in Economics, No. 69/9.), pages 11. and 14.
42The Financial Times, 15 March 1984.
43The Economist, 11 July 1992.
44Privatisation International, January 1997, page 21.
45H.M. Treasury: Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme (December 1993), Appendix F.
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attached to this single share are so defined as to enable the government to intervene
"in appropriate cases to safeguard the national interest".49
The first Golden Share scheme was set up in Amersham International Ltd. in 1982;
more Golden Shares followed soon.4^7 Yet Golden Shares were introduced on an ad
hoc basis in Britain. For example, no Golden Share was retained in the main port
operator (Associated British Ports pic.); but Sealink Ltd., one of the carriers, was
privatised with a Golden Share . Exactly the opposite arrangements are in place in
the air traffic sector: the operator of leading airports (British Airports Authority pic.)
has a Golden Share, but not the main carrier, British Airways pic.
This thesis does not intend to discuss why or why not politicians introduced Golden
Shares; the main question here is how the legal nature of Golden Shares may be
defined.
2.3 Legal nature of Golden Shares under British law
The most important characteristics of Golden Shares are that (a) the holder of this
share may exeicise (b) special rights under (c) certain circumstances. To understand
the legal nature ofGolden Shares points (a) - (c) should be analysed in turn.
Point (a) - The holder of the Golden Share
As a rule, the Golden Share may only be held by the Secretary of State, or another
Minister of the Crown, the Treasury Solicitor or "any other person acting on behalf of
the Crown"49
The personality of the holder of the Golden Share is of paramount importance. It is
up to the competent Secretary of State whether a Golden Share will be voted or not.
Takeovers of privatised companies are the best examples here. The Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry was willing to waive the Golden Share in Jaguar so as to let
Ford to take over the British car manufacturer.^9 Some six years later a new
Secretary of State pointed to the Golden Share in National Power to fight off a
potential bidder.^
To conclude, Golden Shares will always be controlled by a Government agent, usually
by the relevant Secretary of State. The Golden Share will be activated as and when
those influential enough within the government think fit to do so.
46The Financial Times, 15 March 1984.
47 • • •
For example, Bntish Telecommunication pic, VSEL Consortium, British Gas pic., Rolls-Royce
pic., British Airports Authority pic., British Steel pic., the ten English and Welsh water companies,
and each company in the British electricity sector.
48HC 34 1985-6, pages ix - x.
49British Energy: International Offer and UK Public Offer Prospectus (1996), page 128.
50Cosmo Graham and Tony Prosser: op. cit., pages 148 - 149.
51See, Chapter 5., Part I., C., (3) below.
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Point (b) - Special rights
Compared with ordinary securities, Golden Shares carry certain extra rights. Before
discussing what those rights are, it would be useful to make an introductory point
here.
As Professor Gower notes, "the initial presumption of the law is that all shares confer
the same rights and impose the same liabilities.""'" This presumption might be
modified by the creation of different classes of shares. As a rule, different classes may
carry different rights as to (i) dividends, (ii) return of capital on winding up, and (iii)
attendance and voting at company meeting. Traditional business practice held that
preferential treatment as to one of these rights should be granted with the
corresponding reduction in the entitlement to other shareholders' rights. For example,
preference shares paid a fixed dividend "before any dividend is paid on the company's
ordinary shares". But these shares had no votes unless such dividends were in
arrears. Deferred shares carried 'disproportionally large voting rights'"5 but limited
right to dividends. Thus extra-rights (e.g. fixed dividend in the case of preference
shares) counterbalance rights taken away (preference shares - no votes): this is the
'balancing theory'. The diagrammatic presentation of this theory would be as follows:
Preference
share
Deferred
Share
Right to vote NONE Extra
Right to dividend Extra NONE
TABLE: 5.: Balancing theory in the case of Preference and Deferred Shares
Golden Shares seem to challenge the validity of the 'balancing theory'. As a rule,
Golden Shares confer no right (i) to vote nor any other rights at any company
meeting nor (ii) to participate in the capital or profits of the company "except that, on
a distribution of capital in winding-up, the holder of Special [Golden] Share is entitled
to repayment of GBP1 [i.e. the nominal value of the Golden Share] in priority to
other shareholders.""5^ Thus both (i) the right to dividend and (ii) the right to vote
have been taken away: is it to say that the 'balancing theory' may not be applied to
Golden Shares ? Two issues should be considered before answering that question:
1,/ Extra voting rights
The statement that Golden Share carries no right to vote should be qualified here: the
first generation of Golden Shares did have extra voting rights. Hence the first
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generation of Golden Shares was hardly more than a developed version of deferred
shares mentioned above: in certain circumstances the holder of the Golden Share had
disproportionally large voting rights, but no right to dividend. This arrangement was
introduced in the case ofBntoil pic. and Enterprise Oil pic. The relevant provisions of
the Articles of Association may be summarised as follows:
If the holder of the Golden Share had reasonable grounds for believing that a
"relevant person" has obtained or is attempting to obtain control over the board,
(s)he was required to give a written notice to the board. After the delivery of
such notice the holder of the Golden Share
• might call an extraordinary general meeting; and
• at the EGM the Golden Share carried a total number of votes which was
. . . one more than the total number of votes which may be cast on such
poll in respect of all the voting shares which are not registered in the
name of the Secretary of State [i.e. the holder of the Golden Share],^
Similar arrangements applied if a "relevant person" attempted to acquire more
than 50 per cent of the voting rights. But the holder of the Golden Share need
not give notice to the board here: the threat of 'unwelcome' take-over
automatically triggered the special voting rights of the Golden Share.
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The first generation of Golden Shares was a "relatively unsophisticated device".
The British Petrol - Britoil takeover - saga is an example here. As was mentioned
above, the holder of the Golden Share (i) had the right to call an extraordinary
general meeting if Britoil was the target of a takeover bid; and (ii) could outvote
private shareholders at the EGM. Thus the holder of the Golden Share had the right,
among others, to appoint directors to the board of Britoil. The designers of the
Golden Share thought that the company would not be an attractive target if the
predator could not obtain control over the board. While this argument is correct in
principle, it did not quite discourage British Petrol from making a hostile bid for
Britoil. Thus the first generation of Golden Shares did not work well in practice; the
Golden Share did not deter potential predators from making 'unwelcome' bids. This is
why the second generation of Golden Shares was introduced in Britain.
John Moore, the former Financial Secretary to the Treasury, summarised the key
characteristics of the second generation of Golden Shares as follows:
They are always tied to one or more specific provisions in a company's
articles of association; they do not carry voting rights; they do not give
57Britoil: Offer for Sale of Ordinary Shares (1982). Re-printed in The Financial Times, 12
November 1982.
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the government control over a company's activities except in the
specified area; and they confer no right to interfere in management
decisions. But they are an effective way to resolve concern about the
national interest.
The ingenuity of the second generation of Golden Shares is that it has nothing to do
with 'turbo' voting rights.^ The Golden Share constitutes a special class of shares;
the Articles of Association lists certain matters (to be discussed under heading (c)
below) which are deemed to be proposed variation of the class rights attaching to the
Golden Share. The Articles of Association provides that such variations are effective
only with the consent in writing of the holder of the Golden Share. The beauty of the
classic model is that Golden Shares do not outvote private shareholders. This type of
Golden Shares offers a more discreet form of protection: "... certain provisions in the
Articles of Association . . . may not be changed without the specific consent of the
special shareholder."^ Thus the second generation ofGolden Shares may stop things
before they actually happen: certain actions are impossible unless approved by the
holder of the Golden Share in advance. Are extra-rights and rights taken away
balanced in the case of the second generation of Golden Shares ?
2J Repayment in priority to other shareholders
The first comment here is that the repayment of GBP 1 is hardly worth mentioning in
the light of emoluments paid to directors of privatised utilities. Nonetheless, the
provision that the holder of the Golden Share shall be repaid in priority to other
shareholders is a standard term in the Articles of Association of all privatised utilities.
Why was the repayment provision considered to be so important ? Its practical
implications, if any, are limited: the omission of this point would have made no
material difference. The right to be repaid in priority to other shareholders does not
make sense unless one were to accept the 'balancing theory'. The special provision as
to repayment intends to counterbalance the taking away of other shareholder rights,
namely the right to vote and the right to dividends.
To conclude then both the first and the second generations of Golden Shares are
'balanced': the right to dividend has been taken away, but extra rights (first generation
- right to vote; second generation - right to repayment) have been granted to the
holder of the Golden Share. Thus the balancing theory of shareholders' right is
applicable to Golden Shares.
59
John Moore: British Privatisation - Taking Capitalism to the People In: H.M. Treasury: Guide to
the UK Privatisation Programme (1993), page 67.
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Point (c) - Circumstances
Proposed variations of rights requiring the consent of the holder of the Golden Share
fall into two groups. The first group includes matters designed to protect the special
status of the Golden Share. Without the consent of the holder of the Golden Share (i)
provisions in the Articles of Association relating to the Golden Share may not be
amended, removed or altered; (ii) no voting shares may be created or issued with the
exception of shares carrying ordinary voting rights; and (iii) voting rights may not be
varied.
The second group is concerned with (i) strategic issues, like limitation on
shareholding^-, nationality of directors^ and (ii) actual management decisions, like
the appointment of certain company officials , the voluntary winding up of the
company, and the disposal of material parts of assets^. There is an unusual provision
in the Articles of Association of Scottish Nuclear pic.: the transfer out of Scotland of
any of its headquarters' functions is deemed to be a proposed variation of the rights
attached to the Golden Share.^
To conclude the above discussion, the legal nature of the second generation of
Golden Shares may be summarised as follows:
The Golden Share constitutes a separate class of shares carrying no right to vote
or to dividend;
Rights attaching to the Golden Share may only be altered with the consent in
writing of the holder of this share; and
Certain matters listed in the Articles of Association are deemed to be a proposed
variation of the class rights mentioned above.
So far as company law is concerned, these three points are truly important; they
determine the legal nature ofGolden Shares in Britain. The next question is how these
points have been transplanted into foreign legal systems.
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2.4. Reception ofGolden Shares in Hungary
Professor Alan Watson writes in connection with the reception of Roman Law that
. . . ruler or legislature accepting Roman law as a whole or as glossed
as subsidiary law clearly has no precise interest in the political, social,
or economic messages of the individual rules.^
The reception of Golden Shares in Europe shows that the validity of this statement is
by no means restricted to Roman law. A number of European countries adopted
Golden Share-like arrangements over the last decade; but the political message of the
British rules did not come through in every country. The discussion below will be
concerned with the reception of Golden Shares in Hungary.
The privatisation of the Hungarian telecommunication, gas and electricity companies
was depended upon, among others, the introduction of Golden Share-like schemes.
For example, the first tender for the privatisation of the regional gas distribution
companies was called off in 1992. The government told potential investors that post-
privatisation control techniques should be in place before gas companies would be
offered for sale. The privatisation agency was instructed to introduce Golden
Shares.^ Was the reception ofGolden Shares a sound project in Hungary ?
It was certainly not impossible: the reception of the second generation of Golden
Shares did not require any amendment to the Hungarian Companies Act 1988. It
should be recalled that the conclusion above listed three simple points about the legal
nature of Golden Shares in Britain. Thus Golden Shares may be introduced in any
legal system which recognises the following company law principles:
(1) The share capital of a company may be divided into different
classes of shares.
(2) Different classes might carry different rights as to (i) dividends
and/or (ii) votes.
(3) Rights attached to a particular class of shares might not be altered
without the consent of the holders of that class of shares.
The above listed conditions are incorporated in Sections 234., 242., and 283.
respectively of the Hungarian Companies Act 1988. Thus the Hungarian legal system
was ready for the reception of the second generation of Golden Shares. The drafting
of Articles of Associations was also in safe hands: the London-offices of well-known
international law firms advised the Hungarian privatisation agency.^
Alan Watson: Failures of the Legal Imagination (1988), page 136.
68For more details, see Chapter 6., point 2.4.
69For example, Clifford Chance in connection with die privatisation of the Hungarian gas
distribution companies.
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Why was the reception of Golden Shares delayed then ? There are no legal solutions
for political unwillingness. Ministries, public utilities, and trade unions lobbied against
the introduction of Golden Shares in Hungary. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to
analyse all relevant articles, public addresses, or lectures. Two extreme examples will
suffice here:
(i) A senior civil servant stated in a confidential ministerial document that the
Golden Share is a share certificate the edges of which are gold-plated. He
concluded that no such security should be introduced in Hungary.
(ii) The former head of the legal department of the privatisation agency
published a lengthy article in a Hungarian daily paper7® He argued that
Golden Shares may only be introduced upon registration with the Companies
Court. The hidden message of the article was that public utilities should be
wound up and re-registered with Golden Shares: this exercise would have
taken roughly two - three years to complete.
Fiscal considerations smashed opposition to Golden Shares in Hungary. The 1994 -
95 budget provided for HUF 150bn (cc. GBP468m) proceeds from the sale of state-
owned companies. Without the disposal of public utilities this plan was illusory. Hence
the minister responsible for privatisation ordered the acceleration of all major
privatisation projects. As one of the preparatory steps, the Articles of Association of
Hungarian public utilities were amended: Golden Shares were introduced.
But Hungary did not opt for the second generation of Golden Shares. Decision
makers did not learn from British experience: the Hungarian privatisation agency
acted on the understanding that 'turbo' voting rights are indispensable to Golden
Shares. Thus Golden Shares in Hungary appear to be similar to the Britoil - Enterprise
Oil solution. For example, in the case ofMATAV the holder of the Golden Share is
71entitled to 50,000,000,000 votes in certain circumstances.
The main point here is that Hungary adopted that version of Golden Shares in 1995
which had been discarded in Britain in the late 1980s. It is a mystery why Hungary
chose an outdated model; as was noted above, the reception of the second generation
of Golden Shares would have been viable at no extra cost. The above quoted section
from Professor Watson offers a possible explanation: the Hungarian legislator did not
consider the political, social, or economic messages of the British rules on, and
experiences with, the second generation of Golden Shares.
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Part ID.
Government-Appointed Directors
It was noted in Part I. that the government may not control privatised companies
through residual stakes unless boards are packed with government nominees. How
many of them were actually appointed ? Seven government-appointed directors
7 *7
served on the boards of four privatised companies before 1984. ~ Another two were
73
appointed to the board of British Telecommunication pic. Although Cento
Veljanovski claims that a government nominee joined the board of British Gas plc.^,
the prospectus does not mention that the government had the right to appoint a
director. ^ According to the Treasury, none of them holds office as of today7^ Yet
government-appointed directors have not disappeared on the Continent: as a rule, no
utility privatisation project is completed without the appointment of new 'nominee'
directors. Dissimilarities between the Continental and British experience raise the
question: Why did government-appointed directors fail in the UK ? It will be argued
below that they provided important services: government-appointed directors
constituted a communication channel between the government and privatised
companies. Why did not they stay on then ? The second part of the discussion will
attempt to answer that question. It will be argued that the legal foundation of this
institute was fragile under British law: government-appointed directors could not do
what they were supposed to do. The main comparative point is that government-
appointed directors operate in a different legal environment in other European
countries; they are likely to face a more buoyant future there.
2.5 Role ofGovernment-appointed Directors
The first question here is what government-appointed directors were expected to do.
Different departments held different views as to the responsibilities of government-
appointed directors. The Committee of Public Accounts published a special report
• 7' /
about the role and duties of government directors. As far as the role of directors is
concerned, the Report offered two versions:
72British Petroleum pic. (two government appointed directors); Britoil pic. (two); Cable & Wireless
pic. (one); and British Aerospace pic. (two). Source: Committee of Public Accounts: Role and
Responsibilities of Nominee Directors HC 33 1985-6 (incorporating HC 124-i 1984-5), Annex A.
73British Telecommunication: Offer for sale of Ordinary Shares (1984), page 48. and The Financial
Times, 21 September 1984.
74Cento Veljanovski: Selling the State (1987), page 127.
75British Gas: Offer for Sale (1986). Published in: The Financial Times, 25 November 1986.
76Telephone conversation with Privatisation Unit of HM Treasury on 9 November 1996.
77Committee of Public Accounts: Role and Responsibilities of Nominee Directors HC 33, 1985-6,
incorporating HC 124-i, 1984-5,
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(a) Official Version
According to the official version, government-appointed directors were supposed to
help government departments. The Treasury told the Committee of Public Accounts
that government-appointed directors were
to safeguard strategic interests;
to protect the Government's financial interest in a company; and
to provide an independent view of the quality and performance of the company's
Board.78
Representatives of the Treasury also told the Committee that"... the main reason for
appointing nominee directors to companies was to aid the development of those
companies,. . ,".7^ Thus the Treasury assigned two roles to government-appointed
directors: they were expected (i) to assist departments and (ii) to aid companies. As a
matter of fact, these two objectives might not always run in the same direction. It will
be examined below what government-appointed directors could do if the two roles
conflicted.
The main point here is that the official version from the Treasury set forth
contradictory expectations. Government-appointed directors were to serve two
masters (i) the Treasury and (ii) the company at the same time.
(b) Non-official Version
Development agencies presented additional reasons for the appointment of nominee
directors. For example, the Welsh Development Agency told the Committee that its
nominee directors were required to send copies of minutes and agenda of board
meetings to the Agency. The Scottish Development Agency reported that its nominee
directors were expected to inform the Agency of matters of material importance.
Representatives of the Agency met the directors on a regular basis. The Highlands and
Islands Development Board followed similar practices. In short, nominee directors
passed on confidential information and internal documents to the appointing agency.
Did the same function exist in the case of directors appointed by the government ?
The Committee noted that government-appointed directors were expected "to inform
the Government of the companies' trading performance and strategy, thus
supplementing contacts with Board chairmen."8^ The Treasury emphasised in the
Annex to the Memorandum submitted to the Committee that government-appointed
directors
HC 33, 1985-6, incorporating HC 124-i, 1984-5, page vi.
79Ibid, page vi.
80tu-,I •Ibid, page xi.
81
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should seek to ensure that the Government is informed of any
significant developments of interest to it as Government whether as
shareholder, lender or guarantor or more generally.^"
A Permanent Secretary met government-appointed directors on a regular basis to
discuss business matters. The Committee referred to these meetings as "confidential
81discussions with directors" .
The legal problem here lies in the passing on confidential information to the
government. Two issues should be considered here:
(i) Access to information
The Committee of Public Accounts did not investigate what information government-
appointed directors actually passed on to the appointing bodies. It is not clear whether
government-appointed directors were aware of all 'significant developments'. As a
rule, board members may be cut off from information in Britain. It is a standard
practice today that committees (as opposed to full board) make strategic decisions.
Members of Committee X do not have a statutory right to inspect minutes of
proceedings of Committee Y.^ It may not be ruled out that government-appointed
directors happened to be members of 'less important' committees (e.g. Public
Relations Committee), while other committees made strategic decisions. The
government did not stipulate in the Articles of Association that government nominees
must have full access to documents: hence it is questionable whether government-
appointed directors were aware of all major developments within privatised
companies.
Draftsmen of the Fifth Company Law Directive did address this potential problem.
Article 11 (5) of the draft Directive provides that each member of the supervisory
organ or each non-executive director (in the case of two-tier management structure)
are entitled to "examine all reports, documents and information" supplied. Thus had
the Fifth Company Law Directive been in force, government-appointed directors
could not have been cut off from information.
(ii) Disclosure of business information
It is trite law that directors must not disclose confidential or sensitive information to
85third parties. This obligation lingers on after the termination of appointment. The
same rules were applicable to both government- and agency-appointed directors;
hence confidentiality should have been a potential source of concern.
Ibid, Annex C.
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The regional development agencies address this issue as follows. The duty of
confidentiality was waived in a contract between the investee company and the
agency. Financial assistance to investee companies was granted on condition that the
nominee directors were authorised to pass on confidential information to the
appointing bodies.^
It is regretted that no similar arrangements were made in the case of government-
appointed directors: government appointees were not exempted from ordinary
fiduciary duties. They were responsible and liable like any other directors.^ Two
issues follow from this point:
Breach of confidentiality
As was noted above, government-appointed directors were a communication channel
between the government and privatised companies: they were expected to inform the
appointing departments about 'any significant developments'. Strictly speaking,
government-appointed directors were in breach of their fiduciary duties if and when
they passed on confidential information to the government. Unlike agency appointed
directors, government nominees were not exempted from the duty of confidentiality.
Fiduciary duties versus interests of the government
It was not always easy to reconcile (a) fiduciary duties owed to the privatised
company and (b) Treasury interests. Two simple examples may be mentioned here:
(a) The board intends to bring legal action against H. M. Government. The
chairman of the board and the CEO believe that it would be in the best interest
of the company to sue the government. The board is split into six against six; it
is the government-appointed director's turn to cast her/his vote. How shall
(s)he vote ?
(b) The board of a privatised company intends to take the company's banking
business to Switzerland. The board believes that it would be in the best interest
of the company to use Swiss banks in the future. Shall a government-
appointed director inform the Treasury about this proposal ?
The law may be summarised briefly: the Privy Council ruled in Kuwait Asia Bank
EC. v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd. [1991] 1 AC 187. that nominee
directors are bound to ignore the interests and wishes of the appointing body. Lord
Lowry underlined that nominee directors "... could not plead any instruction from
the bank [i.e. the appointing body] as an excuse for breach of their fiduciary duties . .
II
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H.M. Treasury came to the same conclusion in a House of Commons paper. The
Treasury argued that
Government Directors have the same general responsibilities under the
common law and under the Companies Act (whether those of Great
Britain or Northern Ireland) to the Company for the control and
management of its business as other directors, and must exercise their
best judgement in the interest of the company. They are not the
Government's delegates on the Boards on which they serve; their
duties as director are owed to the company and not to the Government
and if a nominated director were ever to be in breach of these duties it
would not be an answer that his motives were public spirited and
justified in terms of some wider public or national interest as defined
by the Government.^
The main point from the Kuwait Asia Bank - case and from the Treasury document is
the same: government-appointed directors should ignore the interest and wishes of the
appointing body. There is a paradox here: government directors are encouraged to
disregard the interests of the government. What solutions are available ?
2.6. Potential Solutions
Professor Gower makes the following comment in connection with fiduciary duties:
It is often stated that directors are trustees and that the nature of their
89
duties can be explained on this basis.
If fiduciary duties arise from the fact that directors are taken as trustees*^, the conflict
between duties and wishes would not arise if the 'trustee' analogy were abandoned.
Or, alternatively, the duties of 'trustees' could be modified in the case of nominee
directors. Professor Gower seems to support the latter option; however experiences
from abroad suggest that a lot may be said for the former.
Gower solution
Professor Gower argues that directors appointed by a particular class "shall pay
special attention to the interests of that class whether that be of members or
creditors.He refers to the Ghana Companies Code 1973 (Act 179) which reads as
follows:
Ibid, Annex C.
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In considering whether a particular transaction or course of action is in
the best interests of the company as a whole, a director, when
appointed by, or as a representative of, a class of members, employers
or creditors, may give special, but not exclusive, consideration to the
interests of that class.
The draft EU Fifth Company Law Directive recommended a similar solution. Article
21q(2) of the draft Directive provided that
All the members of the administrative organ shall carry out their functions
in the interest of the company, having regard to the interest of the
shareholders and the employees.
The 'special interest' approach seems to be unsatisfactory: this solution merely restates
reality. Presumably it was never a secret that government-appointed directors did give
special consideration to the interests of the government. The Gover solution does not
explain how the duties versus interests controversy should be resolved.
Two alternative solutions would present themselves on the Continent.
Two-tier solution
Government-appointed directors may be placed in a supervisory board - style body.
Supervisory board members are not involved in day-to-day management, their main
duty is to monitor the development of the company. The advantage of this option is
that (i) the trustee concept would remain intact in the case of executive directors, but
(ii) government-appointed directors would be discharged from some of the "legal
constraints" within which nominee directors operate.^
There is a lot to be said for the introduction of a two-tier board system. As far as
government directors are concerned, the main argument is that membership on
supervisory boards would be an excellent post for senior civil servants. Delegates
from ministries and, more recently from regulatory bodies, may harness working
relations between the company and the competent ministry: they also report back to
the government on financial circumstances of the company.
The idea of two-tier board was incorporated in the draft Fifth Company Law
Directive. The Commission argued for the introduction of supervisory boards as
follows:
The coexistence of people with totally different responsibilities in a
single administrative body is no longer consonant with the
requirements ofmodern management.^
Ibid, page 556.
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Article 3(1) of the draft Directive provided that EU-based companies above a certain
size shall be managed by a management organ under the supervision of a supervisory
organ. Yet British opposition to this Directive left little hope for the early introduction
of supervisory boards: British companies will have no two-tier management system in
the foreseeable future. Hence this proposal is likely to remain a theoretical option.
No vote solution
France offers another solution. Under the French Privatisation Act of 1993 the holder
of the Golden Share has the right to appoint one or two representatives to the boards
of companies to be privatised. These government-appointed directors attend board
meetings, take part in the proceedings, but have no voting rights.^ The French
solution seems to offer the best of both worlds: (i) government-appointed directors
are members of the boards and can influence the decision making process; but (ii)
having no voting rights, they are not liable for board resolutions passed.
The UK did not follow the French lead. As a rule, government nominees could vote
in Britain. For example, the Articles of Association of British Telecommunication pic.
contained the following provision:
... In the absence of some other material interest, the Government-
appointed Directors may vote in respect of any resolution concerning
any matter in which the Crown may be interested or to or in which a
Government-appointed Director may be a party or be interested on
behalf of the Crown.
Yet voting rights had a mixed record in Britain. As a rule, government-appointed
directors could not have intervened at board level successfully: they were in minority
on the boards of privatised companies. There were only two government directors on
the fourteen-member board of British Telecommunication pic. Hence government-
appointed directors could not outvote non-government members of the board.
Actually, government-appointed directors may exert influence over privatised
companies even though they have no voting right. For example, nine government-
appointed directors served on the board of San Miguel, a beer-based conglomerate, in
the Philippines. When a bitter boardroom battle erupted between 'ordinary' and
government-appointed directors in 1988 the latter refused to sign San Miguel's annual
report.^ Thus government-appointed directors could delay the approval of the
annual report without using their voting rights.
Meredith M. Brown and Giles Ridley (eds): Privatisation: Current Issues (1994), page 114.
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To conclude, government nominees may have some control over the running of
privatised companies even though they have no right to vote.
Three potential solutions have been outlined above. Under the Gower - solution
fiduciary duties would remain but would be modified in the light of "special, but not
exclusive" considerations. The second solution advocated the introduction of a two-
tier management system. The last solution is the reception of the French model.
Government-appointed directors would have no voting rights, but would influence the
decision making of the board indirectly.
Further options may be listed, of course. But it is quite unnecessary to search for
potential solutions so far as the UK is concerned: government-appointed directors
disappeared in Britain. The Articles of Association of privatisation candidates
provided that the government had the right to appoint directors provided that H.M.
Government held a certain percentage of voting rights. For example, the government
had the right to appoint two non-executive directors to the board of Britoil pic. "so
long as H.M. Government holds more than 35% of the voting shares of the
Company."^' As was mentioned in Part I., residual government holdings were
privatised. After the sale of British Petroleum, Britoil, Cable & Wireless, British
Aerospace and British Telecommunication etc. stakes the government could not
satisfy the condition mentioned above. Hence the government lost the right to appoint
directors to the boards of privatised companies in Britain.
But contrary developments take place on the Continent: government-appointed
directors serve on the boards of privatised companies. According to a study from the
United Nations, Turkey and Portugal are especially keen to delegate "State-appointed
10?directors". As will be discussed in Chapter 6., the Hungarian government-
appointed a director to the supervisory board of each privatised utility company.
It is easy to see why this institute is flourishing in Europe. The two tier company
management system is ideal for government-appointed directors: being members of
the supervisory board they monitor the performance of privatised companies, but do
not make executive decisions.
The final point here is then that, compared with Britain, government-appointed
directors work in a more favourable legal environment on the Continent. Subjected to
British company law doctrines (i.e. (i) fiduciary duties owed to company; (ii) no two-
tier management system) government directors could not operate successfully. As
Colin Scott argues, the inactivity of government-appointed directors
Britoil pic: The Financial Times, 12 November 1982.
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. . . combined with their duty to act in the best interest of the company,
rather than of a particular shareholder, has meant that this device has
had little perceptible impact.^
Yet this form of government interference has a brighter future in Europe:
government-appointed directors will stay on the board of privatised utilities.
Part IV.
A Time to Compete
While denationalisation and nationalisation have many regulatory principles in
common (see Chapter 1. above), they hold diametrically opposing views about
competition. To put it bluntly, nationalisation did not believe in competition, while the
post-privatisation era is the age of liberalisation in Britain. The discussion below will
explain this point in some detail.
Although it may sound absurd today, the designers of nationalisation blamed
competition for the poor performance of public utilities. As David Coombes writes, "it
was strongly believed that in most respects competition was harmful in the industries
nationalized."^^ For example, a reader of The Economist argued in 1947 that the
"greatest wastage of private industry arises from separate undertakings having to
compete with each other1', and concluded that both gas and electricity must be "on the
national balance sheet". Few would agree with this statement today. But it should
be recalled how the electricity and gas sectors looked like when the sentences quoted
above were drafted. There were 505 electricity undertakings^ and, as was noted in
Chapter 1., over 100 electricity tariffs were charged. According to The Economist, the
distribution side of electricity "was a patchwork which in some parts of the country
looks like a crazy quilt."^ Gas was even a 'crazier quilt': 269 local authorities, five
joint boards, 509 independent companies and 264 undertakings under holding
company control operated.^ Some gas companies supplied a handful of customers
only, while the biggest, Gas Light and Coke Company, controlled over 10% of the
UK market. Both industries were earmarked for re-organisation in the 1930s. As The
Economist reported,
In the decade before the war there were several sets of proposals, of
varying degrees of authority, for the grouping of "authorised
undertakers", and the debate went on during the war
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Thus the reform of the gas and electricity sectors had been on the agenda before the
war broke out: war-damage was not the principal reason for reorganisation in the
electric and gas industries. But proposals were not implemented before or during the
war and the structure of these industries remained unchanged. Hence hundreds of
electricity and gas suppliers operated in the post-war era. Both the Labour and the
Tory parties accepted that some 'co-ordination of the fuel and power industries'11®
was desirable.
It remains a theoretical question how the Tories would have interpreted the term 'co¬
ordination'; the Labour party won the elections in 1945. The incoming government
believed that 'co-ordination' meant the creation of monopolies. The theoretical case
for the 'monopolisation' of utilities was set forth in the writings of a prominent party
member, Mr. Herbert Morrison. It is well known that Mr. Morrison argued as early as
1933 that independent public corporations (point A.) must be the monopoly
suppliers (point B.) of public services. 111 It is less well known, however, that the
Labour party did not actually agree with both points. It was argued in Chapter 1. that
point A. did not reach the statute book: public corporations were not run at arm's
length from the government and their financial independence was notional. As David
Coombes remarked in 1971,
The distinction recommended by Herbert Morrison between 'general
policy' and 'day-to-day administration' has never been maintained in
practice.112
It was point B. of the Morrison-model, i.e. monopoly suppliers, which the British
legislator quite liked. It is well known that the 1945-1950 Labour government "sought
to take whole industries into public ownership and to set up some form of centralized
organization."11"1 Coal, gas, electricity supply, railways and steel were 'monopolised'.
The following two points should be considered to appreciate why the Labour
government wanted to create monopolies:
(i) Monopoly is beautiful
Mr. K. E. Boulding published an article in the August 1945 edition of The
Quarterly Journal ofEconomics under the title 'In Defense ofMonopoly'. He
argued that there is an economic justification for monopoly: monopoly is a
method to miard a business enterprise against the destructive effects of
deflation.11 The idea that monopoly may be established to rescue an industry
from decay had many supporters in Britain. For example, the Heyworth
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Committee reported in 1945 that the existing structure of the gas industry was
likely to restrict further progress. The Committee advocated the compulsory
acquisition of gas undertakings by the state arguing that
no voluntary process (of integration) is likely to be sufficiently
speedy to satisfy present and future requirements.'
According to Sir Christopher Foster, the owners or operators of electric
undertakings also wanted to "achieve greater economies of scale" via
amalgamation.'"3 Politicians agreed: The Economist commented in
connection with the Electricity Bill 1947 that
... the case for larger units of production and distribution and
a greater centralisation of control and technical management is
widely agreed.
1 1 O
The Bill's central theme was "generally accepted by all parties." Thus
economists and politicians found themselves in happy tandem in the mid-
19403: national or regional monopolies must be introduced in the electric and
gas industries.
(ii) Monopoly and ministerial control
The Labour government had a practical reason for the 'monopolisation' of the
electric and gas industries. As was mentioned above, the Labour party was not
enthusiastic about the idea of 'arm's length' relationship between 'sponsoring'
departments and industries. Ministers wanted to have some control over the
running of public corporations. Yet controlling 505 electricity and 1,046 gas
companies might be a time consuming business. To give a very simple
example: had the minister intended to instruct each gas company not to
increase tariffs before the passage of the Gas Act 1948, he should have signed
and dispatched over one thousand letters. Thus the patchwork of electric and
gas industries was a barrier to effective ministerial control. As Lord Brand
remarked
. . . we are all getting day by day more aware of the difficulties
of extending Government control and planning over the vastly
complex structure of our industry, . . .
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As a rule, the more complex structure an industry has, the more time and
energy would be needed to keep it under direct ministerial control. As far as
the ministry was concerned, reorganisation was a cost-saving exercise: the
setting up of monopolies was expected to reduce the future cost of
'supervising' electric and gas undertakings.
The 'Monopoly is beautiful' and the 'Monopoly is easier to control' arguments bore
fruits: the Electricity Act 1947 and the Gas Act 1948 created local monopolies.
Undertakings were merged into fourteen electricity and twelve gas area boards. The
other two branches of public utility services were also monopolised:
Telecommunication was re-organised as a national monopoly earlier (Telegraph Act
1869), the water services much later (Water Act 1973). To conclude, national
(telecommunication) or local (electricity, gas and water) monopolies provided utility
services in Britain.
The classic recipe for utility nationalisation looks like as follows:
Enterprise Cake
serves millions ofcustomers
1 90
Preparation time: some months (depending on parliamentary time)
Ingredients:
Utility industries;
Parliamentary majority; and
Political propaganda to decorate.
Method:
• Take the telecommunication, electricity, gas or water sector;
• Create some area Boards;
Pour one industry into one (telecommunication), fourteen (electricity),
twelve (gas), or ten (water) Boards and let them rise for some decades.
Serving suggestions:
Give a piece of cake to everybody who requests one;
Only you may prepare 'Enterprise Cake'.
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Whether a different 'Method' is needed to prepare 'Privatisation Cake' will be
examined in Chapter 4.; the discussion below will concentrate on 'Serving
suggestions'.
'Serving suggestions' are concerned with the so-called Social Contract. It may be
useful to define what this term means.^
Utility enterprises operated as truly natural monopolies after nationalisation: the state
acquired complete monopoly in the telecommunication, electricity, gas and water
1 99
sectors. As a rule, area boards were de facto monopoly suppliers: no other
undertakings offered utility services to the general public in the UK. The
telecommunication and gas suppliers were also de hire monopolies: the Post Office
Act 1969 and the Gas Act 1972 provided that British Telecommunication and the
British Gas Corporation had the exclusive privilege of running telecommunication
systems or of supplying natural gas in Britain. Had the Post Office (later British
Telecommunication) or British Gas Corporation selected new customers on the basis
of some economic criteria ("cherry picking"), who would have supplied customers
whose request for supply was refused ? Hence monopoly came with the requirement
that Boards "had to provide a service to all" (Universal Services). As a rule,
nationalised enterprises had statutory monopoly status, but were expected to discharge
social obligations, including the obligation to provide universal services (Obligation
to supply). This was the original model of Social Contract: statutory privileges, most
important of all, monopoly status in exchange for the obligation to provide
Universal Services.
The point here is that competition was inconsistent with the original model of Social
Contract. Nationalisation was not a pro-competition policy. As Anthony Ogus
remarks,
... a degree of scepticism of the merits of competition developed,
particularly in relation to water and gas, as the duplication of facilities
funded by major capital outlays and often with surplus capacity, was
perceived to be wasteful.
It was mentioned above that nationalisation created (un)natural monopolies in the
telecommunication, electricity, gas and water sectors. There was no competition: a
customer could pot choose which telecommunication, electricity, gas or water board
should supply her/his home. Only one supplier operated per region (electricity, gas
and water) and there was only one telecommunication enterprise in the UK. Thus
customers had no choice after nationalisation. However (s)he could take it for granted
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that (s)he would get a supply upon request (obligation to supply). This is what
'Serving suggestions' are about: only nationalised Boards may prepare 'Enterprise
Cake' (statutory monopoly); but the Boards must give a piece of cake to everyone
(Universal Services).
The role of competition in the utilities sector changed fundamentally after
privatisation: the telecommunication, electricity, gas and water services were
liberalised. What is the reason for referring to liberalisation in this chapter ?
Liberalisation is an example of government interference. As Professor Prosser points
out, "... the government has had a key role in determining the amount of
competition" in the utilities sector. Indeed, it was the Secretary of State (as
opposed to the regulators) who phased in competition in the telecommunication, gas
and water sectors. This point will be explored further below.
As a rule, the Telecommunications Act 1984, the Gas Act 1986, the Electricity Act
1989 and the Water Act 1989 did not specify how many licensees shall provide utility
services after privatisation. Hence the government determined the number of licences,
authorisations, appointments [hereinafter: licences]. Two procedures were used in
Britain:
(i) Negotiation
As was mentioned in Chapter 1., the right to issue the initial licences was reserved for
the Secretary of State under the privatisation Acts. The post-privatisation structure of
the telecommunication, gas, electricity and water industries was settled in negotiations
between the government and the successor companies to the nationalised boards.
Important concessions were made during this process to guarantee the success of
utility flotations. The best example is the telecommunication sector. Having licensed
British Telecommunication Pic. and Mercury Telecommunications Ltd., the
government pledged not to issue further licences until 1991. The official reasons for
maintaining a 'duopoly' in telecommunication were that (i) British Telecommunication
would need some time to adjust to market conditions and (ii) Mercury should be
protected from competition for an initial period. This thesis is not concerned with the
validity of these arguments. The point here is that the Telecommunications Act 1984
did not envisage that only two companies will be licensed after privatisation: the
government decided that only BT and Mercury might offer telecommunication
services to the public. The 'duopoly' - policy had no statutory foundation whatsoever;
but this policy blocked the liberalisation of the telecommunication services for a
number of years in Britain.
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(ii) Delegated power
The Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992 delegated important competition
issues to the Secretary of State in the (a) gas and (b) water industries.
(a) Gas industry
It is well known that British Gas pic. had a statutory monopoly to supply premises
taking less than 25,000 therms per annum after 1986. Section 8A(1) of the Gas Act
1986, as amended under the 1992 Act, provides that the Secretary of State may
modify or remove the '25,000 therm limits'. Such limits are referred to as the
'monopoly threshold' in the gas sector. Such powers were used in 1992 to modify the
25,000 therm limits to 2,500 therms in 1992 The 'monopoly threshold' is due to
be abolished by 1998.
(b) Water industry
Similar arrangements apply in the water industry. The Competition and Service
(Utilities) Act 1992 allowed "inset appointments to be granted not only for green field
sites but also for sites supplied with 250 megalitres (1 megalitre = 220,000 gallons) or
1 ^8
more water a year." The Secretary of State may reduce this threshold at any time.
While the idea of increased competition is generally welcome, it should be noted that
statutory powers concerning competition in the gas and water industries should have
been delegated to OFGAS/OFWAT. It is unfortunate that the regulators seem to have
no control over such an important issue as the modification of the 'monopoly
threshold'. The Secretary of State is under no obligation to consult the Director
General of OFGAS/OFWAT prior to modifying the currently applicable
therm/megalitre limits.
The main point here is that the introduction of competition in the gas and water
sectors is a political (as opposed to regulatory) issue in Britain. The Secretary of State
may modify the 'monopoly threshold' as and when (s)he thinks fit to do so: regulators
are not decision-makers so far as the liberalisation of gas and water services are
concerned. It is alarming: the opening up of telecommunications, electricity and gas
networks to competition raises important regulatory issues. Most important of all,
liberalisation challenged the original model of Social Contract: basic principles, like
(a) universal services and (b) statutory monopoly, have been re-defined recently. The
discussion below will discuss this process in detail.
SI 1992/1751: The Gas (Modification of Therms Limits) Order 1992.
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(a) Universal Services
As a rule, Universal Services were never universal; the obligation to provide services
to all was subject to statutory exceptions. Dunn J. introduced a non-statutory
exception in Woodcock v. South West Electricity Board [1975] 1 W.L.R. 983:
supply obligations do not extend to unlawful occupiers. A request for supply might be
refused if, and only if, it failed to satisfy a two-tier test: the request for supply must be
reasonable; and the provision of services must meet certain conditions which varied
from industry to industry. For example, British Telecommunication could legitimately
refuse a request for supply if it was impracticable or not reasonably practicable to
provide telecommunication service*"^; British Gas Board was obliged to give a
1 OA
supply of gas if it was economical to do so ; while Scottish electricity boards were
to provide electricity services so far as it was practicable *J' Thus different let-out
clauses applied in different industries.
Privatisation would have been an ideal occasion to reconsider whether Universal
Service obligation should be qualified after the disposals; and if yes, whether the
legislator should use the same vague terms. But neither of these points received much
attention: the new gas and telecommunications Acts simply repeated the relevant
provisions of the nationalisation statutes. As was mentioned in Chapter 1., the same
term ('economical') qualifies the obligation to supply under the Gas Act of 1948 and
of 1986; and the same conditions ('impracticable or not reasonably practicable')
appear in the British Telecommunications Act 1981 and in the Telecommunications
Act 1984. These provisions were also mirrored in the licences issued to British Gas
pic. and British Telecommunication pic. respectively. A new qualification was
introduced in the electricity industry: 'practicable' was replaced with the 'reasonable in
all the circumstances' condition.* "To conclude, the idea of Universal Services and
the historical limits to the provision of such services "have in general been carried into
privatization."*"*"*
Thus the obligation side of Social Contract did not change much after privatisation.
Both nationalised and privatised utilities shall supply customers on request; the
ownership of telecommunication, electricity, and gas companies is irrelevant to their
being obliged to provide Universal Services. The obligation to supply is subject to the
same exceptions under nationalisation and privatisation Acts. But profound changes
happened as far as privileges of the utility companies were concerned.
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(b) Farewell to monopoly
Statutory privileges arising from the original Social Contract were first altered under
the Telecommunications Act 1984. A new supplier, Mercury Communications Ltd.,
started to run telecommunication services as from 8 November 1984. Similar
developments happened in the gas and electricity sectors: alternative suppliers were
licensed under the Gas Act 1986 and the Electricity Act 1989. Competition between
privatised utilities and new entrants was limited immediately after privatisation. British
Telecommunication pic. had only one major competitor in 1984; while the newly
licensed energy companies were authorised to supply certain groups of customers: i.e.
those consuming more than 25,000 therms of gas a year (monopoly threshold) or
having a peak electricity demand greater than 1 MW (franchise limit). The historical
importance of this embryonic competition is that after privatisation British
Telecommunication pic., British Gas pic. and the regional electricity companies had
less privileges than their nationalised predecessors: they were perhaps de facto but
certainly not de hire monopolies. Thus one condition of Social Contract was gone:
the privilege of statutory monopoly was abolished. Was the other condition (social
obligations) also adjusted 9
As far as obligations are concerned, the main provisions of the new Social Contract
may be summarised as follows:
After privatisation British Telecommunication pic., British Gas pic. and the
regional electricity companies retained the obligation to supply;
With the exception of electricity, the legislator did not amend the terms of the
supply obligation: privatised utilities and their nationalised predecessors had the
same 'excuses' to refuse a request for supply; and
New licensees were not saddled with supply obligations. The licence issued to
Mercury Communications Ltd. did not include the Universal Telecommunication
Services conditionNew market players need not bother about Social
Obligations in the gas and electricity industry; the franchise limit/monopoly
threshold barred them from supplying low user, high cost customers.
Economists seem to be content with this arrangement. They argue that the above
outlined rules intend to forge competition and the incumbent suppliers have great
advantages "which do not offset the disadvantage of facing universal service
obligations" This thesis does not discuss the validity of these arguments. It simply
notes that privatisation statutes replaced the original model of Social Contract
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(monopoly rights in exchange for the obligation to provide Universal Services) with
Social Contract No. 2. (no statutory monopoly hut obligation to supply). The main
point here is that rights and obligations do not seem to be balanced after privatisation:
the privilege had been taken away (no monopoly rights); but the obligation remained
intact (see point A./ above). Will a liberalised market re-balance rights and
obligations?
Future ofSocial Contract
Will liberalised markets have a Social Contract ? It is generally presumed that free
markets would need no such contract. Some commentators concluded from this
1
presumption that the obligation to supply may be abolished : such obligation would
be "anomalous with the competitive market" and would distort competition.^^
Professor Prosser dissented in an article published in the Utilities Law Review. He
argued that (i) "... social dimension to utility regulation has become absolutely
central to regulatory performance and credibility." and (ii) "... relationship between
privatisation, regulation, and the provision of what are still widely seen as public
services with a social dimension will be a key question of regulation in the next few
years."^ Thus two views may be observed in the literature: (a) Demise of Social
Contract: the obligation to supply may be abolished, and (b) Rise of Social Contract:
the future of supply obligations will be the key question ofutility regulation.
Regulators did not stay aloof from the debate concerning the future of Social
Contract. It is unfortunate that OFTEL, OFFER, and OFGAS do not have a uniform
approach: the three offices seem to advocate three different views as to how Social
Contract No. 2. should be amended.
Telecommunications
The Director General of OFTEL does not intend to re-draft Social Contract No. 2.
until 1999 at the earliest. Don Cruickshank argues in a recently issued discussion
paper that "the current net cost involved in the provision of universal service in the
UK is not proven and does not justify setting up a universal service funding
mechanism in the short term." The government agrees with the regulator: DTI
told the Select Committee on European Legislation that "the cost to BT and Kingston
Communications ofmeeting their universal service obligation is likely to [be] very low
or of a de minimis nature. As a result it is possible that the UK may choose not to set
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up a universal service funding scheme in the immediate future."^ Thus Universal
Service obligation, and its financial burden, if any, are to remain with British
Telecommunication pic. for the time being.
To conclude, rights and obligations are not balanced in the telecommunication sector
after liberalisation: British Telecommunication pic. has no monopoly rights but must
provide Universal Services. Yet no new Social Contract will be drawn up here in the
near future; according to OFTEL there is no undue financial burden on BT arising
from Universal Services obligation.
Electricity Industry
As was mentioned above, second tier licensees are not subject to statutory supply
obligations for the time being. After some hesitation OFFER proposed to modify
Social Contract No. 2. in the electricity sector: similar obligations will apply to the
second tier suppliers as presently apply to public electricity suppliers after 1998.
Condition 22. of the draft Standard Second Tier Electricity Supply Licence requires
1 A O
the licensee to supply domestic customers on request. As far as the financing of
Universal Services is concerned, OFFER seem to be in complete agreement with
OFTEL: no action is necessary for the time being. According to the Director General
of OFFER, the public electricity suppliers should meet the costs of Social Services
until 1998. The Office is currently considering what financing regime shall be in place
after that date: the preferred solution seems to be the introduction of a small levy
which would be charged on customers.
Thus proposed changes in the electricity sector seem to echo the original principles of
Social Contract: rights and supply obligations shall be balanced out. If second tier
suppliers were to supply any customer they have to shoulder social obligations.
Gas Industry
In the case of the two industries mentioned above, the regulators attempt to adjust
Social Contract No. 2. to the needs of liberalised markets; it is the legislator who has
set out new social arrangements in the gas sector. While the basic principle is the same
here as in the electricity sector (i.e. each licensee must supply customers on request), a
unique system is emerging under the Gas Act 1995.
(1) Statutory obligation to connect
Public Gas Transporters are obliged to connect premises under Section 4 of the Gas
Act 1995. Compared with the 1986 statute, the scope of this obligation is broader in
two respects: (i) Transporters are to connect any premises (1986 Act: premises
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which are (a) situated within 25 yards from the main or (b) connected to any such
main) if the service pipe is supplied and laid, or proposed to be supplied or laid, by the
owner or occupier; and (ii) a customer may request a supply of gas up to 75,000
therms (1986 Act: up to 25,000) per annum. The obligation to connect is subject to
the usual two-tier test, i.e. (a) reasonable request and (b) whether it is economical to
supply.^ But, and this is the main point here, the Gas Act 1995 does not provide
for a statutory obligation to supply customers.
(2) New exceptions
The obligation to supply does not appear in the legislation: it is Condition 2. of the
Standard Conditions of the Gas Suppliers' Licences which require a licensee to supply
every potential domestic customer which is connected to a relevant main. The
Standard Conditions set a new exception to the obligation to supply. A licensee is not
obliged to supply at new premises "if and so long as to do so would significantly
prejudice its ability" to supply existing domestic customers.'^ This new qualification
does not appear to be more down-to-earth than the old (a) reasonable request and (b)
economical to supply - conditions. The Director General of OFGAS will be in an
unenviable situation when she will be called to interpret terms like 'prejudice' and
'ability'.
(3) Financing ofUniversal Services
As was mentioned above, OFTEL and OFFER do not seem to have definite plans as
to how Universal Services shall be financed in the future; both Directors General will
review the current arrangement (i.e. the costs of Universal Services fall on British
Telecommunication pic. and the public electricity suppliers) in 1999 and in 1998
respectively. Out of the three Directors General it was the DG of OFGAS who took
the plunge: the Standard Conditions of the Gas Suppliers' Licences revolutionized the
financing of social obligations. If certain conditions are met, as determined under
Condition 6(2) of the Standard Conditions of the Gas Suppliers' Licences, a licensee
may make a Special Customer Payment Claim. Unless the Secretary of State or the
Director General of OFGAS would decide that the claim is unjustified, the Public Gas
Transporter will (i) make a payment to the supplier and (ii) in turn increase its charges
for the conveyance of gas. This arrangement will not be operative before 1999.
To conclude, rights and social obligations will be re-balanced in the gas industry: each
licensee will have (i) the right to supply any customer and (ii) the obligation to
provide Universal Service. A special funding scheme is due to be introduced in the
British gas industry to finance the costs ofUniversal Services.
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(c) The European dimension
If the three above mentioned regulators do not agree on the financing of Universal
Services in Britain, do the fifteen Member States of the EU have a better prospect of
forming a uniform position on the same matter 9 Not really. The first and most
important problem at the European level is that "neither the concept nor the scope of
the [public service] obligations is in any way harmonized between the Member
States." A prolonged debate about the future of the Social Contract could thwart
the liberalisation of the EU telecommunication, electricity, and gas markets; thus the
relevant Directives try to say as little as possible about public service requirements.
For example, the first telecommunication Directive (90/388/EEC) was reticent about
social obligations. Principles of Universal Services were set out eventually in a
Council Resolution (94/C 48/01); and it was Directive 96/19/EC which laid down
rules in connection with the financing of Universal Services. The main point of this
Directive is that the National Regulatory Authority is to determine whether a
Universal Service financing scheme is required or not. If such a scheme is introduced
it must operate in accordance with Community Law; the Commission is to review the
financing schemes no later than 1 January 2003. As was mentioned above, OFTEL
decided that Universal Service funding is not required in the UK; thus Community
Law on financing schemes does not apply to British telecommunication operators.
The recently passed electricity Directive (96/92/EC), and the draft natural gas
Directive (COM(93) 643 final) do not discuss Social Obligations in detail. Although
the Economic and Social Committee stressed that "the 'public service' obligations of
these sectors cannot be overlooked" the documents mentioned merely declare
that Member States may impose on distribution companies an obligation to supply.
Hence the electricity Directive does not seem to require further action from the UK
government in connection with social obligations: the two cornerstones of the
proposed system (obligation to supply will extend to every supplier; while financing of
Universal Services will not be reformed until 1998) are consistent with Community
Law. Attention is now focused on the natural gas proposal. The latest draft seems to
mirror the Electricity Directive; thus the gas Directive will have limited impact in the
UK. The Standard Conditions of the Gas Suppliers' or Transporters' Licences are
likely to satisfy the EU requirements as set forth in the draft Directive.
However the electricity Directive and the draft natural gas Directive may not be the
last documents from the EU on Social Contract: the Economic and Social Committee
noted that "... the present proposals represent a compromise which will have to be
fine-tuned as the proposed process of aligning the operating conditions in both sectors
progresses and as experience is acquired in operating the internal market in these
146 • •
Opinion from Economic and Social Committee on Common rules for the internal market in
electricity and natural gas (94/C 195/24) OJ No C 195, 18. 7. 94, p. 82, point 4.3.
Opinion from Economic and Social Committee on Common rules for the internal market in
electricity and natural gas (93/C 73/10) OJ No C 73, 15. 3. 93, p. 31, point 2.2.6.
77
148
sectors under these conditions." As a result of 'fine-tuning', a European Social
Contract is likely to emerge in the electricity and natural gas sectors; details of that
arrangement are not available for the time being.
The EU position on social obligations may be summarised then as follows: (i) As a
main rule, Directives do not discuss public service obligations in detail, (ii)
Community Law on the financing of Universal Services in the telecommunication
sector does not apply in the UK; OFTEL decided that no financing scheme is
required, (iii) The OFFER proposal for the liberalisation of the UK electricity market
harmonizes with the electricity Directive. The proposed natural gas Directive is likely
to have limited impact in the UK gas sector.
The main points of the above discussion may be re-stated as follows:
The original model of Social Contract intended to balance out supply obligations and
monopoly rights. Yet rights and obligations do not go hand in hand after privatisation:
statutory monopoly of the incumbent telecommunication, electricity, and gas suppliers
was abolished, nevertheless they have to provide Universal Services (Social Contract
No. 2.). The final point here is that the third generation of Social Contract will govern
liberalised markets: market players may supply any customer but must provide
services to all.
Conclusion
Chapter 1. concluded that privatisation did not break the political link in the utilities
sector. It was argued that the competent Secretary of State is the 'regulator' of the
regulators; he may and does meddle in regulatory affairs. This Chapter has attempted
to show that utility regulation is not the only venue for government intervention.
Three legal instruments of government interference have been analysed in Parts I. -
III.; while Part IV. discussed how the government phased in competition in the
utilities sector.
As far as the former is concerned, the main point is that there were three main forms
of government interference after privatisation: only one exists as of today.
Residual stakes and government-appointed directors failed for the following
reasons:
Residual shares and government directors faced an uncertain future from the start:
(i) the government could NOT control privatised companies through residual
shares; and (ii) government nominees worked in a legally impossible situation. As
a rule, government-appointed directors had little 'perceptible impact' in Britain.
Existing government holdings were sold off after 1984; and no significant new
holdings were retained after 1991. Thus the importance of residual stakes
diminished; and government-appointed directors suffered a similar fate. After
148Opinion from Economic and Social Committee on Common rules for the internal market in
electricity and natural gas 94IC 195/24 OJ No C 195, 18. 7. 94, p. 82, point 3.3.
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the sale of residual stakes the government had no right to delegate directors to the
boards of privatised companies.
Thus Golden Shares gradually exceeded residual stakes and government directors
in importance. This process peaked in late 1993: only two stakes of significant size
remained, while the government held Golden Shares in some forty companies.
Legal instruments of government interference have a different story on the Continent.
Compared with Britain, the three principal forms of government interference are
interlinked on a different basis in Europe. The right to appoint directors is not
derived from holding a certain percentage of the voting capital (residual shares); it is
the inherent privilege of the holder of the Golden Share. Hence Golden Shares and
government-appointed directors co-exist in Europe.
The discussion above has identified two further differences between European and
British privatisation practices: (i) Governments tend to sell a minority stake in utilities
and in companies of 'special' importance in Europe. Thus significant residual stakes
are retained after privatisation, (ii) Government-appointed directors have a well-
recognized role in Europe. They work on the supervisory (as opposed to
management) boards; they serve as a two-way information channel between
companies and ministries.
Thus European governments have at least three channels to interfere with the
operation of privatised companies.
Turning to the introduction of competition, the main point is that liberalisation has
been a 'managed' process in the UK. It was the Secretary of State (as opposed to the
regulators) who phased in competition in the telecommunication, gas and water
sectors. With the exception of OFFER, the regulatory offices had little influence over
the liberalising ofutility industries. Thus the liberalisation of utility services is a further
example of government interference.
Chapter 3.
Judicial Review ofRegulatory Decisions
The regulation of privatised utilities has expanded the scope of administrative orders
susceptible to judicial review: decisions of the utility regulators, namely OFTEL (set
up in 1984), OFGAS (1986), OFWAT (1989), and OFFER (1990), may be
challenged before the court. Yet there were not many applications for judicial review
after the British Telecom (year of privatisation: 1984) and British Gas (1986)
flotations. No boom in the number of applications followed the sale of the
EnglishAVelsh water (1989) and the UK electricity (1990 - 1991) companies either.
Thus the regulation of privatised utilities was a 'judicial review-free' area up until the
early 1990s; and then the number of applications started to rise. More regulatory
orders were challenged between 1995 - 1997 than between 1984 (OFTEL, the first
utility regulator, established) and 1994. Commentators argue that "there will be more
court cases in the future" 1; according to Colin Scott, increased judicial review will be
one offshoot of liberalisation.- This is not what the legislator intended; the Tory
government tried to keep the courts out of the regulatory game.^ This Chapter will
analyse why judicial review is getting fashionable after privatisation.
The structure of this Chapter will be as follows: Part I. will make some general points
about judicial review. Judicial review procedures will be examined in Part II. Finally,
Part III. will present an economic analysis of law; this discussion will conclude that
judicial review may not be the most efficient procedure to settle disputes between
regulators and regulatees.
Part I.
General comments on judicial review
Judicial review is the main dispute resolution technique in the post-privatisation
regulatory regime. It is easy to see why the courts may review decisions of the utility
regulators:
OFTEL, OFFER, OFGAS etc. are 'public bodies';
it is a fundamental principle of British administrative law that decisions of public
bodies may be challenged before the court (judicial review); thus
'Cosmo Graham: Judicial Review and the Regulators [1997] 8 Util LR 107.
2Colin Scott: The Juridification of Regulatory Relations in the UK Utilities Sector (paper for
presentation at LSE - Brick Court Seminar Series, 22 April 1997), page 6.
3C.D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (1992)
Blackwell, page 107.
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decisions of the single-industry regulatory offices should be susceptible to judicial
review
Regulators and regulated utilities are not the only participants of the regulatory game:
customers may also wish to seek legal remedies. What forms of appeal are available 9
As was discussed under Chapter 1., Part I., B.3, if a customer is dissatisfied with the
services of a privatised utility (s)he should apply for judicial review. It was also noted
there that, according to de Smith, a dissatisfied customer may not sue the utility
directly; (s)he may obtain
a remedy indirectly by bringing proceedings against the regulatory
body if it fails to take appropriate action to ensure that the privatised
body does not act improperly. ^
So far as customer protection is concerned, this arrangement is unsatisfactory; the
reasons for this have been explained in Chapter 1. above. What should be underlined
here is that customers may NOT bring ordinary proceedings against privatised
utilities; judicial review seems to be the sole remedy available. Why should it be so ?
This is not a simple question; the following example may help to appreciate why:
You and your neighbour receive a notice from a local gas distribution
company: the gas supplier would like to connect your farms to the natural gas
network. You turn down the offer and carry on heating your house by LPG
(liquefied propane gas). Your neighbour is fed up with LPG and switches to
natural gas. You and your neighbour fly to Barbados for a short break next
winter. It is freezing cold outside when you arrive drive home the airport.
Both of you try to switch on the gas heating in vain. What happened ?
The gas distributor has cut off the supply to your neighbour's farm. The gas
company refuses to re-connect your neighbour unless and until certain charges
are paid. He complains to OFGAS, but the regulator finds in favour of the gas
company."
Your LPG container is empty. The LPG distributor should have filled it up on
15 January, but failed to do so.
Both of you are angry and would like to appeal to the court. What legal
remedies are available ?
The story of your neighbour has been discussed above: he may seek judicial review.
As was mentioned, his only option is to bring proceedings against OFGAS. It will be
4 de Smith, Woolf & Jowell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995),
para. 3-046.
5 op.cit., para 3-046.
6 Regina v. Director General of Gas Supply & Another, ex parte Smith and another (QBD),
LEXIS, 31 July 1989.
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explored below what remedies the court may grant. It will also be examined whether
judicial review is the most satisfactory procedure to settle disputes between
disappointed customers (like your neighbour) and utilities.
So far as the LPG user is concerned, the story is straightforward. You would have a
contractual claim against the LPG distributor: your container should be filled up on
the 15th of each month under the service agreement. You might claim damages,
specific performance, etc. if applicable.
Who is in a better position then - your neighbour or you ? It will be a main theme of
this chapter that disappointed customers would prefer ordinary litigation to judicial
review. The point here is that, compared to ordinary litigation, judicial review seems
to be a less attractive option; and this is for the following reasons:
the judiciary is reluctant to be involved in the economic regulation of public
utilities (3.1);
• judicial review may be sought on limited grounds only (3.2);
remedies are not likely to satisfy applicants (3.3); and
if judicial review is granted, the matter would be remitted to the same regulator
for further consideration (3.4).
Each of these points will be discussed in turn below.
3.1 Judicial attitude towards regulatory decisions
The starting point here is that judges regard judicial review as an extraordinary
procedure; this remedy will be granted in exceptional circumstances only. Three cases
may be mentioned here to illustrate that point:
• Regina v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission and another, ex parte
Argyll Group Pic. [1986] 2 All ER 257 CA
The Court of Appeal was asked to quash an ultra vires act of the chairman of
MMC7 Sir John Donaldson, MR pointed out that the judicial power to grant a
remedy sought is discretionary. In this particular case discretion was exercised in
the light of the "proper awareness of the needs of public administration"^; and the
remedy was not granted.
7 See R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness Pic. [1989] 1 All ER 509 AC,
at 526-D. "... this court [Court of Appeal] found that the chairman of the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission had acted wholly without jurisdiction, but refused to quash his order [in the
Argyll - case]."
8at 266-C.
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Regina v. Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Bruce [1988] 3 All ER 686
This case was concerned with the dismissal of an executive officer from the public
service. Mr. Bruce applied for judicial review claiming that provisions of the
disciplinary code had not been complied with. The court found that the applicant
was entitled to judicial review but declined to grant a remedy: an alternative
remedy existed.
• Regina v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness Pic. [1989] 1
ALL ER 509 CA
This decision by the Court of Appeal reinforced the point that judicial review of
administrative decisions is a supervisory or 'longstop' jurisdiction. The court will
interfere with administrative decisions when "all avenues of appeal have been
exhausted, at least in so far as the alleged cause for complaint could thereby be
remedied.
Two points should be emphasized here:
(i) Discretionary remedy
Judicial review is a discretionary remedy. As Sir John Donaldson, MR underlined in
Argyll Group it is up to the court whether a remedy will be granted or not. The
general trend seems to be that judges try NOT to grant judicial review: Bruce is as
example. As a main rule, judges in Britain are reluctant to rule on administrative
decisions; de Smith refers to this approach as 'judicial self-restraint'.^
One my argue that the independence of the judiciary would be in danger if judges
were involved in administrative decision-making. As Simon Brown LJ pointed out
recently, judges are "to remain within their constitutional bounds and not to trespass
beyond them."H The regulation ofmonopolies is the domain of the legislator and/or
the government. Hence it would be unfortunate if the judiciary were to attempt to
interfere with the operation of these branches of government. * - Judges are becoming
very sensitive on this point: as Lord Diplock put it in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs
[1980] 1 All ER 529, ". . . Parliament makes the laws, the judiciary interpret them."
9Guinness - case, at 526
10 de Smith, op. cit., para. 1-009.
nR. v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith and other applications [1995] 4 All ER 427, at 448-
B.
12In Hungary, for example, a local court recently ruled that road tolls charged by a private
concession company are not proportionate to services provided. This interference in the regulation
of toll charges will have unforeseen consequences as far as future highway projects are concerned.
See: http://www.nepszabadsag.hu - 20 November 1996.
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For example, Sir Robert Megarry V.-C. commented in Estmanco Ltd. v. Greater
London Council (Vac. Ct) [1982] 1 W.L.R. 2 that
Provided a local authority complies with the law, matters of policy on
housing, as on other things, are matters for decision by that authority,
and not by the courts.
The policy of non-interference has a long tradition in other branches of law as well.
For example, it is a well-accepted principle in company law since Foss v. Harbottle
(1843) 2 Hare 461. Professor Pennington writes that the refusal of the courts to
interfere in the management of a company
is an obvious necessity, because it cannot be the court's function to
take management decisions and to substitute its opinions for those of
the directors and the majority of members.^
The courts are unhappy "to undertake to review matters of commercial judgement or
policy or of internal administration".^ Regulatory decisions always involve
commercial and political factors. The rule in Foss v. Harbottle and the comment from
Sir Robert Meggary V.-C. quoted above are similar: if the courts may "not be
required on every occasion to take the management of every Playhouse and
Brewhouse in the Kingdom." 1°, why should the judiciary pursue a different policy
when regulatory orders are challenged ? A departure from this conservative, purely
supervisory standpoint would lead to a re-distribution of power between the
regulators, the regulated, and the judiciary. Such a change would upset the basic
constitutional position. As Rene David put it,
. . . The security of legal relations and the supremacy of the law would
be threatened if judges were willing to bring the rules of established
law back into question . . .; the English judiciary has clearly indicated,
in striking language, its determination not to do so.^
It was the idea that 'rules of established law' should not be questioned which
precluded the setting up of a Constitutional Court in Britain. A comparative comment
should be made here: there is a marked contrast between the UK and mainland
Europe on this point. Constitutional courts were established in many Central and
Eastern European countries after the collapse of what was labelled as 'communism'.
13at 7- H and 8- A.
14 Pennington's Company Law (1990), page 648
15 L.S. Sealy: Cases and Materials in Company Law (1992), page 452
16 Carlen v. Dury (1812) 1 Ves & B 154 at 158, quoted in L.S. Sealy: Cases and Materials in
Company Law (1992), page 452
17Rene David and John E.C. Brierley: Major Legal Systems in the World Today (Stevens & Sons,
1985), page 328.
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There was a general belief that no Rule of Law may be introduced without the
establishment of constitutional courts. They were wrong. The Rule of Law is a British
idea: that country never had special administrative tribunals, let alone a constitutional
court. Actually, it was Germany which set up the first, modern constitutional court
after World War II. All the Central European countries followed the German model.
The irony of ironies was that the advocates of constitutional courts in Central and
Eastern Europe were using English terminology ('Rule ofLaw') and were referring to
British authors (e.g. A.V. Dicey); they argued for the transplantation of an idea that
was and will be unacceptable in Britain (i.e. the German-style constitutional court).
Some countries went one step further. They tried to refine the German model; with
disastrous result. The best example is Hungary, perhaps.
The Hungarian Constitutional Court has broader jurisdiction than any other court in
the world: it may rule about the constitutional status of (i) a Bill presented to the
Parliament, (ii) an Act passed by Parliament and submitted to the President for
signing, and (iii) any Act, Degree or other sources of law in force. A new Finance
Minister was elected in 1995 who tried to introduce an austerity package to slow
down inflation in Hungary. He urged the government to amend fundamental Acts,
like the budget and the Social Security Act. His proposals were referred to the
Constitutional Court; all of them were declared unconstitutional just before certain
Bills passed to implement such proposals would have come into force. The
Constitutional Court ordered the Ministry of Finance to prepare new proposals.
Economic reforms had come to a standstill. As a journalist commented in the local
press, something was fundamentally wrong here: is it the Rule of Law when the
Minister of Finance is reading judgements, while the Constitutional Court is preparing
the budget ?
What is the moral from the Hungarian story ? There is a lot to be said for 'judicial
self-restraint'. Should the judiciary take an active interest in executive and legislative
decisions, basic constitutional principles may turn upside down: it is not for the
judiciary to re-draft Acts or to rearrange the budget. It is in the best interest of
modern administration that judicial review should be kept within limits. This is not to
say that judicial self-restraint is the best arrangement available. It will be argued below
that potential applicants do not appeal to the UK courts for help: they do not believe
that judicial review will be granted. Yet 'judicial self-restraint' is certainly better than
the pro-active approach which seems to hold sway in Central and Eastern Europe for
the time being.
(ii) Last-ditch action
The moral from the Guinness - case is that a regulated company may not seek judicial
review if an internal appeal forum is available. As a rule, there are two 'internal appeal
forums' in the post-privatisation regulatory regime: (a) the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission [hereinafter: MMC]; and (b) the Directors General.
(a) MMC
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Privatisation Acts provide that so-called 'Modification references' may be made to
the MMC in connection with "any matters which relate to the supply of' utility
services. Thus the MMC appears to be the 'main court of appeal' 19 in relation
to disputes arising in connection with licence modification.
The main rules on licence modification may be summarised as follows:
licence conditions may be modified at any time by agreement between the
regulator and the regulated;
the regulated does not have the right to require a modification of the licence;
and
the Director(s) General may unilaterally make modifications only following a
report from the Monopolies and Mergers Commission authorising her/him to
do so. A different solution has been adopted in the water industry: the Water
Authority has the right to revoke or to modify a licence. A licensee has no
remedy but the right to appeal to the Secretary of State.20
It should be noted, however, that the MMC is not a universal appeal forum; its
jurisdiction is limited to issues concerning licence modification. For example, there
is no appeal to the MMC when Directors General interpret Acts^l or licence
conditions^; and billing disputes may not be referred to MMC either.^3 For
example, the applicant could not appeal to the MMC in R. Director General of
Electricity Supply, ex parte Redrow Homes (Northern) Ltd. (QBD), LEXIS 3
February 1995; the dispute was about the interpretation of the Electricity Act
1989 (as opposed to licence modification).
To summarise, "the regulatee either accepts the ruling of the regulator or allows
the matter [i.e. licence modification] to be referred to MMC."24 Thus disputes
concerning proposed licence modifications should be referred to the MMC first;
persuant to the rule in Guinness, judicial review is not available until after this
internal appeal forum has been exhausted.
18See, for example, Section 24 of the Gas Act 1986.
19House of Commons: Trade and Industry Committee: Energy Regulation HC 50-viii. 1996-97,
page 247., Q.5.
20Section 52 of the Water Resources Act 1991.
21See Redrow Homes - case, discussed under point (2) IB/ below.
22C. D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (1992),
page 284.
23Aileen McHarg: The Competition and Services (Utilities) Act 1992: Utility Regulation and the
Charter In: [1992] P.L. 385, at 392.
24Sir James McKinnon: Conference on Regulatory Reform In: [1993] 4 Util LR 119, at 121.
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(b) Directors General
The Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992 provides that (i) billing
disputes25 and (ii) disputes about discrimination26 may be referred to the Directors
General. Her/his determination is final and shall be enforced in Scotland "as if it
were an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued
by the sheriff."27
The point here is that a regulated utility or a disappointed customer may NOT
appeal to the court for help if the dispute concerned may be referred to the
competent Director General (rule in Guinness). Hence the Competition and
Service (Utilities) Act 1992 may reduce the number of applications for judicial
review: the Directors General will emerge as an important appeal forum in the
regulatory game.
To summarise then, there are two 'internal appeal forums' in the post-privatisation
regulatory game: (a) the MMC, if proposed licence modifications are in dispute; and
(b) the Directors General. If (a) the MMC and/or (b) the competent Director
General have no jurisdiction, then any party may appeal to the court for help: the rule
in Guinness is not applicable if there is no internal appeal forum available.
The discussion about the judiciary's approach to judicial review may be concluded
then as follows. Judicial review of regulatory decisions is probably the last true
example of judge-made law in the Common law system. The Stair Memorial
Encyclopaedia makes the following comment:
. . . the grounds of judicial control of administrative action have resulted
mainly from judicial decisions, not from legislation, and there continues
to be scope for further judicial development of the law.28
The judiciary in Britain tends to shape the law with a view to reducing its own
involvement to the minimum. What judges have to say about the regulation of
privatised utilities is that the game is (i) to be played by reasonable players^ and (ii)
for the purposes of the game. Subject to these fairly broad rules, the game may
develop in either direction: judges are reluctant to lay down further guidelines. Those
who wish to see a more active judiciary in Britain are warned: the newly established
constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe have upset the basic constitutional
25For example, Section 20 of the Water Industry Act 1991.
26In the telecommunications industry only: Section 5. of the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act
1992.
27Section 27F(7)(b) of the Telecommunications Act 1984, as amended.
28The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume 1., para 213.
29The 'obligation to act reasonably' was emphasized in Bank of Scotland v. Investment
Management Regulatory Organisation Ltd. (Ex. Div.) 1989 S.L.T. 432, at 444-A.
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arrangements on more than one occasion - active and politically more sensitive judges
may not necessarily deliver 'better' judgements.
3.2. Grounds of Challenge
The grounds on which judicial review may be sought are usually summarised by
reference to Lord Diplock's speech in C.C.S.U. v. Minister for Civil Service [1985]
A.C. 374. The main features of the three headings, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, and
(iii) procedural impropriety, may be summarised as follows:
Illegality
The decision-making authority "must understand the law that regulates his decision¬
making power and must give effect to it. "30 What does it mean in the context of
utility regulation ?
First of all, the Director General must interpret the privatisation statutes correctly
when deciding whether (s)he has the power to make certain decicions. Lord Dunpark
discussed this point in Watt v. Lord Advocate (OH), 1977 S.L.T. 130; a decicion of
an administrative body may be challenged if the decision-maker
. . . has wrongly defined the nature and limits of [her/his] statutory duty
and ... by not doing something which the statute required [her/him] to
do, has not acted in accordance with [her/his] statutory powers.
R. v. Director General of Telecommunications, ex parte British
Telecommunications pic. (QBD), LEXIS, 20 December 1996 and R. v. Director
General of Electricity Supply, ex parte Redrow Homes (Northern) Ltd. (QBD),
LEXIS 3 February 1995 are examples here. The application argued in British
Telecom that it was not within the powers of the Director General of
Telecommunications to insert into the BT's licence the so-called Fair Trading
Conditions. The court disagreed: Phillips LJ pointed out that
• The DG is empowered and obliged under the Telecommunications Act 1984 to
promote competition in the telecommunication sector;
• the licence modification seeking to introduce the Fair Trading Conditions was
in accordance with such statutory duties; thus
• the proposal was not ultra vires.
The Redrow - case has been discussed under point 3.2 B./ above: the point to be
recalled here is that the Director General of Electricity Supply told the construction
company that he had no statutory power to decide certain disputes. The court held
30 C.C.S.U. - case, at 410
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that his interpretation was NOT correct: the Director General misconstrued the
relevant provisions of the Electricity Act 1989.
Irrationality
Whenever an authority comes to a conclusion "so unreasonable that no reasonable
authority could ever have come to it" the court may quash an administrative
resolution. The test of a reasonable tribunal was adopted, for example, in R. v.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte Matthew Brown Pic. [1987] 1
All ER 463 : the court rejected the application for judicial review on the basis that the
procedure ofMMC was not so unfair that no reasonable tribunal would have adopted
it.In R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex parte World Development
Movement Ltd. [1995] 1 All ER 611 the court applied the test of irrationality and
ruled that
. . . the contemplated development is, on the evidence, so
economically unsound that there is no economic argument in favour of
the case . . .32
In a recent case the court re-confirmed that a decision of an administrative body may
not be quashed unless the applicant can satisfy the unresonabless test.3 3
The main point from Matthew Brown and World Development is that a challenge
under the test of'reasonable authority' or 'sensible person'34 may succeed in the most
extreme cases only. Regina v. Director General of Electricity Supply, ex parte
Scottish Power (CA), LEXIS, 3 February 1997 is an example. The applicant claimed
that a decision of the Director General of Electricity Supply was irrational. While
judicial review was granted, the Court ofAppeal did not actually rule that the decision
was irrational. Hence regulated utilities have limited hope of success under this
heading: it is hard to prove that a regulatory offices acted irrationally.
Yet two further points should be considered in connection with 'Irrationality'.
• There is little doubt that this term also covers (i) the unreasonable exercise of
discretionary power (e.g. Maystart Ltd. v. Director General of
Telecommunications (CA), LEXIS, 17 February 1994), (ii) the taking into
account of irrelevant considerations (e.g. R. v. Director General of Electricity
Supply, ex parte Scottish power (CA), LEXIS, 3 February 1997), and (iii) the
31The approach of the court in Matthew-case has been criticised in de Smith's Judicial Review of
Administrative Action arguing that reasonabless has no place in relation to procedural propriety.
See: de Smith, Woolf & Jowell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995), Section 8-011.
The issue seem to be open to further discussion for the time being.
32at 626 - 627.
33 R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Fayed [1992] BCLC 938 CA, at 953-D
34 C.C.S.U. - case, at 410
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failing to consider relevant factors (e.g. R. v. Director of Passenger Rail
Franchising, ex parte Save Our Railways and Others (CA), LEXIS, 15
December 1996).
• According to de Smith, one of the principles governing the exercise of official
power is that 'legitimate expectation' of the governed must not be thwarted.35
The notion of legitimate expectation is of special importance in the post-
privatisation regulatory regime. As was discussed in Chapter 1., secret
negotiations are central to utility regulation in Britain. Successful negotiations lead
to promises and expectations: concrete steps will follow in due course. It is
essential then that promises and expectations may be relied upon in the meantime.
The ultimate question whether the law may acknowledge such promises and
expectations. Can undertakings from a regulator create 'legitimate expectation' ?
For example, the Rail Regulator issued a 'policy statement1 in 1994; he set forth
criteria OFRAIL would adopt in approving track access agreements. If the
Regulator were to disregard those principles at the time when the access
agreements are due to be re-negotiated, could a privatised rail company apply for
judicial review ? Is the regulator obliged to comply with its own guidelines or
policy statement ? Did the 'policy statement' create a 'legitimate expectation' ?
Lord Hope addressed this point in Highland Regional Council v. British
Railways Boards 1996 S.L.T. 274. His Lordship explained that the court should
check (i) whether the licensing policy is within the power of the administrator; (ii)
if it is, then the court would enforce that policy both against the administrator and
the administered.^ 6 Thus, provided that the licensing policy is not ultra vires, the
court may grant judicial review if a regulator fails to comply with policy
statements, or does not adhere to long-standing licensing practice.
The concluding remark here is then that 'irrationality' is an umbrella term. In addition
to the test of 'reasonable authority', it also covers issues like unreasonable exercise of
discretionary power, the taking into account of irrelevant factors, and the failing to
consider relevant points.
Procedural impropriety
This heading is self-explanatory. It covers "failure by an administrative tribunal to
observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by
which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial
of natural justice."37 Regulatory orders must be made and issued in accordance with
35de Smith, Woolf & Jewell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995), Sweet & Maxwell,
para. 13-029.
36Highland Regional - case, at 281-E-F.
37C.C.S.U. - case, at 411
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procedural rules set forth under the privatisation statutes; should that not be the case
interested parties may apply for judicial review.
Procedural impropriety includes both (i) the breach of statutorily required procedures
and (ii) the common law rules of natural justice.38 So far as utility regulation is
concerned, point (i) is of limited importance: privatisation statutes are reticent about
regulatory procedures. Thus natural justice (point (ii) above) is the main ground of
challenge.
It should be noted that privatisation statutes do not refer to 'the rules of natural
justice'. There is no need for such reference: it is a presumption ofEnglish39 law that
. . . when Parliament has conferred a judicial or quasi-judicial power upon a
person, he must act in accordance with the rules of natural justice.40
Many applicants find this presumption useful: it is not unusual that a regulated utility
and/or a customer claim that the regulator breached the rules of natural justice. For
example, a decision of the gas regulator was quashed in R. v. Director General of
Gas Supply, ex parte Smith and Another (QBD), LEXIS, 31 July 1989. The court
ruled that the procedure was not fair: Mr. and Mrs. Smith were not invited to make
representations in connection with certain information British Gas pic. presented to
the DG. Pill J. pointed out that the regulator's discretion as to the procedural rules
(s)he follows is not unfettered: there is a "requirement to adhere to rudimentary
concept of fairness".
The Court of Appeal reaffirmed the principle that regulators are under a duty to act
fairly in Scottish Power. Sir Ralph Gibson granted judicial review arguing that the DG
of Electricity Supply should have proposed certain modifications "on the grounds of
fairness".
To conclude, the courts are unwilling to quash regulatory decisions on procedural
grounds, unless the investigation, inquiry etc. was unfair.
3.3 Available remedies
If, despite the problems highlighted above, an application for judicial review were
successful what kind of remedies may be awarded ? The most satisfactory solution for
the applicant would be if the court were to overrule the regulatory agency. The
original decision would be declared null and void. The judgement may also contain a
new decision which would be final and binding. In other words, by the end of the
judicial review procedure the successful applicant would have a new resolution in
hand. The dispute would be over once and for all.
Yet, in practice, judicial review operates along quite different principles in the United
Kingdom. As was argued above the judiciary is not enthusiastic about being involved
38de Smith, Woolf and Jowell: Judicial review of Administrative Action (1885), Section 15-067.
39There is no reason why the same presumption would not apply in Scotland.
40Glanville Williams: Learning the Law (1982), page 109.
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in administrative decision-making: judges see their role as being a 'football referee'
whose task is "to intervene when a breach of the rules has occurred."41 Football
referees do not score goals; judges do not make administrative decisions. It is a
fundamental principle ofjudicial review that the courts do not reconsider the merits of
administrative decisions. De Smith states that "the judges ought not to imagine
themselves as being in the position of the competent authority". To do so would
involve the courts in a process "which is inappropriate to judicial review because it
involves the court acting as if they were themselves the recipients of the power. "42
The Court of Session came to the same conclusion in West v. Secretary of State for
Scotland 1992 S.L.T. 636.43 y^g Court held that
the sole purpose for which the supervisory jurisdiction might be exercised
was to ensure that the person or body did not exceed or abuse that
jurisdiction, power or authority or fail to do what the jurisdiction, power
or authority required.
Lord Hope in his speech underlined that the Court of Session has no jurisdiction to
review the judgement of an inferior tribunal on the merits of the question.44 His
Lordship restated the principles ofjudicial control as follows:
. . . where a particular matter has been entrusted to an inferior body or
tribunal the Court of Session cannot substitute its own view for what that
body or tribunal may decide; but it can nevertheless interfere in order to
control any excess or abuse of power or failure to act within the limits of
the jurisdiction which has been conferred.45
Academic writers also emphasize the limits of judicial review jurisdiction. For
example, Stephen Dow points out that
. . . judicial review does not [. . .] allow the substantive point to be
raised before the court, rather the sole issue is whether the regulator
followed appropriate procedure to arrive at his decision.46
Similarly, Jeffrey Goh noted in connection with Highland Regional Council v.
British Railways Board 1996 S.L.T. 274. that
41E.C.S. Wade and A.W. Bradley: Constitudonal and Administrative Law (1993), page 671.
42de Smith, Woolf & Jowell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995), Section 13-007.
43W.J. Wolffe: The Scope of Judicial Review in Scots Law. In: [1992] P.L. 625 - 637.
44at page 641 F-G.
45at page 644 F.
46Stephen R. Dow: A Survey of Major Development in the Post-privatisation Phase of UK Gas and
Electricity Supply Industries (1996), page 25.
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. . . the substantive merits of a [regulatory] policy should not be a
matter for judicial determination.^
To conclude, courts do NOT reconsider the merits of administrative decisions
challenged. This point determines the scope of available remedies. If judges may not
rule on the merits of the administrative decision impugned, the remedy will be either
(i) a declaration or (ii) the regulatory order will be quashed.
An additional remedy is available in Scotland (but not in England and Wales). As was
explained in Chapter 1. above, privatised utilities are under a statutory duty to supply
customers on request. The Court of Session may order the specific performance of a
statutory duty: the Lord President ruled so in T. Docherty Ltd. v. Monifieth Town
Council 1971 S.L.T. 13.In theory, the Court of Session may order a privatised
utility to connect would-be customers to the telecommunication, electricity, gas or
water networks. This remedy does not form part of the law of England. Thus the
Court of Session has a broader range of remedies than its English counterpart; and
this is not the only difference between the two legal systems.
Two further points should be noted here:
(i) 'Public - Private' divide
Judicial review is a public law remedy in England: private law matters are NOT
subject to judicial review. The 'public - private' divide may give rise to difficulties.
There is little doubt that (i) a dispute between soldiers and the Ministry of Defense
would satisfy the 'public law matter' - test (R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte
Smith and other applications [1995] 4 All ER 427); while (ii) there is no public law
element if a husband is quarrelling with his wife. Yet drawing the line between
'public' and 'private' is not always easy. For example, the High Court ofEngland and
Wales may refuse to get involved in disputes concerning the decisions of religious
bodies.
As will be mentioned under point (ii) below, the Court of Session may review the
decisions of church courts and office-bearers. The question whether the power of
review extends to a particular claim is NOT decided by reference to the 'Public -
Private' divide in Scotland: as John St. Clair and Neil Davidson underline, "... the
Scottish remedies are competent against any respondent".49 Hence applications that
would not satisfy the 'public law matter' - test in London will not be refused in
Edinburgh.
47Jeffrey Goh: Have Sleep Will Travel In: [1995] 6 Util LR 148.
48 See also: Tom Mullen: Introduction to Scottish Judicial Review In: [1996] JR 107., at 109. and
Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, volume 1., paras 302. and 335.
49John St. Clair and Neil F. Davidson: Judicial Review in Scotland (1986), point 3.16.
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(ii) Jurisdiction
It follows from the fact that the 'Public - Private' divide does not apply in Scotland
that more claims are subject to judicial review under Scots law. Two examples may be
mentioned here:
• the behaviour of arbitrators is susceptible to judicial review in Scotland^; and
the Court of Session is willing to review the operation of church courts^ *.
One may conclude then that, compared to England, Scotland may be a better place to
challenge regulatory decisions. Judicial review is NOT a public law remedy in
Scotland, therefore
the Court of Session (1) may order the specific performance of a statutory
duty (T. Dochertv - case); and (2) may review certain claims which would not
be susceptible to judicial review under the law of England (e.g. religious
bodies and behaviour of arbitrators).
Is there a paradox here ? Scotland seems to be a better place to challenge regulatory
decicions; yet all the cases to be discussed below were proceedings in the High Court
of England and Wales. Why did not potential applicants turn to the Court of Session
for help ? Why was Scottish Power pic. advised to bring proceedings in England (R.
v. Director General of Electricity Supply, ex parte Scottish Power pic. (C.A.),
LEXIS, 3 February 1997) ?
The answer my be found in Bank of Scotland v. Investment Management
Regulatory Organisation Ltd. (Ex. Div.) 1989 S.L.T. 432. The main points of this
case may be summarised as follows:
the Bank of Scotland [hereinafter; the Bank] presented a petition for judicial
review of certain decisions of IMRO, a self-regulating body;
the Bank contended that the Court of Session had jurisdiction to entertain the said
petition under Rule 2(2) of Schedule 8 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements
Act 1982; and
IMRO argued that the application was incompetent: the Court of Session had no
jurisdiction because IMRO's registered office was in London.
The Extra Division of the Court of Session ruled that "The bank has instituted these
proceedings in the wrong part of the United Kingdom."52 The Court held that " . .
Rule 2(2) does not apply to found jurisdiction by Scottish courts, . . .".53 As Lord
50Ibid, 3.20.
51Ibid, point 3.18.
52Lord Dunpark, at 442-L.
53Lord Dunpark, at 442-K.
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Maxwell underlined, Rule 1. of Schedule 8. to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements
Act 1982 was applicable:
1. Subject to the following rules, persons shall be sued in the courts
for the place where they are domiciled.
His Lordship found that (i) IMRO was the 'defender' and (ii) the seat of a corporation
was its 'domicile'^ therefore the Court of Session had NO jurisdiction.
The Bank of Scotland - case is an important warning: an application seeking to
challenge decisions of a London-based regulatory office may be refused in Scotland
on jurisdictional grounds. As a matter of fact, all the single-industry regulatory offices
are based in London; hence the rule in Bank of Scotland may not be ignored in
seeking jurisdiction. This is why potential applicants seem to prefer the High Court of
England and Wales to the Court of Session. Thus the discussion below will
concentrate on the English procedure; nevertheless references will be made to the
appropriate Scottish terminology.
A./ Declaration (in Scotland: Declarator^)
The action for declaration is one of the most popular forms of proceedings in the
High Court today.^6 If intervention in the administrative decision making is
necessary, declaration appears to be the preferred technique. 57 The Director General
of OFFER told the Trade and Industry Committee that disappointed licensees should
apply for "a declaration in ordinary proceedings."^ This advice is correct: the vast
majority of legal disputes between regulators and regulated are concerned with the
meaning of statutes, contracts, licences, etc. The courts are the best qualified forum
for interpreting Acts of Parliament and legal documents. A party dissatisfied with the
interpretation of a regulatory agency might expect definite and final interpretation
from the judiciary.
A Declaration was sought in Regina v. Director General of Gas Supply, ex parte
Smith (Q.B.), LEXIS, 31 July 1989 as to the powers and duties of British Gas pic.
under paragraphs 1, 4 and 10 of Schedule 5 to the Gas Act 1986. Mercury
Communications Ltd. v. Director General of Telecommunications and another
(H.L.) [1996] 1 All ER 575 is another example. The Director General of OFTEL
interpreted certain terms ('Hilly allocated costs' and 'relevant overheads') in a way
which was not to the advantage of Mercury. Mercury challenged the validity of the
54 Lord Maxwell, at 445-L.
55John St. Clair and Neil F. Davidson: Judicial Review in Scotland (1986), point 4.06.
56de Smith, Woolf & Jowell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995), Section 14-066.
57 See comments by Sir John Donaldson, MR, in R. v. Take-over Panel, ex parte Datafin pic.
[1987] 1 All ER 564, CA, at 579-J.
58House of Commons: Trade and Industry Committee: Energy Regulation HC 50-vii 1996-97, page
187.
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Director General's interpretation. As the Chief Executive Officer of Mercury
summarised in the press, all Mercury wanted was
... an independent interpretation of the correct basis on which the
Director General of OFTEL must now set interconnect charges
payable by Mercury to BT.^9
The interesting point about the Mercury - case is that Mercury issued an originating
summons; they were not applying for judicial review. The Court of Appeal ruled that
Mercury was wrong: judicial review would have been the proper form of action.
Yet the House of Lords overruled the Court of Appeal in the case quoted above.
Hence judicial review is not the sole dispute resolution technique in the regulatory
game: ordinary 'private' litigation may be initiated under certain circumstances.
Why did Mercury prefer originating summons to judicial review ? One of the potential
reasons is that a Declaration as to the meaning of the two terms in dispute would not
have been good enough for the telecom company. After a successful judicial review
Mercury should have gone back to the Director General with a request to reconsider
his interpretation in the light of the judgement. A Declaration from the court could
not have solved the problem; it would have been a step towards finding a solution. By
contrast, proceeding with originating summons may resolve the dispute at once: as
Lord Slynn commented in the House of Lords
The court has jurisdiction to interpret the words at issue, [. . .], then
the contractual obligation undertaken must be, if the interpretation of
these words is referred to the court, that which the court decides.^ 1
Thus Mercury might not have to go back to the Director General; the court would fix
the terms and conditions of the contractual obligation undertaken. This outcome is of
more practical use than a Declaration; perhabs this is why Mercury preferred
originating summons to judicial review.
To conclude, a declaration does not end a dispute between regulators and regulated.
The court pronounces the final and definitive interpretation, but leaves it to the
regulator to redraft the order challenged in the light of the judgement.
59The Financial Times, 1 March 1994.
60The Financial Times, 23 July 1994.
61Mercury - case, at 583 - H.
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B./ Application to quash
Two comparative law points should be made here:
(i) English - Scots terminology:
'Application to quash' versus 'Petition for reduction'.
The term 'Application to quash' is not in use in Scotland. The equivalent in Scots law
is 'Petition for reduction': if judicial review is granted then the administrative order
will be quashed by a 'decree of reduction'.62 So far as the end-result is concerned,
there is no difference between the two legal systems: the administrative decision
impugned will be quashed.
(ii) English - Continental systems:
Judicial review: whether appeal or not.
The setting aside of a decision of an inferior administrative tribunal is not an appeal in
the UK. 63 By contrast, the setting aside of decisions is the principal form of appeal in
France and in Italy. As Zweigert and Kotz note, the French Court of Cassation and
the Italian Corte di Cassazione quash decisions of the inferior courts. 64 Hence judicial
review is an appellate jurisdiction on the Continent, while it is not classified as an
appeal in Britain. It is of special importance whether judicial review is seen as an
appeal or not:
If judicial review is an APPEAL, then
the court may substitute its decision for the administrative resolution.65 See the
French and Italian examples.
Ifjudicial review is NOT an APPEAL, then
the court may not consider substantive points. If an application is successful, then the
order challenged is set aside: it is for the administrative body to make a new
resolution. This is the situation in the UK.
Yet this theoretical distinction may not hold sway if the quashing of the original
resolution points directly to the only legally acceptable interpretation. This is the case
when the merit of an administrative decision may be expressed as a YES - NO binary
62For example, Watt v. Lord Advocate, 1977 S.L.T. 130 (O.H.).
63Denning LJ in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Tribunal, ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 KB
338, at 347 (English view) and Lord Hope in West v. Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 SLT
636, at 641-F-G (Scottish view)
64Zweigert and Kotz: Introduction to Comparative Law (1992), page 124. And see also: Peter De
Cruz: Comparative Law in a Changing World (1995), page 107.
65Peter Cane: An Introduction to Administrative Law (Clarendon Press, 1996), page 8.
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code (see point 3.9.2. below). For example, an administrative body refused to issue a
licence to perform in Gerry Cottle's Circus Ltd. v. Edinburgh District Council
1990 S.L.T. 235 (no licence - i.e. NO - choice). The circus applied for judicial
review. The resolution of the council was quashed leaving the council no option but
to issue the licence to perform (if not NO, then YES - choice - i.e. licence shall be
issued).
A further example is Air 2000 v. Secretary of State for Transport (O.H.) 1989
S.L.T. 698. In this case the court ruled that Section 3. of the Traffic Distribution
Rules 1986 was ultra vires and invalid. The said section forced transatlantic flights
from Glasgow and from Edinburgh to stop at Prestwick Airport. The decree of
reduction deleted Prestwick Airport from Section 3. of the Traffic Distribution Rules
1986; hence Air 2000 could fly directly from Scotland to the USA. No other
interpretation of the said Rules was legally possible.
The test of 'only one decision' is not unknown in the utilities sector: it was applied in
R. v. Director General of Electricity Supply, ex parte Scottish Power pic. (C.A.),
LEXIS, 3 February 1997. The electricity company asked the court, among others, to
propose specific licence modifications; yet Sir Ralph Gibson refused to do so arguing
that
The Court should not, in our judgement, make such an order unless it is
clear that at the time of making the invalid decision, there was only one
decision which the Director, in the proper performance of his duties, and
on the material before him, could reasonably make.66
To conclude, the quashing of the original resolution may be as good as a new
resolution from the regulator PROVIDED that
(i) there are two legally possible solutions only (YES - No choice - e.g. either
a licence is issued or not), and
(ii) the court declares the original decision of the administrative body invalid
(Gerry Cottle's Circus and Air 20001 then
(iii) there is only one legally acceptable solution (i.e. if the original decision
was NO, then YES, and vice versa).
Privatisation acts expressly empowered the courts to quash an order or any provision
of an order challenged in judicial review.67 If application to quash is successful the
court may rule that (i) the original decision must be set aside and (ii) the regulator
should re-hear the case. R. v. Director General of Electricity Supply, ex parte
Redrow Homes (Northern) Ltd. (QBD), LEXIS, 3 February 1995. is an example.
The Director General of OFFER advised the construction company that he had no
power to determine the reasonabless of connection charges once those charges had
been paid. Redrow Homes applied for judicial review arguing that this interpretation
66Lexis, 3 February 1997.
67See, for example, Section 27(2) of the Electricity Act 1989.
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was not correct. Mr. Justice Schiemann ruled that if a dispute was referred to the
Director General he had to deal with it.68 Had Mr. Justice Shiemann not adhered to
the purely supervisory theory of judicial review (see above), he could have determined
whether the connection charge was reasonable. But he quashed the resolution of the
Director General and referred the dispute back to OFFER. Similarly, the court
remitted the case to the Director General of OFFER in Scottish Power mentioned
above; the Director General was ordered to examine the case and
... to reach a decision in accordance with the findings of this Court,
including consideration ofwhether to make a further reference to MMC.
The point here is that the order of certiorari to quash does not end the dispute
between regulators and regulated. As a rule, it is for the regulatory office to re¬
consider the case and to make a new resolution.
To conclude, the two remedies discussed above do not end the dispute between
regulators and regulated. Neither (A) a declaration nor (B) the setting aside of the
original resolution will extinguish the dispute between regulators and regulated. What
the regulated company seeks is a new resolution which will come, as a main rule,
from the regulator and not from the court. Thus ordinary remedies from the courts do
not satisfy the practical needs of regulated utilities: this is one of the reasons why
privatised companies do not apply more frequently for judicial review.
3.4 The making of a new regulatory decision
It was argued above that the court will not reconsider the merit of a regulatory order:
it is for the regulator to make a new decision. The practical problem here is that the
post-privatisation regulatory regime in Britain is personalised.
The Directors General are personally responsible for the regulation of gas, electricity,
water, and telecommunication industries. The personality of the Directors General
does influence the style of regulation and the co-operation between regulators and
regulated utilities. John Ernst makes the point that
... the British model of regulation differs most notably from its American
progenitor in its reliance on, what could reasonably be described as,
'personality-led regulation'. In other words, much of the focus, and
certainly the character of the public bodies set up to regulate the
privatised utilities in Britain, imitate the persona of their respective
directors. 69
68The Times, February 21, 1995.
69John Ernst: Whose Utility (1994), page 63.
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The story of the two Directors General of OFGAS illustrates this point. After fierce
confrontations in the press, working relations between the gas company and Sir James
McKinnon broke down; the latter had to step down eventually. The incoming
Director General of OFGAS, Ms. Clare Spottiswoode, went out of her way to
improve the day-to-day relationship with British Gas plc.^O.
Privatisation legislation made a major contribution to the emergence of personalised
regulation in Britain. Privatisation statutes, following the pattern of the Fair Trading
Act 1973, recognise the Directors General as officers in charge of the regulation of
utility industries. Yet the legislation does not refer to regulatory offices. Hence there
were some uncertainties as to the constitutional standing of OFGAS, OFWAT,
OFFER, and OFTEL. Some commentators argued that the single-industry regulatory
offices are government agencies, while others classify them as ordinary departments
of government. 71 The most satisfactory classification of the single industry regulatory
offices would be to label them as non-ministerial government departments. 72
Being agencies of the Crown provisions of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 are
applicable to these offices. Section 17 provides that proceedings against the Crown
shall be instituted against the appropriate authorised department. The list of authorised
departments is annexed to the Act; it includes the Directors General^. Thus the
proper respondent in a judicial review procedure is the competent Director; service is
to be made on The Treasury Solicitor. This arrangement further emphasises the
personalised character of regulation in Britain: regulatory offices have no legal
standing in the UK.
A House of Commons publication summarised the standing of the single-industry
regulatory offices as follows:
The Acts of Parliament which carried out the privatisation and established
the powers of the regulatory agencies lay the various duties upon the
Directors of the various industries and not upon the regulatory agencies as
corporate bodies. Each agency is there to assist the Director and not
legally to share in the decision-making process.74
70For example, OFGAS accepted a recommendation by MMC that the efficiency factor in the
formula be relaxed to - 4 from the original - 5. The Financial Times, 28 January 1994.
71Cento Veljanovski: The Regulation Game, In: Cento Veljanovski (ed): Regulators and the Market
(1991). In connection with the status of OFT, see: Brian W. Harvey: The Law of Consumer
Protection and Fair Trading (1982), page 268.
72Fiona Poole suggests the same classification in connection with the status of OPRAF. Fiona
Poole: Rail Privatisation: a Progress Report (1995), page 18.
73For example, The Supreme Court Practice (1995), Volume 2., para. 6038.
74House of Commons Library Research Division. Background Paper: The Regulation of Privatised
Utility Companies (1991) page 1.
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The Directors General personally are sued in judicial review. 75 Furthermore,
Directors, and not offices, may bring proceedings against a licensee: Section 30(8) of
the Gas Act 1986 provides that the Director General of OFGAS may apply to the
court for "an injunction or interdict or any other appropriate relief."
The personal involvement of the Directors General may be a source of practical
concerns. It was mentioned above that if a regulated utility does not agree with the
regulator on a proposed licence modification the dispute is referred to the MMC. Two
problems may arise here:
(i) It is the Director General who frames the reference to the Commission;
she/he may also vary a reference
by adding to the matters specified in the reference or by
excluding from the reference some or all of the matter so
specified. 76
It should be underlined that regulated utilities do not have a word in the
drafting ofmonopoly references. As Dr. Kim Howells MP noted "... this
is not necessarily conducive to the spread ofuniversal happiness. "77
(ii) After a successful judicial review, the matter complained of would be
returned to the regulator for further consideration (see Scottish Power -
case above).
As a matter of fact, a single Director General is in charge of each office: thus the same
officer who framed the MMC reference and signed the original resolution will have
the final word again. The regulated company will be in an awkward position: the
same decision is to be re-discussed with the same regulator. What is the likelihood
that the same Director General would come to a different conclusion ? Will (s)he take
a fresh approach ?
With all respect for the outstanding professional and personal capabilities of the
Directors General, it is to be noted that seeking a new decision from the same
decision maker is not an easy task. Different legal systems offer different solutions to
this problem. In France, for example, if a judgement is quashed, the Court of
Cassation will remit a case to a different inferior court. 78 in Hungary, the same
dispute may go back to the same county court in civil litigation; but not before the
75For example: Regina v. Director General of Electricity Supply, Ex parte Redrow Homes
(Northern) Ltd. The Times, February 21, 1995; or the Scottish Power - case.
76See, for example, Section 24(1) - (2) of the Gas Act 1986.
77Dr. Kim Howell MP: Approaching Regulation from Westminster (1996), page 9.
78Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz: Introduction to Comparative Law (1992), page 124.
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same panel of judges. ^9 As far as regulatory decisions are concerned, no similar
safeguards exist in the UK: the same Director General will deal with the matter if the
original order is quashed in a judicial review procedure.
A particularly interesting question is whether a Director General may be removed
from office in the course of a judicial review procedure. What would happen if a
privatised utility were to prove that a Director General does not have an open mind to
rethink the problem ? For example, Lord Slynn noted in Mercury Communications
Ltd. v. Director General of Telecommunications and another (HL) [1996] 1 AH
ER 575 that the Director General of OFTEL stands by his original interpretation.80
In the law of arbitration, an arbitrator may be removed provided that she/he made up
her/his mind and would be unable to decide otherwise. Is the same remedy available
injudicial review ? The court may not remove Directors General: it is the Secretary of
State who may dismiss a Director from office "on the ground of incapacity or
misbehaviour".81 It is unlikely that adherence to an interpretation would fall under
any of these categories. As Aileen McHarg remarks,
The chances of a regulator ever being dismissed must be very slim,
though pressure to resign or failure to reappoint are perhaps more
likely.8^
What solutions are available then ? Some regulated companies suggest that Directors
General should be replaced with a tribunal of between three and five members, along
with the creation of a single joint utilities regulator.8^ Academic commentators made
the same recommendation.8^ The idea of a regulatory panel was welcome by the
Labour Party. Although not in a definite form, this party promised that individual
regulators will be replaced with a panel of regulators under a Labour government.8^
A joint study by the Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries and Price
Waterhouse concludes that the idea of regulatory panels should be considered.8^
79Polgciri Perrendtartis (Act III. of 1952).
80Mercurv - case, at 583-E.
81For example, Section 1(3) of the Gas Act 1986.
82Aileen McHarg: Accountability in the Electricity Supply Industry In: [1995] 6 Util LR 42,
footnote 16.
83The Financial Times, 15 April 1994.
84Alex Henney: A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and
Wales (1994), page 326. Stephen R. Dow: A Survey of Major Developments in the Post-
privatisation Phase ofUK Gas and Electricity Supply Industries (1996), page 66.
85The Financial Times, 17 May 1995.
86Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries & Price Waterhouse: Regulated Industries: The UK
Framework (1996), page 14., point 2.4.1.
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Yet not all commentators are enthusiastic about the setting up of panels. The
Memorandum submitted by the Public Utility Reform Group to the Trade and
Industry Committee states that
The formal organisation of a 'panel' system of management of
regulatory function would not by itself guarantee what is most
required.^
The Director General ofOFGAS also told the Committee that "A panel may not be as
responsive and flexible as a single Director General.Professor Cosmo Graham
warned against the establishment of a regulatory panel:
Panel decision taking will inevitably tend towards a greater degree of
compromise and consensus than decisions by a single individual. This
may not mean better decision making. The record of equivalent bodies
in the UK is mixed.^9
John Kay agrees. He claims that the practical difference between regulation by board,
like in the financial services, or by a single regulator is negligible. He makes the
following comments:
This personalisation of regulation is itself another subject of, largely
unjustified, criticism. If able people are to be attracted to regulatory
positions, it is likely that they will become well-known public figures, if
they are not already; . . . The greater danger by far is that the functions
are performed by nonentities. Securing staff of appropriate calibre for
regulatory agencies is already a serious problem. 90
The argument presented by John Kay is correct to this extent: personalisation is not a
problem if and when the regulatory regime works smoothly. Yet as soon as utilities or
customers seek help from the courts, 'personalisation' may create practical difficulties.
A Director General might face some professional and, perhaps, personal dilemma
when she/he is required to reconsider her/his previous decisions.
To conclude, the setting up of a joint regulatory panel, or single industry panels would
reduce the personalised character of regulation in Britain. It was argued above that
personalisation is a problem if the court quashes a regulatory order but the Director
General has fixed her/his mind. This problem may not occur if regulatory panels were
in place. Hence the application to quash a regulatory order might be a more popular
87House of Commons: Trade and Industry Committee: Energy Regulation HC 1996-97 50-v, page
150, point 11.
88op. cit., HC 50-viii, page 247., Q.5.
89op. cit., 50-11, page 121, point 11.
90John Kay: The Future of UK Utility Regulation. In: Professor M. E. Beesley (ed): Regulating
Utilities: A Time for Change ? (1996), pages 152 - 153.
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action if regulatory pannels (as opposed to Directors) were in charge of utility
regulation in Britain.
The main points on the general law on judicial review may be summarised as follows.
As a rule, the prospects for potential applicants are gloomy: (i) the judiciary does not
want to be involved in the administrative decision making process; (ii) available
remedies will not satisfy the practical needs of privatised companies; and (iii) after a
successful challenge the same regulator is supposed to issue a new order. Compared
with the general law on judicial review, are the privatised utilities in a better position
under the privatisation Acts ?
Part EL
Judicial Review in the Utilities Sector
Having analysed the general law on judicial review, it is appropriate to turn to the
utility legislation. Two issues should be discussed here: (i) Who may seek judicial
review under the privatisation Acts ?; (ii) What procedural regimes govern the judicial
review of regulatory decisions ?
3.5 Standing to apply for judicial review
Privatisation Acts expressly authorise regulated utilities to question the validity of
regulatory orders on grounds to be discussed under point (ii) below.91 The question
here is whether a third party having the necessary locus standi may seek judicial
review. A theoretical example here would be as follow:
A gas distribution licence contains two annexes: Annex A lists settlements
which are connected to the gas distribution network; Annex B lists settlements
which shall be connected by 19X8. Under the Gas Act 1986 the distribution
company and the regulator may modify the gas distribution licence by an
agreement: at the request of the licensee, OFGAS deletes Nowhere Town
from Annex B in 19X7. After this modification the supplier will no longer be
obliged to get this settlement connected to the distribution network. The local
council of Nowhere Town wants to block the coming into force of that
modification. Could the local council initiate proceedings ?
Under the Gas Act 1986 the modification of licences by agreement is a deal between
the office and the licence holder. But the legislation also provides that before the
competent Director General makes modifications, a notice should be given specifying
the period within which representations and objections may be presented. 92 The
Directors General are explicitly required to bring the notice to "the attention of
91For example, Section 30 of the Gas Act 1986.
92See, for example, Section 11 of the Electricity Act 1989
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persons likely to be affected by the making of the modification. "93 As a general
practice, notices are published in the national and the local newspapers.
Thus the local council may make objections to the Directors General who will be
obliged to consider such representations and objections.94 Should the Directors
General go ahead with the modification ignoring objections made the local council
could apply for judicial review. De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action
points out that:
... if the statute gives the applicant the right to make representations
before the decision is reached this will be a strong indication that he
has standing to challenge the decision when it is made.95
In addition, the local council in the example above may also have title to sue under the
rule in Gordon v. Kirkcaldy District Council 1989 S.L.T. 507. The main points of
this case may be summarised as follows:
A local council had been collecting waste free of charge directly from
caravans in a caravan park. Subsequently the council decided to collect waste
only from the site as a whole and to charge the operator of the site for
collecting. It goes without saying that caravan owners were unhappy with the
new practice of the local council; two of them appealed to the Court of
Session.
One of the preliminary questions before the court was whether tenants of two caravan
pitches had title and interest to bring a petition. Counsel for the respondents submitted
that they had none: the administrative decision issued by the local council was
addressed to the site operator and not to the tenants of the site. Counsel for the
petitioners averred that they had title by reason of being rate payers and also
producers of domestic waste. Lord Cullen ruled that the petitioners had title and
interest to sue "in order to have that decision set aside".96
As far as modification by agreement is concerned, the local council ofNowhere Town
is in the same position as tenants of the caravan sites were in Gordon. The local
council is not a party to the administrative decision complained of (i.e. the agreement
between the regulator and the gas supplier), nevertheless it has title and interest to sue
in order to block the proposed licence modification.
To conclude, third parties likely to be affected by a decision of the regulator may
challenge the validity of a proposed licence modification. It is settled law that persons
who are entitled to make representations before a decision is reached may apply for
93See, for example, Section ll(3)(a) of the Electricity Act 1989
94See, for example, Section 11(2) of the Electricity Act 1989
95De Smith, Woolf & Jowell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995), Section 2-024
96at 513 - L
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judicial review. For example, a regular swimmer had standing to sue in connection
with the discharge of sewage to the sea in Regina v. National Rivers Authority, ex
parte Moreton, LEXIS, 13 September 1995
Modification by agreement is subject to the same rules. Hence third parties may bring
proceedings even though the regulator and the regulated company agreed on a
particular licence modification. The Trade and Industry Committee came to the same
conclusion in a report on energy regulation: according to the Committee, "judicial
review of regulatory decisions may be applied for by any interested party . . .".97
3.6 Judicial Review Procedures
One of two procedural regimes shall be used if a potential applicant intends to
challenge the validity of a regulatory decision: /A/ Statutory Application to Quash
and /B/ 'ordinary' Common Law judicial review. As a main rule, the vast majority
of applicants will proceed under point /B/; statutory application to quash is only
applicable if so-called 'final' or 'provisional' orders are impugned. What kind of
orders are these ?
/A/ Statutory Application to Quash Final or Provisional Orders
The Directors General may issue final or provisional orders if a licensee "is
contravening, or has contravened and is likely again to contravene, any relevant
condition or requirement"^. A final or provisional order may require a licensee
"to do, or not to do, such things as are specified in the order or are of a decription
so specified"99. The enforcement of licence conditions is the main point here: the
regulator will issue final or provisinal orders if a licensee does not toe the line. It is
unlikely that many such orders will be made. As was discussed in Chapter 1.,
utility regulation is a 'negotiated process' in Britain: regulators and regulated
utilities tend to settle disputes informally. One would suppose that the two parties
will reach an agreement before the regulator were to issue a final or provisional
order. It is no surprise then that no application seeking to impugn a final or
provisional order has been reported until today.
Should a licensee intend to challenge such orders in the future, the following points
would be relevant:
"House of Commons: Trade and Industry Committee: Energy Regulation HC 1996-97 50-1, page
lix, point 169.
98Section28(l) of the Gas Act 1986.
"Section 28(7)(a) of the Gas Act 1986.
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I. Grounds: the validity of orders may be questioned on two grounds: (i)
Powers - the regulator had no power to make the decision impugned; or (ii)
Procedure - procedural requirements of the privatisation Acts were not
complied with;
II. Time Limit: the period within which applications for judicial review shall
be made is 42 days; and
III. Ouster Clause: the validity of a final or provisional order "may not be
questioned by any legal proceedings whatever", save as provided in the
relevant privatisation Act.
Points I. - III. set forth standard conditions: the same grounds, time limit, and
ouster clause may be found in a number of statutes, especially in the fields of
complusary purchase and land use planning Three notes should be made here:
(i) Grounds
Although the privatisation Acts refer to grounds (a) and (b) only, there is little
doubt that applicants are in the same position as if they would seek judicial review
under R.S.C. Ord. 53 (to be discussed below). All the traditional grounds (see
point 3.2 above) are available to impugn the validity of final or provisional orders.
As de Smith notes, " . . ., the language of judidical review is sometimes employed
to assess the validity of decisions challenged under statutory review [i.e. Statutory
Application to Quash]."101
(ii) Time limit
Compared to ordinary 'Common Law' judicial review procedures, the time limit is
(a) shorter and (b) stricter in the case of Statutory Application to Quash.
As to (a) -
Proceedings must be made within 42 days "from the date of service on him
of a copy of the order" *02 Applicants have only half the ordinary time limit
(three months) to turn to the court for help. Sir Thomas Bingham MR
underlined in Save Our Railways that applicants should "take action with the
utmost promptness."
100de Smith, Woolf and Jowell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995), Sections 14-072
and 15-065.
101de Smith, Woolf and Jowell: op. cit., Section 15-066.
102Section 30(1) of the Gas Act 1986.
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As to (b) -
Once this period has expired judicial review is deemed to be precluded 103;
the court has "no discretion to extend" this time period. 104
(ii) Scope of remedies
This issue has been discussed under point 3.3 above and will be analysed further
under 3.9.2(ii) below. Suffice it to say here that, compared to 'ordinary' judicial
review procedures, the remedial powers of the court are limited. 105 As a rule, two
kinds of remedies may be granted: the order complained of may be (a) quashed; or
(b) quashed and remitted back to the decision-maker for reconsideration106 So far
as the utilities sector is concerned, there is no practical difference between
remedies (a) and (b). If a final or provisional order is quashed, the issue will be
remitted to the Director General: as was noted under 3.4 above, only the head of
the regulatory offices may issue a new order.
/B/ R.S.C., Order 53 - procedure
This is the 'ordinary', Common Law judicial review procedure in England and
Wales. The procedural rules are set forth under Order 53. of the Rules of the
Supreme Court [hereinafter: R.S.C.].!^ This is the main procedural regime to
challenge regulatory orders. The point to be stressed here is that none of the
restrictions mentioned under point /A/ above are applicable here.
• Unlike in the case of the Statutory Application to Quash procedure, the kind of
orders susceptible to review is NOT defined here. Utilities and third parties
seek judicial review under R.S.C. Ord. 53. to impugn a wide variety of
regulatory decisions. The applicants argued in R. v. Director General of
Electricity Supply, ex parte Scottish Power (CA), LEXIS, 3 February 1997
that the regulator attached importance to a fact of no significant force; in R. v.
Director of Passenger Rail Franchising, ex parte Save Our Railways and
Others (CA), LEXIS, 15 December 1996 that the Director did not comply
with a ministerial direction; in In the Matter of Applications by Sherlock
and Morris for Judicial Review (QBD), LEXIS, 29 November 1996 that
Northern Ireland Electricity did not consider the personal circumstances of the
applicants; in R. v. Director General of Electricity Supply, ex parte Redrow
103Michael Fordham: Judicial Review Handbook (1997), para 28.2.
104de Smith, Woolf and Jowell: op.cit., Section 15-061.
105Ibid., Section 15-063.
106"Remission with a directon to consider" - Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson: Judicial
Review Procedure (1997), para 3.2.3.
107It was Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 which gave a statutory basis to Ord. 53. - de
Smith, Woolf and Jowell: op. cit., Section 15-011.
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Homes (Northern) Ltd. (QBD), LEXIS 3 February 1995 that the refusal to
determine a dispute was based upon a misconstruction of statutory provisions;
and so on. The point here is that any regulatory decision may be challenged
under R.S.C. Ord. 53., save final or provisional orders.
• The remedial powers of the court are not restricted to certiorari in the case of
R.S.C. Ord. 53. applications. In theory, mandamus, prohibition, declaration,
etc. may be issued: in practice, the court tends to grant certiorari only. The
reason for this will be discussed under point 3.9.2 below.
The diagrammatic presentation of the above discussion would be as follows:
Statutory Application to
Quash
R.S.C. Ord. 53
Grounds illegality, irrationality, and
procedural impropriety
illegality, irrationality, and
procedural impropriety
Time limit 42 days 3 months
Remedies certiorari or remission with a
direction to consider
certiorari, mandamus,
prohibition, declaration,
etc.109
TABLE 6.: Judicial Review Procedures Compared
To summarise: (i) two procedural regimes are available to challenge the validity of
regulatory orders; (ii) Statutory Application to Quash - rules apply if final or
provisional orders are reviewed; (iii) R.S.C. Ord. 53. shall be followed in the case
of other applications.
Part m.
The Economic Analysis of Judicial Review*
Economics and law interact in every regulatory decision. If economics and law are so
closely connected here, the economic analysis of law might help to understand how
the courts actually review regulatory orders.
The economic analysis of law is originally an American idea. The starting point for
this school of legal studies was a very simple observation: the fundamental logic of
Common law may be economics. Jiirgen Mackhaus summarised the basic principles
as follows:
108As was discusssed above, Statutory Application to Quash is the proper form of action in the case
of final or provisional orders.
109See: point 3.9.2 below.
110A version of this part of the thesis has been published in: Util. Law Rev., 9(1) Jan - Feb 1998,
pages 5-9. See Appendix 2.
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. . . the Common law evolves toward efficiency; the implication being
that statute law does not. . . . inefficient law creates large transactions
costs; hence parties gain from having inefficient legal arrangement
removed. It follows that inefficient legal rules will be litigated again
and again, until they approach efficiency. . . . We should therefore
observe a tendency toward efficiency in judicial rule making,
independent of the particular legal culture in which a judge opines. * 11
The operation of certain legal institutions may be remarkably well described with the
help of economic principles. For example, tort, contract, and competition law^ *2 may
be analysed by reference to principles such as (i) the inverse relationship between
price and output, (ii) opportunity cost, and (iii) the tendency of resources to gravitate
from lower valued to higher valued uses if voluntary exchange is permitted. * 1 3 Jhe
economic analysis of law became one of the fastest growing legal subjects in the USA
in the 1970s. Some leading figures of this law school were promoted to judiciary
posts in the 1980s. ^ ^ In contrast, the economic analysis of law was not able to take
root for decades in the UK. The subject was "all but ignored". ^ ^ The emergence of
post-privatisation regulation might direct the attention of British scholars and
business(wo)men towards the economic analysis of law. In his classic treatise on the
subject, The Economic Analysis of Law, Professor (later Judge) Posner dedicates a
full chapter to economic regulation. He argues that public utility regulation is the law's
answer to the problem of natural monopoly. 1 ^ Posner points out that public utility
regulation is a product "much like other products except supplied by the
government".
This 'product' is equally available to both the regulators and the regulated companies
at a certain cost. The Economic Analysis of Judicial Review intends to find out why
(i) certain potential 'customers' opt for this 'product', while (ii) others decide not to
pay for judicial review.
The discussion below will cover this very tiny area of the economic analysis of law. It
will be argued that judicial review is not the most efficient method of dispute
resolution between regulators and regulated companies. Judicial review does not
produce the best allocation of resources. Thus the number of litigations concerning
regulatory decisions may not increase further in the UK.
mJurgen Backhaus: Efficient Statute Law. In: Essays in Law and Economics, edited by: Michael
Faure, Roger Van den Bergh (1989), page 23.
112Cento Veljanovski: The Economics of Law (1990), page 15.
113Richard A. Posner: The Economic Analysis of Law (1972), page 5.
114Cento Veljanovski: op. cit., page 26.
n5Cento Veljanovski: op. cit., page 25.
116Richard A. Posner: op. cit., page 141.
U7Richard A. Posner: op. cit., page 153.
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As was mentioned above, judicial review of regulatory decisions was relatively rare
until the early 1990s. For example, the Director General of OFFER was sued on three
occasions only between 1989 and 1997.118 There has been an upsurge in judicial
review cases since 1993. The question now is whether the number of applications will
increase further. It may be useful then to discuss what points applicants are likely to
consider before turning to the courts for help. Potential applicants are expected to
challenge the validity of regulatory orders if certain conditions are fulfilled: it will be
argued below that a simple, perhaps oversimplified, mathematical formula may
summarise such conditions. The main points here will be that (i) potential applicants
may be divided into two groups; (ii) Licensees and Customers have different
incentives to seek judicial review; and (iii) the latter may find it easier to appeal to the
courts for the time being.
3.7 Introduction
It has been long recognised that there is an economic dimension to making
applications for judicial review. As a rule, practitioners are cost conscious when
contemplating an application for judicial review; and they frequently weight up the
pros- and cons in economic terms. Three examples might suffice here:
(1) The Public Law Project advocated the introduction of a pre-litigation
questionnaire in 1996 arguing that it would reduce "costs risk for
applicants".* 19
(2) Legal aid applications are decided on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis.
According to the Legal Aid Notes for Guidance (1995), no aid will be granted
"if the proceedings are not likely to be cost effective, i.e. the benefit to be
achieved does not justify the costs."
(3) A practitioner argues that making submissions at the application stage is a cost-
saving device for the respondent: (s)he attends and makes submissions "in the
hope of saving [her/]his own future costs which will be incurred if leave is
granted. "120
Thus practising lawyers are not deaf to economic considerations; they do make a brief
economic analysis before applying for judicial review.
As far as the economic analysis of law is concerned, judicial review of regulatory
orders is an especially promising research theme. Economics and law intertwine in
utility regulation: economic concepts, like cross-subsidy ('Hydro Benefit' in Scotland)
or cost-benefit analysis (Moreton - case below), are transplanted to a legal
environment here. Hence the economic analysis of law may help to understand under
what circumstances potential applicants will seek judicial review.
118Trade and Industry Committee: Energy Regulation HC 1996-97 50-ix, page 275. Q.6.
n9Stephen Cragg: The PLP's Pre-Litigation Questionnaire In: [1996] JR 71.
120Mark Shaw: Costs at the Leave Stage In: [1996] JR 8.
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3.8 Economic Model Introduced
The economic approach to judicial review would turn to applicants first, then a
formula will be introduced.
3.8.1. Applicants
The starting point here is that any interested party may apply for judicial review
against a regulatory decision.*21 As a rule, two groups of applicants exist: (i)
Licensees and (ii) Customers. The latter group includes (a) customers of utility
companies; plus (b) pressure groups. 122 jhe economic approach to judicial review
assumes that the difference between the behaviours of (a) and (b) is marginal: hence
this group will be referred to as Customers.
It is further assumed that Customers (i) always have a free choice whether (a) to apply
for judicial review or (b) not; and (ii) they are rational profit maximisers when opting
for (a) or (b): tactical challenge is excluded.
3.8.2 The formula
If (i) and (ii) are simultaneously assumed then applicants will seek judicial review if
(Papp - Preg)P-app > Capp
where
Papp probability that judicial review will be granted as estimated by the
applicant;
Preg probability that judicial review will be granted as estimated by the
regulator;
Rapp remedy as valued by applicant; and
Capp costs incurred by the applicant. 123
In the discussion below Probability, Remedy and Cost will be expressed as either low
or high. The reason for preferring 'low - high' to figures is discussed under 3.9.2
below. Numbers are not indispensable to the economic analysis of law: as Professor
Richard Posner notes, the economic analysis of law "need not be conducted at a high
121House of Commons: Trade and Industry Committee: Energy Regulation, HC 50-1, 1996-7, point
169., page lix.
122About the standing of pressure groups to seek judicial review, see: Kris Gledhill: Standing,
Capacity and Unincorporated Associations In: [1996] JR 67.
123For background to formula see: Richard A. Posner: Economic Analysis of Law (Little, Brown
and Company, 1992) §21.5
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level of formality or mathematization. The heart of economics is insight rather than
technique. "^24
3.9. Formula Applied
Not many regulatory orders were impugned between 1984 (OFTEL established) and
1997. The Trade and Industry Committee noted that "there have been few judicial
reviews" in the utilities sector. ^ -5 What it means is that more often than not the left-
hand side of the formula is smaller than Capp; thus potential applicants do not
challenge regulatory orders before the court. Why is it so ? To answer that question
the three elements of the formula should be analysed in some detail.
Applying the above formula to
Regina v. Director General of Gas Supply & another, ex parte Smith and
another (QBD), 1989 (Lexis, 31 July 1989);
Regina v. Director General of Electricity Supply, ex parte Redrow Homes
(Northern) Ltd. (QBD), 1995, (Lexis, 3 February 1995)
Regina v. National Rivers Authority, ex parte Moreton (QB), 1995 (Lexis, 13
September 1995);
• Regina v. Director General of Rail Franchising, ex parte Save Our Railways
(CA), 1995 (Lexis, 15 December 1995);
• Mercury Communications Ltd. v. Director General of Telecommunications
and another (HL) [1996] 1 All ER 575;
• In the matter of Applications by Sherlock and Morris for Judicial Review
(QBD), 1996 (Lexis, 29 November 1996);
Regina v. Director General of Telecommunications, ex parte British
Telecommunications pic. (QBD), 1996 (Lexis, 20 December 1996);
Regina v. Director General of Electricity Supply, ex parte Scottish Power
pic. (CA), 1997 (Lexis, 3 February 1997)
three conclusions would follow:
3.9.1. Probability
Nothing much should be said here. It is a well-known fact that the vast majority of
applications falls through in Britain: it is more likely than not that the original
regulatory order will not be quashed. As far as the above list is concerned, judicial
review was granted in Smith -, Redrow Homes -, Save Our Railways - and Scottish
Power - cases; that is four out of ten. The overall picture is not more promising: (a)
124Richard A. Posner: The Future of Law and Economics Movement in Europe. Internationa]
Review of Law and Economics 17:3-14, at 14.
125House of Commons: op.cit., point 169.
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no judicial review against decisions of the Takeover Panel has succeeded so far; 126
and (b) 6.4% of the total number of applications for judicial review against decisions
of the Home Office were successful between 1991 and 1996.127 Hence Preg is high:
regulators may be optimistic that the court will not set aside regulatory orders
challenged.
Turning to Papp, the first point is that an applicant may never be sure whether her/his
application will be successful. As a rule, judicial review jurisdiction is
discretionary: 128 1S Up t0 the court whether judicial review will be granted. Thus
applicants should proceed with caution when estimating the probability that her/his
application will be successful. The Sherlock & Morris - case is a reminder: although
Kerr J found that "the applicants are, prima facie, entitled to have the decisions of
NIE quashed", he did not "accede to the applications for judicial review." Hence Papp
tends to be low.
If Preg is high and Papp is low then (Papp - Preg) will be low; and it must be low.
Otherwise disputes between regulators and regulatees would not be negotiated but
referred to the court.
3.9.2 Remedy
It may be useful to make an introductory point here. Rapp should not be confused
with the monetary value of claims, and this is for two reasons:
(i) The monetary value of certain claims may not be established. The Moreton -
case is a good example here. Ms. Moreton is "a regular swimmer in the sea at
Tenby"; she was concerned "about the effect of the increased effluent discharge
... on the quality of the bathing water where she swims." What was the
monetary value ofRapp in this case ? The formula set forth above presumes that
Ms. Moreton had a positive Rapp in her mind; otherwise she would not have
applied for judicial review. But it is pure guesswork to express Rapp as
hundreds or thousands of pounds now. Thus the economic analysis of judicial
review might run into practical difficulties if Rapp were the monetary value of
claims.
(ii) Should Rapp stand for the sums of money at stake, it would simply reflect the
well-known fact that Licensees have bigger financial muscles than their
customers. For example, the applicant reckoned in Scottish Power that an
additional GBP40m revenue may be collected until the next price review (1998)
if the application for judicial review were granted. On the other hand, a gas
customer was suing for as little as GBP 198.19: Pill J himself commented in
Smith that "the sum of money involved is not large." The point here is that if
126House of Lords: Hansard, 14 January 1997, Column 164.
127House of Commons: Hansard, Written Answer, 16 July 1997.
128Peter Cane: An Introduction to Administrative Law (Clarendon Press, 1996), page 70.
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Rapp were the same as the value of claims it would be always high for Licensees
and low for Customers. But Rapp has a more complex role to play in the
formula.
It should be recalled that Rapp was defined above as Remedy as valued by applicant.
The economic analysis of law would underline that applicants consider two factors in
deciding whether to seek judicial review: (i) Lawfulness and (ii) Action. The two
terms and the difference between them may be explained as follows:
(i) Lawfulness
All the cases listed above may be reduced to a YES - NO binary code: either
the regulator's decision is legally 'respectable' or not. Either he complied with a
direction given to him by the Secretary of State or not (Save Our Railways -
case); Either he has the power to make certain licence modifications or not
(British Telecom - case); Either he must determine a dispute referred to him or
not (Redrow Homes - case); and so on. The economic analysis will refer to
this YES - NO point as Lawfulness. It is the classic domain of judicial review
jurisdiction. Judges are well placed to make decisions about the Lawfulness of
regulatory orders. But Lawfulness is not the full story in the regulatory game:
the emphasis is on Action.
(ii) Action
If Lawfulness has been decided in favour of the applicant, the "And what's
next ?" question will arise. A new regulatory order will be issued in
accordance with the judgement of the court: it will spell out Action. The link
between (a) judgement and (b) Action is of crucial importance. Applicants
may not worry about the Lawfulness of a regulatory decision if, and so long
as, it does not harm their economic or other (e.g. Moreton) interests. They
would like to know what Actions will follow once the regulator's decision has
been quashed. Thus applicants want judicial review to cover Lawfulness and
Action.
The point here is that applicants are looking for remedies that address both
Lawfulness and Action. Six kinds of orders may be granted under the law of England:
there are (i) the 'trilogy of prerogative orders' (certiorari *29^ mandamus^0 ancj
prohibition), (ii) declaration^ 1, (iii) injunction and (iv) damages. 132
129Scottish terminology: Reduction. John St. Clair and Neil F. Davidson: Judicial Review in
Scotland (1986), point 4.02.
130There is no mandamus in Scots law; the nearest equivalent is 'Implement'. Tom Mullen:
Introduction to Scottish Judicial Review In: [1996] JR 107.
131Scottish terminology: Declarator. John St. Clair and Neil F. Davidson: op. cit., point 4.06.
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Declaration and mandamus would be the best choices, perhaps: they may determine
what Action the regulator must take. It is no surprise then that these orders are
popular among applicants. Declaration was sought in, for example, Smith. Scottish
Power. British Telecom. Mercury. The courts have full discretion as to the form of
judgements under British administrative law. Judges tend to keep their involvement in
the regulatory game to the minimum: they are willing to set aside the original
resolution but other remedies may not be granted. The best examples are Scottish
Power and Smith: the original regulatory decision was quashed but no further orders
were made, although the applicants were seeking other remedies. It is unsatisfactory:
judicial review settles Lawfulness but the judgement is likely to be reticent about
Action. As a rule, certiorari or a "remission with a direction to consider" 133 do not
determine what Action the regulator shall take. It is for the regulator to reconsider the
matter impugned: (s)he is the decision-maker.
There are exceptions: certiorari may point to the only legally acceptable Action in
certain cases. Once the court has ruled in favour of the applicant on Lawfulness, the
course the regulator "should lawfully take will often be obvious." 134 For example, the
applicants had been disconnected in Smith or Sherlock & Morris. If judicial review is
granted, it is likely that they will be reconnected. As a rule, certiorari may determine
Action when applicants are complaining about a past grievance; like disconnection,
payment of excessive connection charge IRedrow Homes) and the like.
But Licensees apply for judicial review so as to influence future regulatory actions.
For example, Lord Slynn commented in Mercury that the plaintiff was "seeking to
clarify position for future negotiation and determination." The Scottish Power - case
is another example. Although it was a challenge against the currently operational price
formula, the applicant's main worry was not the 1994/95 - 1997/98 period. What the
applicant tried to achieve was that the September 1994 price proposals, which
retained the total market definition of GBY, will not "set a precedent for future
regulatory reviews." The setting aside of the original decision will not satisfy
Licensees in the cases mentioned above. As was noted above, the order of certiorari is
reticent about Action: the Director General may come to the same decision (s)he
previously made. 135 por example, the Director General of Telecommunications made
it clear in Mercury that he adhered to his original determination. Certiorari would not
have been a terribly useful order in this case. Thus Licensees want judicial review to
go beyond Lawfulness: judgements should address Action.
Judges disagree. As Sir Thomas Bingham, MR, put it in the Save Our Railways -
case, "Our task begins and ends with review of lawfulness ofwhat has been done". As
a rule, the courts confine their attention to Lawfulness: judges try to steer clear of
Action. Thus judges prefer certiorari to declaration: and they may impose their
132Michael Fordham: Judicial Review Handbook (John Wiley & Sons, 1997), para 24.1.
133Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson: Judicial Review Procedure (John Wiley & Sons, 1997),
para 3.2.3.
134Ibid.
135Michael Fordham, op. cit., para 4.1.3.
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preferences on potential consumers. As was mentioned above, judges have full
discretion as to the form of order(s) to be granted: the application may be for
mandamus and declaration, but the court may issue an order of certiorari (Smith and
Scottish Power - cases).
What does it mean in terms of the formula ? The main point here is that Licensees and
Customers have different views about Remedy. As far as Licensees are concerned,
Rapp will be high if judicial review deals with both Lawfulness and Action.
Declaration or mandamus would be ideal remedies: they could indicate what Action
shall follow once the original order has been quashed on the ground of Lawfulness.
Thus Rapp will be high if declaration or mandamus were likely to be granted. But
judges have a certiorari-friendly policy. They intend to limit their involvement to
Lawfulness; Action is not their concern. This judicial approach devalues Rapp- Hence
Remedy will be low for Licensees: they cannot predict from the decision on
Lawfulness what Action the regulator will take.
As far as Customers are concerned, the certiorari-friendly policy is less problematic:
an order to quash may point to the only acceptable Action. Thus Remedy may be
high for Customers. The importance of this point will be apparent in a moment.
3.9.3. Costs
It is common ground that judicial review is costly. Potential consumers will incur
hefty expenses: it cost on average GBP50,000 to bring a judicial review case in
1995 136 Qne 0f the reasons for the relatively high cost is that legal fees are allocated
on the basis of the 'loser-pay-all' principle in Britain. If I sue you before a British
court and my application is NOT successful, then I have to pay two sets of solicitors
and barristers - yours and mine. By contrast, each party bears its own cost in the US.
The Toser-pay-all' principle discourages potential applicants in Britain: only (a) the
very rich (i.e. utilities) and (b) the 'sufficiently' poor (i.e. those eligible for legal aid)
will seek judicial review. The vast majority of utility customers is somewhere in-
between (a) and (b): as a rule, they will not run the risk of incurring hefty legal
expenses.
And legal expenses are not the full story here: judicial review tends to increase the
overall cost of regulation. A consensus-driven system of utility regulation operates in
the UK. An application for judicial review flies in the face of the 'Negotiate but do not
litigate !' principle. Dragging a Director General to court will re-arrange relations
between regulators and regulatees: this is the phenomenon known as 'juridification'.
Increased judicial review will slow down the regulatory machinery. *37 it is bad news
for the regulatees: regulation will be more time consuming and, consequently, more
expensive. Thus judicial review is likely to put regulatory costs up.
!36The Independent, 2 August 1995.
137Colin Scott: The Juridification of Regulatory Relations in the UK Utilities Sector (unpublished
paper, 1997), page 29.
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This point does not apply to the other group of consumers. Unlike Licensees,
Customers do not negotiate with regulators on a day-to-day basis. The fact that the
regulatory process may slow down does not disturb them. Thus increase in regulatory
costs is not a cause for concern in the case of Customers.
Furthermore, some Customers may receive state aid when challenging the validity of
regulatory orders. For example, the Smiths and Ms. Sherlock were dependent on
DHSS benefit: they were presumably on legal aid. Thus judicial review was available
on a free-of-charge basis in the Smith - and Sherlock & Morris - cases.
The final point here is that the more applications for judicial review are there, the
more expensive utility regulation will be; Cost is likely to go up. Licensees will get the
lion's share of regulatory costs; they will have high Capp. But Capp is low for
Customers. Actually, some of them may get legal aid to impugn the validity of
regulatory orders.
The main points of the above discussion may be re-stated briefly: (a) Probability tends
to be low for Applicants, (b) Remedy would be high if orders other than certiorari
were granted. For the time being Rapp is low for Licensees: judges pursue a
certiorari-ffiendly policy. The granting of other prerogative orders or declaration are
more the exception than the rule; and (c) Cost is high for Licensees and low for
Customers.
According to the formula set forth above, potential consumers will opt for judicial
review if (Papp - Preg)Rapp is bigger than Cost. As was mentioned above, Probability
is low. And it shall remain so: high Papp would open the floodgates for judicial
review applications. Hence the left-hand side of the formula may be bigger than Capp
if (i) Remedy is high, or (ii) Cost is low.
Two concluding remarks may be made here:
Licensees - Cost is high. Thus they will only apply for judicial review if Remedy is
high. But Rapp is actually low: certiorari is the preferred form of order. Remedy
would be high for Licensees if mandamus or declaration were granted more
frequently; while
Customers - Cost is low; and Remedy is high here. Customers are complaining of
past grievances an order to quash may redress effectively.
The economic analysis would conclude then that the certiorari-friendly policy may
discourage Licensees from seeking judicial review: they would have more incentives
to turn to the court for help if judges were inclined to make orders of mandamus
and/or declaration. The judiciary's practice concerning the form of orders granted will
influence the future number of applications for judicial review.
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3.10. Towards arbitration ?
If the courts are unwilling to supervise the operation of the regulatory agencies, who
else should do this job ? The likely direction of development will be towards
alternative dispute resolution techniques. In principle, disputes between regulators and
regulated may be arbitrated both in England and in Scotland. As far as the law of
Scotland is concerned, the Stair Encyclopaedia makes the following declaration about
the scope of questions which may be referred to arbitration:
... in general every matter may be made the subject of arbitration with
regard to which the parties have a dispute and over which they possess
a sufficient power of disposal. 138
The Encyclopaedia gives specific examples of matters which are not subject to
arbitration. These include question of domicile, legitimacy, subsistence or otherwise of
marriage, whether a party is an alien or a British subject, and obligation which are
illegal or contra bonos mores.^9 Unless regulatory orders fall into the last group, as
some Labour supporters seem to think, no theoretical difficulties exists as to the
arbitrability of regulatory decisions. For example, arbitrators could have interpreted
the two terms that were in dispute in Mercury. This case did not involve public rights
or questions in which the public have an interest. The parties could have opted for
arbitration.
Regulators and regulated may consider to arbitrate future disputes. The electricity
sector took the lead in this direction. Prior to the privatisation of the distribution
companies a general arbitration agreement was executed whereby all the parties
agreed to refer future disputes to a panel of arbitrators. No reference has been
reported under this agreement to date. Similar developments may occur in the gas
sector. British Gas pic. recommended that the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
should arbitrate in any dispute between OFGAS and the company. ^0 Furthermore,
two adjudicating bodies were established in the rail industry to resolve disputes
without recourse to court. ^1
The main point here is that arbitration would serve the interests of the parties better
than the courts do. Arbitration would offer the following benefits:
As to cost and time - The cost of a short arbitration procedure is likely to be less than
the overall costs of litigation before the courts. Furthermore, arbitration provides a
high degree of privacy. Regulators could avoid publicity which may help to preserve
much-needed working relations for the future.
138The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume 2., para. 413.
I39Ibid, para. 414.
140The Financial Times, 16 January 1996.
141 Jeffrey Goh: Privatisation of the Railways and Judicial Review In: [1996] 7 Util LR 42.
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As to suitability of the final product - Compared to an order of the High Court, an
arbitration award may better fit the practical needs of the parties. Arbitration is not a
supervisory jurisdiction; the final award need not be restricted to a declaration or to
the setting aside of the original order. If the arbitration agreement is so drafted, the
arbitrators may rule on the merits of the regulatory decision impugned. At the end of
the arbitration process the applicant may end up with a final version of the new order.
As was shown above, the Royal Courts of Justice cannot provide this kind of service
due to jurisdictional restrictions.
As to high risk - Arbitrators tend to be less concerned with broad public policy
arguments than the ordinary courts are. Regulated utilities may expect to obtain the
remedy sought if the disputed is arbitrated, provided that they can show a strong case
(Cf: Sherlock & Morris)
To summarise, arbitration appears to be a less risky method of dispute resolution than
judicial review. This method of dispute resolution does not suffer from the three
short-comings of judicial review discussed above. Some regulated companies already
indicated their willingness to switch to arbitration. It is up to the regulatory offices
now to make the necessary steps in this direction.
Conclusion
This chapter has tried to find out why judicial review is a relatively rare remedy in the
post-privatisation regulatory regime. The main point is that judicial review does not
satisfy the practical needs of regulated companies, and this is for the following
reasons:
Judges do not intend to participate in the regulatory game. As Sir Thomas
Bingham put it in Save Our Railways. " . . the court should not intervene [in the
regulatory process] unless it is quite clear that it should, . . .".
Remedies granted do not solve the problem. A declaration or the setting aside of
the original order will not end the dispute between the regulator and the regulated.
(Scottish Power: and Smith) On the other hand, legal proceedings could seriously
damage day-to-day co-operation with the regulator.
• Regulation is highly personalised. After a successful judicial review the regulated
company must go back to the same regulator. Only one person, the competent
Director General, could issue a new order.
120
• The economic analysis of law concluded that judicial review is not the most
efficient dispute resolution technique. The non-interventionist approach of the
judiciary may discourage potential applicants from seeking judicial review. Thus
regulated utilities and their customers may refer future disputes to arbitration (as
opposed to judicial review).
Chapter 4.
The Success ofPrivatisation - how could it be appraised ?
A discussion about the success of privatisation is not an exact science; the same
transaction may please some and disappoint others. For example, the Department of
Education and Science told the Committee of Public Accounts that the sale of the
Plant Breeding Institute "represented a wholly satisfactory outcome".* As will be
discussed in Part I. below, the Treasury actually lost GBP38.85m. One may wonder
then whether it was really a 'satisfactory outcome'.
How should the success of privatisation transactions be appraised ?
According to the findings of Dennis Swann, commentators approach the economic
impact of privatisation from three angles:
Theoretical issues: "whether ownership is itself a significant factor";
Relative efficiency of public and private enterprise; and
Actual experience in UK industries pre- and post-privatisation.2
High level economics and a load of empirical studies are a must to research any of
these issues: this thesis will take a less sophisticated approach. Let us suppose that you
and I agree that we will walk from the Royal Commonwealth Swimming Pool to the
top of Lion's Head and back within five hours. It would be quite natural ifwe were to
agree that our performance shall be tested against the objective agreed (i.e. (a) top of
Lion's Head and (b) back within five hours). If
(a) you return within five hours, while I do not; and/or
(b) you reach Lion's Head, while I do not, then
there is no doubt that you succeeded and I failed.
The same approach may be adopted to assess the success of the sale of state-owned
assets/companies. The 'what happened' should be compared with the 'what should
have happened': results should be tested against the objectives of privatisation. In
theory, this exercise should be straightforward - only two simple questions should be
answered: (i) What objectives and targets were set ? and (ii) Did the government
achieve those targets ? Yet this approach does not seem to work in practice: the
British government did not have a clear set of objectives. Sir Christopher Foster notes
that "there was no clear or comprehensive government statement of its [i.e.
Committee of Public Accounts: Sale of the National Seed Development Organisation and Part of
the Assets of the Plant Breeding Institute HC 218 1988-89 [hereinafter referred to: HC 218 1988-
89], page v., point 3. and page 5., Q. 1833.
2Dennis Swann: The Retreat of the State (1988), page 296.
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privatisation] objectives" in the first years of privatisation.3 Peter Jackson agrees; he
points out that
Privatisation was a policy which was stumbled upon. The incoming
1979 Thatcher Government did not have a well established
privatisation policy. Instead, privatisation policy emerged or evolved.
It was a policy which enabled politicians the means of achieving a
number of policy objectives.4
Peter Saunders and Colin Harris also argue that:
There has never been an official government statement about the
objectives behind privatization. Over time, of course, various ministers
have delivered speeches or written articles defending and justifying the
policy, but the reasons they have given have seemed to change as the
years have gone by and they have sometimes contradicted each other. ^
Academic writers finished the job the government did not (or could not) do:
university professors compiled lists of privatisation objectives. Actually one was not
an authority on privatisation unless (s)he had her/his own list of 'major objectives of
privatisation'. For example, Peter Saunders and Colin Harris list the following
objectives:
to reduce public sector borrowing;
to increase efficiency;
to weaken the power of the public sector trade unions;
to enhance managerial autonomy and initiative; and
to create 'popular capitalism'."
Christopher Johnson defined four objectives:
to reduce the role of the state in the economy;
• to raise money for the public finances;
to improve economic performance by increasing competition; and
to widen share ownership.^
3C.D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (1992),
page 116.
4Peter M. Jackson: The Privatisation of the British Public Sector: An Assessment of a Policy
Innovation In: Mario Baldassarri, Alfredo Mucchiati and Diego Diacertino (eds): The Privatisation
of Public Utilities: The Case of Italy (1996), page 76.
5Peter Saunders and Colin Harris: Privatization and Popular Capitalism (1994), page 18.
6Peter Saunders and Colin Harris: op. cit., page 19.
7Christopher Johnson: The Economics of Britain's Electricity Privatization In: Lloyds Bank Annual
Review: Privatization and Ownership (1988), page 60.
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According to Cento Veljanovski, the following emerged as the major objectives of
privatisation:
to reduce government involvement in the decision-making of industry;
to permit industry to raise funds from the capital market on commercial terms
without government guarantee;
to raise revenue and reduce the public sector borrowing requirement;
to promote wide share ownership;
to create an enterprise culture;
to encourage workers' share ownership in their companies;
to increase competition and efficiency; and
to replace ownership and financial controls with a more effective system of
economic regulation designed to ensure that benefits of greater efficiency are
passed on to consumers. ^
And, finally, Brian McBeth summarises the objectives of privatisation as follows:
The efficiency of publicly-owned assets would improve while market discipline
would be restored in certain key areas;
Government involvement in public enterprise decision-making would be reduced,
so that companies would be more free to allocate their financial, physical and
human resources to the most appropriate areas;
The financial burden of the government and, most importantly, its borrowing
requirement would decrease;
The government's revenues would receive a one-off boost, and then would be
increased by improved tax revenues; and
Financial market development would be stimulated.9
The government could have put an end to the 'battle of lists' by publishing a paper on
the objectives of privatisation: but it was never done. As Simon Jenkins writes, "The
cabinet never saw a white paper putting the case for privatization. Thus it was not
quite clear what goals the government actually pursued. According to Oliver Letwin,
this is not a problem: he warns that searching for a single stream of objectives is
"dangerously naive and unproductive.But how may one decide whether the goals
of privatisation have been achieved if there are no pre-established objectives against
which the success of transactions could be tested ?
8Cento Veljanovski: Selling the State (1987), page 8.
9Brian McBeth: Privatisation. A Strategic Report (1996), page 9.
10Simon Jenkins: Accountable to None (1995), page 25.
11Oliver Letwin: Privatising the World (1988), page 27.
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The starting point is that there are three motives on the list of all the commentators
quoted above:
maximizing revenue;
extending share ownership; and
improving economic performance.^
For the purposes of this discussion, let us suppose that these were the 'core objectives'
of privatisation. Having answered question (i) as set forth above, the discussion may
move on to question (ii): Did the government achieve these objectives ? This Chapter
will try to answer that question.
An introductory point should be addressed here. The Preface has promised that this
thesis will concentrate on utility privatisation. Yet this Chapter will analyse the sale of
some non-utility companies, like Plant Breeding Institute, the trust ports, and British
Coal. The reason for 'straying away' from the utilities sector is that the transactions
mentioned above are prime examples of'less successful projects"; i.e. disposals which
did not live up to expectations. In the case of 'less successful projects' there is a gap
between (a) objectives and (b) reality; and those gaps are a must if one wishes to
analyse the success of privatisation in Britain. The main reason for discussing the sale
of the Plant Breeding Institute, trust ports, and British Coal is that such 'gaps' are
easily visible in the case of these projects.
Yet detecting 'gaps' would be more complicated in the utilities sector. So far as the
first two objectives listed above are concerned, one would find rather impressive
numbers, (a) The government collected millions of pounds from the sale of electricity,
gas, telecommunication, and water shares; the facts are as follows^:
Industry Privatisation proceeds
(GBP million, financia year)
Electricity (England & 3,134 2,329 1,465
Wales) (1990-91) (1991 -92) (1992 -93)
Electricity (Scotland) 1,112 907 709
(1991 -92) (1992 -93) (1993 -94)
Natural gas 1,820 1,758 1,555
(1986 - 87) (1987 - 88) (1988 - 89)
Telecommunication 1,358 1,246 1,081
(1984 - 85) (1985 - 86) (1986 - 87)
Water 423 1,487 1,485
(1989-90) (1990 -91) (1991 -92)
TABLE 7.: Privatisation proceeds
12For example, John Ernst: Whose Utility ? (1994), page 83.
13Source: H.M. Treasury: Her Majesty's Treaury Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme
(August 1995), Table 5.6.
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(b) It is a fact that millions of people subscribed for utility shares. For example,
around a quarter of existing shareholders increased their holdings, and "over 800,000
people became new shareholders" in National Power/Power Gen when the residual
stakes were sold off in 1995(extending share ownership).
This thesis does not intend to discuss whether utility privatisation met the 'maximizing
revenue' and 'extending share ownership' objectives; rather (i) Parts I. and II. will
refer to non-utility projects which certainly failed to satisfy the two objectives
mentioned; while (ii) Part III. will argue that utility privatisation seems to have
difficulties with the third objective (improving economic performance).
Hence the structure of this Chapter will be as follows: Part I. will be concerned with
the objective of'maximizing revenue': the sale of (i) British Coal, (ii) British Energy
pic., (iii) Plant Breeding Institute and (iv) the trust ports will be analysed here. Part II.
will discuss the other two core objectives: it will be argued that the structure of share
ownership did not change fundamentally in the UK, thus it is open to question
whether the 'widening share ownership' objective has been achieved. Part III. will deal
with the restructuring of public utilities. The discussion will conclude that 'the
improving economic efficiency' objective may not be achieved unless utility markets
are restructured and liberalised.
Part I.
Maximizing Revenue
Every newspaper reader is familiar with the 'maximizing revenue' objective in Britain.
It is the 'family silver' argument: did the Tory government sell off the 'family silver' ?
Those who answer this question in the affirmative believe that nationalised industries
were undervalued at privatisation. The Conservative party disagrees; the two most
frequently used arguments are as follows:
Giant transactions
The disposal of public utilities was among the biggest ever flotations in Europe:
the sale of the first tranche of British Telecom shares was "the biggest equity
offering ever made anywhere in the world."^ It was necessary to set a price at a
relatively low level in order to guarantee that millions of investors would purchase
British Telecom, British Gas, water or electricity shares.
14Sir George Young Bt MP: Speech to World Privatisation Conference In: H.M. Tresury: op. cit.,
pages 77 - 82., at 80.
15Simon Jenkins: Accountable to None (1995), page 29.
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Maximizing revenue overridden
In addition to 'maximizing revenue1 other objectives, like the widening of share
ownership or the need to close a transaction as soon as possible, were also
considered in setting the offer price. Cento Veljanovki notes that when the
government tried to widen share ownership the disposals were "a bit of a bargain":
"The shares must appear a good buy to the man in the street."^ Simon Jenkins
makes a similar point: Margaret Thatcher "stressed the need to sell fast, and if
necessary cheap, to the widest number of shareholders."^ Bryan Hurl delivered
the final judgement on this point:
. . . positive economics usually yields to the 'political utility
function': governments maximize short-term political vote-catching
returns at the expense of resource optimization. Throughout theJS&Os.,
the silver has been under-valued in an attempt to establish 'people's
capitalism'.
The issue whether companies were undervalued at privatisation or not has been
discussed in hundreds (if not thousands) of publications. This Part will attempt to
approach the 'maximizing revenue' objective from a different perspective. The starting
point here is that the Treasury did not (i) retain or (ii) collect privatisation proceeds in
full in the case of certain transactions. This Part will refer to such projects as 'less
successful transactions'. The attraction of this approach is that it is not concerned with
the 'undervalued or not' dilemma; the 'maximizing revenue' objective was obviously
not achieved if "it cost the government more to get rid of the industry than it received
back in revenue". 19
Two issues should be analysed in connection with less successful transactions: (i)
Liability of privatisation candidate; and (ii) Mismanagement. Liability will be
considered in connection with (a) the coal industry and (b) nuclear power stations.
Mismanagement will be discussed in the light of the (c) PBI-sale and (d) the disposal
of the trust ports.
Mining Subsidence and Nuclear Decommissioning
After the giant flotations, like British Telecom pic. (1984), British Gas pic. (1986),
English and Welsh electricity companies (1991), privatisation seemed 'unstoppable'^:
no political party or trade union could deter the government from offering further
companies for sale. Yet two long-awaited projects were not coming forward: in 1993
16Cento Veljanovski: Selling the State (1987), page 102.
17Simon Jenkins, op. cit., page 32.
I8Bryan Hurl: Privatization and the Public Sector (1988), page 56. Bold original.
19Peter Saunders and Colin Harris: Privatization and Popular Capitalism (1994), page 53.
20The Financial Times, 20 November 1992.
127
the Treasury referred to the privatisation of the coal and the nuclear power industries
as 'major privatisations in hand'21. These transactions were completed in 1995 and in
1996 respectively. If not political opposition, what else could hold up the sale of
British Coal and the nuclear industry ? While the disposal of coal mines seems to have
nothing common with the flotation of British Energy plc.22^ the two projects are
actually closely linked: both of these industries were beset with 'open ended'23
obligations.24 The purpose of this Part is to examine how such claims were parcelled
out between the government and investors (a) in the coal industry and (b) in the
nuclear energy business.
4.1 British coal
Preparations for the sale of coal mines took some eight years in Britain.25 It would
not have been an unusually long period in the utility sector26) however coal mining is
not a natural monopoly. Hence the two most likely reasons for delay, ownership and
economic regulation, may be ruled out:
Ownership of Coal
Pursuant to the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, interests in unworked coal
and in coal mines were vested in the National Coal Board; these interests were re-
transferred to the newly established Coal Authority in 199422
Price of coal
The price of coal is not regulated. Price regulation would be superfluous: coal is in
direct competition with alternative sources of energy, especially with natural gas.
21HM Treasury Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme (1993), page 23., point 132.
22The coal industry has been in the decline since 1957 (R. Keif-Cohen: Twenty Years of
Nationalisation (1969), page 210.), while nuclear may be the power of the future. The former was
a trade sale in a closed tender; the latter was a public flotation.
230pen ended obligation: potential claims the total value of which may not be assessed precisely at
privatisation but likely to be detrimental to the profitability of the business concerned.
24Lord Crickhowell, Chairman of the National Rivers Authority made a similar point in 1994;
however, his comment went unnoticed in the financial press. See: The Guardian, 15 April 1994. see
also: C.D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly
(1992), page 134.
25The Financial Times, 23 November 1993.
26According to C.D. Foster, preparation for the disposal of British Gas pic. took more than five
years. See: C.D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly
(1992), page 130.
27Section 7 of the Coal Industry Act 1994.
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Competition was so fierce in the past that coal prices were 'absurdly' low in relation to
costs.28
Hence a third issue may be blamed for the long delay: the liability of mine operators.
Two major sources of liabilities were identified in the coal industry: (i) environmental
'time-bombs'; and (ii) subsidence.29
(i) Environmental issues
A commentator noted in early 1995 that environmental time-bombs were the
"major challenge facing British Coal's new owners."20 Water pollution was of
special concern in the coal industry. On average, 2.3 tons of water must be
pumped from a British mine to extract a ton of saleable coal. 21 For example,
British Coal pumped 25m gallons of water every day from the Durham pits;
running the eleven pumping stations cost GBP6m a year.22 Underground
water remains a source of potential liability after the closure of mines. If not
pumped for certain period of time, water from abandoned mines starts to leak.
The Commission on Energy and the Environment reported in 1981 that 0.5m
gallons per day had been overflowing into the river Girvan since 1979.22 j^e
mine closure programme of the early 1990s compounded the problem:
according to the National Rivers Authority, 200 km of rivers in England and
Wales were polluted by leaks from abandoned coal mines in 1994.24 In
addition to water pollution, flooding was also a threat: for example, 10 acres
of fields in County Durham were flooded from a single disused pit shaft in
1979.25
The National Rivers Authority published a special report about abandoned
mines and water pollution in 1994.26 This document concluded that the
Authority had insufficient statutory power to prosecute mine operators for
polluting water. Under the Water Resources Act 1991 'permitting' water from
28The Economist, 9 February 1991. World price was around GBP30/ton, while the British Coal
price was around GBP43/ton. Source: The Economist, 24 October 1992.
29The Financial Times, 1 June 1994.
30J. Fitzpatrick: British Coal Privatisation. An Examination of the Environmental Issues (1995),
page 26.
31Commission on Energy and the Environment: Coal and the Environment (1981), Table 7.1. The
pumping of water from coal mine is by no means a modern problem. W. Leibniz, philosopher and
mathematician, developed windmills to pump minewater in Harz Mountains in the 1680s. Source:
The Encyclopaedia Britannica (http://www.eb.180), entry: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.
32The Financial Times, 1 October 1993.
■"Commission on Energy and the Environment: Coal and the Environment (1981), page 45.
34The Financial Times, 15 April 1994.
35The Financial Times, 22 December 1993.
"National Rivers Authority: Abandoned Mines and the Water Environment (1994)
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an abandoned mine to enter controlled water is not an offence. 37 While the
Water Resources Act 1991 does not apply to Scotland^ Scots law is not
different from the law of England on this point. The Stair Encyclopaedia
writes that "To permit water from an abandoned mine to enter relevant waters
is not of itself unlawful. "3 9 Who shall finance then the minewater pumping
and water treatment programmes after privatisation ?
(ii) Subsidence
Houses and lands had been subsiding ever since the introduction of deep coal
mining. The liability of mine operators for subsidence damages had a "long
and often tangled" history in Britain.40 One point should be highlighted from
the past of subsidence regulation here: after the passage of the Coal-Mining
(Subsidence) Act 1957 British Coal Corporation was obliged to repair
damaged property or, alternatively, to pay compensation. The Corporation
spent around GBP50m per annum on subsidence.41 Who shall pick up the bill
for subsidence claims after privatisation ?
Environmental time-bombs and subsidence were truly open ended liabilities: nobody
knew how much the "large overhang of financial obligations"^ would cost, but
claims were doomed to be in the region of millions of pounds. It was feared that the
total value of claims would make the mining of certain coal uneconomic; past
liabilities were reported to exceed profits in some of the five regions offered for
sale.43 The Guardian went one step further: the newspaper alleged that liabilities 'are
likely' to exceed the total business value of British Coal.44 The government
acknowledged that questions surrounding the extent of liabilities must be resolved
prior to privatisation. Lord Wakeham, the then Energy Minister, told the House of
Commons that
37Section 89(3) of the Water Resources Management Act 1991.
38Section 225(3) of the Water Pollution Act 1991. The relevant Act in Scotland is the Control of
Pollution Act 1974.
39The Law of Scotland The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (1989), Vol. 25., Para. 403. The same
act was declared to be an offence under the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) (Scotland) Act 1951.
See: Lockhart v. National Coal Board 1981 S.L.T. 161.
40The Repair and Compensation System for Coal Mining Subsidence Damage Cmd 235 (1987-
1988), page 34.
41The figure for the 1992-93 business year was GBP46m. Source: The Financial Times, 13 January
1994.
42C. D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (1992),
page 134.
43The Financial Times, 13 January 1993 and Energy Committee: Mining Subsidence HC 287 1989-
90, page 90., Q. 376.
44The Guardian, 15 April 1994.
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. . . there seems no possibility of privatising British Coal without first
clearing up the questions of liability and subsidence.45
In addition to the government and potential investors, third parties were also keen to
see how liabilities will be apportioned. For example, Durham City Council told the
financial press that it would seek an injunction against the new mine operator unless
"the government spells out where responsibility lies after privatisation" .46 The
Chairman of the National Rivers Authority also insisted that uncertainty over liability
should be settled before privatisation.47
The main point here is that the history of British Coal privatisation is the story of
allocating open-ended liabilities between the private and the public sectors. The
underlying rule of this process may be summarised as follows: the more liabilities the
government was willing to retain, the higher privatisation proceeds will be. The
Environmental Department alluded to this rule in the press: the Department pointed
out that making mine owners responsible for liabilities "would have adverse effects on
the proceeds to the Government. "48 Thus the two extremes were out of the question:
neither the government nor potential investors could take on all liabilities. The former
would have been politically embarrassing, the latter would have deterred investors.
Hence future claims had to be portioned out between the government and investors.
After years of negotiations49 the following arrangements were in place when coal
mines were offered for sale:
Water pollution -
A new Act was passed to assuage potential investors. Under the Environment Act
1995 water from abandoned mines may enter controlled water without legal sanction
until 2000; all mines closed before then will be exempt. 50 After 2000 operators will
be fined for polluting controlled water from mines that were in operation after 31
December 1999.
Legislators in other countries are less lenient as far as mine water pollution is
concerned. For example, the new Mining Act in Poland burdens operators with the
costs of damage caused by dumping water in rivers. 5 1 It may not be ruled out that the
British Parliament exempted mine operators so as to help the privatisation of the coal
industry.
45HC Debt. 16 January 1990, c. 199.
46The Financial Times, 26 January 1994.
47The Financial Times, 15 April 1994.
48The Guardian, 25 February 1995.
49The Financial Times noted that the structure of British Coal privatisation was not shaped out
"through debates in Westminster but through government talks with the would-be buyers of British
Coal." The Financial Times, 23 November 1993.
50Section 60 of the Environment Act 1995; and Section 30J of the Control of Pollution Act 1974.
51East European Energy Report, January 1994, Vol. 28., page 12.
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Mining subsidence -
There was little hope of a compromise on this issue. Bidders lobbied for leaving
subsidence claims with the newly created Coal Authority^; on the other hand, the
Department of Trade and Industry insisted that coal operators must assume
responsibility for subsidence.53 The Parliament had the final word on this point; the
Coal Industry Act 1994 provides that
References to the British Coal Corporation in the Coal Industry Act 1991 are to
be replaced with references to the responsible person (i.e. the person with
responsibility for subsidence affecting the land which has been damaged). 54
The responsible person is the licence holder where the land is within the licensed
area; in any other case (e.g. when the land is not within a licensed area) the Coal
Authority shall be the responsible person. 55
"... a person is the responsible person in relation to any subsidence damage
whether that damage was caused or occurred before or after the time that person
became the person with responsibility for subsidence affecting the land in
question. "56
The main points here are that (i) licence holders are responsible for subsidence
damages within their licensed areas irrespective of the date of mining activities
causing the subsidence; while (ii) the Coal Authority will compensate owners of
damaged properties in areas currently not under mining. Hence claims in respect of
damages in licensed areas will be passed on to private mine operators after
privatisation. 57 For example, the Coal Authority forwarded 116 such claims to RJB
(Mining) Ltd in the first year after privatisation. 5 8 To conclude, the government had
reason to celebrate on this issue: mine operators are going to pick up the bill for
subsidence claims in their licensed areas, even though damage was caused by British
Coal.
Yet two additional points should be considered here:
(i) The Coal Authority is responsible for claims in currently unmined areas. The
handling of subsidence claims is actually one of the principal activities of the
Authority.59 The Authority appears to be the residual body in charge of
52The Financial Times, 14 April 1994.
53The Financial Times, 13 January 1994.
54Sections 43 (1) and (2) of the Coal Industry Act, 1994. This amendment logically followed from
the new system of licensing - See: Coal Mining Subsidence Act, 1991. A Guide to the Provisions
of the Act (1994?), Part II., Section 2.
55Section 43 (3) of the Coal Industry Act, 1994.
56Section 43 (4) of the Coal Industry Act, 1994. Italics added.
57Coal Mining Subsidence - A Guide (1994), point 2.4.
58Coal Authority: Report and Accounts 1995-96 (1996), page 9.
59Coal Authority Accounts 1995-96 HC 549 1995-96, page 1.
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historical liabilities, including subsidence.60 It will be discussed below what
financial resources are available to meet subsidence claims.
(ii) The Authority effectively underwrites subsidence obligations of the private
mine operators. Section 2(l)(c) of the Coal Industry Act 1994 provides that
the Authority shall secure that no person will sustain loss in consequence of
any failure of a licensed operator to make financial provision for meeting
subsidence liabilities. Operators are obliged to put money aside into a special
fund to cover subsidence claims; but, as Fitzpatrick notes, "... provision for
environmental responsibilities may not figure too prominently within budgets
[of the new operators]".61 Thus the Coal Authority may pick up the bill for
subsidence claims, if an operator goes into liquidation without leaving
sufficient money in the fund.62
Mine water pollution is another source of potential liability for the government. It is to
be recalled that mine operators will not be responsible for water pollution until the
end of the century. Furthermore, ifminewater leaks from a mine which will have been
abandoned before 31 December 1999 the operator is exempt from liability. Hence
private operators are encouraged to abandon as many mines as possible by 2000. The
government will certainly pay for water clearing-up until the end of the century; but
this obligation may not cease then if mine operators are shrewd enough to abandon
mines before that date.
To conclude, the government got the lion's share of open-ended liabilities in the coal
industry; and this is the reason for discussing coal privatisation in this Chapter. The
Treasury collected some GBPlbn from the sale of coal mines in December 1994.6J
However this amount of money will not be in the Consolidated Fund for too long.
Millions must be earmarked for meeting environmental liabilities and subsidence
claims. The following payments have already been made in the coal sector:
British Coal's external financing limit was adjusted from GBP35 to GBP59m in
1995 to reflect the continuing management of various ex-employee liabilities.64
60The Financial Times, 4 August 1993.
61J. Fitzpatrick: British Coal Privatisation. An Examination of the Environmental Issues (1995),
page 25.
62The Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors warned that the subsidence Estimate of the Coal
Authority might prove insufficient. Source: The Financial Times, 4 December 1993. And see also:
The Guardian, 20 February 1994.
63RJB Ltd. paid GBP815m for the three English regions; Celtic Energy paid GBP94.5m for the
Welsh mines; and the Scottish region went to Mining (Scotland) ltd. for GBP49m. Sources: The
Financial Times, 30 December 1994, and The Guardian, 21 December 1994.
64Weekly Hansard, No. 1702 15th November to 17th November 1995, Written Answers, page 12
(17 November 1995).
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The sum of GBP 123,940,000 was paid to DTI for assistance to the coal industry
under the Appropriation Act 1996, including expenditure on "payments to
redundant workers and other liabilities in respect of former employees of the
British Coal Corporation and their dependants; and on the costs of the subsidence
and other external advisers and statutory arbitration arrangements. "65
The Coal Authority received GBP53.5m Grant-in-Aid in the financial year
1995/96; for the 1996/97 financial year the limit was GBP59.7m.66 The Authority
spent GBP49,506,000 on subsidence claims and GBP5,126,000 on "historic
liabilities" in 1995-96.67
To sum up, the government spent GBP236.4m on managing coal-related liabilities
over the first two business years following privatisation. More than 20% of the total
privatisation proceeds has already been 'reinvested' in the coal industry to finance
environmental and subsidence liabilities.
4.2 Nuclear energy
The government was once more engrossed with the apportioning of liabilities in 1996
when British Energy pic. was offered for sale. The privatisation of the nuclear power
stations was not a routine job: as the CEGB noted, it was "the biggest challenge
which faces the government in the whole exercise [i.e. electricity privatisation]".68
The nuclear privatisation programme was likely to founder on open-ended
obligations. The government did not find a solution to questions like nuclear waste
storage or station decommissioning in the run-up to the big electricity sell-off in 1990.
Hence nuclear stations were withdrawn from the sale on the grounds that
they were drawing to the end of their lives, and it would not be
appropriate to burden the private sector with the significant costs of
their operation and closure.69
Thus the entire nuclear industry was retained in the public sector:^ the
English/Welsh and Scottish generators owned or operated no nuclear power stations
65Appropriation Act 1996, Class IV., Vote 4.
66Coal Authority Accounts 1995-96 HC 549 1995-96.
67Coal Authority Accounts 1995-96 HC 549 1995-96., page 13.
68Alex Henney: A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England & Wales
(1994), page 138.
69Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries: The UK Electricity Industry. Charges for Electricity
Services 1996/97 (1997), page 2.
70At one stage the government proposed that National Power pic. (England and Wales) and the two
Scottish companies should own the nuclear stations. This is why the 'golden-share' (See Chapter 3.
above) is non-time limited in National Power/PowerGen and in Scottish Power/Scottish Hydro-
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at their privatisation^. Two wholly government owned companies (Nuclear Energy
pic. and Scottish Nuclear Ltd.) assumed all nuclear-related liability.72
But this was only a temporary arrangement: liability was to be parcelled out between
the private and the public sector prior to the proposed privatisation of the nuclear
power stations. Hence a second restructuring was bound to precede the sale of British
Energy pic.; the following arrangements were made in March 1996:
A new company, Nuclear Electric Ltd., was incorporated to take over the non-
MAGNOX stations^ ofNuclear Electric pic.;
Nuclear Electric pic. changed its name to Magnox Electric pic. This company is
wholly owned by HM Government;
Scottish Nuclear Ltd. transferred its MAGNOX stations to Magnox Electric pic.;
British Energy pic., a newly incorporated company, became the parent company
ofNuclear Electric Ltd. and Scottish Nuclear Ltd.74
As a result, Magnox Electric pic. owns nine MAGNOX stations; on the other hand,
the recently privatised British Energy pic. owns non-MAGNOX stations only. As a
rule, MAGNOX stations are near the end of their useful lifetime; they must be closed
and decommissioned in the near future. 75 Three ofMagnox Electric plc.'s stations are
being decommissioned for the time being.76 in contrast, the decommissioning of the
first British Energy stations will not be due before 2006.77
Thus significant nuclear-related liabilities remained in the public sector, while the
profit earning units (i.e. non-MAGNOX stations) were privatised. The main point
here is that Magnox Electric pic. will depend on government subsidy in the future.
This company has a turnover of GBP0.6bn to finance the currently ongoing
decommissioning programme which will cost GBP8bn.78 Although the government
Electric. Sources: Nuclear Power and Electricity Privatisation (1989) House of Commons
Background Paper No. 230., page 230. and Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry (1988),
Reference Services. Central Office of Information No. 309/88.
71National Power pic. PowerGen pic.: Offers for Sale (1991), page 58. and Scottish Hydro-Electric
pic. Scottish Power pic.: Offers for Sale (1991), page 39.
72Alex Henney: A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England & Wales
(1994), page 141.
73Nuclear stations running MAGNOX reactors. The Prospectus defined MAGNOX reactors as
follows: "The first generation of gas cooled nuclear reactor built in the UK in the 1950s and
1960s." British Energy pic: International Offer and UK Public Offer (1996), page 242. More
discussion about the MAGNOX programme: Alex Henney: A Study of the Privatisation of the
Electricity Supply Industry in England & Wales (1994), pages 130-131.
74British Energy pic: International Offer and UK Public Offer (1996), page 55.
75Andrew Holmes: Privatising British Electricity (1992), page 31.
76British Energy pic: International Offer and UK Public Offer (1996), page 55.
77British Energy pic: International Offer and UK Public Offer (1996), page 71.
78The Financial Times, 31 August 1996.
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provided a GBP3.8m financial undertaking to Magnox Electric plc.79? it is not clear
whether the company will have sufficient funds to finance the decommissioning
programme. By contrast, British Energy pic. is in a better financial position. This
company had GBP4.2bn total undiscounted decommissioning liability against a
turnover of GBP1.7bn in 1996.^0 In addition, the government halved the level of
debts in the balance sheet of British Energy pic. from GBPl,500m to GBP700m.81
Thus British Energy pic. will be able to cope with decommissioning.
To conclude, the privatisation of British Energy pic. is a less successful transaction:
the taxpayer "may have lost out on British Energy sell-off'.^2 Proceeds of
GBP1.4bn^3 collected from the sale of British Energy pic. will be spent on financing
the nuclear liabilities ofMagnoc Electric pic. As the Chairman of the Public Accounts
Committee put it, "Taxpayers may face the costs of nuclear decommissioning if
British Energy fails to find all of the cash itself
And a final point: despite the slimming down of liabilities, British Energy shares had a
disastrous debut in the London stock exchange. Share prices fell sharply in July 1996
when two stations were shut down to investigate concerns about the strength ofwelds
in steam pipes. ^5 The performance of British Energy shares was reported to be the
worst^ since the partial disposal ofBritish Petroleum pic. in 1987.^7 As a result, the
privatisation was not completed until December 1996 when the government sold the
last tranche of 81m shares (11.2% ofBritish Energy pic.) to a financial investor. 88
The Economist reported in connection with coal privatisation that the Treasury
attempted to saddle investors with "lots of unpredictable liabilities"^; the above
discussion has tried to show that this forecast missed the point. It was the Department
of Industry and Trade which saddled the Treasury with coal- and nuclear-related
obligations. Liabilities did not follow assets in the case of the two disposals discussed
above: the government privatised profitable parts of the coal and nuclear industries
but retained a great chunk of liability. Thus the sale ofBritish Coal and British Energy
pic. are less successful transactions: liability claims will drain privatisation proceeds.
79PowerUK, 25 June 1996, pages 14 - 15.
80British Energy pic: International Offer and UK Public Offer (1996), pages 13. and 55.
81Inside Energy, Vol. 6., No. 19., 3 April 1996, page 3.
82The Financial Times, 8 May 1998.
83The Financial Times, 15 July 1996.
84The The Times, May 8 1998.
85The Financial Times, 11 July 1996.
86It should be noted, however, that British Energy pic. has seen better days recently. According to
The Financial Times, BE shares outperformed outher generators in early 1998. The Financial
Times, March 14/March 15 1998, Weekend Money, page 4.
87The Financial Times, 16 July 1996.
88The Financial Times, 4 December 1996.
89The Economist, 22 January 1994.
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Part II.
Mismanagement -
PBI and the Sale of Trust Ports
This part will discuss two disposals: /A? Plant Breeding Institute (PBI) and /B/ Trust
Ports. Both of these transactions could have been successful: PBI and the trust ports
were good investment opportunities, thus purchasers were not in short supply. Yet
civil servants did not excel in managing privatisation.
4.3 PBI and the charitable trap
The National Seed Development Organisation (hereinafter: "NSDO") and the Plant
Breeding Institute (hereinafter: "PBI") were among "the most prestigious and
successful research institutes in the world".90 Despite their fame, the business world
perhaps did not even know that these organisations existed. Hence the proposed
privatisation ofNSDO and PBI was expected to proceed without much publicity. Yet
quite the contrary happened: the sale was an embarrassing debacle. What went
wrong?
The history of the NSDO - PBI transaction may be summarised as follows. The
Secretary of State announced in February 1986 that NSDO and a part of PBI would
be transferred to the private sector. The Department of Education and Science
("DES") presented an Estimate to the Parliament in December 1986; it was approved
on the understanding that the full net proceeds would be remitted to the Consolidated
Fund. A memorandum of information had been distributed to potential investors in
early 1987^1; three candidates were shortlisted and finally UNILEVER pic. agreed to
pay the sum of GBP66m for NSDO and a part of the assets of PBl92 in September
1987 93 Considering these facts one would conclude that the sale ofPBI was actually
a successful transaction: proceeds were collected within nineteen months from the
date ofmaking the announcement in Parliament.
But proceeds were in the hands of the government for two weeks only: on 14
October 1987 DES passed on to the Institute of Plant Science Research
90HC 218 1988-89, page 11., Q. 1902.
91HC 218 1988-89, page 4., Questions 1820-1821.
92Departments of Cytogenetics, Molecular Genetics and parts of the Pathology and Physiology
Departments remained in public ownership. Source: Plant Breeding Institute: Annual Report 1986.,
page 23.
93GBP27.15m was paid for NSDO and GBP38.85m for PBI. Source: Appropriation Accounts 1987-
88 HC 17-vii 1988-89, Class XII., Vote 13., pages 45 - 46.
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("Institute")94 the sum of GBP38.85m, plus an ex gratia payment of GBP137,000.
Why did the department transfer this amount to the Institute ?
As was mentioned above, the Department offered NSDO and a part of PBI together
for sale. The two establishments, however, had different legal status. NSDO was an
ordinary state-owned body, while PBI was a registered charity. The Memorandum of
the charity set forth special rules concerning the disposal of assets.95 The point here is
that these rules were so drafted that proceeds from the sale of PBI could not possibly
be remitted to the Exchequer.
The Department came up with a new privatisation plan in April 1987. The main point
was that the trustees of PBI were requested to pass a resolution. This resolution was
to provide that proceeds from the sale of PBI should be re-transferred to the
Agricultural and Food Research Council ("AFRC")96; in turn the Council would
undertake to use such funds to further the objectives of PBI. But this plot turned out
to be ineffective: the Institute indicated to DES in February 1988 that it could not
comply with the 1987 resolution without the express authorisation of the Charity
Commission. DES did not take this warning seriously: the department submitted a
Supplementary Estimate to Parliament in the same month confirming that the full net
proceeds would be remitted to the Exchequer. When a meeting was called in March
1988 the Charity Commissioners expressed some concerns about the feasibility of the
proposed transfer. Three months later the Commission informed all the parties that
proceeds from the sale of PBI could not be transferred to AFRC; the sum of
GBP38.85m belonged to the Institute. DES and AFRC sought legal advise. The
Treasury Counsel accepted the findings of the Charity Commission and advised DES
not to take the matter to court. Finally, DES and AFRC acknowledged in July 1988
that the Institute should retain GBP38.85m.
The main point of the PBI - saga is that DES prepared unrealistic Estimates twice:
both the 1986 and the 1988 Estimates forecasted that full net proceeds should be
remitted to the Exchequer. Inaccuracy of the original Estimate may be forgivable:
compared with the Department of Trade and Industry, DES had limited privatisation
experience. Yet DES was keen to join the league of Departments having a successful
privatisation history: thus less experienced civil servants prepared the original
Estimate in an enthusiastic mood.
It is the second Estimate which is hard to give an explanation for. As was mentioned
above, the Supplementary Estimate was submitted to Parliament in February 1988. By
94This Institute took over the remaining functions of PBI.
95HC 218 1988-89, page 5., Q. 1827.
96AFRC, a Non-Departmental Public Body, was in charge of the financing of NSDO and PBI. It
ceased to exist from 1 April 1994. See: Agricultural and Food Research Council: Annual Accounts
1993-94 In: HC 217 1994-95. page 1., point 1.
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this time DES knew97 that the Treasury might not receive the full net proceeds: DES
was also warned in the same month that the said resolution may be ineffective. Thus
one may conclude that DES misled Parliament.98 DES breached one of the basic
rules ofprivatisation:
. . . money received for sales should be remitted to the Consolidated Fund
rather than to third parties unless there has been a prior approval of
Parliament.99
The transfer of GBP38.85m to the Institute was not approved; in fact, the Parliament
was led to believe that the full net proceeds will be remitted to the Exchequer. It is not
for this Chapter to discuss political responsibility; the question here is what legal
solutions, if any, could have prevented this debacle.
Charities, trusts and the like are not simple privatisation candidates. The sale of
charitable assets must be structured with special care so as to guarantee that charity
law constraints will not bar the Treasury from retaining privatisation proceeds. At
least three solutions presented themselves in the PBI - case:
Act of Parliament
The framework of the PBI privatisation could have been set forth under an Act of
Parliament. The legislator could have provided that the full net proceeds shall be
remitted to the Exchequer.
The legislator is sovereign in Britain; "... there are no legal constraints on its
legislative powers". 100 While the sovereignty of Parliament has not been absolute
ever since the UK joined the EU, the point remains: the British government need not
worry that a British court will declare a privatisation Act invalid. ^91 As 0. Hood
Phillips writes, "Once a document is recognised as being an Act of Parliament, no
English [British] court can refuse to obey it or question its validity. "102 qUOte the
celebrated words of Blackstone: ". . . what the Parliament doth, no authority upon
97According to the findings of the Public Account Committee, DES and AFRC recognised as early
as 1986 that PBI's actions were constrained by charity law. Source: HC 218 1988-89, page 5., Q.
1826.
98The Financial Times, 6 December 1988.
"HC 218 1988-89, page v.
100Cosmo Graham and Tony Prosser: Privatizing Public Enterprises (1991), page 38.
101Constitutional Courts in Europe may rule about the constitutionality of Acts. See, for example,
[1992] Euro C.L.Y. 1916., and 1924.
102O. Hood Phillips' Constitutional and Administrative Law (1987), page 49.
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earth can undo."103 Hence a privatisation Act is an ironcast guarantee that the
transaction is legally feasible.
This technique was used successfully in the case of, for example, (a) the Trustee
Savings Bank and (b) the EnglishAVelsh water authorities.
(a) TSB
It was the Trustee Savings Bank Act 1985 which rescued TSB from joining the
league of less successful transactions. When unhappy depositors tried to challenge the
privatisation of TSB, the House of Lords ruled that
The Act of 1985 privatised the statutory trustee savings banks and
Parliament decided to present their surplus assets amounting, it is said,
to GBP800 million to the successor company. Your Lordships are not
concerned with the wisdom of this decision. 104
The final comment from Lord Templeman echoes a basic constitutional principle:
judges in Britain do not rule about the merit of an Act of Parliament. 1^5
(b) English and Welsh water industry
Turning to the privatisation of the water companies, the leading case is Sheffield City
Council v. Yorkshire Water Services Ltd. and another and related actions
(Ch.D.) [1991] 2 All ER 280. Seventeen local authorities tried to block the sale of
water companies; they argued that
. . . the water authority held the legal interest in the property transferred
[pursuant to the Local Authorities (England) (Property etc.) Order 1973]
subject to a power to use it for water purposes but otherwise in trust for
the plaintiffs beneficially. 106
The court ruled that the plaintiffs' construction was not correct. Having analysed the
Water Acts 1973 and 1989, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C concluded that the
proposed disposal of shares "is not controversial, at least legally. "107 The legislator
made the following arrangements:
103Quoted by Dicey In: A.V. Dicey: Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution
(Liberty Classics, 1982), page 5.
104Ross v. Lord Advocate 1986 S.L.T. 603, per Lord Templeman at 611-D.
105This point has been analysed in more details in Chapter 3. above.
106at 292-B.
107at 286 -B.
140
assets of the water authorities were transferred to newly established limited
companies (e.g. Yorkshire Water Services Ltd.);
all the issued shares of such companies were held by public limited companies
(e.g. Yorkshire Water pic.); and
shares in the latter were issued to the public in 1990; thus
property vested in the water authorities under the Water Act 1973 to discharge
certain statutory functions was NOT sold.
The final point here is that the Water Act 1989 shielded water privatisation from legal
challenges. Local authorities tried to challenge the validity of the statutory scheme
seeking to sell water shares (as opposed to assets); however, the court dismissed the
claim in Sheffield.
Thus no legal difficulties may thwart privatisation in the UK, if (i) an Act of
Parliament provides for the disposal of certain assets or companies and (ii) the
legislation is not in breach of EU law. The EU dimension was especially important in
the case of the water industry. The Environment Commissioner in Brussels
"threatened to take the British government to the European Court": he believed that
the Water Bill was a "deliberate attempt to flout EC law". 108
As far as the PBI - case is concerned, the above discussion comes down to a simple
point: had an Act of Parliament been passed to facilitate the sale of PBI the Treasury
could have retained privatisation proceeds in full.
Reorganisation
Assets and activities of PBI could have been split into two bits: (a) departments which
were to remain in the public sectors, and (b) departments to be sold; only the former
would have retained charitable status after the reorganisation. The Charity
Commission would have been requested to authorise this scheme. Hence the
privatisation ofbit (b) would have been subject to no charity law restrictions.
Winding up
With hindsight, the Committee of Public Accounts argued that a third technique
would also have been available. The main points of this solution may be summarised
as follows: (i) PBI trustees should have agreed to wind up PBI; (ii) upon winding up
proceeds should have been paid over to the Exchequer; and (iii) a new organisation
could have been set up immediately.
Out of the three mentioned methods, the winding up solution was unacceptable to
DES.109 p)epartment was correct; winding up would have been a dubious
108Peter Saunders and Colin Harris: Privatization and Popular Capitalism (1994), page 49.
109HC 218 1988-89, page 11., Q. 1902.
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technique. As far as the other two options are concerned, DES told the Committee
that the use ofprimary legislation was not considered;^ 0 and reorganisation is not
mentioned in the Report. Thus DES correctly ruled out the least practicable solution
but did not consider other techniques in detail.
The main point to conclude here is that the privatisation of charity assets may cause
"unpleasant surprises"1Due to charity law constraints the Treasury may not retain
privatisation proceeds, even though the charity was financed from public money.
Special arrangements are necessary to secure that charity law will not upset
privatisation strategy. Simple legal tricks (like the 1987 resolution) may fall in the
'charitable trap'.
4.4 Trust ports
The moral from the Plant Breeding Institute - saga was that the disposal of charity
assets might not be completed successfully without a privatisation statute. It was also
mentioned above that an Act of Parliament may render such hurdles harmless (TSB
privatisation). This Part will argue that legislation is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for successful disposal.
Trust ports were not convenient privatisation candidates: strictly speaking, these ports
were not state-owned.aVoid privatisation debacles, the Ports Act 1991
[hereinafter: 1991 Act] was passed. The main provisions of the 1991 Act may be
summarised as follows:
The Act enabled the trust ports to set up companiesancj to transfer to those
companies property, rights, liabilities and functions of the port authorities
(Transfer Scheme). Subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, port
authorities had the right to sell shares in the newly created companies voluntarily.
The relevant port authorities were responsible for managing the transaction. The
1991 Act provided that a 50% levy shall be charged on net proceeds after
deducting allowable expenses (Statutory Levy). After the sale of shares and the
payment of the Statutory Levy to the government, port authorities were to be
dissolved.
110HC 218 1988-89, page 11., Q. 1902.
111A Treasury Officer of Account used this term when he was examined by the Committee. Source:
HC 218 1988-89, page 3., Q. 1181.
112The Financial Times, 14 January 1992.
113It is interesting to note that the National Ports Council ruled out the idea of converting trust ports
into ordinary companies in 1972. Source: National Ports Council: Reconstitution of Major Trust
Ports. Proposal for Discussion (1972), page 4.
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The diagrammatic presentation of the relevant provisions of the 1991 Act would be
the following:
Step 1 Port Authority (PA) set up NewCo
Step 2 Property, rights etc. of PA transferred to
NewCo
Step 3 PA offer NewCo shares for sale
Step 4 PA collect proceeds
Step 5 After the deduction of expenses,
Statutory Levy paid to Department
Step 6 PA dissolved
TABLE 8.: Ports Act 1991
Two peculiarities should be highlighted here:
(i) Port Authorities in charge of privatisation
Port Authorities (as opposed to the Department of Transport) managed the sale of
trust ports; the authorities "sold themselves". 1 ^ Port authorities submitted transfer
schemes to the relevant Ministers and subsequently disposed of their holdings in the
successor companies. 1^ While these powers were subject to ministerial approval 1
the point is that the authorities "were responsible for all aspects of the sale". * ^
(ii) No proceeds to the government
Net proceeds were to be paid to the authorities, being the legal owners of the
successor companies. The government was entitled to a statutory levy which was due
to be paid into the Consolidated Fund.^^ A two-step procedure was introduced for
the collection of levy: (a) The Department of Transport was to serve on each port
authority a notice of assessment; and (b) The relevant authorities were to pay the levy
within three months of the date of disposal or within 30 days from the date of the
notice, if that period ends later. * 19
What happened to the rump of privatisation proceeds ?
114Section 4 of the Ports Act 1991. and Committee of Public Accounts. Department of Transport:
The First Sales of Trust Ports HC 225-i 1993-94 [hereinafter: HC 225-i 1993-94], page 10., Q.
165.
115Sections 4 and 9 of the Ports Act 1991.
116Section 5 of the Ports Act 1991.
117Alfred J. Baird: Privatisation of United Kingdom Trust Ports (1995), page 6.
118Section 16(5) of the Ports Act 1991.
119Section 14(2) of the Ports Act 1991. and also: National Audit Office Department of Transport:
The First Sales of Trust Ports HC 896 1992-93, page 12., point 3.4.
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The National Audit Office reported that the remainder of the proceeds was passed on
to the successor company, "and hence returned to the purchaser."120 While this
statement may be correct in a political sense, it is not accurate legally. It is a basic
principle of British company law that "... the corporation is a legal entity distinct
from its members." 121 When the port authorities were dissolved under Section 7 of
the 1991 Act, the balance of proceeds was transferred to the successor companies and
not to the investors. Bids reflected this "somewhat odd"122 procedure: the purchasers
offered more than the real value of the ports on the understanding that a portion of
the price will be returned to the successor companies. Although trust ports were
established locally to foster sea-born trade from certain British ports, local areas ended
with nothing after privatisation. Proceeds were divided between the government and
successor companies; it is unfortunate that those who promoted and established trust
ports received nothing.
Five port authorities (Tees and Hartlepool, Clyde, Forth, Medway and the Port of
London) decided to privatise their ports voluntarily. These were the most profitable
trust ports in the UK.123 an(j they accounted for around 30% of traffic throughput at
major UK ports!24:
Name of port % of traffic
London 9.4
Forth 8.6
Tees and Hartepool 8.4
Medways 2.6
Clyde 1.4
Total 30.4
TABLE 9.: Trust ports
Steps 1. - 4. of the privatisation timetable were completed with unprecedented
speed both the Department and the five port authorities wanted to finish this
project before the forthcoming general election. Four of them opted for trade sale,
120HC 896 1992-93, page 12., point 3.1. and also: Alfred J. Baird: Privatisation of United
Kingdom Trust Ports (1995), page 7.
121Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (1992), page 85.
122HC 225-i 1993-94, page 10., Q. 100.
123Alfred J. Baird: Privatisation of Trust Ports in the United Kingdom: Review and Analysis of the
First Sales In: Transport Policy Vol. 2(2), 135 - 143., page 136.
124Source: Department of Transport. In: Memorandum submitted to: House of Commons: Scottish
Affairs Committee: The Removal of Tariff Rebate Subsidy on Northern Isles Freight. HC 1995 -
1996 229-1.
125Alfred J. Baird: Privatisation of United Kingdom Trust Ports (1995), page 12.
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while Forth Ports pic. was floated. Gross proceeds of some GBP380m were paid to
the port authorities by March 1992.126
Difficulties began when the Department tried to collect the Statutory Levy (Step 5).
According to the National Audit Office, the port authorities did not pay the full
amount of levy until March 1993.127 The government lost GBP4.5m interest (based
upon simple interest at Treasury bill rates) for the six months to December 1992 on
uncollected levies. 128 Under the 1991 Act interest is chargeable on levy not paid by
the due date 129- what was the due date here ? As was mentioned above, the 1991 Act
set two possible dates: (i) within three months of the date of disposals or (ii) within 30
days from the date of the notice, if this ends later. Thus the due date should have been
June 1992 (see point (i) above). But the collection of levy was delayed; the
Department did not issue the notices until February 1993.120 Thus the deadline was
fixed in accordance with point (ii), i.e. within 30 days from the date of notice.
According to the findings of the National Audit Office, the following two issues may
be blamed for the delay:
(i) Private Bills
The Department and two authorities had some disagreement about certain
expenses in connection with Private Bills. These Bills were promoted before
the passage of the 1991 Act; the Department and the relevant authorities did
not agree whether such expenses might be deducted from the levy or not. 121
(ii) VAT refund
The amount of recoverable Value Added Tax was not established for some
time. The point here was that unrecoverable VAT was treated as allowable
costs and as such was deductible from the gross proceeds. *22 The total
amount in dispute was some GBP 1 6m. 123
126HC 896 1992-93, page 1., point 1.
127HC 896 1992-93, page 2., point (b).
128HC 896 1992-93, page 12., point 3.9. Please note that GBP4.5m is the interest for the first six
month; it is not clear why the National Audit Office did not calculate the amount of interest for the
entire period (i.e. March 1992 - March 1993). According to the calculation of Richard Page Esq.
(Committee of Public Accounts), the total amount of interest was "approaching GBPlOm". Source:
HC 225-i 1993-94, page 13., Q. 151.
129Section 14(4) of the Ports Act 1991.
130HC 896 1992-93, page 12., point 3.6.
131HC 896 1992-93, page 12., point 3.7.
132HC 896 1992-93, page 12., point 3.8.
133HC 896 1992-93, page 12., point 3.6.
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Hence the Treasury lost some GBP 10m on interest while the Department of
Transport was resolving fictitious disagreements with the port authorities. One may
argue that the proper course of action would have been as follows:
(i) The Department should have tried to collect the duty from those authorities
which had not promoted Private Bills.
(ii) Disputes concerning VAT should have been ignored in deciding whether to
serve notices or not. The VAT disputes were irrelevant as far as the payment
of statutory levy was concerned. Anyway, the amount at stake (GBP1.6m)
was trifling compared to the principal amount of levies (GBP 169m).
The Department eventually conceded that Private Bill expenses were allowable ^ 34-
while an additional GBP300,000 of levy was collected from the disputed amount of
VAT. 5 The National Audit Office commented that "the costs of delay in the
collection of the levy were large in comparison with the disputed amounts". 136
No special accountancy skill is required to conclude that the Department did not act
with much commercial grasp here. No reasonable business(wo)man would risk to lose
millions of pounds on interest in order to collect some GBP300,000. If those
privatising the trust ports had been in private practice, they would have lost their jobs.
What alternative action could have been taken to collect the Statutory Levy promptly?
Solution number 1, -
Contract
When the parties noticed that the disagreements mentioned above might delay the
collection of levy, the Department and the relevant port authorities could have agreed
in a contract that
port authorities will use their best endeavour to pay statutory levy within three
months 137 from the date of the contract;
if the levy is not settled within that time limit, then either party may appeal to an
arbitration tribunal so as to get the amount of levy payable determined. The award
would be final and enforceable against the port authorities.
134HC 225 1993-94, page ix., point 18.
135HC 896 1992-93, page 12., point 3.9.
136HC 896 1992-93, page 13., point 3.10.
137As was mentioned above, Section 14 of the Ports Act 1991 also allowed a three month period for
the payment of levy.
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This contract would have been valid and binding under British constitutional law. De
Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action writes that if a public body enters
into a contract
. . . the same principles of private law apply as those which govern similar
transactions between private corporations, though if in making a contract
a public body acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, or exceeds its
statutory powers, its decision may be subject to judicial review. ^8
The proposed contract would not have been arbitrary, unreasonable, or ultra vires;
hence the contractual solution could have worked. Yet it is doubtful whether the
authorities were willing to sign such a contract. After the sale of the successor
companies, the port authorities were more interested in reducing the level of Statutory
Levy than in paying the money to the Department.
Solution number 2, -
Administrative action
Had the port authorities refused to consent to Solution number 1., the Minister should
have served a notice of assessment straightaway. The legislation does not provide that
such notice may not be issued without the consent of the relevant port authorities.
Once the notice is served it is for the port authorities to challenge the validity of the
assessment. Although the Department might not have obtained a final judgement for
some time, the court could have awarded interest on unpaid levy under Section 14(4)
of the Ports Act 1991. The port authorities perhaps would have been less fastidious
about the costs of Private Bills and VAT refunds, had they been liable to pay interest
on GBP114.6ml39.
But the Department considered neither of these solutions; they advocated a third
option.
Solution number 3, -
'Provisional' notice
The Department intended to issue 'provisional' notices of assessment "in order that
they might receive the undisputed portions of levy." 140 Yet the internal legal unit of
the Department concluded that this action would be impossible under the 1991 Act.
The Department summarised its understanding of the law as follows:
138de Smith, Woolf & Jowell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995), page 173.
139Total amount of levy due: GBP169m minus GBP54.4m (levy paid by Forth Ports) =
GBP114.6m.
140HC 896 1992-93, page 13, point 3.10.
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What the Act says is that the Secretary of State shall make an
assessment, one only, of the amount due in levy. ... It would in
principle have been open to the Department to make an assessment
which was the amount already agreed and not in dispute. The
Department would then have had no powers to demand any further
money from the port because of the structure of the legislation.^ 1
The Department acted on the understanding that (i) they "had only one shot" ^2 ancj
(ii) even that shot may not be fired without the agreement of the port authorities. As
far as point (i) is concerned, the Committee of Public Accounts accepted the 'one shot
assessment' view and urged the Department to secure amending legislation. 1^3 But
Point (ii) was a total fallacy: as was mentioned above (Solution number 2.), the 1991
Act does not stipulate that the Department and the port authorities must agree on the
amount of levy. It is remarkable then that neither the National Audit Office nor the
Committee of Public Accounts discussed this issue further.
The point here is that it would not have been ultra vires for the Department to serve
notices the amount of which was in dispute. Had the port authorities been unhappy
with the Statutory Levy, then they could have applied for judicial review. But, and
this is the main point, the Department refrained from serving notices; civil servants
preferred negotiations with the port authorities to taking the matter to court. It was
argued in Chapter 1. above that, so far as the regulation of utilities is concerned,
legalism has no particularly strong tradition in Britain: 'Negotiate and do not litigate' is
the golden rule. While this is a commendable approach usually, the first sale of trust
ports shows that the policy of negotiation has its own limits: in this case too much
negotiation cost some GBP 10m for the Treasury.
This discussion of the 'maximizing revenue' objective may be summarised then as
follows:
British Coal
The government undertook to pay for (i) water pollution until 2000, and (ii)
subsidence in unlicensed regions. New mine operators took on subsidence claims
in their licensed areas only. The total value of liabilities assumed by the
government will exceed privatisation proceeds (GBPlbn).
British Energy
The government is responsible for the decommissioning of MAGNOX stations;
Magnox Electric pic. was retained in the public sector. The decommissioning of
14)HC 225-i 1993-94, page 12., Q. 140.
142HC 225-i 1993-94, page 14., Q. 167.
143HC 225 1993-94, page x., point 32.
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British Energy stations will not start until 2006 the earliest. Thus the bulk of
nuclear liabilities remained in the public sector. The government collected
GBP1.4bn from the sale of British Energy pic.; but will have to spend some
GBP8bn on decommissioning MAGNOX stations.
Plant Breeding Institute
The DES did not consider the legal implications of charity status before
submitting an Estimate to Parliament. Having noticed that proceeds might not be
transferred to the Treasury, the department and their advisers tried to contrive an
alternative procedure: PBI trustees were 'requested' to pass a resolution. This
privatisation plan fell in the 'charitable trap' unfortunately; the Treasury lost
GBP38.85m.
• Trust ports
Statutory Levy of GBP 114.6m remained uncollected for almost a year in this
transaction. The principal reason for the delay was mismanagement. The
department delayed the issuing of notices on dubious grounds. Had the notices
been served on time, the port authorities would have been liable to pay interest on
unpaid levy. Mismanagement cost the Treasury GBP 10m.
The four disposals mentioned above do not satisfy the 'maximizing revenue' objective.
The Treasury (i) did not collect privatisation proceeds in the case ofPBI and the Trust
Ports; or (ii) may spend more on future liability claims than the total amount of
proceeds remitted to the Treasury (British Coal, British Energy pic.). Thus the
'maximizing revenue' objective was not achieved in the case of less successful
transactions: whatever the business value of the four companies mentioned above
was, the Treasury could have collected higher privatisation proceeds from their
privatisation.
Part II.
The remaining two objectives
There is an underlying reason for discussing the 'extending share ownership' and the
'improving economic performance' objectives under one heading: statistics. As a main
rule, modern statistics never prove anything. Privatisation statistics would be a perfect
example. Official statistics seem to show that utility privatisation (a) widened share
ownership and (b) improved economic performance in Britain.
Cento Veljanovski refers to a number of statistical surveys conducted by bodies like
MORI, National Opinion Polls and the London Stock Exchange and concludes that
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. . . the evidence is clear that as a direct result of privatisation individual
share ownership has doubled if not trebled. 144
John Moore writes in an article praising the achievements of privatisation that
The ultimate that people of all kinds have bought shares in British Gas,
British Telecom, British Airways - in all of the 46 major companies
privatized in the UK to date. . . . And the proportion of individual citizens
holding shares directly has risen from barely 1 in 14 to 1 in 4. Close to 11
million people in the UK now own shares directly - that is, not through a
pension fund or unit trust. We wish the number were higher, . . .145
Finally, Sir George Young Bt MP, Financial Secretary to the Treasury told the World
Privatisation Conference in 1995 that
The number of share-owners in the UK has risen to some 10 million
three times the number in 1979. ... [in connection with the flotation
of National Power and PowerGen] The financial services industry
generated over GBP3.25 billion of retail demand from more than a
million people - an excellent performance on which I congratulate
them. More than a quarter of existing shareholders increased their
holdings and over 800,000 people became shareholders in
companies. ^46
The three sources quoted above suggest that the government achieved the
'maximizing share ownership' and 'improving economic performance' objectives: why
would one analyse these points further ?
Two reasons may be mentioned here:
(1) As a rule, one should be rather careful when reading statistics on
privatisation. Bryan Hurl gives the following example:
If I turn to an academic journal (Fiscal Studies) to check the gains and
losses of the franchising of local authority services, I read that the cost
savings are in the region of 20 per cent. This looks convincing, a
supportive fact to include in this book. No sooner have I decided on
this than the next issue of the same journal caries a refutation by
another group of academics, who proceed to demolish the basis of the
first article and then call into question the reliability of the figures
144Cento Veljanovski: Selling the State (1987), pages 102 - 103.
145John Moore: British Privatisation: Taking Capitalism to the People In: Her Majesty's Treasury
Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme (August 1995), page 76.
146Sir George Young Bt MP: Speech to World Privatisation Conference IN: HM Treasury: Her
Majesty's Treasury Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme (HMSO, August 1995), page 80.
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which looked so convincing. The virtues and defects of privatisation
are, indeed, to be found in the eye of the beholder.^7
To sum up, it is an open question how reliable statistics on privatisation are.
As a rule, political standing seems to 'colour' statistics on the performance of
privatised utilities: having analysed the same set of statistics two beholders
might come to diametrically opposing conclusions. For example, the Centre for
Policy Studies, established by Baroness Margaret Thatcher, Lord Joseph and
John Major, commissioned a survey about the economic performance of
privatised companies in 1996 (NERA: The Performance of Privatised
Industries). The Centre attached a paper to every copy of the NERA report
arguing that on the statistical evidence set forth in the report "... privatisation
must be judged an outstanding success." 1^8
A financial advisory firm, Ernst & Young, disagrees. A special report about the
UK privatisation programme concludes that
Unfortunately, it is difficult to prove that the theory [i.e. privatisation
must guarantee greater efficiency] works in practice. 149
But Brian McBeth agrees with the Centre for Policy Studies: he argues that "In
general privatisation has improved economic efficiency." 1^0
Simon Jenkins dissents: he points out that by the mid-1990s
'total factor productivity' had risen in all industries while prices had
fallen. . . . Non-privatized corporations such as the Post Office and
British Rail [Note: Sold after the publication of Jenkin's book] had also
seen big advances in productivity over these years. 1 ^ 1
To conclude, statistics do not help to decide whether privatisation has improved
economic performance or not: the number of views is limited only by the number of
'beholders'.
147Bryan Hurl: Privatization and the Public Sector (1988), page 87.
148Centre for Policy Studies: Privatisation and its Effect on the Exchequer. Profit or Loss (1996),
page 8.
149Ernst & Young: Privatisation in the UK (1994), page 24.
150Brian McBeth: Privatisation. A Strategic Report (1996), page 10.
151Simon Jenkins: Accountable to None (1995), page 39.
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(2) Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary explains 'statistic, statistics' as
follows:
Statistics are facts which are obtained from analysing information
expressed in numbers, . . .152
But some points may not be 'expressed in numbers'. For example, so far as 'the
widening share ownership' objective is concerned, the following issues should
be remembered when analysing official statistics:
It was argued in Chapter 2. that, as far as corporate governance is concerned,
shareholding does not really matter: the ultimate question is who keeps the
board under control. As was pointed out above, residual government shares as
an instrument of government interference did not work in practice. It was
irrelevant how many shares were publicly owned after privatisation; the real
question was whether the boards of privatised companies were packed with
government nominees. If not, the government could not control the
management of partially privatised companies irrespective of the percentage of
residual shares held. If the biggest shareholder after the flotations could not
influence the running of privatised companies, how influential are the millions
of 'Sids' holding a tiny number of shares each ? Three examples should be
mentioned here:
(a) Sid outraged
The salary increases executives of privatised utilities awarded to themselves
received much publicity in the press. The best example here is British Gas pic.:
the total remuneration for Mr. Cedric Brown, chief executive, was increased
by 71 per cent from GBP287,765 to GBP492,602 in 1995.153 Small
shareholders were outraged and called for directors to 'revise their executive
pay policy in line with best practice.1 It was the Prime Minister who advised
small shareholders on this matter: The Financial Times reported John Major
saying that "if British Gas shareholders were unhappy about the chief
executive's salary rise they should go along to the annual meeting and
complain."*54 And so did they: over 4,000 shareholders attended the Annual
General Meeting on 31 May 1995. Yet British Gas defeated the shareholders'
revolt: 50% of the company's shares were voted1", but small shareholders
accounted for around 20% of BG shares. 156 Votes from institutional
152Collins Cobuild: English Language Dictionary (1990), page 1425.
153The Financial Times, 18 May 1995.
154The Financial Times, 27 May 1995.
155The Financial Times, 1 June 1995.
156The Financial Times, 13 May 1995.
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investors carried the day. The point here is that small shareholders are not "as
effective as the institutions in uncovering managerial weaknesses and forcing
change. "157
(b) Sid ignored
More recently, the Chief Executive of United Utilities pic., a water and
electricity utility (see Chapter 5. above), has been warned that 'shareholders'
are not happy with the performance of the company.1" What did he do ? He
went out of his way to assuage the biggest shareholders; he did not approach
the millions of 'Sid'. Why ? Small shareholders have no influence over the
board ofUnited Utilities pic. Thus a Chief Executive does not mind what 'Sid'
thinks about her/his appointment: it is the vote of institutional investment
which really matters.
(c) Sid missing
Peter Saunders and Colin Harris interviewed fifty-nine shareholders who
purchased water company shares at privatisation. According to the findings of
Saunders and Harris, approximately one shareholder attended the first Annual
General Meeting of Southern Water for every 240 who stayed away. 159 And
Southern Water is not a one-off example: according to The Financial Times,
614 shareholders attended British Gas's Annual General Meeting in 1994.160
Why does Sid not attend company meetings ? The economic analysis of law
would offer the following answer: the individual cost to Sid of "obtaining
information and attending meetings to vote intelligently is often higher than
the expected individual return." 161
Having considered the three points mentioned above, one may be tempted to refer to
Sid as a debenture- (as opposed to share-) holder: (s)he invested some money at
privatisation and earns a higher-than-expected return on her/his investment. Richard
Posner correctly notes that
The typical shareholder ... is not knowledgeable about the business of
the firm, does not derive an important part of his livelihood from it,
and neither expects nor has an incentive to participate in its
management. He is a passive investor and, because of the liquidity of
157Dennis Swann: The Retreat of the State (1988), page 305.
158The Sunday Times, 10 August 1997, Section 3., page 1.
159Peter Saunders and Colin Harris: Privatization and Popular Capitalism (1994), page 153.
160The Financial Times, 18 May 1995.
161Benito Arrunada and Candido Paz-Ares: The Conversion of Ordinary Shares into Nonvoting
Shares In: International Review of Law and Economics 15: 351 - 372, 1995., at 354.
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his interest, has only a casual and often transitory relationship with the
firm. His interest, like that of a creditor, is a financial rather than
managerial interest. 162
The majority of small shareholders would not object to this interpretation. A survey
by Peter Saunders and Colin Harris revealed that around 27% of shareholders
interviewed regarded shares "as a long-term investment for themselves or their
families." For this group "the opportunity to buy shares was little more than an
attractive alternative to leaving cash on deposit with a bank or building society. "163
Around 80 % of the purchasers of British Telecom shares believed that BT shares
were a low-risk investment and "half of them thought that purchase of BT shares was
no more risky than putting their money in the building society." 164 Saunders and
Harris quote extreme examples:
(i) Some people bought British Telecom shares under the misapprehension
that they would lose their telephone lines if they did not.
(ii) . . . some people continued to buy shares in the aftermath of the Stock
Exchange crash of 1987, apparently oblivious of what had
happened. 165
The main point here is that groups of small investors mentioned above are
shareholders in law but not in practice: they either see shares as "a safe long-term
home for their savings" 166 0r do not understand what share ownership is about. All
they want is a good rate of return on their money; whether they have rights in
(shareholders) or against (debentureholders) privatised companies does not matter.
As it turned out, purchasing utility shares at privatisation was an excellent alternative
to bank deposits: the millions of Sid made a decent profit. The most recent figures are
as follows: 167
I62Richard A. Posner: Economic Analysis of Law (Little, Brown and Company, 1992), page 410.
163Peter Saunders and Colin Harris: op. cit., page 155.
164Peter Saunders and Colin Harris: op. cit., page 156.
165Peter Saunders and Colin Harris: op. cit., page 155.
166Peter Saunders and Colin Harris: op. cit., page 162.
167Memorandum submitted by Peter Vass for the Study of Regulated Industries: The Total
Investment Returns (before tax) to Shareholders in Privatised Industries In: House of Commons:
Trade and Industry Committee: Energy Regulation HC 50-11 1996-97, Volume II., pages 142 - 144.
means average figure.
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Name of Utility Real Internal Dividend Capital Gain
Privatised Rate of Yield per annum
Return per annum per cent
per annum per cent
per cent
British Telecom* 10.3 7.3 3
British Gas 11 9 2
RECs* 38.5 15.7 22.7
English generators* 25.2 13.2 12
Scottish companies* 13.5 6.5 7
Water companies* 24.4 11.2 13.2
TABLE 10.: Utility share performance
Thus investors earned a better-than-expected rate of return on their money. An
intriguing question may be raised here: Would public utilities have pursued a
different dividend policy if no millions of small shareholders would have been
waiting for dividend cheques twice per annum ? As was mentioned above, a
group of small investors subscribed for shares on the understanding that share
ownership is an 'attractive alternative' to leaving spare cash on bank accounts.
Board members were well aware of the fact that dividends were competing
against bank rates; and they also knew that small shareholders would not bother
to attend company meetings (see Southern Water - story) unless something
would outrage them (see British Gas AGM of 1995). The easiest way to avoid
shareholders' revolt is to pay out dividends: especially so, if around 25% of
investors purchased shares on the understanding that it was a better long-term
investment than leaving money with banks. Thus the following principle might
help to understand the dividend policy of privatised companies: the higher
dividend paid, the less likely that Sid would attend company meetings or would
vote her/his shares. Perhaps it was not a coincidence then that the executive
emolument - scandal erupted at the British Gas Annual General Meeting. This
company had the lowest Real Internal Rate of Return among privatised utilities;
Capital Gain per annum was a mere 2 per cent.
To conclude, executives may, and actually do, treat Sid as a debentureholder: if
privatised companies pay sufficient dividends to her/him, Sid is unlikely to take
an active interest in business decisions. It was also argued above that a group of
small shareholders would not disagree with this approach. Sid purchased shares
at privatisation so as to earn a good return on her/his money; company
management does not interest her/him at all. Would it not be better then to re¬
classify Sid as a debenture holder ? Although (s)he has shareholder rights, (s)he
does not exercise those rights (Southern Water); and (s)he cannot outvote
institutional investors anyway (British Gas). Perhaps some small shareholders
would be happy to trade in voting rights in return for a privileged dividend. The
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Spanish example may be adopted in Britain: holders of non-voting shares would
be entitled to (i) normal dividend (ii) plus a fixed return with a minimum of 5%
of the share's nominal value. 1^8
To sum up points (1) and (2), it is "dangerously naive" to rely on statistics exclusively
when analysing the success of utility privatisation. Actually, one need not bother with
statistics when analysing the economic consequences of denationalisation in the
utilities sector; the next Part will present a 'statistics-free' analysis of the 'improving
economic performance' objective.
Part III.
The economic performance objective and reorganisation
It was remarked above that statistics (i) may omit important factors that may not be
expressed in numbers and (ii) political standing seems to colour the analysis of
statistical data. Thus it might be a good idea to say goodbye to statistics when trying
to assess the success of privatisation. So far as (i) maximizing revenue and (ii)
extending share ownership objectives are concerned, figures are indispensable: How
much money was paid into the Consolidated Fund ? How many shareholders were
there after the flotation of the public utilities ? Turning to the last objective,
'improving economic performance', figures may be disregarded IF one were to accept
the following assumption: "... it is competition rather than ownership which has the
biggest impact on efficiency. "169
Professor David Newbery (Cambridge University) has explained this point as follows:
My thesis is that introducing competition into previously monopolised
and regulated network utilities is the key to achieving the full benefits
of privatisation. Privatisation is necessary but not sufficient. Regulation
is inevitably inefficient. Replacing regulation by competition for
network services can increase efficiency.
The report from Ernst & Young quoted above makes the same point:
... it has been long held that ownership is not the critical factor but
rather whether a firm is subject to the forces of competition in its
product markets. Introduce competition where previously there was a
monopoly, so the argument runs, and efficiency will look after
itself. 1T1
168Benito Arrunada and Candido Paz-Ares: op. cit.
169Peter Saunders and Colin Harris: Privatization and Popular Capitalism (1994), page 22.
170David M. Newberry: Privatisation and Liberalisation of Network Utilities (1996), page 1.
171Ernst & Young, op. cit., page 24.
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Dennis Swann writes in the Conclusion of The Retreat of the State that
. . . changes in the ownership in the absence of competition do not
inevitably lead to improvements in performance. Changes of
ownership which occur under conditions of competition and
particularly those that are accompanied by the creation of competitive
conditions, are likely to be beneficial - . . .172
Thus the main point of the 'competition rather than ownership' philosophy is that
privatisation will not increase efficiency unless competition is introduced. Hence an
analysis of the 'improving economic performance' objective shall concentrate on
competition: it is competition which will improve the economic performance of
utilities. If a sector is competitive it is quite likely that its economic performance will
be improved; thus the question of'opening up utilities sector to competition' should be
examined below in detail.
As a rule, competition presupposes choice: a utility sector is competitive if, and only
if, it is the customer who selects a firm to supply her/his home with
telecommunication, electricity, gas and water. Thus a number of competing utilities
must be licensed to serve the same market, otherwise the customer would have no
choice. Compared with nationalisation, this is a revolutionary idea indeed.
As was mentioned in Chapter 2., the designers of nationalisation did not believe in
competition: there were no competing suppliers. As a rule, the telecommunication,
electricity and gas industries were statutory monopolies; in addition, the legislator
conferred on Post Office and the British Gas Board the exclusive privilege of running
telecommunication/gas services. 173 as m. A. Mutton put it, nationalisation "involved
unified control and a statutory prohibition on entry to and exit from the industry". 174
Hence the licensing of alternative suppliers was out of the question until the early
1980s.
The pendulum started to swing from the 'one industry - one enterprise' principle in the
run-up to privatisation; however the pro-competition policy was facing a practical
difficulty. Although the de iure monopoly of British Telecom, CEGB/the electricity
area boards, and the British Gas Board was abolished in the early 1980s^^,
competition was slow to emerge. For example, the Energy Act 1983 introduced the
so-called 'Third-party Access' in the natural gas industry 176; yet no independent firm
tried to gain access to British Gas pipelines until 1986.177 jt was argUed above that
without alternative suppliers competition was illusory. Hence the number one priority
172Dennis Swann: The Retreat of the State (1988), page 302.
173Post Office Act 1969; and Gas Act 1972.
174M.A. Mutton: The Economics of Regulating Industry (Basil Blackwell, 1986), page 190.
^Telecommunications Act 1984; and the Energy Act 1983.
1761hird-party Access is discussed in Chapter 6. below.
177British Gas pic: Offer for Sale of Ordinary Shares. In: The Financial Times, 25 November 1986.
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was to find suitable firms which would be willing to challenge the de facto monopoly
of the newly-privatised utilities.
New competitors were firms (i) which had not been involved in the provision ofutility
services before ('new-comers'); OR (ii) were established after the reorganisation of the
nationalised boards (successor utilities). The licensing of new competitors has been
discussed in Chapter 2. above; it is point (ii) which shall be analysed here.
While the term 'reorganisation' is self-explanatory, it may be useful to make some
introductory comments here. Reorganisation may be defined as the splitting up of
nationalised boards into smaller, independent business divisions. Thus reorganisation
is the opposite of 'monopolisation', i.e. when a number of formerly competing units
are amalgamated.
As a rule, each utility industry may be sub-divided into a number of operational units.
For example, the electric industry consists of (a) generation, (b) transmission and (c)
distribution. There are similar divisional lines in the natural gas sector: (a) extraction,
(b) transmission and (c) distribution. The internal structure of the water sector looks
like as follows: (a) collection and treatment of water; (b) provision of
domestic/industrial water supplies; and (c) the collection, treatment and disposal of
sewage. 1^8 The telecommunication sector covers four activities (a) the supply of
telecommunication apparatus; (b) the running of telephone networks; the provision
(c) of basic telephony services and (d) of Value Added Services (i.e. Internet, sex-
lines!79) jt should be noted here that the telecommunication business was divided
into three main areas in the past. 1^0 But it may be appropriate to sever Value Added
Services, especially Internet, from basic telephony now: the latter is seen as a 'basic
right', while the 'obligation to supply' does not extend to the former as of today.
The obvious solution would be if reorganisation were to mirror these divisional lines:
activity (a) from (b), while (b) would be separated from (c), and so on. A given
business unit may be then de-merged into as many utilities as expedient. As a rule, the
number of companies operating in the field of (a) or (b) or (c) is in direct ratio to the
competitiveness of the activity concerned: the more competitive a given sub-sector is,
the more firms may be licensed to enter that particular piece of the market. For
example, a single firm is usually in charge of transmission (activity (b) above) in the
electric and gas industries. High voltage/pressure transportation of electricity/gas is a
truly natural monopoly; it is questionable whether this segment of the electricity/gas
chain will ever be competitive. The UK (National Grid pic.) and Hungarian (MVM
Rt.) electric industries are examples. On the other hand, there may be a number of
electric/gas distributors (activity (c) above): twelve independent electricity distribution
178Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries & Price Waterhouse: Regulated Industries: The UK
Framework (1996), page 37.
179See: Maystart Ltd. v. Director General of Telecommunications (CA), LEXIS, 17 February
1994.
180See, for example, M.A. Mutton, op. cit., page 206.
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companies operated in England and Wales after the reorganisation of 1990. And how
about the reorganisation of the telecommunication, gas and water boards in Britain ?
Were activities (a), (b) and (c) separated at privatisation in these sectors ?
The short answer is NO. As far as the telecommunication, gas and water industries in
Britain are concerned, pre-privatisation reorganisation was an opportunity passed up.
British Telecom pic, British Gas pic, and the English and Welsh water companies
were NOT reorganised prior to their disposals. As far as competition is concerned, the
fact that, with the exception of the electric industry, no public utility was reorganised
may not be a problem: in theory, a sector may be competitive even though it has not
been restructured. As a rule, new competitors may come from outside the boundaries
of the nationalised telecommunication, gas and water industries. This is the
phenomenon known as liberalisation; it has been discussed in Chapter 2. above. A
further point should be added here: if a sector is not reorganised, it is more likely than
not that outsiders (i) may not find the legal and regulatory playgrounds attractive;
hence (ii) would decide not to compete with the incumbent utility. It was noted above
that no independent supplier was seeking 'Third-Party Access' to the British Gas
network after the passage of the Energy Act 1983. Similarly, opportunities for
competition were limited in the water industry. While companies were allowed to
apply for 'inset appointments' to supply 'green field sites' under the Water Act 1989,
no applications were reported until 1992; then, as was remarked above, the
Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992 tried to boost competition further. It was
the same Act which reduced the 'monopoly threshold' in the gas sector from 25,000
therms per annum to 2,500 therms. As a result, the number of gas suppliers licensed
multiplied and the UK natural gas sector emerged as one of the most competitive
markets in Europe. A number of big industrial customers, including the electricity
generators, turned their backs on their existing supplier. It was a blow to British Gas;
BG had signed long-term 'take-or-pay' contracts. As a result, British Gas was in
serious financial troubles by the mid-1990s. The company was reorganised: the
transmission unit (BG Transco) was separated from the trading arm. To conclude,
liberalisation achieved something privatisation tried to sweep under the carpet: the
splitting up ofBritish Gas pic.
Two points should be underlined here:
(1) Spontaneous reorganisation
The designers of the British Gas privatisation project did not envisage that the UK
gas market would be fully liberalised by 1998: this company failed to take into
account the possibility of competition. The privatisation prospectus did not present
a long-term view of the gas industry. It is questionable whether the Treasury
and/or British Gas pic. had any ideas as to how the UK gas sector should look like
twelve years after the flotation. One may argue that long-term planning was all but
ignored in the run up to utility privatisation in Britain. As will be discussed in
Chapter 5. below, the structure of the English and Welsh electricity sector was
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reorganised spontaneously between 1995 and 1996; the expiry of Golden Shares
opened the floodgates for predators. Further takeover offers are reported in the
electricity sector in 1998: Energy Group (formerly Eastern Group) is subject to
two offers. ^The government had no blueprint for the shape of the electric
sector beyond year 1995 (i.e. the year when the time-limited Golden Shares were
due to expire). The same comments are also correct in the case of the water
sector: here the Golden Shares expired in 1994.
To conclude then, the UK government did not have plans for the medium and
long term development of privatised utilities. Hence spontaneous reorganisations
took place in the (i) gas, (ii) electricity, and (iii) water industries. The lack of long-
term strategy is especially alarming in the utilities sector. Gas, electricity, and
water companies tend to plan for twenty - twenty-five years in advance: it is
regrettable that their ex-owner, the state, did not do the same at privatisation.
(2) Reorganisation post-privatisation
It was remarked above that British Gas pic. was restructured some ten years after
flotation. Reorganisation post-privatisation is problematical. As a rule,
reorganisation must precede privatisation. As M.A. Mutton argues,
Once the privatisation has occurred within a specific regulatory
framework it then becomes very difficult, if not impossible, to envisage
fundamental changes taking place, because if those changes directly
aim to intensify competition, the valuation of assets and thence the
shares will be correspondingly reduced. 1 ^2
It is easy to see why investors were not particularly happy with the post-
privatisation restructuring ofBritish Gas: they subscribed for shares in 1986 on the
understanding that this firm would be a quasi-monopoly. Share prices rocket after
flotation. The government found buyers for its residual stake at 219^/4 p per share
in 1990: the share price at privatisation was a mere 130p per share. 1^3 What was
behind this price hike ? Two factors, perhaps: (i) efficiency gains^4 AND (ii) the
privilege of being the monopoly supplier of natural gas in Britain. Post-
privatisation restructuring has stripped away point (ii): a British Gas operating in a
competitive market is a less attractive investment than a British Gas having the
monopoly right to sell gas to certain categories of customers. The picture is less
rosy today: The Financial Times reported that British Gas shares have been
181The Financial Times, March 14/March 15 1998, Weekend Money, page 4. For details, see:
Texas Utilities Company: Cash Offer for the Energy Gorup pic. (March 1998).
182M.A. Mutton, op. cit., page 205.
183H.M. Treasury: Her Majesty's Treasury Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme (1995), page
22.
184Chapter 1., Part II.
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underperformed by 19% in April 1998. The shares have been trading at a "near
10% discount to a 'sum of the parts' valuation, whereas many utilities trade at a
premium."^ The final note here is then that share prices will plummet if utilities
are reorganised after privatisation.
The main points of the above discussion may be summarised as follows: British Gas
pic. was cushoned against competition until recently: it was privatised and run for
years as a fully integrated, de facto monopoly. Yet this structure did not survive the
liberalisation of the UK gas market: increased competition after 1992 spawned the
reorganisation of British Gas.
Thus there are three liberalised utility sectors today (telecommunication, electricity
and gas), out of which two were reorganised pre- or post-privatisation: (i) electricity
and (ii) natural gas. The remaining two sectors, telecommunication and water, should
be considered in turn below.
Telecommunications
Reorganisation seems to be unnecessary here and this is for two reasons:
Telecommunication is "the most liberalized of the utilities sector" 186- there were
"over 150 licensed public telecommunication operators to whom nearly a
thousand licences have been issued" in 1996.187
The dominant player, British Telecom pic., is subject to tougher economic
regulation than electricity, gas or water companies. For example, the Director
General of Telecommunications introduced so-called 'Fair Trading Conditions'
into British Telecom's licence in 1996: the Director General may deal with
"incidents of conduct which he considers to be anti-competitive" without making a
formal reference to MMC.188
Hence the telecommunication sector became competitive without the splitting up of
British Telecom pic. into NewCo 1. (development, maintenance and operation of the
networks) and NewCo 2. (provision of services).
185The Financial Times, April 15 1998.
186Colin Scott: The Juridification of the Regulatory Relations in the UK Utilities Sector (Paper for
presentation at LSE-Brick Court Seminar Series, 22 April 1997), page 6.
187Phillips LJ in Regina v. Director General of Telecommunications, ex parte British
Telecommunications pic. (QBD), LEXIS, 20 December 1996.
188Ibid.
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Water
It is easy to see why restructuring was not on the agenda in the water industry at
privatisation. First of all, the supply of water to domestic customers is a liberalised
activity in Britain. As a rule, any customer may request any water company to provide
a supply ofwater for domestic purposes. Yet cross-boundary supply is rare: would-be
customers must meet the cost of any pipelaying needed. * ^9 Hence it is not the lack of
alternative suppliers, but the purse of customers which limits the scope for cross-
boundary competition.
Secondly, there were a relatively large number of firms in this market: 10 water and
sewerage companies [WaSCs] and 23 water only companies [WoCs] operated in
1992 190 While a number of take-overs and mergers took place after the expiry of the
Golden Share^l; the number of licensees remains high. Thus comparative
(yardstick) competition could be introduced without the reorganisation of the WaSCs.
To conclude, the provision of water and sewage services to customers is the least
competitive among all the utilities. It is unlikely that reorganisation at privatisation
would have increased competition in the water industry.
What is the relationship then between reorganisation and increased competition ? The
following points should be considered to see why it is not easy to answer this
question:
Reorganisation is not necessarily a precondition to competition. The British
telecommunication industry is among the most competitive ones in Europe, even
though British Telecom pic. was not reorganised prior to its privatisation.
• Reorganisation may be one of the consequences of competition. British Gas pic.
was reorganised after the introduction of competition: by the time BG was split
into smaller business units in 1996/97, a number of alternative gas suppliers
operated in Britain. Thus reorganisation followed competition in the UK gas
sector.
Reorganisation may not render certain industries more competitive. The
reorganisation of the English/Welsh water industry would have been a futile
attempt to introduce competition. It is doubtful whether the water sector will be
competitive in the foreseeable future.
i89OFWAT: Increasing Competition in the Water Industry, Information Note No. 10, as revised,
HMSO (1996).
19°ofwAT: Issues Involved in Regulation of Privatised Water Utilities, HMSO, (1992), page 10.,
point 53.
191See Chapter 5. for details.
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This is not to say, however, that reorganisation is of secondary importance. The
restructuring of the UK electric industry was a milestone in the history of
competitive utility services. It was the restructuring of 1990 which paved the way
for full competition in the electricity supply industry.
The conclusion here is that a discussion about 'restructuring' may not explain
satisfactorily why certain industries are competitive and others are not. A further point
should be taken into account to understand the development of competition in the UK
utility services; and it is liberalisation.
Four options are available here. The first two are simple enough: (a) fierce
competition will follow if a sector is both restructured and liberalised; (b) there will be
no competition if an industry is neither restructured nor liberalised. It is more difficult
to see whether competition will develop if (c) an industry is restructured but not
liberalised and (d) liberalised but not restructured. The Hungarian and British natural
gas industries are examples here. The former was restructured but not liberalised in
1991 (see Chapter 6.): no new supplier was licensed until 1996. The British gas sector
was liberalised after the passage of the Competition and Services (Utilities) Act 1992;
yet no restructuring took place until 1996-97.
Which one is more competitive ? Competition was negligible in Hungary between
1991 - 1996: as will be explained in Chapter 6., the regional gas distribution
companies were de facto monopolies. As far as Britain is concerned, the main point is
that it was increased competition which led to the restructuring of British Gas pic;
details have been discussed above.
The final point here is then that liberalisation is essential to competition, while
restructuring is not. The following examples support this statement:
British telecommunication and gas sectors
If a utility sector is liberalised, it may become competitive even though the former
nationalised enterprise has not been split up into smaller business units.
Hungarian gas industry
If a sector is restructured but not liberalised competition may not develop. New
suppliers should be allowed to challenge the monopoly of the incumbent utilities.
The diagrammatic presentation of these points is as follows:
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Reorganisation Liberalisation Competition Example
NO YES will develop British
telecommunication
YES NO will NOT develop Hungarian gas
YES YES the best option British electricity
NO NO not available Nationalised sectors
TABLE 11.: Reorganisation and liberalisation
The discussion concerning the 'improving economic performance' objective may be
summarised then as follows:
• It is competition, rather than ownership, which improves the efficiency of a
privatised company;
Liberalisation is indispensable to competition in the utilities sector; while
restructuring may or may not render an industry more competitive,
thus
It was liberalisation which improved efficiency in the UK utilities sector; hence
privatisation as such did not meet the 'improving economic performance' criteria.
Conclusion
This chapter has tried to assess how successful the British privatisation programme
was. The introduction has identified three 'core objectives' of privatisation: (i)
maximizing revenue; (ii) extending share ownership; and (iii) improving economic
performance. It has been argued above that privatisation did not meet any of these
objectives:
The 'maximizing revenue' objective was ignored in the case of (a) Plant
Breeding Institute, (b) the sale of the trust ports, and (c) the disposal of the coal
and the nuclear industries.
It is dubious whether privatisation extended share ownership in Britain. If it did,
it is not clear whether small investors are properly to be considered as
shareholders or as debenture holders.
Change of ownership is a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving
economic performance in the utilities sector. Firms tend to develop towards
increased efficiency in a competitive market. Liberalisation opened up the
telecommunication, electricity and gas sectors to competition in Britain: and
economic performance has improved in the industries mentioned. Thus it was
liberalisation (as opposed to privatisation) which improved the economic
performance of privatised utilities.
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Is it to say that privatisation failed in the UK ? Not, of course. There is little doubt that
privatisation was successful in political terms. The sale of state-owned companies was
a characteristic feature of the neo-conservative policy which served the Tory party
well between 1979 and November 1990^2 To retain power for almost two decades
in Britain is an outstanding performance indeed. Thus, so far as politics is concerned,
privatisation was successful; and it was this political motive which kept the ball
rolling. The fact that other objectives, e.g. maximizing revenue, widening share
ownership or improving economic performance, were not achieved was all but
ignored while the Tory party was in power. Perhaps it is the right time to reconsider
the success of privatisation taking into account the 'core' objectives mentioned above.
192When John Major succeeded to the office of Prime Minister.
Chapter 5.
Five Years after Privatisation -
Takeovers in the Electricity Sector
Five is a mysterious number from time immemorial. Five was declared to be the
Supreme Ultimate in ancient China. According to a legend, Fu Hsi (29th century BC)
discovered a Magic Square of I Ching trigrams while he was wandering along the
bank of the Yellow River:
Keeping
still
6
The
Yielding
1
The
Arousing
8
The The
Abysmal 5 Clear
7 3
The
Gentle
2
The
Firm
9
The
Joyous
4
TABLE 12.: The Yellow-River diagram
The space at the centre of the Yellow River Diagram was given the numerical value
of five; this number was "to serve as the fulcrum to all the directions and thereby
represents the Supreme Ultimate. "1
Politicians in the 20th century were also obsessed with number five. For example,
Lenin advocated the introduction of five-year economic plans in Russia. Fie argued
that a five-year period would be the ideal time scale to test economic policy in
practice. All the COMECOM countries followed suit after World War II: five year
plans were to guide socialist economies towards communism. Yet the idea of five year
planning did not disappear entirely after the collapse of the centrally planned
economies : it was actually adopted in Britain. Although it is unlikely that advisers to
Mrs. Thatcher consulted Lenin's books on economic planning, the regional electricity
companies [hereinafter: RECs] were sold on the basis of a five-year plan: (i) the
original price formulae were valid for a period of five years; (ii) the Golden Shares in
RECs were to expire in the fifth year after the disposals; and (iii) electricity generators
and British Coal signed a five year back-to-back coal contract after the flotations. The
purpose of this Chapter is to examine what changes have happened in the British
electrical industry when the 'five-year plan' ran out.
The structure of this Chapter will be as follows: after a short introduction, Part I. will
summarise how the British electricity sector was reorganised between 1995 - 1996;
Part II. will analyse the pre-conditions to and the rationale for electricity mergers; and
finally Part III. will raise some competition and regulatory law issues.
'Roy Collins: The Fu Hsi I Ching. The Early Heaven Sequence (1993), page 16.
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Introductory comments
Electricity privatisation - the tough project
The most fascinating thing about the sale of RECs is that it actually happened; neither
politicians nor engineers were too enthusiastic about electricity privatisation. The most
likely reasons for opposing the sale of electric utilities may be summarised as follows:
Politics
Virtually every household has electricity supply in mainland Britain. Electricity is
regarded as a basic necessity today: it was noted in Green v. Yorkshire
Electricity Group Pic. (Ch.D.), LEXIS 19 November 1991 that a building is
not usable as a dwelling house without electricity. The other main source of
domestic energy, natural gas, will never achieve the same penetration rate;
remote, low population areas may not be economically connected to the gas
distribution network. Hence virtually every voter in England and Wales was a
customer of one of the twelve RECs at privatisation. As a main rule, the more
voters a given parliamentary decision is likely to affect, the more Members of
Parliament will have something to say in connection with that decision. Active
political interest is not necessarily a good omen as far as the progress of
privatisation is concerned: parliamentary debates, energy sub-committee
discussions etc. tend to delay disposals. According to the official data-base of the
Office of Parliament, 42 House of Lords papers and 37 Standing Committee
papers were published on the Electricity Bill.2 Thus the high electricity
penetration rate engendered excessive political attention; politics played too large
a part in electricity privatisation.
Regulatory concerns
Unlike the natural gas or the coal industries, electricity "requires a high degree of
co-ordination between the production, transmission and distribution elements.
Two physical factors should be emphasised here: (i) Electricity may not be stored
economically. Electricity generated must be transmitted into the national grid
immediately, (ii) Electricity consumption is not constant. Peak demands may not
be satisfied from storage; customers have to be supplied straight from the
transmission grid as and when electricity is required. As Andrew Holmes notes,
"there can never be a gap between supply and demand. If there is, the light goes
out. Thus generation, transmission, and supply must be synchronised constantly.
2UKOP Stationery Data on CD-ROM (1997).
3Francis McGowan: The Struggle for Power in Europe: Competition and Regulation in the EC
Electricity Industry (1993), page 2.
4Andrew Holmes: Privatising British Electricity. Restmcturing and Resistance (1992), page 68.
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Against the above mentioned political/regulatory background, it is no surprise that
electricity privatisation is not universally popular within the EU. France, Greece,
Ireland, and Italy seem to prefer centralised electricity systems to liberalisation and re¬
structuring. ^ The UK pursued a fundamentally different energy policy after 1990. The
old, centralised electricity system was re-structured in England and Wales as follows:
Generation was separated from transmission and distribution (no vertical
integration);
The electricity area boards were re-registered as 100% state-owned,
independent, Companies Act-like companies;
The twelve regional electricity distribution companies jointly owned the
transmission unit (National Grid pic.);
As was mentioned in Chapter 4., the first round of privatisation did not affect the
nuclear power stations: they remained state-owned until 1996.
The above model was not introduced in Scotland. The Scottish electricity industry
was NOT restructured: the two Scottish companies were privatised as fully integrated
utilities. It is one of the 'never answered questions'^ of UK privatisation policy why
the reorganisation of the Scottish electricity industry was not on the agenda. Why was
reorganisation seen as beneficial in England and Wales only ?
Potential arguments against the introduction of the English-Welsh model might have
included factors like (i) the size of the Scottish market; (ii) social obligations in the
case of Hydro Electric; and politics was the third reason. The co-existence of two,
fundamentally different electricity systems was not a political issue between 1990 (i.e.
year of REC privatisation) and 1995 (i.e. expire of Golden Shares in RECs). It was
(a) the Scottish Power bid for Manweb and (b) the National Power/PowerGen bids
for RECs which brought the 'integrated versus non-integrated' issue to the forefront
of daily politics in 1995. As will be highlighted under point C./ (2) below, the English
generators' bids for RECs were refused on political grounds. Perhaps it was not the
first occasion when the future shape of the UK electricity industry turned on party
politics: it may not be ruled out that political (as opposed to technical, business, or
practical) arguments decided against the restructuring of the Scottish electricity
system.
The date of the major electricity sales in Britain were as follows:
5Eugene D. Cross: Utility Regulation in the European Union (1996), Part 1.
6See Conclusion, Point (4).
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Name of utility sold Year
RECs 1990
National Power and 1991 and 1995
PowerGen
Scottish Power and 1991
Scottish Hydro-Electric
Northern Ireland 1993
Electricity
National Grid 1995
First Hydro Company 1995
British Energy 1996
TABLE 13.: Electricity sales in Britain
This Chapter is not concerned with post-privatisation developments in the Northern
Ireland electricity sector. The discussion will concentrate on England and Wales,
while references will be made to the Scottish companies where appropriate. The
reason for focusing on England and Wales is that this area of the UK has experienced
the most radical changes over the last eight years: there were no 'revolutionary' post-
privatisation developments in Scotland or in Northern Ireland.
Part I.
The "Great RECs Race"^
Privatisation is usually the biggest shock in the life of a state-owned company; the
electricity industry is an exception to this rule. Just five years after privatisation the
English and Welsh electricity sector was in a turmoil: a number of takeover talks were
reported in the press and all but two (Yorkshire^ and Southern) RECs were taken
over by December 1996.
This paper does not intend to give a full historical survey of the Great REC Race^; it
will concentrate on three aspects of the electricity takeovers, namely A./ Bidders, B./
Types of Bids, and C./ Outcome ofBidding Process.
A./ Bidders
Bidders may be divided into two groups: (i) UK regulated companies and (ii) others.
Scottish Power, North West Water, and Welsh Water belong to the former group;
while the latter is comprised of Hanson and US utilities (Dominion Resources,
7 The Financial Times, 15 February, 1995
8American Electric Power and Yorkshire Electricity were in merger talks in late February 1997. See:
The Financial Times, 24 February 1997
9For a detailed analysis see: OXERA: Utility Takeovers (1997).
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Entergy, Avon Energy Partners, CalEnergy, Central and South West, and Southern
Group).
So far as group (i) is concerned, a theoretical question may be raised. Had price
regulation worked 'properly' in Britain, would regulated firms have had spare cash to
purchase another utility ? In theory, tariffs are supposed to cover REASONABLE (i)
operational expenses, (ii) capital expenditure programmes, and (iii) a rate of return
on capital employed. If UK regulated companies had sufficient funds to finance the
Great REC Race, one would start to wonder whether the regulators set the 'right
kind' of tariffs: perhaps OFFER (in the case of Scottish Power pic.) and OFWAT (in
the case ofNorth West Water pic. and Welsh Water pic.) were too lenient. The taking
over of fellow utility companies is certainly beyond the limits of 'reasonable capital
expenditure programmes'.
Others may rebut this argument. The fact that UK utilities emerged as predators
confirms that price regulation works perfectly well. Scottish Power, North West
Water and Welsh Water had sufficient financial resources to acquire other firms
because these companies were run very efficiently: they cut back costs after
privatisation. The issue of cost-saving will be discussed below in Part II. The point
here is that it is open to debate whether the fact that UK regulated utilities were
predators is the triumph or failure ofRPI-X regulation.
Turning to group (ii), the first point to note is that, with the exception of Hanson, all
companies here are US-based utilities. The lack of European predators is striking;
especially so, if one were to compare the electricity sector with the water industry in
the UK. After privatisation French companies purchased a total of eight English water
companies. 10 If French utilities were determined to get a stake in the water supply
industry, why did Americans only enter the Big REC Race ?
(a) The French 'NON'
The French had at least four reasons for not bidding for British electricity companies.
First of all, Electricite de France is already a member of the British Pool; the French
enterprise sells around 4% of the annual English electricity demand via an undersea
interconnector. 11 It is a market player without being physically present on the British
Isles. The recently passed EU Directive on the internal market in electricity^ opens
up generation to competition. Thus EdF need not acquire a distribution company to
secure its market position in the UK.
Secondly, the French are not the most adamant supporters of liberalisation in the
electricity sector. In France electricity supply is a public service subject to central
10OXERA: Utility Takeovers (1997), page 5.
1 'Eugene D. Cross: Utility Regulation in the European Union (1996), page 238.
12OJ L No.27, 30.1.97, page 20.
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planning. ^ The full liberalisation of the UK domestic market does not seem to appeal
to EdF. One may argue that EdF found the English and Welsh electricity sector too
competitive.
Thirdly, a bid from EdF would have been subject to European Community merger
rules. As the latest edition of the Practitioner's Guide to the Acquisition of Private
Companies in the European Union states, EC Merger Regulation (Regulation
4064/8914) applies if a transaction is a 'concentration' with a 'Community
dimension'. 15 A bid from EdF for any of the RECs would have satisfied both tests: (i)
the takeover would have been a concentration; and (ii) the Community dimension,
defined by reference to turnover16, would have been met as well:
(i) EdF on its own has more than Ecu 5,000m turnover^ and
(ii) the turnover of any REC was more than Ecu 250m in 1995.18
The European Commission is expected to decide within one month of full notification
whether the transaction will be cleared or referred to a detailed investigation. The
second stage investigation may take up to four months. EdF might have decided not
to take part in the Big REC Race so as to avoid a full investigation into its business
dealings.
Finally, French utilities were investing in other European countries at the time of the
Big REC Race. For example, EdF purchased two electricity distribution companies in
Hungary for FIUF 24bnl9; and is keen to acquire power stations in Romania, Poland,
and Germany (the City ofBerlin).
To sum up, the French were not interested in purchasing British electricity suppliers;
this lack of interest explains why EdF owns no REC for the time being.
13Eugene D. Cross: Utility Regulation in the European Union (1996), page 21.
14OJL 395/1, 12.30.1989.
15Maurice Button and Sarah Bolton (eds): Practitioner's Guide to the Acquisition of Private
Companies in the European Union (1997), page 5, point 5.1.
16"The combined worldwide turnover of all the 'undertakings concerned' is more than Ecu 5,000m
and the EU-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than Ecu
250m, unless each of the undertakings concerned derives two-third of its EU-wide turnover in one
and the same Member State." See: Maurice Button and Sarah Bolton (eds): Practitioner's Guide op.
cit., page 5., point 5.1.
17EdF turnover in 1995: Ffr 195.8bn.(app. Ecu 29,560m) Source: Power in Europe, 8 March 1996,
page 11.
18Source: Electricity Association: The UK Electricity System (http://www.electricity.org.uk),
Distribution and Supply.
19East European Energy Report, December 1995, page 2.
(b) The American YES
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According to OXERA, an Oxford-based research group, US utilities had five
principal reasons for purchasing non-US electric companies:
Lack of opportunities in the USA;
Liberalisation in the USA;
Higher returns in the UK;
Acquiring good management; and
Springboard into the European market.^0
The first two reasons explain why American utilities were keen to invest abroad, while
many European countries could have satisfied the last two points: it was the third
point then which was truly peculiar to the English and Welsh distribution companies.
American investors were well aware of the fact that price regulation in the UK "allows
the possibility of earning supernormal profits, whereas US - style rate-on-return
regulation does not."21 This issue will be analysed further in Part II. below; the main
point here is that a number of reasons might have motivated American investors to
acquire British electricity companies. But the principal reason was the 'possibility of
earning supernormal profits'.
The last issue to be discussed here is why RECs were not bidding for other RECs. As
will be mentioned under point B./ below, the electricity companies were cash-rich:
they could have financed intra-industry takeover battles. Actually, more than one
REC purchased electricity companies abroad: Eastern Group invested in the Czech
Republic, and Midlands Electricity tried to acquire a Hungarian distribution company.
Why did RECs look abroad ? Two possible reasons may be mentioned:
(i) The electricity area boards were packed with engineers in the era of
nationalisation: the electrical industry was run by engineers for engineers.22
Engineers did not know much about the pros and conts of takeovers; the area boards
could not be taken over after nationalisation. Not all incumbent board members were
removed at privatisation^ thus engineer-oriented corporate culture lingered on after
1990. The boards ofRECs did not have an 'aggressive' background as far as takeovers
20OXERA: Utility Takeovers (1997), page 17.
21OXERA: ibid.
22C.D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (1992),
pages 88. and 152.
23For example, all board members of Hydro-Electric pic. held similar positions with the North of
Scotland Hydro-Electric Board. The Production and Engineering Director is an example: he was
appointed in 1966. See: Scottish Hydro-Electric pic. and Scottish Power pic.: Offers for Sale (1991),
page 139.
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and mergers were concerned: this is why the RECs were attractive targets but not
active bidders themselves.
(ii) There is little doubt that intra-industry bids would have been referred to the MMC.
As will be discussed in Part III. below, the outcome of a merger reference cannot be
foretold in the UK. Two points should be underlined here: (i) It is hard (if not
impossible) to guess "what view the MMC would take" i.e. whether the
Commission will conclude that a merger will operate against the public interest or not;
and (ii) The Secretary of State has discretion whether or not to follow the
Commission's recommendations. As a rule, uncertainty increases the opportunity cost
of intra-industry takeovers: an REC might never be sure whether its bid for another
REC would be blocked or not. Hence an REC might find a foreign target more
attractive: the uncertainty mentioned did not exist in connection with acquiring
companies in the Czech Republic and/or Hungary. Furthermore, the acquisition of
Czech and/or Hungarian utilities is NOT subject to EU merger control: these
countries are not members of the European Union as of today. Yet both countries
may join the Common Market by 2005: they are already members of the EU
electricity network. Thus taking over electric utilities in the Central European region
seems to offer the best of both worlds: (a) the acquisition is not subject to EU
approval today, BUT (b) the target countries will join the EU in the foreseeable
future.
The final point here is then that had the British system of merger control been more
predictable^ perhaps some RECs would have been bidding for other RECs.
B./ Hostile or Recommended Bids
It would be naive to suggest that take-over offers came like a bolt from the blue: the
RECs were quite attractive takeover targets. The RECs reported steady profits for the
first five years after privatisation: on average, a company made an operating profit of
GBP 120m on an annual turnover of GBP330m from distribution, and another
GBP30m profit on a turnover of GBP 1,300m from supply.Board members were
well aware of the fact that the RECs might not defy their fate: with the exception of
Manweb (Scottish Power), SWEB (Southern Group) and Northern Electric
(Trafalgar House and, later, CalEnergy), all the bids were recommended.
The fact whether a bid was recommended or not did not influence the operation of
the competition authorities. On the one hand, recommended bids were blocked (bids
24Regina v. Director General of Electricity Supply, ex parte Scottish Power pic. Lexis, 3
February 1997.
25For example, the Electricity Act 1989 could have provided for automatic reference to the MMC
under certain circumstances. The lack of automatic reference clause is further discussed under Point
3. of Part III.
26Electricity Association: The UK Electricity System (http://www.electricity.org.uk), Distribution and
Supply.
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by National Power and PowerGen for Southern Electric and Midlands Electric); on
the other hand, hostile bids (e.g. CalEnergy's bid for Northern Electric) succeeded
without being referred to the MMC.
C./ Outcome
As was mentioned above, ten RECs were taken over by December 1996. But more
than ten bids had been launched in the British electricity sector; some takeover
attempts did not bear fruit. The Trafalgar bid lapsed, the National Power/PowerGen
bids for RECs did not get the green light, and the proposed takeover of National
Power was blocked by the government. Unsuccessful bids will be analysed in turn
below.
(1) Trafalgar House - Northern Electric
The Great REC Race actually had a bad start: the first bid lapsed after a fierce
takeover battle between Trafalgar House and Northern Electric. Adverse
circumstances decided against this bid. First of all, the bid was premature; it was
launched in December 1994 some three months before the expiry of the Golden Share
in the RECs. Strictly speaking Northern was more a potential than a real takeover
target at that stage: as will be discussed below, bids were at the mercy of the Golden
Share holder until 31 March 1995. Secondly, the bid was based upon a presumption
which turned out to be false. Both the bidder and the target company calculated the
future financial value of Northern on the basis of the August 1994 distribution price
proposal from OFFER. As will be discussed below, this proposal favoured the RECs;
thus Northern's management was determined to fight off" the Trafalgar bid. The
Northern defence package included:
507 pence per share cash payment;
special dividend of GBP 165m; and
a promise to distribute proceeds from the sale of Northern's holding in the
National Grid among shareholders.27
The defence documents laid out a buoyant financial position under the proposed new
price regime.28 This financial information did not quite correspond to the forecasts
upon which the Director General of OFFER prepared his price proposal. When
Professor Littlechild looked at "the new evidence associated with the share price
increases and the takeover bid for Northern Electric" he decided to reconsider the
August 1994 proposal.29 The consequences of this announcement will be discussed in
27The Financial Times, 20 February 1995.
28Martin Brough, Seumas Lobban: Guide to the Economic Regulation of the Electricity Industry
(September, 1995), page 13.
29OFFER: The Distribution Price Control: Revised Proposals (July 1995), page 2.
174
Part II. below; here it is sufficient to remark that, although Trafalgar House did not
take over Northern, this bid was an important momentum of the Big REC Race. It
was the Trafalgar - Northern takeover battle which led to the revision of the August
1994 distribution price proposal.
(2) National Power and PowerGen bids for RECs
If competition authorities were bound by their previous decisions, then the English
generators would be the happy owners of two RECs today. National Power and
PowerGen launched their takeover bids for Southern Electric and Midlands Electric
respectively after the acquisition ofManweb by Scottish Power.
The background to these bids may be summarised as follows: 'vertical integration'
was a crucial issue at privatisation. After the winding up of CEGB, generation was to
be severed from distribution in England and Wales: as was noted in the Introduction,
the two Scottish companies remained vertically integrated. The generators' bid for
RECs challenged this institutional structure. The question was whether vertical
integration should be permitted in England and Wales or not.
In the case of the Scottish Power - Manweb takeover the Secretary of State answered
this question in the affirmative: the bid was not referred to the MMC.30 Hence
National Power and PowerGen were led to believe that the same hands-off approach
would apply to their bids. The Secretary of State sent the first strange signal on 23
November 1995: both bids were referred to the MMC. The remit of the Commission
was as follows:
to consider whether the situation qualifies for a merger investigation;
* if so, to decide whether it might be expected to operate against the public interest;
and
if it is expected to operate against the public interest, to recommend possible
remedies.^ 1
The MMC report allayed the generators' fears: the Commission approved the mergers
subject to three conditions.32 The Secretary of State was expected to clear the bids.
But Ian Lang Esq. had a different agenda; the bids were blocked on 24 April 1996 on
the grounds that "the mergers would have adverse impacts on the development of
competition in generation and supply, and on the effectiveness of regulation. "33
With hindsight, one may argue that (a) the Scottish Power bid for Manweb and (b)
the National Power/PowerGen bids for RECs may be distinguished. As was noted
above, Scottish Power was already a vertically integrated company, while the English
generators were deliberately excluded from distribution after privatisation. Thus the
30The Financial Times, 18 September 1995.
31OXERA: MMC Reports on Power Generators (1997), page 12.
32Short Circuit. In: The Economist, April 13 1996.
33Electricity Association: The UK Electricity System (http://www.electricity.org.uk) Appendix.
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Scottish Power - Manweb merger merely added an extra unit to the already existing
distribution business of the Scottish company; the National Power/PowerGen bids
would have turned English RECs and generators into vertically integrated utilities.
Yet commentators do not agree with this argument. They claim that concerns over
the future of competition was perhaps the least important factor in this case^; the
National Power and PowerGen bids fell victim to a power struggle in Westminster.
The Financial Times published the following comment as early as September 1995:
It would be undesirable if he [Secretary of State] eventually referred a
bid simply because political pressure could not be ignored.3 5
This is exactly what happened. The government had a majority of one vote in the
House of Commons by early 1996; Conservative backbenchers openly opposed the
National Power/PowerGen bids. Thus parliamentary mathematics decided against the
power companies; when all the votes count the Secretary of State may not enrage
bankbenchers.
(3) Proposed takeover ofNational Power
National Power lived a double-life in the Great REC Race; it was both a predator and
a target company. Southern Group indicated in early 1996 that it intended to bid for
National Power.36 Takeover plans fell through in early May when the government
clarified its position on the status of the English generators:
As a result of recent merger activity in the electricity industry, the
Government has reviewed its policy on the special shares in the light of
the possibility of bids being made for the generators. It has been
decided that it should retain the special shares in view of the
importance of National Power pic. and PowerGen pic. as independent
generating companies operating in a market which is not yet fully
competitive. As and when the Government is satisfied that there is
adequate competition in the generation and supply markets it will be
prepared to consider whether, after consultation with the companies,
to redeem the special shares.37
34OXERA: MMC Reports on the Power Generators (1997), pages 19 - 20. and Dr. Kim Howells MP:
Approaching Regulation from Westminster (1996), pages 2-3.
35The Financial Times, September 18 1995.
36Ken Bailey: A Bid too far ? In: [1996] 7 Util LR 134, at 135.
37Press release from the Department of Industiy and Trade. Quoted in: Power in Europe, May 3,
1996, page 2.
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The general implication of this announcement was that the government will block the
takeover of any electric utility in which it holds a Golden Shared 8 Hence with the
exception of the two remaining independent RECs, no electricity company might be
taken over in the UK after May 1996.
The government, however, may change its policy: the Secretary of State may request
the generator companies to redeem the Special Share at any time. 3 9 Thus it is up to
the government of the day whether National Power and PowerGen will be taken
over; and, if yes, when. Uncertainty as to when and how Golden Shares will be
activated was discussed in Chapter 2. above. Suffice it to say here that potential
bidders would be advised to go and meet the relevant Secretary of State first.
Consulting law books and statutes may be a waste of time; it is up to the Secretary of
State whether the remaining Golden Shares will be activated or not.
Part EL.
Rationale and Conditions
Prior to the analysis of legal and regulatory issues (Part III.), it may be useful to
address two preliminary questions: (i) Why were so many predators so keen to
acquire RECs ? and (ii) If RECs were ideal takeover candidates, why were no bids
launched before December 1994 ?
Question (i) is concerned with the underlying economic reasons for electricity
takeovers. It was price regulation which made the RECs attractive target companies.
As was mentioned in Chapter 1., Britain opted for the introduction of an 'RPI-X' -
style regulation in 1984 (flotation of British Telecom pic.). Compared with other
widely used methods of price control (e.g. rate-on-return and sliding scale), this price
regime presents the strongest incentives for regulated firms to reduce costs. The point
here is that utilities may reap the full benefits of efficiency gains between two price
reviews. It was also argued in Chapter 1. that efficiency gains, as opposed to an
increase in the number of units sold, are the main source of profit after privatisation.
The following tables reinforce that point:
Sales per consumer (average all consumers, all RECs)4Q
Year 1993 1994 1995
kWh 10,864 10,680 10,940
TABLE 14.: REC sales
38National Grid Company; National Power; PowerGen; Scottish Power; Scottish Hydro-Electric;
Northern Ireland Electricity; and British Energy.
39National Power and PowerGen: Offers for Sale (1991), page 245., point 13.
40Source: Digest of UK Energy Statistics (1996), Table 49., page 104.
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Operating profit ofEastern Group4!
Year 1993 1994 1995
GBPmillion 186.1 195.2 244.3
TABLE 15.: Eastern Group (1993 - 1995)
Operating profit of Southern Electric4^
Year 1993 1994 1995
GBPmillion 191.8 210.7 231.0
TABLE 16.: Southern Electric (1993 - 1995)
Thus operating profit is not in direct ratio to electricity sales; sales dropped in 1994
while operating profit continued to soar.
This is why the RECs were attractive targets for those predators who believed that
further cost savings may be achieved in electricity distribution and/or supply. The
answer to question (i) is then that efficiency gains were the main drive for mergers in
the UK electricity industry.43 US investors could see further scope for efficiency
improvement and cost reduction; this is why American offerors were particularly
active in the Big REC Race.
Turning to question (ii), the starting point is that potential bidders had presumably
been aware of the above discussed peculiarity of UK price regulation since 1990.
Nonetheless predators could not launch their bids for some time; the following
circumstances precluded takeovers until the Summer of 1995:
A./ Bid proofRECs
RECs could not have been taken over immediately after privatisation: Golden Shares
protected the electricity companies from hostile bids and from other 'unpleasant things
happening'. The relevant section of Article 10(2) of the Articles of Association of
Eastern Group pic.44 read as follows:
Notwithstanding any provision in these articles to the contrary, each of
the following matters shall be deemed to be a variation of the rights
attaching to the Special Share and shall accordingly be effective only
with the consent in writing of the Special Shareholder and without
such consent shall not be done or caused to be done:-
41Hanson: Recommended Cash Offer for Eastern Group pic. (1995), page 48., Appendix 3., Part B.
42National Power: Recommended Cash Offer for Southern Electric (1995), page 41., Appendix III.
43Ken Bailey: A bid too far ? In: [1996] 7 Util LR 134.
44It is understood that the twelve RECs had a standard set of Articles of Association at privatisation.
References in this Chapter are to the Articles of Association of Eastern Group pic.
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(a) the amendment, or removal, or the alteration of the effect of
(which, for the avoidance of doubt, shall be taken to include the
ratification of any breach of) all or any of the following:-
(i) in article 1, the definitions of "the Special Share", the
"Special Shareholder" and "recognised person";
(ii) this article;
(iii) article 40;
(b) ...
It was point (a) (iii) (Article 40.) which ruled out the acquisition of any RECs. This
Article was concerned with limitations on shareholdings. The main rule here was that
no person might directly or indirectly own or control the right to cast on a poll 15 per
cent or more of the votes at general meetings.45 This Article was to remain in force
until 31st March 2000.46 Two questions should be discussed here: (i) How was
Article 40. supposed to work in practice ? and (ii) What happened to the 31st March
2000 deadline ?
(1) Procedure to enforce limitations on shareholdings
In line with ordinary British company law practice, the share capital of each REC
consists of registered (as opposed to bearer) shares. The transfer of shares should be
registered in a Share Register as regulated under Section 352 of the Companies Act
1985. Article 40(6) provided that if it appears to the directors that a person holds an
interest in shares which carry the right to cast 15% or more of the total votes
(Relevant Shares), then the directors shall give a notice to that person (Relevant
Person). This notice would set forth two points: (i) it would draw the attention of the
addressee to the 'Limitations on shareholdings' section of the Articles; and (ii) would
require the Relevant Person to reduce his/her holding to below 15% within 21 days
(Required Disposal).
Once a notice has been served the Relevant Person may not attend or vote at any
general meeting. However, the third component of shareholder rights, the right to
dividend, does not seem to be affected: one may argue then that had an REC declared
dividend after the date of the notice, the Relevant Person could have claimed such
dividend.
If the Relevant Person fails to comply with the notice, then the directors might sell
Relevant Shares; the net proceeds (minus any expenses incurred) would be transferred
to the Relevant Person.
45Article 40(1).
46Article 40(2).
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To summarise, directors of the RECs were to ensure that no person controls 15% or
more of the votes at general meetings.
(2) Deadline
If the above discussed 'Limitations on shareholdings' rules were to remain in force
until 31st March 2000, how could bidders acquire 100% of the issued share capital of
ten RECs between July 1995 - December 1996 ?
What should be underlined here is that there was a time gap between (a) the final date
for the redemption of Golden Share (March 1995) and (b) the date set forth under
Article 40. (March 2000). Out of the two deadlines the former was of special
importance, while the latter had no effect upon the timing of the Big REC Race.
So far as the redemption point is concerned, the point is that two kinds of Golden
Shares were in use in Britain: (a) time limited and (b) non-time limited. The difference
between (a) and (b) may be expressed as follows:
• A time limited Golden Share will expire automatically 'X' years after the initial
flotation. As a rule, the value for X was five (5) in Britain. Is it open to debate
whether a time limited Golden Share is "an effective way to resolve concerns
about the national interest.'"^ A long list of questions may be raised here: Why
does 'the national interest' deserve protection between years 1-5 only ? What
difference does it make whether RECs are taken over in 19X4 or in 19X5 ? If a
possible takeover was regarded as a threat to 'national interest' last year and the
year before, why could foreign predators acquire the same companies today ?
A possible argument in favour of time-limited Golden Shares is that the RECs
were sold at an undervalue: the offer price was low so as to attract as many small
investors as possible. Yet setting low offer prices necessarily implied that big
institutional investors found the RECs surprisingly cheap. The question for the
government (and its advisors) was how to make sure that the latter group will not
take over RECs immediately after privatisation. Time-limited Golden Shares were
meant to create some distance in time between (i) privatisation and (ii) the
prospect of foreign take-overs. The UK government decided to keep US utilities
out for five years hoping that RECs would not be too attractive take-over targets
after that period: for example, (i) share prices could rocket; (ii) the regulator
might 'tighten the reins of power'; and (iii) managers could restructure RECs in a
way that foreign predators would not bid for them. But this plan did not quite
work out: US utilities snapped up RECs as soon as the Golden Shares expired.
Hence the merit of the argument discussed here (i.e. very attractive RECs will be
'less' attractive take-over targets once things settled down in the electricity sector)
may be subject to some debate after the 'Big REC Race'. The final point here is
47 John Moore: British Privatisation: Taking Capitalism to the People. In: H.M. Treasury: Her
Majesty's Treasury Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme (1995), page 71.
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that it is fairly difficult to find a good reason for introducing time-limited Golden
Shares in the UK electricity sector.
There is no fixed 'Expiry date' in the case of non-time limited Golden Shares. As
a rule, the government may redeem such shares at any time. Yet the tendency is
that non-time limited Golden Shares do remain in place. The proposed takeover
ofNational Power in 1996, discussed under Part I., C./ (3) above, is an example:
the government activated the non-time limited Golden Share to fight off an
American predator.
As was noted above, Golden Shares in the RECs were time limited: all of them
expired on 31 March 1995. The 31st March 2000 deadline was set forth under Article
40.; as was quoted above, this Article was one of the three Articles which might not
be amended, removed, or altered without the consent in writing of the Special
Shareholder. After that date the amendment of the "Limitations on shareholdings"
article was subject to ordinary company law rules. The diagrammatic presentation of
this point would be as follows:
Golden Share
(Article 10.)
Limitations on
shareholdings
(Article 40)
1991 1995 2000
TABLE 17.: Golden Share and limitations on shareholdings
Hence an extraordinary resolution passed at a general meeting after 31 March 1995
might remove the 31st March 2000 deadline from the Articles. Potential target
companies might amend Article 40. in order to enable offers to proceed; this is what
happened, for example, in the case of the Hanson - Eastern bid.48 Thus the
'Limitations on shareholdings' section was amended in 1995, although Article 40.
could have remained in force for another five years. One may conclude then that
shareholders opened the floodgates to predators: after the expiry of the time limited
Golden Shares they voted to remove 'Limitations on shareholdings' section from the
Articles.
48Maurice Button and Fiona Buxton: A Practitioner's Guide to the City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers (1996), page 97., point 3.3.1.
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B./ Distribution price review
The Golden Shares expired in each REC on 31 March 1995, however the Big REC
Race did not start until the Summer of 1995. Why did potential predators hesitate to
launch their bids ? Presumably they would have been glad to go ahead as soon as
possible, but one condition was missing until July 1995: the new price formula for the
period 1996 - 2000.
As was mentioned in the introduction, the English and Welsh electricity sector was
privatised on the basis of a five-year plan. The original distribution price formulae
were in force for five years after privatisation; thus new formulae were due to be
introduced as from 1996. The Director General of OFFER published a consultation
paper on the proposed price regime in August 1994. Professor Littlechild's
recommendations stunned the twelve distribution companies: the proposed new
formulae were lenient. The main elements of the proposal were (i) a one-off 11 - 17%
cut in allowed charges and (ii) an RPI-2 price increase per annum,49 It was this
proposed price regime which induced Trafalgar Elouse to try to acquire Northern
Electric as early as December 1994. As was mentioned under Part I., point C./, (1)
above, the Northern board did not recommend the bid. The defence document
published in February 1995 set out a buoyant financial future for the 1996 - 2000
period: the directors contended that Northern would be a gravy train under the new
price regime. The profit forecasts outraged both politicians and consumer councils.
At this stage Professor Littlechild made a move which was, and hopefully will remain,
unprecedented in the history of post-privatisation regulation: the Director General
announced on 7 March 1995 that he was 'minded' to reconsider the August 1994
proposal. Both the main point and the timing of the announcement were unfortunate:
Main point
It was argued in Chapter 1. that utility regulation is not 'legalistic' in Britain. As a
rule, law is foreign to British utility regulation; negotiation and mutual trust are
the key words here. As Anthony Barnett notes, "regulation of utilities is handled
day-to-day by close co-ordination between the regulators and the privatised
utilities.Thus Professor Littlechild's announcement did not go down well: The
Financial Times quoted investors saying ". . . the statement defies belief. I felt
almost as if I had been sent to the lunatic asylum. It says more about the regulator
than it does about the RECs. It is a disgrace."51 Ironically, it was the electricity
regulator himself who emphasised the disadvantages of meddling with price
reviews in 1992 as follows:
49The Financial Times, March 8 1995.
50Anthony Barnett: Regulation of the UK Utilities. Prospects to 2000 (1996), page 31.
51The Financial Times, March 8 1995.
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If a Regulator is seen to intervene in the operations of a company,
there will be an adverse effect on the incentive to that company to
improve its efficiency and reduce costs. What is more, the degree of
regulatory risk to which it is subject may be perceived as greater.52
The main point here is that the decision to reconsider the 'botched' price review
undermined the regulator's credibility, increased regulatory risk and damaged
investors' confidence in the electricity sector.
Timing
Professor Littlechild announced his decision on the day after the flotation of the
residual government stakes in National Power pic. and PowerGen pic. (see:
Chapter 3. above). Having purchased back an 8% stake, National Power
threatened to take the government to court. Mr. John Baker, chairman of
National Power, summarised his company's claim as follows: "The flotation price
might have been lower if the market had known rvhat might be going to
happen."53 As it turned out, this statement was more a PR exercise than a legal
threat - National Power did not start proceedings. Nonetheless, the point remains:
the timing of the announcement was unfortunate.
The main point here is that Professor Littlechild's announcement of March 1995
thwarted potential takeovers in the electricity sector. Without the new distribution
price formulae potential predators could not calculate the business value of the RECs
for the 1996 - 2000 period. The irony of this situation was that the 'botched' price
proposal suspended takeover talks in March when the bid-proof status of the RECs
was just about to be relinquished.
The new distribution price proposal was ready by 7 July 1995.54 Professor Littlechild
made the following recommendations: (i) in addition to the 11 - 17% one-off cut in
allowed charges, a further cut of 10 - 13% in real terms in 1996; (ii) RPI-3 price
increase per annum in real terms up to 2000. Compared to the original proposals, the
new price regime was less favourable to the RECs:
52House of Commons. Trade and Industry Committee: Government Observations on the Second
Report from the Energy Committee (Session 1991-92) on the Consequences of Electricity
Privatisation HC 222 1992-93, Appendix 2: Memorandum submitted by the Director General of
Electricity Supply, page xii., point 36.
53The Financial Times, May 17 1995.
54OFFER: The Distribution Price Control: Revised Proposals (July 1995).
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August 1994 proposal July 1995 proposal
Allowed charges one-off cut of 11 - 17% 11-17 % one-off cut PLUS
10-15% cut in 1996
Price increase RPI-2 RPI-3
TABLE 18.: Two price proposals compared
But the July 1995 proposal did not dismay investors: Southern Group set the ball
rolling ten days after the announcement of the new distribution price formulae. Two
further bids followed within the next fourteen days.55
To summarise, the Director General of OFFER decided to re-review the August 1994
proposals in March 1995. This announcement suspended takeover activity in the
electricity sector. The Big REC Race started shortly after the publication of the new
price proposals in July 1995.
Part HI.
Competition and Regulatory Law Issues
The above discussion has touched upon a number of competition and regulatory law
points. The purpose of this Part is to examine the following four issues in more detail:
(1) Discretion and politics; (2) The role of the Director General of OFFER; (3)
Privatisation legislation reconsidered; and (4) Comparative takeover procedures.
(1) Discretion and politics
If law is a set of firm rules, then there is no such a thing as British law on merger
control. Ministerial control over takeovers is fraught with discretionary decisions in
Britain; as two prominent practitioners put it, "merger control in the United Kingdom
is a regime based on discretion and choice".56 An oversimplified description of the
statutory framework would be as follows:
If a proposed merger satisfies certain criteria ("market share test" and/or the
"assets test"), then the Secretary of State may refer that merger to the MMC for
investigation.
The MMC's carries out a detailed investigation over a period of usually three or
four months.
If the MMC' report concludes that the merger may be expected to have effects
adverse to the public interest, then the Commission should make
recommendations as to remedies.
55Scottish Power's bid for Manweb on 27 July 1995; and Hanson Group's bid for Eastern Group on
31 July 1995.
56Roger J. Finbow and A. Nigel Parr: U.K. Merger Control: Law and Practice (1995), page 10., point
1.014.
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The Secretary of State shall consider the report, but he is not bound to follow the
MMC's conclusions or recommendations;
If the offeror gives undertakings to the Secretary of State, he has discretion
whether or not to take steps to enforce such undertakings.^
This system ofmerger control depends upon the action or inaction of the Secretary of
State; "the Commission's role is simply advisory."^ Hence takeovers may be exposed
to political meddling in the UK; especially so if the government of the day has no
strong support in the House of Commons. The first bid for an REC was launched on
14 December 1994 (Trafalgar House - Northern Electric) and the last takeover was
completed on 24 December 1996 (CalEnergy - Northern Electric); this period turned
out to be the last years of the Conservative party in power. As was mentioned in Part
I., the government's majority shrank to one in the Commons by the Spring of 1996.
Thus the timing of the Big REC Race was unfortunate; the less votes the Conservative
party controlled in the Parliament, the more influence party politics had on the
decision of the Secretary of State. As Dr. Kim Howells MP (Labour Party) noted, the
decision to block the power generators' bid for RECs was 'a side of raw meat' thrown
to the European obsessive wing of the Tory party. 59
The main point here is that electricity mergers were not tested against a long-term,
industry-wide strategy; the fate of bids turned on ad hoc political considerations. The
Secretary of State blocked takeovers so as to secure votes on other issues in the
Parliament. Thus the current ownership structure of the British electricity sector
emerged without much planning. Professor Cosmo Graham lamented in 1995 as
follows:
... it is a matter of regret that there seems to be no institutional means
of taking an overview of what is happening in the utilities sector and
the public policy implications.^
Mr. Ken Bailey makes the same point: when the English and Welsh electricity
industry was being restructured in 1995 "no one appeared to have the slightest notion
ofwhere it was going. "61
To sum up, the Secretary of State had no blueprint of the future shape of the
electricity industry; discretionary power was used to serve short-term political goals.
The lack of clear policy framework is especially alarming bearing in mind that long-
term, high level co-ordination is a must in the electricity sector.
"Mid Kent Holding pic. v. General Utilities (Ch.D.) [1997] 1 W.L.R. 14., at 37-D.
58The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume 4., para 1276.
59Dr. Kim Howells MP: Approaching Regulation from Westminster (1996), pages 2-3.
60Professor Cosmo Graham: Mergers, Competition Law and Utilities In: [1995] 6 Util LR 136.
61Ken Bailey: A Bid too far ?In: [1996] 7 Util LR 134, at 135.
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(2) Powerless power regulator
If the Secretary of State was the ultimate decision maker and the MMC's role was
simply advisory, what was the Director General of OFFER supposed to do ? As far as
merger control is concerned, the blunt answer is NOTHING. The Electricity Act 1989
does not contain provisions on mergers involving electricity licensees; thus the Fair
Trading Act 1973 applies in the usual way.62
This is not to say, of course, that the Director General of OFFER could sit back
during the Big REC Race. He had important statutory duties to perform. For example,
he must secure that the merged companies "are able to finance the carrying on of the
activities which they are authorised by their licenses to carry on".63 The regulator
could, and did, seek modification to the licences^; for example, the Director General
proposed certain amendments so as to ring fence the physical and financial assets of
the licensed business.65 But, and this is the main point here, the statutory functions
mentioned above are 'general' duties: the Director General of Electricity Supply has
NO special powers to deal with mergers in the UK electric sector.
Under the Fair Trading Act 1973 it is the Director General of Fair Trading who shall
advise the Secretary of State on a merger situation66 The Office of Fair Trading and
OFFER came up with a 'home-made' solution to create a role for the Director General
of OFFER in connection with electricity mergers. The two Directors General agreed
in a Concordat that the Director General of Fair Trading shall seek the views of the
Director General of OFFER "on bids involving electricity licensees."67 Hence OFT
consulted OFFER in connection with electricity mergers, although the former was
under no statutory obligation to do so. One may argue that the two Directors General
had at least two reasons to execute the Concordat:
(i) The incumbent Director General of Fair Trading, Sir Bryan Carsberg, is the
former head of OFTEL. Sir Bryan Carsberg is then well aware of the fact that
OFFER had no power to interfere in electricity mergers. The Concordat tried
to remedy this shortcoming of the Electricity Act 1989.
(ii) OFFER knows the ins and outs of the electricity industry, while OFT is a
general competition agency. It would have been unfortunate then if the former
could have had no jurisdiction over electricity takeovers. The Concordat was a
62Graham Stedman: Takeovers (1993), page 505., point 19.4.11.
63Section 3(l)(a) of the Electricity Act 1989.
64Maurice Button and Fiona Buxton: A Practitioner's Guide to the City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers (1996), page 98., point 3.3.2.
65See reference to draft licence amendments of 7 September 1995 In: OFFER - OFWAT: Takeover
of Southern Water pic. by Scottish Power pic and Southern Electric pic. (31 May 1996).
66Section 76 of the Fair Trading Act 1973.
67OFFER: Annual Report (1995).
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convenient solution to bring expertise and jurisdiction together; this co¬
operation benefited both offices.
It is important to keep in mind that two separate, although in the case of electricity
mergers overlapping functions are here: (a) merger control and (b) utility regulation.
As was mentioned above, under the Fair Trading Act 1973 the Secretary of State is
the ultimate decision-maker as far as the fate of bids is concerned; the Director
General of OFFER may exercise certain auxiliary rights under the Electricity Act 1989
in connection with takeovers. Should the distinction between points (a) and (b)
become blurred, dubious conclusions may follow, like:
It should be stressed that the regulator (as issuer of licences) will have an
effective veto over any mergers . . . 68
Had the Director General of OFFER had the right to veto mergers, then not many
RECs would have been taken over; Professor Littlechild was not the strongest
supporter of the Big REC Race. He asked the Secretary of State to refer bids to the
MMC; his recommendations were ignored on more than one occasion. But Professor
Littlechild had no statutory power to block bids: his role under the mentioned
Concordat was purely advisory.
To conclude, privatisation Acts did not give the Director General of OFFER carte
blanche as far as merger control in the electricity sector is concerned. Strategic
decisions about electricity takeovers are reserved for the Secretary of State in the UK.
(3) Privatisation legislation reconsidered
The Big REC Race highlighted two shortcomings of the Electricity Act 1989.
No automatic reference to MMC
As was mentioned under point (2) above, ordinary merger control rules applied to the
Big REC Race. Under the Fair Trading Act 1973 it is up to the Secretary of State (i)
whether a bid is referred to MMC; and (ii) whether he accepts the MMC's
recommendations or not. It was also mentioned that the Secretary of State exercised
his discretionary powers in a way which fostered party (as opposed to competition)
policy: the National Power/PowerGen bids were referred to the MMC on purely
political grounds.
The Electricity Act 1989 did not give any guideline as to the use of this discretionary
power. With hindsight, one may argue that the Act could have provided that mergers
likely to create (a) horizontally integrated companies or (b) 'multi-utilities' must be
referred to the MMC. The term 'multi-utilities' should be explained here. Multi-
68Stephen Dow: A Survey of Major Developments in the Post-privatisation Phase of the UK Gas and
Electricity Industries (1996), page 49.
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utilities offer two or more utility services in the same geographical area. United
Utilities (North West Water - Norweb) and Hyder (Welsh Water - Swalec) are
examples.
There is an automatic reference clause in the water industry. Sections 32. and 33. of
the Water Industry Act 1991 provide that the Secretary of State shall refer a merger
between two water enterprises if the gross assets of each enterprise exceeds
GBP30m.69 it is hard to understand why the legislator failed to introduce an
automatic reference clause in the case of the electricity, gas, and telecommunications
sectors. With hindsight, an automatic reference - clause would have been quite useful
in the electric industry: it could have reduced uncertainty as to which bids will be
referred to MMC.
No 'change of control1 clause
It was argued above that the Director General of OFFER had no jurisdiction over
merger references: he could seek modifications to licences, but had no power to block
a proposed merger involving electricity licensees. Neither the Electricity Act 1989 nor
the distribution licences contain a 'change of control' clause^: thus the takeover of an
electricity company is not conditional upon the approval ofOFFER.
Utility regulators have more control over mergers and acquisitions in other European
countries. For example, no person may acquire more than 25% of the shares in an
electricity licensee in Hungary without the prior, written approval of the Energy
Office.^ 1
The 'change of control' clauses should be set forth in Acts of Parliament in Britain.
Licence modifications making the transfer of stakes conditional upon OFFER'S
approval might not be good enough: this option would not give a direct right to the
Director General to interfere under British company law. As will be explained in
Chapter 6. below, a utility licence is seen as a contract between regulator and
regulated in Britain. A predator intending to acquire control over a licensee is NOT a
party to that 'contract': as a rule, licences bind licensees (i.e. utilities) but not their
existing or would-be shareholders. Thus 'change of control' clauses should have been
inserted into the privatisation legislation in Britain.
(4) Comparative takeover procedures
The Big REC Race is likely to remain a one-off experience in the European history of
privatisation. ^2 At least two things would be necessary to repeat the Big REC Race in
69OFWAT: The Changing Structure of the Water and Sewage Industry in England and Wales
(1996).
70National Power: Recommended Cash Offer for Southern Electric (1996), page 11., point 13.
71 Section 24 of the Hungarian Electricity Act 1994.
72A number of mergers took place in the Spanish electricity sector. However, these were intra-
industry consolidation. Spanish energy and bank groups are reported to form 'hard nuclei' to deter
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other countries: (i) privatised utilities and (ii) reasonable takeover regulation.
Referring to the "Horses for courses" maxim one may argue that in some countries
there are no horses, while others seem to have no courses.
(i) Horses: Corporate governance culture
As a rule, 'horses' (i.e. privatised utilities) are in short supply in Europe. First of all,
few European countries have opted to sell energy distribution companies. While
telecommunication companies have been privatised in most EU countries, the disposal
of electricity distributors does not seem to be on the agenda. The main reasons for the
relatively small number of disposals are (i) the conceived political and regulatory
implications of electricity privatisation (see Introductory comments above); (ii) lack of
regulatory arrangements^; and (iii) unsuitable ownership structure.74
Secondly, not many European countries adopted the British version of corporate
governance: mechanisms for monitoring management in Germany and in the Central
European countries are different from those in the UK. Comparative studies divide the
national brands of corporate governance into two main groups: (i) the British -
American outsider system and (ii) the German - Japanese insider system.75 The
contrast between the two systems is most striking in the fields of (a) liquidity and (b)
supervision ofmanagers.
The Outsider System puts the emphasis on liquidity in the stockmarket: investors
want to be sure that they will be able to sell their shares in the future. Shareholders
do not meddle in company management; but if a company does not perform well
in the stockmarket, shareholders would sell off their stakes straightaway.
Plummeting share prices may spawn a hostile takeover. Thus stock exchange
indexes are the most important means of monitoring managers. Inter-corporate
equity holdings are few and far between.
The Insider System prefers close monitoring to liquidity. Heavyweight
shareholders are the key players here: they hold substantial stakes and are keen to
monitor managers closely. More often than not supervisory boards and boards of
takeover bids. Source: Eugene D. Cross: Utility Regulation in the European Union (1996), page 209.
and Power in Europe, May 3, 1996, page 22.
73 Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal have no adequate
regulatory system. Source: Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries: Regulation International
1997 (1997), pages 4 - 5.
74For example, municipalities and consumer co-operatives own distribution companies in Germany
and in Denmark. Source: Eugene D. Cross: Utility Regulation in the European Union (1996), page
323. and 324.
75A Survey of Corporate Governance In: The Economist, January 29 1994; G. P. Stapledon:
Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (1996), page 3.; and J. E. Parkinson:
Corporate Power and Responsibility (1993), pages 170 - 171.
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directors are packed with delegates from major shareholders; employees are also
represented on the supervisory board. Inter-corporate holding is widespread.
Shareholders do not sell their stakes if a company runs into trouble, but rather
reshuffle the board and tighten management monitoring rules.
This simplified description would suffice to conclude that takeovers suit more the
Outsider than the Insider System. While both of these systems exist in Europe, there is
little doubt that 'Insider' countries dominate the EU market for the time being. As the
Commission of the European Communities notes, "takeover activity is concentrated in
few member states and that opportunities in different member states remain
uneven. "76
The point here is that shareholders and managers forge close links that bind in
'Insider' countries: a shareholder who controls a big chunk of shares and has the right
to appoint board members will think twice before selling her/his stake. And even then
existing shareholders tend to sell to a fellow shareholder, rather than to a third party.
Shareholders of private limited companies have a statutory pre-emption right to
acquire shares from a vendor; while the biggest shareholders in public limited
companies tend to stipulate similar pre-emption rights in shareholders' agreements.
J.E. Parkinson points out an additional barrier to takeovers. A simple majority is not
sufficient to obtain management control in the Insider System; an extraordinary
resolution is often necessary to oust directors. Furthermore, a shareholder may not
remove employee representatives from the supervisory board.77
Hence a takeover bid from an outsider is a rare curiosity in the Insider System. As the
chairman of Deutsche Bank commented, the collapse of the Krupp - Thyssen merger
showed that "we lack a takeover culture and a full understanding of corporate
governance in Germany".78
An Austrian practitioner makes a similar point; Stefan Koch argues that takeover is
peculiar in Austria
in that virtually no public takeover offers have been made, and in
particular no hostile public takeover offers. In other words practically
all takeovers result from privately negotiated deals between a very
limited number of shareholders. 79
To sum up, takeovers are more the exception than the rule in Insider Group countries.
German, Italian, Austrian, or Central European companies are not proper targets for
potential predators: (i) a few heavyweight shareholders control big chunks of shares;
76Maurice Button and Sarah Bolton (editors): A Practitioner's Guide to Takeover Regulation and
Practice in the European Union (1997), page 17., point 4.2.
77J. E. Parkinson: Corporate Power and Responsibility (1993), page 148.
78The Financial Times, 14 June 1997.
79Stefan Koch: Austria. In: Maurice Button and Sarah Bolton (eds): A Practitioner's Guide to
Takeovers and Mergers in the European Union (1997), page 51.
190
(ii) stockmarkets offer limited liquidity; (iii) existing shareholders may not sell to an
outsider; and (iv) a simple majority is not sufficient to obtain management control.
Thus the above mentioned countries have no 'horses' for a Big REC Race-style
takeover frenzy.
(ii) Courses: Takeover procedures
Ifmerger regulation is the 'course' for takeover 'races', then the City of London was a
second to none course for the Big REC Race. Ever since the publication of the first
City Code on 27 March 1968^0 a self-regulatory body, the Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers [hereinafter: the Panel], had been in charge of supervising merger activities
in the UK. The distinguishing feature of self-regulation is that practitioners lay down
certain rules for themselves and agree to comply with those rules without external
interference. Whether self-regulation is superior to state regulation is a matter of
political belief, but one point is beyond doubt: self-regulation tends to be more user-
friendly than state imposed rules. The Panel administers the City Code on Takeovers
and Mergers [hereinafter: the Code] with a view to satisfy the practical needs of
predators and target companies. Thus self-regulation is likely to develop towards
down-to-earth rules, while Acts of Parliament may provide for more complicated
procedures. The comparative analysis of British and Hungarian merger rules will
prove that the former is the better 'course' for takeover 'races'. It will be argued below
that Hungarian legislation is in such a muddle that there is no 'course' for post-
privatisation takeover 'races'.
Merger control is the domain of legislation in Hungary: it is Section 323. of the
Companies Act 1988 which sets forth takeover rules. The short summary of the
relevant Hungarian provisions would be as follows:
Majority interest
XYZ pic. has a majority interest in ABC pic. if XYZ (a) has acquired more than
50% of the issued share capital of ABC, OR (b) controls more than 50% of the
votes at any general meeting of ABC.
Notice to shareholders
If XYZ pic. intends to acquire a majority interest in ABC pic., then the offeror
must give a notice to ABC shareholders. The notice must state (i) the number and
class of shares to be purchased, (ii) the purchase price per share, and (iii) a time
limit for an option (see next point).
80The history of the first City Code is discussed in detail in: Sir Alexander Johnston: The City Take¬
over Code (1980), Chapter IV.
81 Sir AJexander Johnston: The City Take-over Code (1980), page 5.
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Option to buy
ABC shareholders have an option to purchase the above 50% portion of the block
of shares XYZ pic intends to acquire. This option is subject to the same terms and
conditions as stated in the above mentioned notice.
An example may help to understand the rules summarised above:
IfXYZ pic. intends to acquire a 65% stake in ABC pic., it must send a
notice to existing ABC shareholders; after the notification ABC
shareholders have an option to purchase 15% (65% - 50%) of the
shares to be acquired by XYZ pic.; should ABC shareholders not
exercise that option, then XYZ pic. may acquire the 65% stake in ABC
pic.
It is to be admitted that Hungarian merger control rules do not seem to make much
sense. Compared with the British Mandatory Rule (Rule 9. of the Code) five potential
flaws may be pinpointed:
(1) Option versus bid
(a) UK provision
Rule 9. of the British Code provides that, if certain conditions are fulfilled (see
below), a person must make an offer to acquire all equity shares in the target
company. This is the Mandatory Offer. Similar provisions apply in France*^ and the
draft Thirteenth Company Law Directive also includes a slightly modified version of
the Mandatory Offer rule.83
(b) Hungarian provision
Existing shareholders of the target company have an option to purchase shares.
(c) Comparative points
Hungarian merger regulation does not seem to harmonise with UK or EU rules:
European legislation tells the predator to purchase shares, while the Hungarian Act
asks the predator to hang on until after the option expires (usually 30 days).
82J. Le Gall: French Company Law (1992), page 127.
83Article 4(1) of the draft 13th Company Law Directive. OJ C 64, 14.4.1989. For a detailed analysis,
see: Maurice Button and Sarah Bolton (editors): A Practitioner's Guide to Takeover Regulation and
Practice in the European Union (1997), pages 15 - 17., point 4.2.
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(2) Onus of payment
(a) UK provision
It follows from point (1) that Rule 9. puts the onus of payment on the predator in the
UK.
(b) Hungarian provision
Existing shareholders must put up money if they intend to exercise the option
mentioned.
(c) Comparative points
The Hungarian arrangement is rather unfortunate. Predators plan the acquisition of a
target company in advance and launch the bid once financing has been arranged; it is
quite likely that they will have the financial muscle to complete the transaction. On the
other hand, an option to buy shares is a bolt from the blue for existing shareholders in
Hungary: the option may lapse before they could find the money to finance the
acquisition of shares.
(3) Trigger limits
(a) UK provision
Rule 9. provides that a Mandatory Offer shall be made if a person acquires shares
which carry 30% or more of the voting rights.
(b) Hungarian provision
There are two trigger limits in Hungary: (i) 50% of the issued share capital OR (ii)
50% of the votes at general meetings.
(c) Comparative points
The rationale for different trigger limits (30% or 50%) is that the UK belongs to the
Outsider System, while Hungary is a member of the Insider System. Large number of
shareholders own relative not too big chunks of shares in Britain. On the other hand,
shareholdings are not scattered in Hungary; few heavyweight shareholders control
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companies. Hence a 30%84 holding is considered to represent effective control in the
UK, while the Hungarian legislator worked on the assumption that a less than 50%
holding is not sufficient to control a company. The trigger limit is also 50% in the
Czech Republic;*^ while Slovenia set the limit at 25%.86 As a rule, different
corporate governance cultures call for different trigger limits. Hence it would be
inappropriate to replace 50% with 30% in the Hungarian legislation, or vice versa.
What is hard to accept is that there are two trigger limits in Hungary: (i) 50 % of the
issued share capital and (ii) 50% of the votes at general meetings. The following
example will show that the co-existence of the two limits mentioned may lead to a
logical impossibility:
A Hungarian public limited company issues two classes of shares: (i)
70 % of the shares (Class A) would be allocated to you; and (ii) I
would get the rest of the share capital (Class B). Under the Articles of
Association each Class B share would carry three votes at general
meetings, while Class A shares would have one vote each. Thus if
1,000 shares were to be issued, then you would have 700 shares (70%)
and 700 votes, while I would have 300 shares (30%) and 900 (300 x 3
= 900) votes.
Under the Hungarian merger control rules, this company would have
two majority owners at the same time:
(i) You would hold a majority interest because you own 70 % of the
issued share capital (700 shares).
AND
(ii) I would also be declared to have a majority interest: I control more
than 50% of the votes (900 votes).
To avoid absurdity of this kind, one of the trigger limits should go. The best solution
would be if the '50% of shares' rule were abolished. So far as merger control is
concerned, it is irrelevant how many shares a shareholder owns; the question is how
many votes that shareholder actually controls.
(4) Offerors subject to merger control
(a) UK provision
Rule 9. is intentionally vague as far as the offeror is concerned: it refers to a 'person'
which may be an individual as well as a company.
84Practitioners recommended that the 30% figure should be reduced in the UK; but the Panel refused
this opinion in 1991. See: Maurice Button and Fiona Buxton: A Practitioner's Guide to the City Code
on Takeovers and Mergers (1996), page 79., point 2.
85Czech Republic section of East European Monitor, June 1996.
86The Financial Times, 7 July 1997.
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(b) Hungarian provision
Hungarian legislation is fairly specific: merger rules apply to 'public limited companies'
only. It would appear then that merger control does not apply to other business
entities recognised under the Hungarian Companies Act 1988, like partnerships,
private limited companies and the like. In addition, a group of influential company
lawyers further restricted the scope of companies subject to the Act. They suggested
in a textbook published in 1993 that takeover rules may not be enforced against non-
Hungarian companies: the Companies Act 1988 is only applicable to companies
registered in Hungary.^ The Hungarian privatisation agency accepted this
interpretation without reservation. While this interpretation may be correct
theoretically, the outcome is certainly absurd: no reasonable Parliament would have
intended to pass an Act which would encourage foreign predators to take over local
companies. To conclude, rules on offerors subject to merger control should be
amended in Hungary.
(5) Exemptions
(a) UK provision
The Code acknowledges that in certain circumstances it would be inadequate to
require the offeror to make a mandatory bid. The latest edition of the Practitioner's
Guide lists the following circumstances: (i) in case of new securities a 'Whitewash'
dispensation may be available; (ii) foreclosure on security for loan; (iii) rescue
operation from insolvency; (iv) innocent mistake; (v) non acceptance notice from
50% of shareholders; (vi) enfranchisement of non-voting shares; and (vii) redemption
or purchase by a company of its own shares. 89
The proposed EU rules also acknowledge the need for exempting certain transactions
from general merger rules. 90
(b) Hungarian provision
The Companies Act 1988 does not provide for dispensation. Hence, in theory, merger
rules are to be enforced under any circumstances. Bearing in mind that the above
listed circumstances may also arise in Hungary, it may be a good idea to introduce
some exceptions.
87dr. Csecsy Robert - dr. Gado Gabor - dr. Makai Katalin - dr. T. Nagy Erzsebet: Tarsasagi jog es
cegjog a gyakorlatban (1993).
88East European Energy Report, March 1996, page 8.
89Maurice Button and Fiona Buxton: A Practitioner's Guide to the City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers (1996), pages 84 - 87., point 2.3.
90Maurice Button and Sarah Bolton (eds): A Practitioner's Guide to Takeover Regulation and
Practice in the European Union (1997), page 16, point 4.2.
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The above discussion may be concluded then as follows: Hungary privatised six
electricity distribution companies and five regional gas distribution companies in
1995: thus potential 'horses' exist in Hungary. But, and this is the main point, there are
no 'courses' for takeover 'races'. Hungarian merger control is so unreasonable that no
reasonable predator is likely to launch a bid. Hence it is unlikely that anything similar
to the Big REC Race will take place in that country.
Conclusion
Speaking metaphorically, the electric industry in England and Wales was a new
edifice built upon the ruins of CEGB. Compared with the old building, the designers
introduced some structural changes: most important of all, the idea of vertical
integration was refused. Golden Shares and limitation on shareholding clauses were
introduced to 'prop up' this new structure. The main point of this Chapter is that as
soon as the Golden Shares expired the new edifice collapsed: perhaps it was badly
designed.
The above discussion has tried to argue the following points:
Post-privatisation reorganisation is not necessarily a bad thing. Privatisation must
not ossify company structures: privatised utilities should be able to adopt to
changing market conditions. But where are the limits to these changes ? The story
of the Big REC Race seems to suggest that there might be NO pre-determined
limits at all. It was argued above that the UK government inadvertently designed
the future shape of the British electricity sector: it was not clear what will happen
after the expiry of the Golden Shares. The government had no blueprint for the
structure of the English and Welsh electricity sector beyond year 1995. Hence the
English and Welsh electricity sector was a 'research laboratory1 between July 1995
and December 1996. Investors tested (i) whether the idea of vertical integration
might be acceptable; and (ii) how many takeovers politicians and regulators would
tolerate.
The government reacted spontaneously during the Big REC Race: the Scottish
Power bid was cleared, while the National Power/PowerGen bids were blocked.
The rationale for this policy may be that vertical integration is not welcome in
England and Wales for the time being. Yet the Scottish system is vertically
integrated; and the Big REC Race would have introduced vertical integration in
England and Welsh. Why did the Secretary of State refuse to adopt the Scottish
model in England and Wales ? Perhaps the government still believes that the
original industry model was right; yet the facts that (i) ten out of twelve RECs
were taken over by December 1996 and (ii) two multi-utilities emerged show that
investors do not necessarily agree on that point. The final remark here is then that
the English and Welsh electricity sector will be further reorganised: vertical
integration and intra-industry mergers are the likely directions of development.
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The Big REC Race may be a one-off episode in the history of European
privatisation. The 'Outsider' corporate governance culture has no particularly
strong tradition in Europe: with the exception of the UK and Ireland, all European
countries belong to the 'Insider' group. Takeovers are few and far between in
'Insider' countries; compared with Britain, the legal regulation of mergers and
acquisitions is less 'customer-friendly' in Europe. Hence mainland Europe may
not host many REC-style races.
Chapter 6.
Privatisation in ex-CMEA Countries:
The Story of the Hungarian Gas Distribution Sector
The previous five chapters have been concerned with British projects; it is high time
to discuss some non-UK disposals. Privatisation, like the habit of having tea with milk,
spread from Britain to Central and Eastern Europe: the sale of state-owned companies
is the craze from the Czech Republic to Albania at present. This chapter does not
intend to discuss general privatisation policy in Central and Eastern Europe; its scope
is limited to energy, especially gas, privatisation. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia pursued similar energy policies during the
lifetime of Council for the Mutual Economic Assistance [hereinafter: CMEA], Gas
industries in the six countries listed above shared at least five common characteristics
in 1991 when CMEA was dissolved. The simplified description of these points would
be as follows:
1./ Import
Gas production was insufficient to meet domestic requirements in all
the six countries listed above; each country was heavily reliant on
import. Russia was the sole supplier of natural gas to ex-CMEA
countries.
2./ Tariffs
Energy prices were distorted: charges had little to do with costs. As a
rule, there were three categories of customers: (i) domestic; (ii)
general purpose (e.g. schools, sport centres etc.); and (iii) industrial.
Each category of consumers paid a nation-wide flat tariff. Tariffs (i)
and (ii) were cross subsidised; compared with domestic customers,
industrial users paid more for gas, although the latter was the cheaper
to supply.
3./ Network Financing
Ex-CMEA governments did not have sufficient funds to finance the
expansion of the gas distribution networks: capital expenditure
programmes were frequently ignored. Underinvestment characterised
gas industries in the region.
4./ Companies
Energy industries were centralised; one national electricity, gas,
telecommunication etc. enterprise operated in each country. The legal
status of these utilities varied from country to country. As a rule, none
of them was a Companies Act-like company. Ministry officials (as
opposed to managers) made strategic decisions; and some utilities were
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organised as ministerial departments (just like telecommunications in
the UK before the passage of the Post Office Act 1969); while others
were a kind of half-way house between departments and companies.
5 / Law and Regulation
Legislation was badly out-of-date. Acts were more a collection of
political declarations than a set of norms. No western-style economic
regulation was in place: regulatory and ownership functions were not
separated.
The above mentioned five issues did not create an ideal environment for market
reforms: every ex-CMEA country was to have a bumpy road to privatisation. It was
Hungary which pioneered large-scale energy privatisation in Central Europe; six
electricity and five gas distribution companies were sold off in 1995. These disposals
are unprecedented: no other government in the region has sold, or is likely to offer for
sale, (i) majority stakes (ii) in energy distributors (iii) to foreign investors. This
Chapter will discuss how Hungary coped with the above mentioned five issues.
Compared with the previous Chapters, this piece will have less footnotes and
references; there are two reasons for this: (i) Hungarian energy privatisation was not
discussed in the international press in detail, (ii) This Chapter draws on private
experience gained while working on the sale of the Hungarian gas sector. To the best
of my knowledge, some points discussed below have not been published before. A
number of references will be made to the Hungarian gas legislation; the English
translation of the relevant sections from the Gas Act 1994 may be found in Annex 1.;
while Annex 2. is a short glossary of frequently used terms.
The structure of this chapter will be as follows: Part I. will discuss how Hungary dealt
with the five problem areas identified above between 1991 and 1994. Part II. will
highlight further developments in the year of privatisation (1995); and finally Part III.
will consider what changes happened in the post-privatisation phase in the Hungarian
gas sector. The Conclusion will summarise what lessons other Central and Eastern
European countries might learn from Hungary.
Part I.
Years of Preparation (1991 - 1994)
Hungary started a radical privatisation programme in 1990 after the election of a new
government. The partial privatisation of the gas distribution sector was first
considered in 1991; but no tender for sale was issued. Problems arising from the
common heritage of the CMEA energy policy (see points 1 - 5 above) were to be
resolved first. The following developments happened in Hungary between 1991 and
1994:
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1.1. Import
Mixed record on Russian influence
In the short term Hungary could import gas from the former USSR: the only
international transmission pipeline connected Hungary via Ukraine to the Russian gas
fields of Orenburg and Yamburg. But there was a growing anti-Russian feeling in the
country; the new right-wing government was alarmed that Russians wanted to take
over Hungarian gas companies. The dilemma was how to secure future gas supply
from CIS without allowing the Russians to dominate the domestic energy sector. The
government pursued a double-edged policy after 1990:
On the one hand, the new government was determined to diversify gas supply.
MOL, the national oil and gas concern, signed a gas supply agreement with
Ruhrgas, a German utility, in January 1991.1 This agreement was nothing more
than a gesture: there was no pipeline between Germany and Hungary, (see 3.1.
below)
Austria and Hungary agreed to construct a high-pressure pipeline with a
maximum capacity of 4 - 4.5 bncm per annum (the HAG pipeline): this pipeline
was to connect Hungary to the West European transmission system. The 118 km
length of pipeline was scheduled to be operational by 1996.
On the other hand, the volume of Russian gas supply continued to rise: after 1990
domestic production could satisfy less than 50% of total demand. In the early
1990s Hungary was more reliant on Russian gas than at any other time before.2
Total domestic consumption was around lObncm per annum in the early 1990s,
out ofwhich 6.3bncm was imported from Russia. Around half of the imported gas
was supplied pursuant to inter-government agreements (Orenburgh and Yamburg
agreements); while MOL and Gazprom contracted for another 3bncm per
annum.3 A MOL - Gazprom (Russian gas giant) joint-venture (Panrusgaz) was
set up in 1994 to facilitate the import of Russian gas.4
Thus Hungary did not need to worry about gas import in the early 1990s: (i) it was a
decided question that Hungary would be connected to the West European gas
network; and (ii) Hungary also succeeded in securing Russian imports: the newly
established Panrusgaz was seen as a guarantee that there would be no shortage of
imported natural gas.
'East European Energy Review [hereinafter: EEER], February 1991, page 22.
Economist Intelligent Unit [hereinafter: EIU]: Country Profile: Hungary (1995 - 96), page 21.
3EEER, March 1994, page 28.
4EEER, October 1994, page 23.
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1.2. Tariffs
No price increase
The new government's energy price policy was a policy of extremes. On the one
hand, the petrol and diesel retail business was liberalised in 1990; fuel prices rocketed
to international level. On the other hand, there were no gas or electricity price hikes
after 1992. Although the annual rate of inflation was 25.4% per annum between 1991
- 1995the government refused to increase gas tariffs. As a result, consumer tariffs
were below the import priced tariffs were not linked to import, transport, and
construction costs. MOL lost $300m in 1994, and $210m in 1993 on gas import.^
Household tariffs remained cross subsidised: what domestic customers paid for gas
was a symbolic contribution to expenses, rather than a real tariff.
1.3. Network Financing
Municipalities as investors
Artificially low gas prices spawned a dash for gas in Hungary. The number of
potential customers requesting gas supply boomed. Annual gas consumption
multiplied as follows:^
year 1980 1985 1987 1990 1991 1992 1993
consumption 100 178.1 260.1 318.2 387.0 400.2 464.0
TABLE 19: Annual gas consumption in Hungaiy between 1980 and 1993
But gas companies had limited financial resources to expand the distribution network:
as was mentioned above, energy prices were frozen, while inflation was soaring. The
state did not provide sufficient funds either. Thus municipalities took the lead.
The Gas Act 1969 did not provide that only gas enterprises may construct pipelines.
Hence municipalities and special 'constructing communities' built pipelines from local
resources. The financing of pipelines was organised as follows:
Step 1. - The competent local municipality ordered a feasibility study from the
regional gas enterprise to estimate the total costs of connection.
Step 2. - The municipality portioned out costs among would-be customers;
every household was requested to pay its share to a fund.
Step 3. - Having collected the money the municipality ordered the
construction of pipelines from the local gas enterprise.
5EIU: Country Forecast: Hungary (fourth quarter, 1996), page 2.
6Peter Cameron: Gas Regulation in Europe (1995), Volume 2., page 89.
7EEER, September 1994, page 17.
8Source: Nepszabadsag, 14 September 1994.
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This financing regime defied common sense: it was not the gas enterprise but would-
be customers who paid for the construction of new pipelines. The cost of construction
was collected from customers in cash; this sum was paid over to the gas enterprise
before the construction of pipelines would have commenced. Yet it is easy to
understand why this method of financing was popular: tariffs were not cost reflective,
construction costs were not built into gas prices. Hence gas enterprises could not
finance the construction of pipelines from turnover. If new customers wanted gas they
had to pay for pipelines. Absurd as this idea might appear, this sytem of 'project
financing' worked well in practice:9
Year 1985 1990 1993
Length of pipelines (km) 9,333 17,399 30,587
TABLE 20.: Total length of pipelines in Hungary
Paradoxically, it was municipality financing which kept gas tariffs at an artificially low
level in Hungary: the cost of pipeline construction was NOT a built-in element of
prices, hence gas was cheap. It will be argued below that this bargain (low gas prices
but do-it-yourself construction) will be the 'old ghost' of the Hungarian gas
privatisation; it may be blamed for delaying the sale of the gas industry.
While principles of network financing were not reformed (would-be customers
financed the construction of distribution pipelines) until 1994 (see point 1.5 above),
two points should be noted here:
(i) Third party owned pipelines
As a rule, pipelines financed by (i) the local municipality and/or (ii) would-be
customers were transferred to the gas distributors free-of-charge until November
1992. Section 19 of the Gas Act 1969 provided that
The gas distribution enterprise may make the concluding of the
contract [i.e. the contract to give a supply of gas] conditional upon the
requirement that the consumer shall have that part of the connecting
pipeline which is situated on public territory constructed partly or fully
on his own expense, and then shall give such pipeline into state
ownership (in the management of the gas distribution enterprise) free
of charge.
After the coming into force of a new Constitution in 1989 municipalities claimed
that the provision quoted above was unconstitutional: gas enterprises must pay for
pipelines constructed from local resources. The government yielded to
municipality pressure in 1992: Decree (23/1992. (XI. 17.) IKM) repealed the
9GiroCredit Research: The Gas Sector in Hungary (December 1994), page 30.
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obligation to hand over pipelines free-of-charge. Hence gas enterprises did not
acquire the ownership of new pipelines automatically after November 1992:
suppliers and municipalities negotiated on what terms and conditions
municipalities would sell newly-constructed pipelines to the local gas distributor. If
the two parties could not agree, which was not unusual, municipalities (i) retained
the ownership of pipelines but (ii) granted a 'quasi-franchise' to the local gas
enterprise to operate those pipelines. The latter was not in a position to refuse this
'offer': as will be discussed under point 1.5, gas enterprises were obliged to supply
customers. Hence gas companies supplied gas through third-party owned
networks after 1992.
(ii) Compensation
An Act of Parliament was passed in 1993 (Act LXXXII of 1993) to compensate
municipalities for making financial contribution to the construction of pipelines in
the past. Municipalities were to receive gas company shares free-of-charge. This
issue will be examined further under point 2.3 below. The point here is that
municipalities re-appeared as owners in the Hungarian gas sector after a forty
year-break. 1 ®
1.4. Companies
Re-organisation
The old giant enterprise, OKGT, was wound up in 1991U; MOL and five regional
enterprises were established. The five state-owned enterprises were re-registered as
Company Act-like companies between January and July 1993. The transformation of
gas enterprises into companies was a book-keeping exercise. Nonetheless one point
should be noted here: unlike its British counterpart, the Hungarian government did
not write off debts at transformation. The newly registered gas companies were
general legal successors to the enterprises: liabilities followed assets and, as a rule, no
debts were written off. As was discussed in Chapter 4., a somewhat different
procedure was followed in Britain: the story of the nuclear energy sector is an
example.
Two organisations were in charge of the management of the newly registered regional
gas distribution companies [hereinafter: GDCs]:
(i) The State Property Agency exercised ownership rights over the GDCs after the
coming into force of Act VII of 1990 on privatisation.
(ii) Decisions on energy policy, technical supervision, and price regulation remained
the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
10Like in the UK, the first gas works were municipality owned in Hungary. Gas enterprises were
nationalised in the late 1940s.
^EEER, October 1991, page 2.
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In 1992 a new privatisation agency, the State Holding Company [hereinafter: SHC],
was established to manage, among others, energy companies; thus the GDCs were
transferred to this agency. But the newly established privatisation agency had no
effective control over the five gas companies; a new symbiosis emerged between the
SHC and local managers. The privatisation body had neither expertise nor
information to run the GDCs; the SHC was reliant upon GDC management. As a
rule, local managers co-operated with the privatisation agency if and when it was in
their best interest to do so. If the SHC and GDC managers fell out, the Ministry of
Industry and Trade backed the latter. Two examples may be mentioned here:
(i) Botched reshuffling
The SHC intended to remove four (out of five) General Managers in the run-up to
privatisation. The Ministry was against reshuffling. Although 'a string of
management changes' was reported in the press 12, jn fact no General Manager
was recalled. The Ministry and the SHC agreed that a new Deputy General
Manager [hereinafter: DGM] should be delegated to each GDC. The primary duty
of the DGMs was to supervise the day-to-day operation of the gas companies. But
this arrangement did not quite work in practice. The General Manager of two
GDCs refused to co-operate with the newly appointed DGMs. SHC did not
interfere: the General Managers had the full support of the Ministry of Industry
and Trade. Hence incumbent General Managers remained in power throughout
the privatisation process.
(ii) In-house hostile takeover
SHC decided to merge an oil-gas export company (Mineralimpex) into MOL in
1994. Both companies were majority state-owned; the merger was deemed to be
completed in May 1995 when the SHC transferred around 90% of the
Mineralimpex shares to MOL. Yet the Ministry of Industry and Trade was not
happy with the merger and tried to rescue Mineralimpex from what was described
as an in-house hostile takeover. Hence an internal battle between MOL and its
90% owned subsidiary erupted; the 'in-house hostile takeover' went on until
Spring 1996.13
To conclude, it was not absolutely clear 'who was controlling whom' in the Hungarian
gas industry. The examples mentioned above show that the state is not a particularly
good owner: private investors would presumably make sure that their appointees are
actually appointed and shares are re-transferred between two wholly owned
subsidiaries as soon as possible.
12EEER, September 1995, page 15.
13EEER, April 1996, page 22.
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1.5. Law and Regulation
New Acts of Parliament
Two models existed for the regulation of energy industries in the ex-CMEA group.
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania had 'umbrella' Energy Acts: these pieces of
legislation set forth common rules applicable to oil, gas, electricity, and the district
heating industries. The structure of energy legislation had never been the same in
Hungary: traditionally a number of Acts regulated the Hungarian energy sector, and
no 'general' Energy Act as such was passed. The following pieces of legislation were
in force in 1991:
Mining Act (Act III of 1960);
Electricity Act (Act IV of 1962); and
Gas Act (Act VII of 1969).
A number of Government and Ministerial decrees contained auxiliary (mainly
operational and safety) rules.
In addition to Acts and Decrees, the Hungarian Civil Code also set forth provisions
relevant to energy distribution. Sections 387 - 388. of the Code provided that energy
suppliers were to supply consumers safely and continuously. Furthermore, energy
Acts frequently referred to the general provision of the Civil Code in connection with
third party rights, compensation for damages, breach of contract etc.
The government announced its intention to replace old energy Acts with a new
generation of statutes in 1992. Three new Acts came into force between 1993 and
1994: the Mining Act 1993, the Gas Act 1994, and the Electricity Act 1994. The main
points of the Mining and Gas Acts may be summarised as follows:
Mining Act IAct XLVIII of 1993)14
The new Mining Act was intended to restrict state ownership and state involvement in
the mining ofmineral resources, hard minerals, and the exploitation of hydro-carbons.
After the abolition of state monopoly rights, any Hungarian or foreign company might
apply for a mining concession. The Mining Act empowered the Minister of Industry
and Trade to grant concessions. As far as hydro-carbons were concerned, the new
Act declared that the transmission of oil and gas through pipelines was an exclusive
state activity; anybody intending to construct or to operate transmission pipelines
would have to apply for a concession. In fact, no such concession was granted and
MOL retained a de facto monopoly in the transmission business.
But this monopoly was not without obligations: drawing on British experience^, the
new Act introduced the first Third Party Access rules in mainland Europe.
A leading gas specialist defined Third Party Access as follows:
14EEER, May 1993, page 21.
15Section 19. of the Gas Act 1986.
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... a commercial transaction under which owners of transportation
assets either agree, or are obliged, to carry gas - which they do not
own - for a third party. 1 ^
Hungary introduced the 'obliged to carry1 model: MOL was ordered to allow access to
its oil and gas transmission pipelines subject to certain conditions.^
So far as Third Party Access is concerned, Hungary was well ahead of other countries
in the former COMECOM block. For example, the biggest oil and gas producer in the
region, the Russian Federation, did not legislate on Third Party Access. The 'Journal
of the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union Law Cimmittee' reports
that in late 1997 there was no
. . . foundation act [i.e. Act of Parliament] with the power of law to
support the entire system of legal regulations for oil transportation
through pipelines. 1 ^
The lack of statutes was only one of the problems in Russia. Compared to Third Party
Access, the procedure to obtain access to transmission pipelines was rather complex.
It is to be recalled that in Hungary oil and gas producers had access to MOL's
transmission system subject to certain exceptions as defined in the relevant
Government Decree. In Russia, the right of access was regulated as follows:
Producers should submit an application for oil transmission to TRANSNEFT (i.e.
a company established in August 1993 to transport oil in Russia);
TRANSNEFT should forward (i) the said application and (ii) information on the
capacity of pipelines to MINTOPENEGO (i.e. Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the
Russian Federation);
MINTOPENEGO should (i) prepare suggestions for the usage of trunk pipelines
and (ii) submit such suggestions to an Interdepartmental Commission for review;
Finally, MINTOPENEGO 'in coordination with' the Interdepartmental
Commission approves or rejects applications.^
If potential investors were asked to choose, it is quite likely that they would opt for
Third Party Access as introduced in Hungary: the Russian procedure may need some
amendments to satisfy basic requirements of the 'Rule ofLaw'.
16Jonathan P. Stern: Third Party Access in European Gas Industries (1992), page 21.
17Section 24(2) of Act XLVIII. of 1993, and Section 10. of Government Decree 115/1993
(VIII. 12.) Korm.
18 Jay T. Kolb, Glenn S. Kolleeny, Dmitry Penstov: Legal Aspects of Transportation of Oil and
Petroleum Products from Russia In: Journal of the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet
Union Law Cimmittee, Summer/Fall 1997, pages 80 - 96, at 86.
19For a detailed description of the Russian procedure, see: Joy T. Kolb, et. al., ibid., pages 90 - 91.
206
But Third Party Access had a short life-span in Hungary. It was feared that Russian
gas companies might take advantage of the Third Party Access obligation and would
sell directly to GDCs.20 It is interesting to note that the Polish national oil and gas
concern (PGNiG) used exactly the same argument when the government intended to
introduce Third Party Access in Poland -1
In response to a scandal involving the illegal trade of oil to Slovakia via MOL
pipelines the Government Decree on Third Party Access was repealed in 1995. Thus
gas transmission was de iure liberalised under the Mining Act 1993; yet it remained a
de facto monopoly.
Gas Act (Act XLI of 1994)
The Gas Bill intended to revolutionize energy regulation in Hungary: first of all, the
Bill called for the establishment of an independent energy regulator. The intention was
to set up a regulatory office which would be in charge of both gas and electricity
sectors; the British model of single-industry regulatory offices was not followed.
Secondly, the Gas Bill introduced a new, western-style licensing regime.22 In addition
to regulation and licensing, four additional issues should be highlighted here:
Legal status of regulatory office
It was mentioned in Chapter 2. that single-industry regulatory offices are non-
ministerial government departments in the UK. Thus regulators are not ordinary
administrators: (i) they have a special, quasi-judicial status^; (ii) they maintain a
special relationship with the regulated companies which involves much
negotiating and bargaining; and (iii) they set procedures for themselves.24 The
Hungarian legislator did not transplant the British rules on this point. The Energy
Office (i) has no judicial status; (ii) is supposed to act as an ordinary administrator;
and (iii) is subject to the Code on Administrative Procedure.
Hence the Hungarian Energy Office has a less fortunate legal status than its British
counterpart. Administrative law in Hungary does not recognise that utility
regulators are, or should be, more co-operative than ordinary administrators. The
Gas Act 1994 or the Code on Administrative Procedure do not provide that kind
of flexibility which is the sine qua non ofutility regulation in Britain.
20EEER, February 1995, page 19.
21EEER, May 1995, page 5.
22For details, see point 2.5 below.
23C.D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (1992),
page 276. and Section 27F(6) of the Telecommunications Act 1984, as amended.
24C.D. Foster: op. cit., page 275.
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Territorial exclusivity
The Gas Bill sought to grant exclusivity in favour of gas companies: no competing
suppliers might be appointed to serve an area licensed to an existing licensee. To
appreciate this point it should be noted that the Gas Act 1969 did not recognise
territorial exclusivity; in theory, would-be customers were free to choose their gas
suppliers.25 A report from an expert panel (Csete-committee) concluded in 1993
that two gas enterprises were serving customers situated in the historical areas of
other gas enterprises. Thus territorial exclusivity did not exist in Hungary; gas
distributors had no exclusive rights under the 'old' legislation (Gas Act 1969).
To conclude, 'cross-boundary' supply was legally possible in the 'old days':
territorial exclusivity was introduced in the run-up to privatisation.
• Price regulation
Part VII on Prices was the shortest (some 60 words) and weakest point of the Bill.
Price regulation was to remain the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and
Trade. According to the Bill, the Energy Office was required to prepare
proposals, but it was for the Minister to fix tariffs. The proposed new price
regulation was a compromise between (i) what the SHC and investors wanted (i.e.
cost-reflective gas tariffs) and (ii) the political unwillingness to liberalise gas tariffs.
As will be seen below this compromise remained one of the most controversial
issues in the history of Hungarian energy privatisation.
• Network financing
The Bill was a break-through in the field of network financing; it introduced the
idea of Connection Charge.26 The main rule is that potential new customers are
obliged to contribute towards the costs of network development not covered by
the official price of gas. Compared with the 'old' system as described under 1.3,
would-be customers are better off under the new regime. As was mentioned
above, customers had to construct connecting pipelines at their own expense in
the past; under the new regime would-be customers are required to pay for that
portion of construction costs which is not covered by prevailing gas tariffs.
Duty to supply
Licensed distributors were obliged to supply customers on request under the 'old'
Gas Act, i.e. Act VII. of 1969; the Gas Bill retained this obligation. Compared
25Interestingly, the same regulatory rules govern 'cross-boundary' supply in the English/Welsh
water sector. See: OFWAT: Increasing Competition in the Water Industry, HMSO (April 1996).
26Section 17(2). Detailed rules on connection charge: 32/1995. (VIII.8.) IKM.
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with the UK Gas Act 1986 (see Chapter 1.), the duty to supply was more of a
burden in Hungary.
In the UK a request for supply should satisfy a two-tier test: (a) the request must
be reasonable and (b) a public gas supplier is obliged to give a supply of gas so far
as it is economical to do so.27
A Hungarian gas distributor might refuse a request for supply if (i) the customer to
be connected did not pay the connection charge (see above) or (ii) environmental,
nature reserve or building protection authorities refused to issue a construction
permit.28 Thus a Hungarian gas distribution might not refuse a request for supply
on the basis that the giving of gas supply would not be economical. The Gas Act
1994 refers to external circumstances (e.g. payment of contribution charge;
permits) in Hungary. Circumstances of the gas distributor are not taken into
consideration: it is irrelevant whether the supply of gas is economical or not.
Hence let-out clauses are stricter in Hungary: a gas company in Britain has more
grounds to refuse a request for supply than its Hungarian counterpart.
The Hungarian Parliament discussed the Gas Bill in early 1994; the general election
was scheduled for May of the same year. The government was keen to get the Bill
passed before the elections. Thus there was no time to re-draft the Bill in detail. Yet
SHC and investors were so unhappy with price regulation that Section VII on tariffs
was amended at the last minute. The main points of the new rules may be summarised
as follows:
Gas tariffs shall be cost-reflective by 31 December 1996;
• Gas tariffs may not discriminate between classes of customers;
The Energy Office will be responsible for determining detailed rules on price
regulation. But the Minister of Industry and Trade will fix prices in accordance
with Act LXXXVTI of 1990 on Prices until 31 December 1996;
Gas licensees may ask the Office to review prevailing prices at any time.
The amendment summarised above raised more problems than it solved: it was not
clear (i) what was to be the division of responsibility between the Office and the
Minister; and (ii) what would happen after 1 January 1997 - would prices be
liberalised or some kind of price control remain in place? As will be discussed under
3.2, these points were in the centre of attention after privatisation.
The Gas Act was passed with the amendments mentioned above on 29 March 1994.
1.6. Conclusion
The gas sector was not ready for privatisation in 1994, although Hungary was
working hard on the five problem areas identified above. The government successfully
27Section 9 of the Gas Act 1986.
28Section 20. of the Gas Act 1994.
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coped with import (point 1.), company reorganisation (point 4.), and legal and
regulatory framework (point 5.); Russian supply was secured, gas enterprises had
been re-registered, and new energy Acts were passed. However not much progress
was made so far as tariffs (point 2.) and network financing (point 3.) were
concerned. As the next Part will try to show, the unwillingness to address these points
left a mark on gas privatisation in Hungary.
Part n.
1995: The year of privatisation
The socialist party won the Hungarian general election in 1994. The change of
government had surprisingly little impact on privatisation policy. The new
government was not less committed to the disposal of state-owned companies than its
predecessor. Thus the irony of the Hungarian energy privatisation is that it was a left-
wing government which sold off electricity and gas distributors. Two general
comments may be made here:
(i) Political standing does not seem to determine privatisation policy.
Left or right-wing governments may be equally ardent supporters of disposals. If not
political standing what else motivates governments to sell off" energy companies ?
(ii) Fiscal prudence is the overriding reason for selling state-owned companies.
When the conservative government came into power in 1979 the British economy
was "in serious trouble. It had been deteriorating for years, but in the 1970s the
decline accelerated."29 The primary objective of the incoming government was to
restore financial equilibrium with the minimal increase in taxation. According to
Dennis Swann, corporate sell-offs were technically easier and politically more
acceptable than any other potential solution.^ C. D. Foster also argues that
. . . the main motive the Treasury had in marshalling a succession of
flotations had been to put continuous downward pressure on net public
expenditure and the PSBR.^ 1
The same motive was equally important in Hungary: in 1994 public sector deficit was
soaring, social security was on the edge of bankruptcy and taxation was stretched to
its limits. The new government was willing to consider any option that promised
29John Moore: British Privatisation - Taking Capitalism to the People. In: Her Majesty's treasury
Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme (1995), page 63.
30Dennis Swann: The Retreat of the State (1988), pages 226 - 227.
31C. D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (1992),
page 117.
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immediate relief from fiscal troubles. Privatisation was an ideal solution: the Treasury
could collect much-needed cash from the sale of state-owned companies straightaway.
Thus two fundamentally different political parties (Conservative and Socialist) in two
fundamentally different countries (UK and Hungary) came to the same conclusion:
privatisation was seen as a new source of income for the Treasury. But privatisation
proceeds may not offset budget deficits in the long run: the number of privatisation
candidates is limited. Privatisation proceeds may balance the books for some years:
the long term fiscal effects of privatisation is a different story. One may argue then
that, so far as the fiscal effects are concerned, privatisation was a short term policy
both in the UK and in Hungary.
A new privatisation Act (Act XXXIX of 1995) was passed: the two privatisation
agencies (State Property Agency and SHC - see point 1.4 above) were merged under
the leadership of a new minister. The merged and renamed agency (APV Rt.) was the
most successful privatisation body in history of the Hungarian privatisation
programme: AJPV Rt. sold more assets and companies between 1995 and 1997 than
the State Property Agency and the SHC did together between 1990 and 1995.
A comparative point should be made here. Every ex-CMEA country set up a
privatisation body and adopted a number of Acts on privatisation: sales in Britain
were administered without a privatisation agency^ and no 'general' privatisation
statute was enacted. John Moore criticised the idea of framework Acts as follows:
Some countries have tried to pass omnibus bills covering the transfer
of all state-owned industries to the private sector, but catch-all bills
cannot allow for individual provisions and prove to be hopelessly
unwieldy in parliamentary terms.33
While John Moore's argument is correct, it should be remarked that 'catch-all' Acts
may be quite useful:
(1) General Principles
A general privatisation Act may lay down some basic principles of privatisation:
rules (i) on the evaluation of shares/property, and (ii) on the selections of advisors
via open tenders are examples. Such principles shall be applicable to ALL future
transactions. Thus a 'catch-all' Act may help to achieve a level ofuniformity.
32The Treasury Privatisation Unit co-ordinated sales in the UK; but it is not an independent
ministry or agency.
33 John Moore: British Privatisation - Taking Capitalism to the People In: H.M. Treasury: Her
Majesty's Treasury Guide to the UK Privatisation Programme (1995), page 71.
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(2) If no individual Act, then . . .
It would be naive to suggest that the Parliament passed an individual Act on every
disposal in Britain. It was mentioned in Chapter 4. that there was no statute
covering the sale of the Plant Breeding Institute. Had the UK passed a 'catch-all'
statute the lack of specific privatisation Act might not have been a problem: the
Department of Education and Science could have consulted the 'general' Act to
find out how Estimates and Supplementary Estimates must be prepared.
To conclude, the individual legislation versus 'catch-all' bills debate is still going on.
While it is correct that 'general' Acts do not allow for individual provisions, there are
at least two arguments for passing a framework privatisation statute. The UK rejected
the idea of 'catch-all' bills: Hungary passed two general privatisation Acts. Both
countries have impressive privatisation track records. The final point may be then that
it does not matter whether a general Act or a long list of individual Acts govern the
sale of state-owned assets/companies, provided that investors trust the legal
framework underpinning privatisation.
The Hungarian privatisation agency started to push through the disposal of strategic
companies in early 1995. Five priority projects were nominated: (i) MATAV
(telecom); (ii) MVM (electricity); (iii) MOL (oil and gas upstream); (iv) regional gas
distributors; (v) and Antenna Hungaria (broadcasting).
The sale of GDCs was conditional upon making further progress on the five problem
areas identified above. The following developments happened in 1995:
2.1. Import
Russian contract and Diversification
Hungary continued to foster import links both in the East and in the West. On the one
hand, Russia remained the sole importer to the country. MOL signed a major contract
with Panrusgaz for the delivery of 4 bncm gas.34 On the other hand, the construction
of the HAG pipeline was under way; Hungary was looking for potential options to
import gas from Western Europe.
2.2. Tariffs
Price increases and schedule for the future
After a three year break gas prices were put up by 53% in January 1995.35
Furthermore, the Energy Office, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Ministry
34EEER, February 1995, page 19.
35EEER, January 1995, page 6.
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ofFinance published a consultation paper on future tariff increases. Chapter Vffl36 of
the Gas Act 1994 set the framework for this proposal: as was mentioned under 1.5,
the Gas Act stated that tariffs shall be cost-reflective after 1 January 1997. Having
considered the discussion paper mentioned, the government passed a special Decree
on the regulation of gas tariffs (Decree 1075/1995. (VIII.4.) Korm). The main points
of this Decree may be summarised as follows:
Wholesale and retail tariffs for natural gas must be increased so as to guarantee
that gas licensees could earn an 8% return on capital by 1 January 1997.
• Three waives of tariff increases were scheduled: (i) on 1 September 1995 an 8%,
(ii) on 1 March 1996 a 25%, and (iii) on 1 October 1996 a further, undisclosed
price hike.
Between 1 January 1997 and 31 December 2001 gas tariffs will be set in
accordance with an RPI-X - style formula. The formula included (i) a cost pass-
through factor and (ii) a so-called 'claw-back' provision: details of this provision
shall be discussed in the Conclusion below.
To appreciate the importance of these points it may be useful to recall how prices
were set during nationalisation. Chapter 1. has considered pricing policy in the era of
nationalisation in Britain. The discussion concluded that (i) the government influenced
the timing and level of tariff increases, and (ii) automatic cost pass-through
mechanism was not in place. These points are also relevant in the case of Hungary:
the only difference is that, unlike in Britain, Act LXXXVTI of 1990 on Prices
explicitly acknowledged that ministers will set maximum prices for natural gas. It was
argued in Chapter 1. that gas boards were empowered to set tariffs under the British
nationalisation statutes; but ministers influenced pricing policy informally ("early
warning system"^7). Hence, as far as ministerial power over price fixing is concerned,
the Hungarian legislation was nearer to reality: ministers were authorised to fix energy
tariffs in Hungary, while their British opposite numbers exercised powers which were
not given them by statutes.
It was also argued in Chapter 1. that utilities are better off after the introduction of the
RPI-X price regime in Britain: (i) the timing of price adjustment is known in advance
and (ii) certain costs may be passed through to customers.^ ° The same points also
apply to Hungarian gas distributors: under the old price regime (i) gas companies did
not know when, and by how much, tariffs would be put up and (ii) changes in the
cost of import gas could not be passed on to customers (see point 1.2. above).
36A new Chapter VII was added to the Gas Act, so what was Chapter VII of the Gas Bill (Price
Regulation) is Chapter VIII of the Act.
37See Chapter 1., Part I., point A.l. above.
38C.D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (1992),
page 209.
213
But in addition to timing and pass-through, a third factor should also be mentioned
here: inflation. Hungary is a high inflation risk country. As was mentioned under 1.2
above, the annual rate of inflation was 25.4% between 1991 and 1995; the figure was
24% in 1996.39 Inflation and price hikes were not linked in the past; the government
refused to increase gas tariffs between 1991 and 1994, even though inflation was
above 20% per annum. Under the RPI-X regime gas tariffs will follow inflation. It is
certainly a good news for gas companies operating in a high inflation rate country.
Thus the introduction of an RPI-X - style formula had similar consequences in the UK
and in Hungary: the new price regime benefited gas companies. And how about gas
customers ? While the average household gas bill has fallen in the UK after 198640,
is not clear what Hungarian customers will gain from the introduction of the RPI-X
formula: tariffs are set to rise in the medium term. The possibility that the 'claw-back'
provision, which was not introduced in Britain41, will be used is remote: this point
will be explained in detail in the Conclusion. The final point here is that gas
companies in Hungary are likely to be happier with the new price regulation than their
customers.
2.3. Network Financing
Further compensation package to municipalities
The Parliament passed a new Act (Act LXX of 1995) handing over further chunks of
gas distribution company shares to the municipalities. Some 955 municipalities
acquired a 40% stake in the five GDCs.42 The book value of shares handed over to
the municipality was HUF 18bn (app. GBP50m). Two issues should be considered
here:
Theoretical problem
Although this piece of legislation was labelled as a compensation Act, it was not
entirely clear what municipalities were expected to be compensated for. As was
mentioned under 1.3 (i) above, municipality financed pipelines were not transferred to
the GDCs free-of-charge after November 1992. Municipalities and GDCs agreed
about the ownership of gas assets prior to the construction of pipelines: either
pipelines were sold to the GDC or the company charged a service fee for supplying
gas through municipality owned pipelines. Why should municipalities be compensated
then ? They signed a contract voluntarily, the other party (GDC) fulfilled its
contractual obligations, nothing unexpected happened - compensation may not be
due.
39The Financial Times: Hungary (supplement), 16 December 1996.
40Sir George Young: Speech to World Privatisation Conference. In: Her Majesty's Treasury Guide
to the UK Privatisation Programme (1995), page 78.
41 See: Conclusion, point (4)(b).
42EEER, October 1996, page 18.
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Hence the handing over of shares to municipalities was not compensation; it was a
new technique of local council financing. As a rule, two models exist as to the
proportioning of privatisation proceeds between (a) municipalities and (b) the central
government. To put it bluntly, either municipalities are entitled to a portion of
proceeds or not. Hungary adopted the former model; Britain follows the latter.
As was mentioned in Chapter 4. above, the main rule in the UK is that proceeds shall
be remitted to the Consolidated Fund rather than to third parties unless there has been
a prior approval of Parliament. Thus the British government does not finance local
councils from privatisation proceeds directly.
Hungarian municipalities seem to be in a more fortunate position: ever since the
passing of the first privatisation statute (Act VII of 1990), local councils are entitled to
a portion of privatisation proceeds. Municipality financing in Hungary was in a crisis
by the mid-1990s; some councils were in the red. The central government was
looking for new ways to finance local councils. Yet no further chunks of privatisation
proceeds might be allocated to the municipalities; the Parliament told the SHC that
HUF 150bn proceeds shall be remitted to the Treasury in 1995. Hence the
privatisation agency did not have spare cash to finance municipalities. An alternative
solution was needed: gas company shares from the government's residual holding
were handed over to the municipalities free-of-charge. As will be noted below (point
3.3), municipalities sold their shares straightaway and, presumably, used the money to
improve their financial situation. One may conclude then that the transfer of GDC
shares to municipalities was not compensation but an emergency solution to rescue
local councils from bankruptcy.
• Practical problem
Act LXX of 1995 did not set a deadline for the distribution of shares among
municipalities. The privatisation agency decided not to hand over shares until after the
completion of gas privatisation: it was feared that municipalities holding 40% of the
votes would thwart the transaction. The company law question here was whether
municipalities were shareholders after the coming into force of the Act or not.
The privatisation agency argued that municipalities were not shareholders; they were
not registered in the share registry. The agency could have referred to Professor
Pennington's textbook:
Shareholders who are not members are not entitled to attend general
meetings, and so holders of letters of allotment and acceptance and
holders of share warrants cannot do so unless the articles so
provide.^
While this argument is correct in a general sense, in this particular case the 'no one
may benefit from her/his own wrong doing' - maxim should have overruled it. The
43Pennington's Company Law (1990), page 633.
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privatisation agency intentionally delayed the distribution of shares so as to prevent
municipalities from being registered as company members. Hence the privatisation
agency barred a number of would-be members holding 40% of the issued share
capital from taking part in the business of the GDCs. Refusing to hand over shares to
would-be members so as to exclude them from company meetings is illegal under the
Companies Act of any civilised nation; resolutions passed at general meetings shall be
declared null and void. The local court of Szeged City (southern Hungary) ruled so in
1996. The Court annulled the results of an EGM of an electricity company, including
the appointment of the representatives of the investor (Electricite de France) as board
members.^4 Yet no further action was taken; Electricite de France and the local
council reached an out-of-court settlement.
The case mentioned above was not the least occassion when a Hungarian court
condemned the privatisation agency for not handing over shares to the local
municipalities. The Budapest Court ruled in May 1998 that the HSC delivered share
certificates to Veszprem municipality 'beyond the reasonable time-limit'. The
privatisation agency was ordered to pay (i) damages and (ii) penalty interest.
Hundreds of municipalities may bring bring similar claims now. To conclude, the
HSC will pay dearly for not handing over gas company shares to municipalities until
after the closing of the GDC privatisation.
2.4. Companies
New Articles of Association
The Articles of Associations of the GDCs were amended before privatisation. A
Golden Share was introduced in each company. The reception of Golden Share in
Hungary was discussed under Part II. of Chapter 3. in detail. It is sufficient to remark
here that the state retained the right to veto certain strategic decisions, like (i)
dissolution of GDCs, (ii) amendments to the scope of activities of the GDCs and (iii)
redemption of shares. In addition, the holder of the Golden Share has the right to
appoint one board member.46
Following the registration ofGolden Shares with the Companies Court the stake to be
sold in each GDC was increased from 25% of the shares to '50% of shares + 1
vote'.47 Xhe main point here is that it was the introduction of Golden Shares which
made the sale of a '50% + 1 vote' stake possible in Hungary. Had the reception of
Golden Shares been aborted, the Hungarian government would have sold minority
stakes (not more than 25%) to foreign investors. It was mentioned in the introduction
that Hungarian gas privatisation is unprecedented in Central and Eastern Europe: no
other government in the region is likely to sell a majority holding in energy
44EEER, May 1996, page 3.
45Nepszabadsag, 26 March 1998, page 5. Internet: www.nepszabadsag.hu.
46The status of government appointed directors under British law is discussed in Chapter 2., Part
III. above.
47See Government Resolution 1065/1995. (VII.6.) Korm., point 13.
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distributors. One of the reasons for not offering majority stakes for sale in other
Central and Eastern European countries is that the legality of Golden Shares is
disputed. For example, the government of Slovakia intended to retain Golden Shares
in twenty strategic companies; but the high court ruled that the principle of Golden
Share is unconstitutional.4^ Thus the Slovak government will retain a controlling
stake in utilities (see Conclusion, point 4./).
2.5. Law and Regulation
Licences issued
The story of the Hungarian gas licences illustrates how difficult it is to transplant legal
institutes from one country to another. The Gas Act 1994 intended to introduce a
British-style utility licensing regime in Hungary:
gas transportation and distribution were declared to be activities subject to a
licence;
unlicensed transport and distribution were prohibited; and
the Energy Office was established to issue (i) gas trading and (ii) distribution
licences.49
However the Hungarian legislator did not specify the legal status of licences: is a
licence an agreement or an administrative resolution ?
In Britain licences are agreements between the regulator and the regulated. C. D.
Foster emphasises that the relationship between the state and the privately owned
utilities had been regulated in a contract since the time of Gladstone. 50 Anthony I
Ogus writes that "the regulatory system can be envisaged as a long-term contract
between the regulatory agency and the monopolistic firm."51 The most important
consequence of the 'licence as contract' approach is that licences (contracts) may not
be modified without the consent of the licence holder (contractual party). For
example, Section 23(4) of the Gas Act 1986 provides that "the Director shall not
make the [licence] modifications without the consent of the public gas supplier".
Section 13(1) of the Water Industry Act 1991 reads as follows:
. . .the Director may modify the conditions of a company's
appointment under this Chapter if the company consents to the
modifications. 5 2
48Eastern European Monitor, June 1996.
49Section 9 of the Gas Act 1994.
50C.D. Foster: Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (1992),
page 124.
51Anthony I Ogus: Regulation (1994), page 306.
52Italics added.
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Were these rules on the legal status of licences transplanted into Hungary ?
Hungary had no system of energy licensing before 1994. Only state-owned enterprises
were involved in the provision of electricity and gas services: the state was the owner,
thus licensing would have been superficial. No one licence had been issued in the past,
hence the legal status of utility licences was not settled. After the passage of the Gas
Act 1994 the Energy Office started to draft the gas trading and distribution licences.53
But the Office was not quite sure what it was expected to draft: a contract or a
resolution ? Thus two drafts were circulated in late 1994:
One draft followed the British tradition; it was a contract between the Energy
Office and the licensees. Section 3. of this draft provided that the licence might
not be amended without the consent of the licensee (Cf: Section 23 of the Gas Act
1986).
The other document was an administrative resolution prepared in accordance with
the Code on Administrative Procedure. It was drafted on the understanding that
the licence might not regulate issues that are not covered under the Gas Act 1994.
It was the Ministry of Industry and Trade which chose between the two drafts. The
Ministry concluded that the Hungarian licences were administrative resolutions. The
argument run as follows: Section 4(2) of the Gas Act 1994 declares that the Energy
Office is an administrative body; all such bodies are subject to the Code on
Administrative Procedure; documents issued by an administrative body are
administrative resolutions; thus licences are administrative resolutions and not
contracts.
While this interpretation is in line with general principles of Hungarian administrative
law, a hiccup should be mentioned here:
Right to amend, modify, or revoke licences
It was mentioned above that a regulator may amend a licence with the consent of
the regulated company in Britain; if the regulated company does not give its
consent, the matter is referred to the MMC. Yet consent is irrelevant if licences
are administrative resolutions. Instead of regulator and regulated, governor and
governed are the two parties in the regulatory process. Regulation is not a process
of "negotiations of (more or less) equals around a table"54 in Hungary. It is the
regulator who dictates: the regulated shall obey administrative orders.
Hence the Energy Office in Hungary could amend, modify, or revoke licences at any
time without the consent of the licensees. This arrangement may leave licensees at the
53A comparative point: in the UK the Secretary of State drafted the first licences. See: Chapter 1.,
point 3.2(ii)(a).
54C.D. Foster: op. cit., page 275.
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mercy of the regulator. Regulated utilities are in a better bargaining position in
Britain: licensees are contracts there.
2.6. Conclusion
The international tender for the sale of 'a 50% + 1 vote' stake in each of the five
GDCs was issued on 5 August 1995.^5 it will be useful to summarise what
arrangements were in place when the five companies were offered for sale.
1./ Russian gas supply secured and progress with diversification
Hungary managed to secure natural gas supplies both from the East and from the
West. On the one hand, Panrusgaz and MOL signed long-term agreements; on the
other hand, the HAG pipeline was under construction.
2.1 Price regulation reformed
Salient changes happened here: Hungary introduced an RPI-X - style price regulation.
Tariffs were increased in 1995. A Government Decree pledged three further waves of
price increases. The intention was to achieve cost-reflective price levels by January
1997.
3./ Financing: troubles in the pipeline
Two issues foreshadowed difficulties here: (i) The Hungarian Parliament passed two
compensation Acts: municipalities were to hold a 40% stake in the gas distributors,
(ii) The gas distribution companies did not own all pipelines in their licensed areas;
uncertainty over third-party owned pipelines lurked in the background.
4./ Re-registered companies and Golden Share
Privatisation candidates were Company Act-like companies. The government retained
a Golden Share in each of them.
5./ Legal environment and regulation
The new Gas Act was a privatisation-friendly piece of legislation. The Energy Office
ofHungary was the first utility regulator in Central and Eastern Europe.^6 MOL and
the GDCs were licensed by early 1995.
55The Financial Times, 5 August 1997.
56Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries: Utility Regulation 1997 (1997), page 5.
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One may conclude then that Hungary successfully dealt with points (1) Gas import,
(4) Company re-registration, and (5) Legislation and licensing. The future of
point (2) Price regulation depended upon the political willingness of the government
to increase prices as scheduled under the Government Decree of 1075/1995. Finally,
point (3) Network financing was in a state of muddle; some municipalities were to
receive GDC shares, while others owned distribution pipelines situated within the
licensed area of the GDCs. Thus the Hungarian government did not quite find a
solution to this problem.
Part D3.
Post-privatisation developments
Gas privatisation was not a miracle in Hungary; it did not dispense with the above
identified problems at once. Actually, (i) pricing and (ii) municipality investment
turned out to be time-bombs which went off after privatisation.
3.1. Import
New gas contracts and diversification
The Hungarian gas system has been further diversified after privatisation: (i) A major
gas contract for the delivery of 225bncm gas was executed between MOL and
Panrusgaz. This contract covers a period of 20 years. 57 (ii) The HAG pipeline was
completed in September 1996. MOL signed an agreement with Gaz de France for the
supply of 0.4bncm gas via the HAG pipeline. Ruhrgas also sold 0.5bncm gas to MOL
in 1996 (see point 1.1).
3.2 Tariffs
Botched price proposal
The second round of price adjustments was completed successfully: energy prices
were increased by 25% in March 1996 as scheduled under the Government Decree
(see point 2.2).58 However the third round was called off in 1996.
As was mentioned under 2.2, the Government Decree did not specify by how much
prices should be increased in October 1996. Hence the exact figures were to be
worked out in accordance with Section VIII. of the Gas Act 1994. The Energy Office
prepared a recommendation taking into calculation factors like (i) currency
devaluation, (ii) import price of natural gas, and (iii) operational costs of the GDCs. 59
The Energy Office's recommendation was submitted to the Minister of Industry and
57EEER, November 1996, page 20.
58EEER, March 1996, page 3.
59Point 2. of Government Decree 1075/1995. (VIII.4.) Korm.
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Trade for approval^; and this is where the weakness of Hungarian price regulation
lies.
A comparative point may be made here. The Minister is not obliged to accept the
recommendation of the Energy Office in Hungary; the Secretary of State might or
might not accept the recommendations of the MMC in Britain.61 Thus in both
countries professional bodies (Energy Office or the MMC) submit recommendations
to politicians (Minister or the Secretary of State). Naturally, politicians are primarily
interested in politics: they might refuse a professionally sound recommendation if
party politics so dictates. This is what happened in the case of the National
Power/PowerGen bids in the UK (see Chapter 5.); and also in the case of the October
1996 price adjustment in Hungary. The government did not accept the Energy
Office's recommendations. 62 A special committee was set up to investigate whether
the Energy Office's recommendations were (politically) acceptable or not.
It is to be recalled that a price proposal was also reconsidered in the UK in the
previous year. As was mentioned in Chapter 5. the Director General of OFFER re-
reviewed his distribution price paper in 1995. Comparing Hungarian and British
experiences with the re-reviewing ofutility tariffs two similarities may be highlighted:
Reaction
Investors reacted exactly the same way in Hungary as they did in the UK. British
comments were quoted in Chapter 5. above; investors made the following remarks in
Hungary:
We will be doing our best to encourage the government to stick to its
promises. What we are seeing here is a government making
commitments when it wants to sell something in 1995 and then having
different ideas in 1996 when it is trying to be more popular and to win
elections. This is simply unacceptable. "3
60Act LXXXVII of 1990 on prices provides that the Minister of Industry and Trade shall fix the
maximum tariffs for gas and electricity, in practice the government had been approving price hikes
ever since the passage of the Act on prices.
61See: Chapter 5., Part III., point (i) above.
62Although 1996 was only the second full business year of the Energy Office, it was the second
occasion when the government did not accept the Office's recommendations. The very first price
proposal from the Energy Office was also refused in September 1994; a bad omen. See: EEER
September 1994, page 14.
63EEER, August 1996, page 2.
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Aftermath
The new distribution price regime was tougher than the August 1994 proposal in
Britain, nonetheless it was not tough enough to thwart the Big REC Race. Thus the
re-reviewing of the original price proposal had limited impact in the UK: as was
discussed in Chapter 5., the RPI-3 price cap did not deter predators from acquiring
RECs.
As far as Hungary is concerned, investors actually benefited from the re-reviewing of
the original Energy Office proposal. While gas tariffs went up by 18.8% only (the
original proposal recommended a 25% hike) in January 1997, investors may be better
off in the medium term: the government announced that gas tariffs shall be adjusted
quarterly in the future. Price adjustments will take into account (i) currency
devaluation and (ii) inflation. The point here is that neither the Gas Act 1994 nor the
licences provide for automatic price adjustments; the quarterly review was introduced
to win back investors' confidence. One may conclude then that the second proposal
was quite 'investor - friendly' in Hungary: one moderate hike followed by regular
adjustments is better than a sharp price increase without subsequent adjustments.
3.3. Network Financing
Municipality stakes sold
The municipalities did not hold on to their GDC shares. In the case of four companies
municipality shares ended up in the hands of investors who purchased the '50% + 1
vote' stakes from the privatisation agency in 1995. As far as the fifth company is
concerned, a variety of financial investors purchased up TIGAZ shares from local
municipalities by early 1997. Shares in all the five GDCS are traded on the OTC
market of the Budapest Stock Exchange as of today.
Thus the ownership structure of the GDCs was rearranged after privatisation: for the
time being certain groups of investors hold a 90% stake (50% + 1 vote acquired from
the privatisation agency, plus 40% acquired from local municipalities or at the Stock
Exchange) in four GDCs.
The question here is whether the HSC envisaged that investors will try to acquire
further blocks of shares from local councils. IfYES, what was the official view ?
If this 'block-building' was seen as 'undesirable' then the transaction
documents^ should have provided that the Buyer(s) may not purchase additional
shares from the local municipalities and/or from third parties.
If the acquisition of further shares was politically acceptable then the HSC and the
local municipalities should have tried to privatise their stakes jointly.
64The Sale and Purchase Agreement, Articles of Association, and the Shareholders' Agreement.
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It is open to debate whether the HSC did consider this issue in detail or not. With
hindsight, it would have been better not to allow investors to acquire further blocks of
shares. The HSC should have tried (i) to purchase back GDC shares from the
municipalities at a reasonable price and (ii) to list GDC shares on the Budapest Stock
Exchange. It is regrettable that it was not the HSC but the investors who took the
plunge: they purchased up municipality shares in the case of four (out of five) GDCs.
3.4. Companies
Competition and re-transfer of shares
/A/ Competition
Privatised gas distributors operate in an increasingly competitive environment both in
the UK and in Hungary.
Liberalisation is the main source of competition for British Gas: the monopoly
threshold had been reduced from 25,000 therms per annum to 2,500 therms per
annum in 1992 and is due to be abolished by 1998.65 Xhus the British domestic gas
market will be fully liberalised in the near future. The EU is likely to move towards
liberalisation once the proposals for the internal market in natural gas has been
finalised. 66
Liberalisation does not play the same role in Hungary: the Hungarian gas sector is not
being opened up to competition. As was mentioned under 1.5, Third Party Access
was abolished and territorial exclusivity was introduced before privatisation.
Nevertheless competition seems to strengthen: new competitors have entered the gas
distribution market.
(i) Independent suppliers
The Energy Office did not issue new licences until after the close of GDC
privatisation. Potential applicants, mainly municipalities, threatened to bring the Office
to court; however the sale of the GDCs was closed before proceedings would have
been initiated. The Energy Office appreciated the 'patience' of applicants; licensing
policy was reviewed after privatisation. The Office announced that if statutory
conditions are fulfilled67 licences would be issued automatically. As a result, four
new suppliers have been licensed during 1996.
(ii) MOL
MOL was excluded from the privatisation of GDCs: the privatisation agency argued
that vertical integration was not desirable in the gas sector. The Bidding Rules
65See: Chapter 4., Part III.
66OJ C 315, 24.10.96., page 18.
67Section 9(3) of the Gas Act 1994.
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provided that no bidder might be licensed as a Gas Trader in Hungary. At the time of
privatisation MOL was the sole Gas Trader; hence this company could NOT bid for
GDCs. But this philosophy vanished after privatisation. MOL did enter the
downstream market: this company (i) holds stakes in the newly licensed suppliers, and
(ii) entices away big industrial customers from the GDCs. Section 4(1) of the Gas Act
1997 (Act XX. of 1997) provides that big industrial customers may be added to the
licence of the gas trader, i.e. MOL. Many industrial customers switched to MOL in
1996 - 1997; leaving the GDCs with high cost, low consumption customers (i.e.
schools, residential homes).
/B/ Re-transfer of shares
The Hungarian state sold the GDCs on condition that investors shall hold on to their
stakes for a period of ten years. The sale and purchase agreements provided that no
investor may transfer its '50% + 1 vote' stake in any GDC without the prior approval
of the privatisation agency; in addition, the transfer of a 25% or more stake should be
approved by the Energy Office under the Gas Act 1994.68 Thus the disposal of shares
acquired from the privatisation agency is subject to two approvals. Yet investors also
hold shares that were acquired from the local municipalities or on the OTC market
(see point 3.3 above): the re-transfer of these shares is subject to Energy Office
approval only.
French are particularly keen to re-transfer their stakes. Gaz de France [hereinafter:
GdF] transferred its '50% +1 vote' shareholding to a 100% owned subsidiary (GdF
International) immediately after closing. The rationale for this transfer was never
properly explained. It was rumoured that GdF could benefit from certain tax
concessions if a subsidiary (as opposed to GdF) held the GDC stakes.
Two years later GdF was negotiating with OMV, an Austrian company, about the
transfer of shares in a GDC (EGAZ). The background to this transaction is as follows:
OMV was keen to acquire EGAZ, a gas company serving north-west Hungary^; the
Austrian company did not bid for any other GDC. It was a surprise then that the
OMV bid was a mere $25,240,000. The '50% + 1 vote1 stake was awarded to GdF for
a total consideration of $77,000,000. This bid was surprisingly high; it was more than
400% of the book value ofEGAZ. One may wonder whether it is a coincidence that
those two companies were discussing the transfer of EGAZ shares in 1996 which
submitted the highest and the lowest bids in 1995. With hindsight, both the OMV and
GdF bids were disproportionate: the former was too low, the latter was too high.
However, the average of the two bids is surprisingly near to the value of the second
highest bid: Italgas/Snam offered $49,837,228 (270% of book value), while the
average of the OMV - GdF bids is $51,120,000 (276% of book value). Of course,
these figures are not sufficient to conclude that an informal agreement was in place
68Section 12 of the Gas Act 1994. As was noted in Chapter 5., there is no similar change of control
provision in the British electricity legislation.
69EEER, July 1994, page 20.
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between OMV and GdF at privatisation; but the idea of some co-operation cannot be
completely discounted.
3.5. Law and Regulation
Gas Act amended
The Gas Act 1994 was amended in 1997 (Act XX of 1997). The main points of the
new legislation may be summarised as follows:
Gas licensees have the exclusive right to supply customers within their licensed
areas. No existing customer may switch to a new supplier after the passage of the
1997 amendments.
No gas pipelines may be constructed in a currently unconnected area until after a
gas supplier has been licensed to supply that area. The point here is that local
municipalities must appoint a GDC prior to the construction of pipelines. It
follows from the first amendment mentioned above that the municipalities might
not choose another supplier subsequently.
These amendments fly in the face of liberalisation: customers have no choice as to
which GDC may supply them. Thus the 1997 amendments strengthen the monopoly
status of the gas suppliers: this is in stark contrast to British gas legislation. Section 7
of the UK Gas Act 1986, as amended, deals with the situation when a new licensee is
appointed to supply gas in the authorised area of an incumbent gas supplier. This
situation may not occur in Hungary: gas suppliers have the exclusive right to supply
customers within their licensed areas. Furthermore, the British gas market is being
liberalised. Gas suppliers will have to compete for domestic customers in Britain. Yet
Hungarian customers seem to be chained to their existing suppliers under the Gas Act
1994 as amended. Hence Hungarian gas legislation does not seem to progress towards
liberalisation for the time being.
Conclusion
Many Central and Eastern European countries consider the idea of extending
privatisation to energy distribution industries: the Czech Republic, Poland, and
Romania are examples. But no actual tenders for sale have been issued as of early
1998. What lessons might Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and
Slovakia learn from the disposal of the Hungarian GDCs ?
Lesson 1. Import
Russia will remain the dominant supplier in the region. A Russian - local joint
venture may be set up in each country to guarantee that there will be no problems
with the importing of natural gas from Russia. At the same time, diversification of
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supply should not he ignored: Central and Eastern European countries should be
encouraged to search forpotential Western (as opposed to Russian) partners.
TOPENERGY in Bulgaria^ and EUROPOLGAZ in Poland^ * are examples.
Lesson 2. Tariffs
Gas prices will not be cost-reflective before privatisation. Nevertheless a political
commitment (i) to review prices regularly and (ii) to phase out subsidies might
assuage investors.
Bulgaria is a classic example here: The World Bank put some pressure on this
country to guarantee that gas prices will be linked to (a) inflation and (b) exchange
rate changes^ Tariffs are supposed to be reviewed regularly.73
Lesson 3. Network financing
Ifprices are not increased, gas companies will have no sufficient funds to finance
capital expenditure programmes. Thuspipelines will be constructed eitherfrom bank
loans orfrom municipal money.
Neither of these options is satisfactory.
If banks finance the capital expenditure programmes, then lenders will try to influence
future tariff policy. For example, in Romania international donors lend on condition
that gas tariffs will be increased.^4
Ifmunicipalities help gas companies with the construction of pipelines, then the local
councils will claim gas company shares. Hungary and the Czech Republic are
examples. The Hungarian story has been discussed under point 2.3 above;
municipalities acquired a 34% stake in each gas distributor in the Czech Republic^
Lesson 4. Companies
Gas industry should be restructured and gas distributors re-registered as Company
Act-like companiesprior to their disposals. The introduction ofGolden Shares would
enable government to offer majority stakesfor sale.
70EEER, June 1995, page 27.
71John Leslie: Central European Energy (1996), page 136.
72EEER, August 1995, page 8.
73EEER, November 1995, page 9.
74EEER, August 1995, page 22.
75EEER, July 1995, page 9.
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Romania and Slovakia seem to disregard Hungarian experience on this point. The
Romanian government is keen to keep ROMGAZ under direct government control;
re-structuring and re-registration is not planned for the time being76 Slovakia is to
retain a controlling stake in utilities^; Golden Shares are declared to be illegal (see
point 2.4 above). The Czech Republic seems to hold a different view on Golden
Shares: the National Property Fund retained a special 'blocking majority' in the gas
companies to prevent decisions being passed that might not be in the national
interest.^8
Lesson 5. Law and regulation
A new generation ofenergy Acts should be passed and independent utility regulation
introduced. The relationship between regulators and governments should be spelled
out in the legislation: regulators must be decision-makers and not advisors to the
government.
Central and Eastern European countries have a long way to go as far as regulation is
concerned. Regulatory offices will be set up in Bulgaria^ and in Poland^® soon;
however they will be advisory bodies to the government with limited scope of
independence. This arrangement might not be good enough: Central and Eatsern
European governments should try to create independent regulatory offices.
These are the main lessons Central and Eastern European countries may learn from
the Hungarian gas privatisation. Yet one would remain pessimistic as far as
comparative privatisation experiences are concerned. Central and Eastern European
countries have no strong comparative tradition: this region was ruled historically
either from German speaking countries (Austria or Germany) or from Russia. Thus
Central and Eastern European countries compared their legal and economic systems
with those ofAustria/Germany or Russia; comparison between countries in the region
was more the exception than the rule. Why should country 'A' try to understand the
legal system of country 'B' when Austria/Germany or Russia will tell both countries
what amendments would be 'welcome' ?
Language is another barrier to comparative research. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia have six official languages; there is no one
universally favoured language in the region. Interestingly, Central and Eastern
European countries never had a common 'communicating' language: Bulgaria
preferred Greek, while others used Latin. For the time being English seems to be the
most popular language in the region. The widespread use of this language implies that
76John Leslie, op.cit., page 169.
77EEER, June 1994, page 11.
78EEER, July 1995, page 9.
79EEER, February 1995.
80EEER, December 1994, page 11.
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these countries are inclined to study British/American examples; especially so in the
field of privatisation where the UK experience is second to none. Hence one may not
rule out that Central and Eastern European countries will try to draw on the
privatisation of British Gas (1986); and lessons from the Hungarian gas privatisation
(1995) will not be considered.
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Annex 1.
Extracts from the Hungarian Gas Act 1994.
NOTE: This is not, and does not intend to be, a word-by¬
word translation. Those wishing to consult the full English
text may find the Hungarian Rules of Law in Force, Nr.
V./14. (15 July 1995) useful. This translation attempts to
concentrate on the meaning (as opposed to words) of the
Hungarian Act. Having that in mind, unnecessary details
have been omitted; and only those sections have been
translated to which references are made in the main text.
Section 4.
The Hungarian Energy Office
(1) The Hungarian Energy Office [hereinafter: the Office] shall be in charge of (i)
the licensing of gas supply and gas trading activities, (ii) the monitoring of
consumer satisfaction and of the level of services, and (iii) customer
protection.
(2) [. . . ] The Government may give directions to the Office. The supervision of
the Office shall be the responsibility of a minister nominated by the
Government.
Section 6.
(1) The Office shall
a) issue and, where the Act so defines, amend the gas supply and gas
trading licences [. . .];
b) approve business codes prepared by the licensees. Opinions of
consumer protection agencies shall be taken into account in approving
such codes;
c) define the scope of business information gas suppliers and traders will
be obliged to publish;
d) [...]
e) prepare recommendation in connection with (i) prices, [ . . . ] and (ii)
rules governing the calculation of connection charge.
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Section 11.
Licence Modification [...]
(1) Licences may be modified at the request of the licensees in the case of
substantial changes in the circumstances.
Section 12.
Demerger, Merger, Consolidation, Reduction of Capital
Licensees may not (i) demerge, (ii) merge or (iii) be consolidated with another
business organisation without the approval of the Office. The consent of the
Office is also necessary to (iv) the transfer of a substantial stake in a licensee;
furthermore (v) licensees should obtain the approval of the Office before
making an application to the court in connection with the reduction of capital.
Section 17.
Construction of Gas Distribution Pipelines
(1) [■ • •]
(2) Potential new customers shall pay a connection charge in respect of
construction costs not covered by the official gas tariffs. The minister shall
determine the amount of connection charge payable.
Section 20.
Obligation to Supply
(1) The gas supplier is entitled and obliged to supply gas [within the area defined
in its licence] continuously and safely.
(2) [. • •]
(3) The gas supplier may be exempted from the obligation to give a supply of gas,
if (i) a potential new customer does not undertake to defray the connection
charge levied, or (ii) approvals concerning environmental, nature reserve,
listed buildings, or other matters have not been granted and the lack of such
approvals prevents the gas supplier from giving a supply. [. . .]
Section 21.
Public Utility Contract
230
0) [■•]
(2) As from the date of the public utility contract the public gas supplier is obliged
to give a supply of gas continuously, while the customer is obliged to pay for
the gas consumed.
Section 31.
Price Regulation
(1) Production, resale, distribution, and supply tariffs for gas shall include factors
like (i) necessary investments costs, (ii) operational costs incurred by a licensee
run efficiently, and shall provide for (iii) a profit margin necessary for the long
term operation of licensees.
(2) [• - •]
(3) The Office shall work out detailed rules concerning price determination and
price setting. The minister shall fix prices and shall publish prices so fixed in a
ministerial decree. [. . .]
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Annex 2.
Glossary of terms
APV Rt. (Allami
Vagyonkezelo Rt.)
cmea
GAZPROM
GDCs
HAG
Italgas/Snam
MOL (Magyar Olaj- es Gazipari Rt)
omv
PANRUSGAZ
SHC (State Holding Company)
State Property Agency
Privatizacios es A new privatisation agency; set up in 1995
after the merger of the State Property Agency
and SHC.
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance;
established in January 1949 and abolished in
1991.
The biggest gas company in Europe,
registered in Russia.
Five regional gas distribution companies in
Hungary: EGAZ, DDGAZ, DEGAZ,
kogAz, tigAz.
Hungary - Austria Gas Pipeline connecting
Hungary to the West European gas network.
An Italian consortium tendering for
Hungarian gas distribution companies; it is
the owner ofTIGAZ for the time being.
Hungarian Oil and Gas Company; the sole
gas trader in Hungary and the biggest gas
company in the country. MOL shares are
listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange.
The main Austrian gas and oil concern.
A Hungarian - Russian joint venture;
established in 1994.
A privatisation agency in Hungary;
established in 1992 to manage 'permanently'
state-owned assets; merged into APV Rt. in
1995.
A privatisation agency in Hungary;
established in 1990 merged into AJPV Rt. in
1995.
Conclusion
One may wonder now whether it is not too early to sum up the above discussion.
Those who are interested in privatisation generally may argue that this thesis is
seriously incomplete: important issues have been ignored, while other topics have not
been analysed exhaustively. Both of these charges were correct IF this thesis would
intend to be a general treatise on privatisation. But that is not the case here. As was
mentioned in the Preface, the scope of this thesis is limited: the above discussion has
concentrated on the disposal of public utilities (a) in the UK and (b) in Hungary.
Bearing in mind that point, this Conclusion would present the following concluding
remarks:
(1) Legal institutions central to the running of utilities were not reformed at
privatisation
Chapter 1. has argued that one should not approach privatisation as if it would be the
antithesis of nationalisation. So far as the regulation of public utilities is concerned,
privatisation was not a fresh start: quite the contrary, the draughtsmen of privatisation
statutes copied provisions on (a) Availability of Services and (b) Consumer Protection
from the nationalisation Acts. For example, Section 4(1) of the Gas Act 1986
(obligation to supply) is identical to Section 1(1 )(9) of the Gas Act 1948. The legal
standing of consumer protection agencies under the nationalisation and privatisation
statutes is fairly similar. How may privatisation be a revolutionary new idea if certain
legislative provisions were copied from an 'outdated' piece of legislation ?
Compared with nationalisation, the post-privatisation tariff system is a novelty. As a
rule, tariffs are set in accordance with a formula. Should one welcome the
introduction of the price formulae ?
It should be recalled that, according to privatisation propaganda, the new regulatory
regime is supposed to protect the customer. And what is happening in real life ? As
was argued in Chapter 1., it is questionable whether customers are better off under
the new price regime: what difference does it make whether (a) prices follow inflation
or (b) utilities, with the prior approval of a minister, fix tariffs ? So far as customers
are concerned, the key point is whether telecommunication, electricity, gas etc.
charges will be increased or not. Thus customers will be happy with the RPI-X system
if, and so long as, utility prices continue to fall. According to the Centre for the Study
ofRegulated Industry, tariffs are set to fall in real terms until the end of the century in
the UK. And how about after the year 2000 ? It would be naive to suggest that
inflation is dead and buried in the UK. The RPI index may start to surge in response
to a major war (e.g. Iraq) or the failure of the EMU; and customers will notice that
the RPI-X price regime does not quite protect them.
1
Centre for the Study of Regulated Industry: Performance of the UK Electricity Industry since
Privatisation (1997?), page 3.
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On the other hand, utilities have at least two reasons to prefer the 'RPI-X' - system
to the ad hoc pricing mechanism of nationalisation: (a) the timing of price reviews is
fixed in advance; and (b) certain costs may be passed through to final customers. Thus
the RPI-X regime seems to protect utilities: consumer protection seems to be an issue
of secondary importance.
To conclude, the following points should be highlighted:
Three legal institutions are vital to the operation of public utilities: (a) price
regulation; (b) availability of services; and (c) consumer protection.
Out of the three institutions mentioned, two were not reformed at privatisation in
Britain. The legislator 'borrowed' rules on the obligation to supply (point (b)
above) and consumer protection (point (c) above) from the nationalisation Acts.
Price regulation (point (a) above) has been revolutionised. Yet utilities and their
customers do not share the benefits of the new tariff regulatory regime: it is the
utility which has reasons to prefer the RPI-X formulae to the 'old' system of ad
hoc pricing.
(2) The odd one out - water
This thesis has concentrated on four sectors: electricity, gas, telecommunication, and
water. Considering the four sectors listed, water is the odd one out. There are four
reasons for arguing that water projects are fundamentally different from the sale of
electricity, gas, or telecommunication companies:
Municipalities - Out of the four industries mentioned above, water is the most
closely linked to local municipalities. As a main rule, water and sewage assets are
often municipality owned - Scotland, Hungary (until privatisation in 1996), and
England (until 1 April 1974^) are examples. It was noted in the Preface that the
electricity, gas, and telecommunication industries were in public ownership by the
late 1940s. Nationalisation cut off the 'municipality-link' in these sectors: while
local councils retained certain consumer protection functions (see Chapter 1., Part
I., point A.3), municipality ownership per se disappeared in the electricity, gas and
telecommunication industries both in the UK and in Hungary. By contrast, local
councils were claiming that they had certain ownership rights over water related
assets as late as 1990.
In addition to ownership, local authority functions should also be examined in the
water sector. As a rule, municipalities have statutory duties under the Water
Industry Act 1991: (i) duties in relation to water quality,4 (ii) remedial powers in
2
Coming into force of (i) the Local Government Act 1972 and (ii) the Water Act 1973.
See Sheffield City Council v. Yorkshire Water Services Ltd. and another and related actions
(Ch.D.) [1991] 2 All ER 280.
4Section 78 of the Water Industry Act 1991.
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relation to private suppliers,5 and (iii) duties where piped supplies are insufficient
or unwholesome6 are examples. Hence municipalities are heavily involved in the
provision of water services today: the same level of municipality involvement
would be impossible in the case of the other utility sectors.
Social obligation - It was argued in Chapter 1. above that public utilities must
discharge certain social obligations: they (i) must provide services upon request,
(ii) may not discriminate between urban and rural customers, etc. The 'Obligation
to supply' point is especially important in the water sector. As a publication from
Cameron McKenna, the well-known City law firm, remarks, "Water is life:
indeed, access to water resources is considered in many countries a fundamental
human right. There is a problem here: the construction ofwater infrastructure is
quite expensive.
The following practical points should be remembered: (i) A potential new
customer will be connected to two mains: (a) water and (b) sewage; two sets of
pipes per customer shall be laid, (ii) Compared to gas pipes or electricity cables,
water and sewage pipes are bigger in diameter. Hence the laying ofwater pipes is
slow and rather labour intensive, and (iii) Unlike in the telecommunication sector
(optic cables; cordless connection; etc.), no revolutionary new technology seems
to be available in the water industry.
According to the World Bank, water companies will spend USD 600 - 800 billion
on infrastructure projects between 1995 and 2004.** Who will fund these projects?
Water charge - The logical solution would be ifwater companies were to finance
construction projects from revenues collected from existing customers. But this is
certainly not the case in many European countries. Ireland is the best example:
according to a survey published by the EU, certain groups of customers are NOT
billed in Ireland. Domestic water seems to be free-of-charge in Dublin; customers
pay for water in rural areas. The competent minister of the Irish government
remarked that no nation-wide water charges may be introduced in the foreseeable
future.
Scotland is another example. The so-called Council Tax includes water and
sewage charges for the time being. Certain categories of residents, including
students in full time education^, are exempt from Council Tax: hence students do
5Section 80 of the Water Industry Act 1991.
6Section 79 of the Water Industry Act 1991.
7
Cameron McKenna: A Guide to Our Legal Services - Water (1997), page 1.
g
Source: Cameron McKenna: op. cit., page 1.
9
Nepszabadsag: 20 April 1998. http://www.nepszabadsag.hu.
10The term 'full time education' has given rise to difficulties. According to the University of
Edinburgh, Ph.D. students in their fifth year of research are NOT in full time education. It is
regrettable diat the University has constructed the term 'full time education' in a way that certain
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not pay for water in Scotland. Would the same arrangement be acceptable in other
sectors ? Certainly not: the notion that customers will be charged cost-reflective
prices is a well established principle in the electricity, gas, and telecommunication
industries. There is NO cost-reflective pricing in the water sector.
Competition and Regulation - This point has been covered in Chapter 4. It has
been argued there that the provision of water and sewage services is the least
competitive among all the utilities. It is sufficient to note here that, unlike in the
electricity, gas, and telecommunication sectors, increased competition is NOT an
issue in the water industry. Hence competition will NOT replace regulation in this
sector: unlike OFFER, OFGAS, and OFWAT, the Director General of OFWAT
will set charges for many years to come.
The final point here is then that water privatisation is a 'special case'. As a rule, it is
easier to sell off electricity, gas, and telecommunication companies, than water boards.
This is the reason why both the UK and the Hungarian governments privatised
telecommunication (year of privatisation: 1984 in Britain, 1994 in Hungary) and gas
(year of privatisation: 1986 in Britain, 1995 in Hungary) companies first, while the
disposal of water companies was deferred. Other European countries also followed
the same 'timetable': telecommunication companies were the first (and perhaps the
only) utilities offered for sale in Germany, France, Moldavia, etc.; the disposal of
water companies may follow in due course. Why telecommunication first ? and why
are water companies the last utility candidates to be privatised ? It is one of the main
themes of this thesis that the 'basic need' test determines the order ofutility projects:
the 'more' basic a given utility service is, the later it will be offered for sale.
Electricity, gas, and water are deemed to be more 'basic' services than
telecommunication: one may live without telephone lines and Internet (Value Added
Network Services). But gas and electricity are 'basic necessities' and 'water is life'.
Hence telecommunication companies will be sold first; the privatisation of electricity
and gas may follow; while the sale of water companies is likely to be the last utility
project in any given country in Europe.
(3) Transplantation of privatisation - difficulties in the pipeline
The privatisation of the UK utilities sector has been completed by the mid-1990s.
British investors and their advisors should look abroad to find new utility projects:
Central and Eastern Europe may be one of the target regions. How British
privatisation techniques may be adapted to local circumstances in that part of the
world ?
To illustrate the kind of difficulties one may encounter, it is sufficient to refer to the
RPI-X price formula discussed under point (1) above. Linking utility tariffs to inflation
post-graduate students are liable to Council Tax. If not the University who will protect the 'gown'
from the 'town' ?
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may be a straightforward exercise in the UK and in Western Europe generally:
inflation is under control there. The RPI-X formula may be introduced then in any of
the fifteen EU countries. And how about Central and Eastern Europe ? Countries of
the former 'Soviet' block are 'advised' to put in place an RPI-X-like system as soon
as possible. The introduction of price tariffs is seen as a precondition to successful
privatisation. There is a practical difficulty here: can utility tariffs follow inflation if the
annual average rate is 1,568.0 % (Uzbekistan, 1994) or 992.0 % (Turkmenistan,
1996) or 100.0 % (Belarus, forecast for 1998)^ ? The point here is that the
'transplantation' of the British model of privatisation may run into practical difficulties
in Eastern (as opposed to Central) Europe. Hence the original design should be
reconsidered taking local circumstances into consideration. There is no doubt that the
transplantation ofBritishAVestern techniques to non-Western countries is not a simple
exercise: clients and their advisors must work together to find a solution which is
acceptable to both Western investors and Eastern customers. How should this process
of 'transplantation' be managed ?
(4) General notes on transplantation
It would be useful to make two general points at this stage:
(a) One objective
Central and Eastern European governments, unlike their British counterpart, do not
seem to pursue a 'trilogy' of objectives (See: Chapter 4.): the main goal there is to
balance the books. As a rule, the 'maximizing revenue' objective is the number one
priority in Central and Eastern Europe. This is not to say, of course, that issues like (i)
widening share ownership or (ii) improving economic performance may not appear in
privatisation propaganda. Central and Eastern European governments should 'sell' the
idea of privatisation to the public: ministers and presidents might refer to
BritishAVestern examples to illustrate how 'great' privatisation is. Yet the idea of
'shareholder's democracy' may be illusory in countries like Belarus:
• As to democracy:
There is an authoritarian president who is loath "to give up any of the prerogatives
of power." The Council of Europe did not invite Belarus to its October 1997
summit "because of Minsk's [capital of Belarus] human rights record." Hence
democracy may be missing from the political agenda in that country for years to
come.
1'Source: Business Central Europe: The Annual 1997/98 (December 1997), page 65.
12Business Central Europe: The Annual 1997/98 (December 1997), page 47.
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As to small shareholders:
Average monthly wa|e was $300 in Belarus in 1997, while annual inflation was inthe region of 80%. How many 'Sids' are there then ready to participate in so-
called 'small investors' programmes' ? Would a reasonable (wo)man subscribe for
utility shares under these circumstances ?
To conclude, there is a simple reason for selling state owned companies in Eastern
Europe: privatisation is a means of trying to balance the books. It is the 'maximizing
revenue' objective which carries the day there: references to other objectives, like
shareholders' democracy or improving economic performance, are window-dressing.
(b) Learning from mistakes
Those working on the 'transplantation' of privatisation to the less developed areas of
the world should remember that certain projects did NOT live up to expectations in
Britain. The privatisation of British Gas pic. (Chapter 4.), and the retention of time-
limited Golden Shares in the water and electric industries (Chapter 5.) are examples;
further projects of this kind have been mentioned in Chapter 4. If possible, such
mistakes should be avoided in countries which try to follow the BritishAVestern
examples. It is of special importance then that (i) 'less successful transactions' should
be identified and (ii) reasons leading to the failure of a particular privatisation proposal
should be analysed in detail.
For example, the Hungarian government was advised to insert so-called 'claw-back
provisions' into the utility tariff formulae in 1995. It should be noted that there was no
similar arrangement in the UK gas sector in 1986 (i.e. the year of British Gas
flotation). The main point of the Hungarian arrangement may be summarised as
follows:
gas companies earning a pre-tax profit in excess of 12% of an adjusted
equity base (as defined in the Decree) are obliged to rebate 50% of
that excess profit to their customers.1^
On the face of it, it is the customer who will benefit from the 'claw-back'
arrangement: 50% of the excess profit shall be rebated to her/him. In practice,
however, utilities see the 12% figure as the upper limit of 'politically acceptable'
profit.
Furthermore, one may not rule out that financial reports will be presented in a way
that pre-tax profit will be less than 12% of the adjusted equity base: auditors may
advise regulated utilities what book-keeping tricks are available to achieve that goal.
Thus pre-tax profit will not exceed 11.99%. And this is not the only problem with
13Ibid, page 65.
14Government Resolution 1075/1995. (VIII.4.)
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'claw-back' arrangements: the whole idea of rebating excess profit to customers is ill
founded. The Director General of Water Services has emphasized in a submission to
the UK government that
... a formal profit-sharing mechanism [i.e. claw-^ack provision]
would blunt incentives on companies to reduce costs.
The same point is valid in Hungary: it would be rather embarrassing for utilities if
tariffs collected in business year 19X7 were to be rebated to customers in 19X8.
Hence the existence of claw-back mechanism may discourage companies from
seeking ways to reduce operational costs.
To conclude, claw-back provisions do not seem to work in Hungary: they do NOT
protect the interests ofutility customers. This point should be taken into account when
privatising the Russian, Slovakian, Rumanian etc. electricity and gas distribution
networks. This is why 'learning from mistake' is essential to the success of the
transplantation of privatisation.
(5) The process of transplantation
The simplified summary of the process of 'transplantation' would be as follows:
As a first step, investors and their advisors should mull over the history of the relevant
privatisation projects in the UK and/or in Western Europe. A long list of questions
that were never properly answered may be raised here: what was the reason for selling
the UK natural gas sector as a de facto monopoly (Chapter 4.) ? Why was the English
ans Welsh electricity industry restructured prior to privatisation ? and why was the
Scottish electric industry NOT restructured (Chapter 5.) ? In addition to these 'never-
answered' questions, it is crucial to pay attention to post-privatisation experience:
Why are there so many non-British owned regional electricity companies in the UK
today ? Was the introduction of time-limited Golden Shares a good idea ? (See
Chapter 5.) Having analysed (i) the 'never answered' questions and (ii) post-
privatisation experience one may move on to the next stage of'transplantation'.
The second step is to form a view about the overall 'success' of the relevant
British/Western projects. As was argued in Chapter 4., evaluating privatisation deals is
not an easy task. As a main rule, the UK government refrained from setting out
'performance targets'; it is hard (if not impossible) to determine what privatisation
was actually supposed to achieve. Three 'core objectives' have been identified in
Chapter 4.: (a) maximizing revenue; (b) extending share ownership; and (c)
improving economic performance. But which was the number one priority ? So far as
the (i) Plant Breeding Institute; (ii) the coal and nuclear industries; and (iii) the trust
ports are concerned, it is beyond doubt that objective (a) was of secondary
15
Util. Law. Rev., 9(1) Jan - Feb 1998, page 21.
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importance: HM Government did NOT maximize revenue from the sales mentioned.
Turning to objective (b), it is open debate whether privatisation has really extended
share ownership in Britain. There was a sharp increase in the number of shares owned
by first-time investors immediately after the British Petroleum, British Telecom,
British Gas etc. flotations: the longer term trend is a different story. As a main rule,
Sid tends to get rid of her/his shares: the reasons for this have been explained in
Chapter 4. The main point here is that privatisation did not change the basic pattern of
shareholding in Britain: institutional investors do control privatised utilities, while the
millions of 'Sids' may be referred to as debentureholders. Thus if the intention behind
the flotation of so many British utilities was to introduce 'shareholder's democracy'
then privatisation has certainly failed in Britain.
So far as government intervention is concerned, the final verdict on the success of
privatisation would be disappointing. The starting point here is that privatisation was
meant to reduce the level of government interference in the UK economy. Chapter 2.
has tried to argue that ministerial intervention did not actually disappear in Britain.
The style of interference changed, the most likely reasons for interference changed,
but governmental 'control' as such lingers on: the 'coal-crisis' of late 1997 is an
excellent example. The UK government 'asked' the electricity generators to
purchase British (as opposed to import) coal so as to save the coal industry from
bankruptcy. The irony of this story is that these are recently privatised industries: the
coal and the electricity sectors were sold off in 1991 and in 1995 respectively. The
government of the day argued that the sale of electricity generators and coal pits will
block political meddling with business decisions. The latest developments seem to
contradict that promise.
Perhaps the best approach would be to accept that political interference will not fade
away: irrespective of the political standing of a government, the executive will keep an
eye on public utilities and other industries of national importance (e.g. the Rolls-
Royces, the British Aerospaces, etc.). Should political conditions so demand, the
government will not hesitate to interfere. The Hungarian electricity and gas sectors are
examples. The Hungarian government 'told' the country's privatised electricity and
gas companies that tariffs 'might' not be increased in the first quarter of 1998. There
was a rather simple reason for not adjusting energy tariffs to inflation (see Chapter 6.):
the next parliamentary elections were scheduled for May of the same year.
The final point here is then that privatisation did not 'break the political link'. Both
the British and the Hungarian governments interfere with the operation of privatised
utilities. Compared with the age of nationalisation, the style and method of
'interference' changed: the very idea of government control remained intact. It might
be unfortunate then ifWestern investors would ask Eastern European governments to
pledge not to interfere with the running ofutilities after privatisation. Such a 'request',
sometimes framed as a precondition to bidding, is beyond the limits of transplantation;
it is an extra requirement no EU government could satisfy.
16The Financial Times, 14 December 1997.
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To conclude, it is important NOT to ask Eastern European countries to do more than
the UK/Western countries did actually achieve at privatisation: raising extra-
conditions is not transplantation.
Finally, the third step is to transplant British/Western privatisation techniques into a
foreign legal system. Golden Shares, RPI-X formulae, flotations on local stock
markets are examples. This work presupposes a high level of comparative knowledge.
As a rule, the legal system of the vendor countries will not be similar to that of the
UK/EU. Prior to 1945 Central European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Hungary) were members of the 'Romano - Germanic' family. Russia
and Eastern European countries had different legal traditions. The victory of
'communism' in that part of the world led to the emergence of a new legal family: the
Socialist Laws. After the collapse of the 'Soviet block' Central European countries
went out of their way to re-join the 'Romano - Germanic' legal tradition. This process
was particularly successful in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland: these
countries have been invited to join NATO in 1997 and may become members of the
EU by 2005. So far as Russia and other Eastern European countries are concerned,
the story of 'Europeanisation' is more complex: with the exception of Estonia ,
NATO and EU talks might not bear fruit for years to come.
What legal families do Central and Eastern European countries belong to ? Socialist
Laws ? or Romano - Germanic family ? or neither of them ?
Comparative lawyers refer to Scotland and South Africa as 'mixed systems': the laws
of these countries contain both (a) Common Law and (b) Romano - Germanic
elements. Central and Eastern European countries are also members of the 'mixed'
legal family, although in a different sense: two legal cultures, namely (a) Socialist
Laws and (b) Romano - Germanic Laws, are mixed here. In the case of Central
Europe, group (b) has already surpassed group (a) in importance: the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland are keen to pass as many EU-conform Acts, Orders, Decrees
etc. as possible. So far as Russia and Eastern Europe are concerned, remnants of
Socialist Laws are of special importance for the time being. Areas like tax law,
socialist security, national defence are examples.^
The fact that there are mixed legal systems in Central and Eastern Europe may impede
the transplantation ofutility privatisation; and this is for the following reasons:
17
The major legal families of the world have no universally accepted titles: different comparatists
may use different titles. This Conclusion follows the classification of Professor Rene David. See:
Rene David and John E.C. Brierley: Major Legal Systems in the World Today (Stevens & Sons)
1985.
18
For a detailed discussion on Socialist Laws, see: Rene David and John E.C. Brierley: op. cit.,
Part Two.
19Business Central Europe: The Annual 1997/98 (December 1997), page 42.
20
Business Central Europe: The Annual 1997/98 (December 1997), page 32.
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As a rule, the governing law of most UK privatisation projects was English.
England and Wales belong to the 'Common Law' legal family: but countries
attempting to draw on British experience have 'mixed' legal systems (i.e. a
mixture of (a) Socialist Laws and (b) Romano - Germanic Laws). There is a
problem here. Comparatists are well aware of the fact that legal techniques that
work perfectly well in the Common Law world might fail in a Romano -
Germanic country. Trust is an example. As Professor Rene David notes, the
concept of trust is "unknown to the Romano - Germanic system" ; hence
continental lawyers may not understand the debacle of the sale of the trust ports in
Britain. The point here is that some legal institutions of the Common Law
system might not be transplanted into the Central and Eastern European region.
The mixed systems of these countries may not be ready for the reception of certain
institutions like trust, floating charge, certiorari etc.
The laws of the Eastern and Central European countries are in a transitory phase:
they are made up of a mixture of 'old' (Socialist) and 'new' (EU-like) laws. A
long list of fundamental statutes, including the constitution and the civil code, has
been amended more than once after the collapse of the 'communism'; and a
number of brand new Acts (Companies Act, Stock Exchange Act, and the like)
have been passed. As a rule, legislators are keen to break with 'old' legal tradition.
The new Hungarian Gas Act is an example. It was mentioned in Chapter 6. that
the new Gas Act was passed in 1994. Section 34(3) provides that after the
promulgation of the new statute Act VII of 1969 on Gas Energy shall cease to
have effect. The setting aside of the 'old' piece of legislation gave rise to
difficulties in the run up to privatisation: (i) there were no reported cases
discussing the interpretation of the 1994 Act; and (ii) neither the regulator nor the
regulated utilities were quite sure about the meaning of certain statutory terms.
For example, Section 9(3)b) provides that licensees shall have sufficient funds to
pay for at least one quarter of the total gas sold per annum. This provision turned
out to be incomprehensible. If the legislator tried to say that a gas company selling
gas worth of $100 per annum shall have $25 in cash in the fund, then no
Hungarian gas entity could have been licensed: no one would-be licensee had this
kind of cash cover, unfortunately. Hence the Hungarian Energy Office and the
Ministry of Industry and Trade agreed that Section 9(3)b) shall be ignored in
licensing gas companies. Some potential investors were not particularly happy
with this solution.
As an alternative to passing a brand new Act, the Hungarian legislator could have
'updated' the 1969 Act. For example, the Energy Act of 1935 is in force in
Germany today. Of course, this Act has been amended several times; but the
original statute has NOT been replaced. A further source of trouble is that new
21
Rene David and John E.C. Brierley, op. cit., page 347.
22
See Chapter 4., point 4.4. above.
23
Hungarian Rules of Law in Force, Nr. V. V./14.
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institutions have emerged in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. constitutional
courts ), while some legal forums (e.g. Central Supervisory Committee in
Hungary, a kind of nation-wide consumer protection agency) disappeared.
Hundreds of government and ministerial decrees have been passed and/or
repealed. The end result is chaos: it is not always easy to find out what legal rules
are in force. Thus UK/EU techniques of selling state-owned utilities should be
transplanted into a legal environment which is anything but stable and settled for
the time being.
• And finally, a few words on courts. As was mentioned in Chapter 4., there were
surprisingly few cases concerning the sale of state-owned assets/companies in the
UK. Leaving aside Ross v. Lord Advocate (H.L.) 1986 S.L.T. 603 and
Sheffield City Council v. Yorkshire Water Services Ltd. and another and
related actions (Ch.D.) [1991] 2 All ER 280, there were not many high profile
litigations. The reasons for the lack of reported cases have been explained in
Chapter 3. It was also argued there that the British courts are reluctant to be
involved in the regulatory game. Judges see themselves as 'football referees'; they
would interfere with the regulation of public utilities if rules of the game have been
breached. Thus applications for judicial review seeking to impugn regulatory
orders are few and far between. Turning to Central and Eastern Europe a
completely different picture would emerge. As a main rule, judges seem to be
quite willing to supervise the privatisation and regulation of public utilities. It is
not unusual that opposition parties and/or municipalities refer a privatisation
proposal to the Constitutional Court for review. Regulatory orders are also
challenged before the courts in Central and Eastern Europe: as was mentioned in
Chapter 3., a Hungarian court ruled in 1996 that certain road toll charges are
excessively high. The comparative point here is that legal institutions and rules
may be transplanted from one legal system into another: legal traditions do NOT
transplant well. Members of the newly established Constitutional Courts in Central
and Eastern Europe were university professors or politicians yesterday; they are
judges today. What seems to be missing in that part of the world is legal tradition.
Constitutional Courts have no well-established practice as to how applications for
review should be handled. It is alarming bearing in mind that these Courts have
the power, among others, to suspend privatisation deals. As was mentioned in
Chapter 3., Constitutional Courts are surprisingly powerful judicial bodies in
Central and Eastern Europe: they may declare Bills or Acts of Parliament
unconstitutional and/or may order the executive to legislate on this or that issue.
The idea of courts (i) ruling on the validity of Acts or (ii) telling the government
how to legislate might shock lawyers educated in the Common Law world. As to
(i): It was discussed in Chapter 4. that a British court may NOT declare an Act of
24
The regrettable consequences of setting up a Constitutional Court in Hungary has been discussed
under Chapter 3., point 3.1.
250ther examples: [1992] Euro C.L.Y. 1916., and 1924.
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Parliament invalid. For example, once an Act has been passed on the disposal of
public utility X in Britain, there is no legal barrier to offering shares in X for sale
to the public. As to (ii): Sir Robert Megarry V-C was quoted in Chapter 3. saying
that policy issues are matters for decision by the executive, and not by the
courts. Simon Brown LJ emphasized in R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte
Smith and other applications (H.L.) [1995] 4 All ER 427 that judges are to
"remain within their constitutional bounds and not to trespass beyond them."
To conclude then, the courts do supervise privatisation deals in Central and
Eastern Europe. Common Law lawyers should be prepared to see that the
transplantation of UK/Western privatisation techniques may be challenged before
the local courts. Hence litigations may delay utility disposals in the Central and
Eastern European region.
There is little doubt that the next ten years will be the decade of utility privatisation
and liberalisation: EU and non-EU countries will offer more utilities for sale than ever
before. This thesis has tried to analyse how the two pioneers of this European-wide
privatisation and liberalisation movement (i.e. the UK and Hungary) reformed their
utility industries. Hopefully other EU and non-EU countries will follow suit before
long: there is no alternative to utility privatisation and liberalisation in Europe.
26Estmanco Ltd. v. Greater London Council (Vac. Ct.) [1982] 1 W.L.R. 2, at 7-H.
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General
Any and All? Future of Social Obligations
Introduction: social contract in
the past
The history of social contract seems to be less
troubled than in its present or, indeed, its
future. In the past, nationalised utilities could
have operated as truly natural monopolies.
For example, area boards were the sole
suppliers of electricity and natural gas in the
United Kingdom. Other utilities could not
supply, for example, gas * "except with the
consent of the [British Gas] Corporation and
in accordance with such conditions as may be
attached to that consent".1 If British Gas had
chosen to select new customers on the basis of
some economic criteria ("cherry picking"),
who would have supplied customers whose
request for gas supply was refused? Hence,
monopoly rights came with the requirement
that Boards "had to provide a service to all"2
(universal services). As a rule, nationalised
enterprises had statutory monopoly status, but
were expected to discharge social obligations,
including the obligation to provide universal
services. This was the original model of the
social contract.
This article will analyse how the main
elements of the social contract in the utilities
sector (universal services and monopoly
status) changed after privatisation. The dis¬
cussion will concentrate on the obligation to
provide universal services under British law.
The domestic arrangements will be related to
the EU position towards the end of the article.
This article will argue (1) that privatisation
abolished monopoly rights but did not
amend the obligation to supply customers,
and (2) that existing supply obligations will be
reformed in the run up to the liberalisation of
EU telecom and UK energy markets.
Universal services
As a rule, universal services were never
universal; the obligation to provide services
to all was subject to statutory exceptions.
Dunn J introduced a non-statutory exception
in Woodcock v South West Electricity Board
[1975] 1 WLR 983 in holding that supply
obligations did not extend to unlawful occu¬
piers. A request for supply could be refused
only if it failed to satisfy a two-tier test: the
request for supply had to be reasonable; and the
provision of services had to meet certain condi¬
tions which varied from industry to industry.
For example, British Telecom could legitim¬
ately refuse a request for supply if it was
impracticable or not reasonably practicable to
provide telecom service;3 British Gas Board
was obliged to give a supply of gas if it was
economical to do so;4 while Scottish electricity
boards had to provide electricity services as
far as it was practicable.5 Thus, different let-
out clauses applied to different industries.
Privatisation would have been an ideal
occasion to reconsider whether the universal
service obligation should be qualified after the
disposals and, if so, whether the same vague
terms should be retained in the legislation.
However, neither of these points received
much attention: the new gas and telecommuni¬
cations Acts simply repeated the relevant
provisions of the nationalisation statutes. The
same term ("economical") qualifies the obliga¬
tion to supply under the Gas Acts of 1948 and
1986; and the same conditions ("impracticable
or not reasonably practicable") appear in the
British Telecommunications Act 1981 and in
the Telecommunications Act 1984. These pro¬
visions were also mirrored in the licences
issued to British Gas pic and British Telecom
pic respectively. A new qualification was
introduced in the electricity industry: "practic¬
able" was replaced with the "reasonable in all
the circumstances" condition.6 To conclude,
the idea of universal services and the histor¬
ical limits to the provision of such services
"have in general been carried into privatis¬
ation".7
Thus, the obligation side of social contract did
not change much after privatisation. Both
nationalised and privatised utilities must
now supply customers on request; the owner¬
ship of telecommunications, electricity, and
gas companies is irrelevant to their being
obliged to provide universal services. The
obligation to supply is subject to the same
exceptions under nationalisation and privat¬
isation Acts. However, profound changes
© 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 109
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occurred as far as privileges of the utility
companies were concerned.
Farewell to monopoly
Statutory privileges arising from the original
social contract were first altered under the
Telecommunications Act 1984. Pursuant to
this Act, a new supplier, Mercury Communi¬
cations Ltd, began supplying telecommuni¬
cation services as from 8 November 1984.
Similar developments occurred in the gas and
electricity sectors: alternative suppliers were
licensed under the Gas Act 1986 and the
Electricity Act 1989. Competition between
privatised utilities and new entrants was
limited immediately after privatisation. British
Telecom pic had only one major competitor in
1984; while the newly licensed energy com¬
panies were authorised to supply customers
consuming more than 25,000 therms of gas a
year (monopoly threshold) or having a peak
electricity demand greater than 1 MW (fran¬
chise limit). The historical importance of this
embryonic competition is that, following
privatisation, British Telecom pic, British Gas
pic and the regional electricity companies had
less privileges than their nationalised prede¬
cessors: they were perhaps de facto but
certainly not de iure monopolies. Thus, one
condition of social contract was gone: the
privilege of statutory monopoly was abol¬
ished. Was the other condition (social obliga¬
tions) also adjusted?
In relation to obligations, the main provi¬
sions of the new social contract may be
summarised as follows:
• following privatisation British Telecom pic,
British Gas pic and the regional electricity
companies retained the obligation to
supply;
• with the exception of electricity, the legis¬
lator did not amend the terms of the
supply obligation: privatised utilities and
their nationalised predecessors had the
same "excuses" to refuse a request for
supply; and
• new licensees were not saddled with
supply obligations. The licence issued to
Mercury Communications Ltd did not
include the Universal Telecommunication
Services condition.8 New market players
need not bother about social obligations in
the gas and electricity industry; the fran¬
chise limit/monopoly threshold barred
them from supplying low-user, high-cost
customers.
Economists seem to be content with this
arrangement. They argue that the above out¬
lined rules intend to forge competition, and
the incumbent suppliers have great advant¬
ages "which do not offset the disadvantage of
facing universal service obligations".9 This
article is not concerned with the validity of
that argument; it notes simply that privatisa¬
tion statutes replaced the original model of
social contract (monopoly rights in exchange
for the obligation to provide universal
services), with social contract no. 2 (no statu¬
tory monopoly but obligation to supply). The
main point is that rights and obligations do
not appear to be balanced after privatisation:
the privilege had been taken away (no mono¬
poly rights); but the obligation remained
intact (see above). Will a liberalised market
rebalance rights and obligations?
Future of social contract
Will liberalised markets have a social contract?
It is generally presumed that free markets
would need no social contract. Some com¬
mentators conclude from this presumption
that the obligation to supply may be
abolished:10 such obligation would be "anom¬
alous with the competitive market"11 and
would distort competition.12 Professor Prosser
dissents from this view by arguing that
.. [the] social dimension to utility regulation
has become absolutely central to regulatory
performance and credibility" and "... [the]
relationship between privatisation, regulation,
and the provision of what are still widely seen
as public services with a social dimension will
be the key question of regulation in the next
few years". Thus, two views may be
observed in the literature: (1) the demise of
social contract - the obligation to supply may
be abolished; and (2) the rise of social
contract - the future of supply obligations
will be a key question of utility regulation.
Regulators did not stay aloof from the
debate concerning the future of social contract.
However, OFTEL, OFFER, and OFGAS do not
have a uniform approach: the three offices
seem to advocate three different views as to
how social contract no. 2 should be amended.
Telecommunications
The Director General of OFTEL does not
intend to redraft social contract no. 2 until
1999 at the earliest. In a recently issued
110 © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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discussion paper, Don Cruickshank argues
that "the current net cost involved in the
provision of universal service in the UK is not
proven and does not justify setting up a
universal service funding mechanism in the
short term".14 The Government agrees with
the regulator: DTI informed the Select Com¬
mittee on European Legislation that "the cost
to BT and Kingston Communications of
meeting their universal service obligation is
likely to [be] very low or of a de minimis
nature. As a result, it is possible that the UK
may choose not to set up a universal service
funding scheme in the immediate future".15
Thus, the universal service obligation, and its
financial burden, if any, are to remain with
British Telecom pic for the time being.
To conclude, rights and obligations have
not been balanced in the telecom sector
following liberalisation. British Telecom pic
has no monopoly rights but must provide
universal services. However, no new social
contract will be drawn up in the near future.
According to OFTEL there is no undue
financial burden on BT arising from the
universal services obligation.
Electricity industry
Second tier licensees are not subject to
statutory supply obligations for the time
being. In the run up to the liberalisation of
the UK electricity market OFFER intends to
modify social contract no. 2: after 1998 similar
obligations will apply to the second tier
suppliers which presently apply to public
electricity suppliers. Condition 22 of the draft
standard second tier electricity supply licence
requires the licensee to supply domestic
customers on request.16 As far as the financing
of universal services is concerned, OFFER
seems to be in complete agreement with
OFTEL: no action is necessary for the time
being. According to the Director General of
OFFER, the public electricity suppliers alone
should meet the costs of social services until
1998. The Office is currently considering what
financing regime will be in place after that
date. The preferred solution seems to be the
introduction of a small levy which would be
charged on customers.
Thus, proposed changes in the electricity
sector seem to echo the original principles of
social contract: rights and supply obligations
will be balanced out. If second tier suppliers
are to supply customers they must shoulder
social obligations.
Gas industry
In the telecommunications and electricity
industries the regulators attempt to adjust
social contract no. 2 to the needs of liberalised
markets; the legislator must now set out new
social arrangements in the gas sector. While
the basic principle is the same as in the
electricity sector (i.e. each licensee must
supply customers on request), a unique
system is emerging under the Gas Act 1995.
Statutory obligation to connect
Public gas transporters are obliged to connect
premises under s. 4 of the Gas Act 1995.
Compared with the Gas Act 1986, the scope
of this obligation is broader in two respects:
(1) transporters are to connect any premises
(under the 1986 Act the obligation was only to
supply premises which were (a) situated
within 25 yards from the main or (b)
connected to any such main) if the service
pipe is supplied and laid, or proposed to be
supplied or laid, by the owner or occupier;
and (2) a customer may request a supply of
gas up to 75,000 therms (under the 1986 Act
this figure was up to 25,000) per annum. The
obligation to connect is subject to the usual
two-tier test, i.e. reasonable request and
whether it is economical to supply.17 How¬
ever, the Gas Act 1995 does not provide for a
statutory obligation to supply customers.
New exceptions
Condition 2 of the Standard Conditions of the
Gas Suppliers' Licences requires a licensee to
supply every potential domestic customer
who is connected to a relevant main. The
Standard Conditions set a new exception to
the obligation to supply. A licensee is not
obliged to supply at new premises "if and so
long as to do so would significantly prejudice
its ability" to supply existing domestic
customers.18 This new qualification does not
appear to be more down-to-earth than the old
(a) reasonable request and (b) economical to
supply conditions. The Director General of
OFGAS will be in an unenviable situation
when she is called to interpret terms like
"prejudice" and "ability".
Financing of universal services
OFTEL and OFFER do not appear to have
definite plans on how universal services will
be financed in the future; both Directors
General are to review the current arrangement
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(i.e. the costs of universal services fall on
British Telecom pic and on the public elec¬
tricity suppliers) in 1999 and in 1998 respect¬
ively. The Director General of OFGAS took
the plunge: the Standard Conditions of the
Gas Suppliers' Licences will revolutionise the
financing of social obligations. If certain
conditions are met, as set forth under condi¬
tion 6(2) of the Standard Conditions of the
Gas Suppliers' Licences, a licensee may make
a special customer payment claim. Unless the
Secretary of State or the Director General of
OFGAS would decide that the claim is
unjustified, the public gas transporter will
(1) make a payment to the supplier and (2) in
turn, increase its charges for the conveyance
of gas.19 This arrangement will not be
operative before 1999.
To conclude, rights and social obligations
will be rebalanced in the gas industry, each
licensee having (1) the right to supply any
customer and (2) the obligation to provide
universal service. A special funding scheme is
due to be introduced in the British gas
industry to finance the costs of universal
services.
The European dimension
If the three above-mentioned regulators do
not agree on the financing of universal
services in Britain, the 15 member states of
the European Union do not really have a
better prospect of forming a uniform position
on the same matter. The first and most
important problem at European level is that
"neither the concept nor the scope of the
[public service] obligations is in any way
harmonised between the member states".20 A
prolonged debate concerning the future of the
social contract could thwart the liberalisation
of the EU telecom, electricity, and gas
markets. Therefore, the relevant directors try
to say as little as possible about public service
requirements.
The first telecom Directive 90/388/EEC was
reticent about social obligations. Principles of
universal services were first set out in a
Council Resolution 94/C 48/01, and Directive
96/19/EC laid down rules in connection with
the financing of universal services. This
Directive states that the national regulatory
authority is to determine whether or not a
universal service financing scheme is required.
If such a scheme is introduced it must operate
in accordance with Community law; the
Commission is to review the financing
schemes no later than 1 January 2003. OFTEL
decided that universal service funding is not
required in the United Kingdom for the time
being; thus, Community law on financing
schemes does not apply to British telecom
operators.
The recent electricity Directive 96/92/EC,
and the draft natural gas Directive
(COM(93) 643 final) do not discuss social
obligations in detail. Although the Economic
and Social Committee stressed that "the
'public service' obligations of these sectors
cannot be overlooked" 21 the documents listed
declare merely that member states may
impose on distribution companies an obliga¬
tion to supply. Flence, the electricity Directive
does not appear to require further action from
the UK Government. The two cornerstones of
the proposed system (obligation to supply will
extend to every supplier, while financing of
universal services will not be reformed until
1998) are consistent with Community law.
Attention is now focused on the natural gas
proposal. The latest draft seems to mirror the
electricity Directive; thus, the gas Directive
will have limited impact in the United
Kingdom. The Standard Conditions of the
Gas Suppliers' or Transporters' Licences are
likely to satisfy the EU requirements as set
forth in the draft natural gas Directive.
However, the electricity Directive and the
draft natural gas Directive may not be the last
documents from the European Union on
social contract: the Economic and Social
Committee noted that "... the present propo¬
sals represent a compromise which will have
to be fine-tuned as the proposed process of
aligning the operating conditions in both
sectors progresses and as experience is
acquired in operating the internal market in
these sectors under these conditions".22 As a
result of "fine-tuning" a European social
contract is likely to emerge in the electricity
and natural gas sectors; details of that arrange¬
ment are not available for the time being.
The EU position on social obligations may
be summarised as follows: (1) as a rule,
directives do not discuss public service obliga¬
tions in detail; (2) Community law on the
financing of universal services in the telecom
sector does not apply in the United Kingdom.
OFTEL decided that no financing scheme is
required; and (3) the OFFER proposal for the
liberalisation of the UK electricity market
harmonises with the electricity Directive. The
112 © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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proposed natural gas Directive is likely to
have limited impact in the UK gas sector.
Conclusion
The original model of social contract intended
to balance out supply obligations and mono¬
poly rights. However, rights and obligations
do not go hand in hand after privatisation.
Statutory monopoly of the incumbent tele¬
com, electricity and gas suppliers was abol¬
ished but, nevertheless, they must still
provide universal services (social contract
no. 2). This article has tried to argue that
a third generation of social contract will
govern liberalised markets: market players
may supply any customer but must provide
services to all.
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common rules for the internal market in electricity
and natural gas (93/C 73/10) (OJ 1993 C73/31).
22. Opinion from Economic and Social Committee on
common rules for the internal market in electricity
and natural gas (n. 20 supra).
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one of quasi-criminal offences and penalties,
with investigatory powers for the first tier
competition authorities backed up by the
possibility of private civil actions. This is
likely to be a significant change, particularly
in the light of full competition in the domestic
energy markets. The possibility of private
actions, for example from Cable TV customers
claiming damage from anti-competitive prac¬
tices by BSKYB,1 raises some novel legal
problems, but also creates an incentive on
the company accused of breach of the
prohibition to fight the case through all the
appeal procedures. Much will depend on the
attitude taken by the competition tribunals to
the Director's initial decision and to the
courts' view of their own appeal function,
given that the division between law and facts
is notoriously messy.
The decision to give the sector regulators
concurrent powers under this new legislation
also raises the possibility of their developing
into sectoral competition regulators-which
seems to be the ambition of some of them.
Cosmo Graham
1. My thanks for this idea to Martin Cave.
A Economic Analysis of Making Applications
for Judical Review
The utilities sector has experienced an upsurge
in the number of judicial review applications
over the last few years. One of the most import¬
ant questions now is whether the number of
applications will increase further. It may be
useful, therefore, to discuss what points appli¬
cants are likely to consider before turning to
the courts for help. Potential applicants are
expected to challenge the validity of regulatory
orders if certain conditions are fulfilled: the
main point of this article is that a simple,
perhaps oversimplified, mathematical formula
may summarise such conditions. It will be
argued below that (i) potential applicants may
be divided into two groups; (ii) licensees and
customers have different incentives to seek
judicial review; and (iii) the latter may find it
easier to appeal to the courts for the time being.
Introduction
It has long been recognised that there is an
economic dimension to making applications
for judicial review. As a rule, practitioners
making such applications are cost conscious
and frequently weigh up the pros and cons in
economic terms. Three examples might suffice
here.
1. The Public Law Project advocated the
introduction of a pre-litigation question¬
naire in 1996 arguing that it would reduce
"costs risk for applicants".1
2. Legal aid applications are decided on the
basis of a cost-benefit analysis. According
to the Legal Aid Notes for Guidance (1995), no
aid will be granted "if the proceedings are
not likely to be cost effective, i.e. the benefit
to be achieved does not justify the costs".
3. A practitioner argues that making sub¬
missions at the application stage is a cost-
saving device for the respondent. He
attends and makes submissions "in the
hope of saving his own future costs which
will be incurred if leave is granted".2
Thus, practising lawyers are not deaf to
economic considerations and they do make a
brief economic analysis before applying for
judicial review.
As far as the economic analysis of law is
concerned, judicial review of regulatory orders
is an especially promising research theme.
Economics and law intertwine in utility regu¬
lation. Economic concepts, like cross-subsidy
("Hydro Benefit" in Scotland) or cost-benefit
analysis (see R v National Rivers Authority
ex p. Moreton (below)), are transplanted to a
legal environment here. Hence, the economic
analysis of law may help to understand under
what circumstances potential applicants will
seek judicial review.
Introduction of economic model
The economic approach to judicial review
would deal first with the applicants, followed
by the application of a formula.
© 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 5
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Applicants
The starting-point is that the number of
applicants is not fixed in advance: any
interested party may apply for judicial review
against a regulatory decision.3 As a rule, two
groups of applicants exist: licensees and custo¬
mers. The latter group includes (a) customers
of utility companies and (b) pressure groups.4
The economic approach to judicial review
assumes that the difference between the
behaviours of (a) and (b) is marginal; hence,
this group will be referred to as customers.
It is further assumed that customers
(1) always have a free choice whether or not to
apply for judicial review; and (2) are rational
profit maximisers when opting whether or not
to apply. Tactical challenge is excluded.
The formula
If (1) and (2) are simultaneously assumed then
applicants will seek judicial review if:
(P - P )R > C^ app x reg' app app
where
Papp = probability that judicial review will be
granted as estimated by the applicant;
?reg — probability that judicial review will be
granted as estimated by the regulator;
Rapp = remedy as valued by applicant; and
Capp = costs incurred by the applicant.5
In the discussion below probability, remedy
and cost will be expressed as either low or
high. The reason for preferring "low-high" to
figures is discussed below. Numbers are not
indispensable. As Professor Richard Posner
notes, the economic analysis of law "need not
be conducted at a high level of formality or
mathematisation. The heart of economics is
insight rather than technique".6
Application of formula
Few regulatory orders were impugned
between 1984 (when OFTEL was established)
and 1997. The Trade and Industry Committee
noted that "there have been few judicial
reviews" in the utilities sector.7 This means
that more often than not the left-hand side
of the formula is smaller than Capp; thus,
potential applicants do not challenge regulat¬
ory orders before the court. Why is this so? To
answer that question the three elements of the
formula should be analysed in some detail.
Applying the above formula to:
R v Director General of Gas Supply and
another ex p. Smith and another (Lexis,
31 July 1989), QBD;
R v Director General of Electricity Supply ex
p. Redrow Homes (Northern) Ltd (Lexis,
3 February 1995), QBD;
R v National Rivers Authority ex p. Moreton
(Lexis, 13 September 1995), QBD;
R v Director General of Rail Franchising ex
p. Save Our Railways (Lexis, 15 December
1995), CA;
Mercury Communications Ltd v Director
General of Telecommunications and another
[1996] 1 All ER 575, HL;
In the matter ofApplications by Sherlock and
Morris for Judicial Review (Lexis, 29 Novem¬
ber 1996), QBD;
R v Director General of Telecommunications
ex p. British Telecommunications pic (Lexis,
20 December 1996), QBD;
R v Director General of Electricity Supply
ex p. Scottish Power pic (Lexis, 3 February
1997), CA
three conclusions would follow.
Probability
It is a well-known fact that the vast majority
of applications in Britain fail. It is more
likely than not that the original regulatory
order will not be quashed. As far as the
above list is concerned, judicial review was
granted in Smith, Redrow Homes, Save Our
Railways and Scottish Power i.e. four out of
10 cases. The overall picture is no more
promising: (a) no judicial review against
decisions of the Takeover Panel has succeeded
so far; and (b) 6.4 per cent of the total number
of applications for judicial review against
decisions of the Flome Office were successful
between 1991 and 1996.9 Hence, Preg is high,
and regulators may be optimistic that the
court will not set aside regulatory orders
challenged.
Papp tends to be low. An applicant may
never be sure whether his application will
be successful. The point is that judicial review
jurisdiction is discretionary;10 it is up to the
court whether judicial review will be
granted. Thus, applicants should proceed
with caution when estimating the probability
that judicial review will be granted. In
Sherlock and Morris, although Kerr J found
that "the applicants are, prima facie, entitled
to have the decisions of NIE quashed", he did
not "accede to the applications for judicial
review".
6 © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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If Preg is high and Papp is low then (Papp-
Preg) wih be low, and must be low otherwise
disputes between regulators and regulatees
would not be negotiated but referred to the
court.
Remedy
It may be useful to make an introductory
point here. Rapp should not be confused
with the monetary value of claims, for two
reasons:
1. The monetary value of certain claims may
not be established. The Moreton case is a
good example. Ms Moreton is "a regular
swimmer in the sea at Tenby"; she
was concerned "about the effect of the
increased effluent discharge ... on the
quality of the bathing water where she
swims". What was the monetary value of
Rapp in this case? The formula set out above
presumes that Ms Moreton had a positive
Rapp in her mind, otherwise she would not
have applied for judicial review. If Rapp is
zero or negative the lefthand side of the
formula would be smaller than Capp;
hence, Ms Moreton would not have
applied for judicial review. But it is pure
guesswork to express Rapp as hundreds or
thousands of pounds now. Thus, the
economic analysis of judicial review
might run into practical difficulties if Rapp
were the monetary value of claims;
2. If Rapp stands for the sums of money at
stake, it would simply reflect the well-
known fact that licensees have bigger
financial muscles than their customers.
For example, the applicant reckoned in
the Scottish Power case that an additional
£40 million revenue may be collected until
the next price review (1998) if the appli¬
cation for judicial review were granted.
On the other hand, a gas customer was
suing for as little as £198.19: Pill J himself
commented in the Smith case that "the sum
of money involved is not large". The point
here is that if Rapp were the same as the
value of claims it would always be high for
licensees and low for customers. However,
Rapp has a more complex role to play in
the formula.
It should be recalled that Rapp was defined
above as remedy as valued by applicant. The
economic analysis of law would underline
that applicants consider two factors in decid¬
ing whether to seek judicial review: (1)
lawfulness; and (2) action. The two terms
and the difference between them may be
explained as follows:
Lawfulness
All the cases listed above may be reduced to a
YES-NO binary code: either the regulator's
decision is legally "respectable" or it is not;
either he complied with a direction given to
him by the Secretary of State or he did not
(see the Save Our Railways case); either he has
the power to make certain licence modifi¬
cations or he has not (see the British Telecom
case); either he must determine a dispute
referred to him or he must not (see the Redrow
Homes case); etc. The economic analysis will
refer to this YES-NO point as lawfulness. It is
the classic domain of judicial review jurisdic¬
tion. Judges are well placed to make decisions
about the lawfulness of regulatory orders; but
lawfulness is not the full story in the
regulatory game - the emphasis is on action.
Action
If lawfulness has been decided in favour of
the applicant, the "And what's next?" ques¬
tion will arise. A new regulatory order will be
issued in accordance with the judgment of the
court, which will spell out action. The link
between (a) judgment and (b) action is of
crucial importance. Applicants may not worry
about the lawfulness of a regulatory decision
if, and so long as, it does not harm their
economic or other (e.g. Moreton) interests.
They would like to know what actions will
follow once the regulator's decision has been
quashed. Thus, applicants want judicial
review to cover lawfulness and action.
The point here is that applicants are looking
for remedies that address both lawfulness and
action. Six kinds of orders may be granted:
(1) the "trilogy of prerogative orders" (certi¬
orari, mandamus and prohibition); (ii) declara¬
tion; (iii) injunction; and (iv) damages.11
Declaration and mandamus would be the
best choices, perhaps determining what action
the regulator will take. It is no surprise, there¬
fore, that these orders are popular among
applicants. Declaration was sought in, for
example Smith, Scottish Power, British Telecom
and Mercury. The courts have full discretion as
to the form of judgments under British admin¬
istrative law. Judges tend to keep their involve¬
ment in the regulatory game to the minimum:
they are willing to set aside the original
resolution but other remedies may not be
© 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 7
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granted. The best examples are Scottish Power
and Smith in which the original regulatory
decision was quashed but no further orders
were made, although the applicants were
seeking other remedies. This is unsatisfactory
in that judicial review settles lawfulness but
the judgment is likely to be reticent about
action. As a rule, certiorari or a "remission with
a direction to consider"12 does not determine
what action the regulator will take. It is
for the regulator to reconsider the matter
impugned - he is the decision-maker.
There are exceptions: certiorari may point to
the only legally acceptable action in certain
cases. Once the court has ruled in favour of the
applicant on lawfulness, the course the regu¬
lator "should lawfully take will often be
obvious".13 For example, the applicants were
disconnected in Smith and Sherlock and Morris.
If judicial review is granted, it is likely that they
will be reconnected. As a rule, certiorari may
determine action when applicants are com¬
plaining about a past grievance, e.g. discon¬
nection, payment of excessive connection
charge (Redrow Homes) etc. However, licensees
apply for judicial review so as to influence
future regulatory actions. For example, Lord
Slynn commented in Mercury that the plaintiff
was "seeking to clarify position for future
negotiation and determination". The Scottish
Power case is another example; although it
was a challenge against the currently opera¬
tional price formula, Scottish Power's main
worry was not the 1994/95-1997/98 period.
What the applicant tried to achieve was that
the September 1994 price proposals, which
retained the total market definition of GBY,
would not "set a precedent for future regulat¬
ory reviews". The setting-aside of the original
decision will not satisfy licensees in the cases
mentioned above. As was noted above, the
order of certiorari is reticent about action: the
Director General may come to the same
decision he previously made.14 For example,
the Director General of Telecommunications
made it clear in Mercury that he adhered to
his original determination. Certiorari would
not have been a useful order in this case. Thus,
licensees want judicial review to go beyond
lawfulness: judgments should address action.
Judges disagree. As Sir Thomas Bingham
MR put it in the Save Our Railways case, "our
task begins and ends with review of law¬
fulness of what has been done". Schiemann J
made the same point in Redrow Homes noting
that "the point [raised by the applicant] is one
of pure statutory construction". As a rule, the
courts confine their attention to lawfulness:
judges try to steer clear of action. Thus, judges
prefer certiorari to declaration, and they
may impose their preferences on potential
consumers. As was mentioned above, judges
have full discretion as to the form of order(s)
to be granted: the application may be for
mandamus and declaration, but the court may
issue an order of certiorari (see the Smith and
Scottish Power cases).
What does this mean in terms of the
formula? The main point is that licensees
and customers have different views about
remedy. As far as licensees are concerned,
Rapp will be high if judicial review deals with
both lawfulness and action. Declaration or
mandamus would be ideal remedies, indicating
what action should follow once the original
order has been quashed on the ground of
lawfulness. Thus, Rapp will be high if declara¬
tion or mandamus were likely to be granted.
However, judges have a certiorari-hiendly
policy; they intend to limit their involvement
to lawfulness - action is not their concern.
This judicial approach devalues Rapp. Hence
remedy will be low for licensees, who cannot
predict from the decision on lawfulness what
action the regulator will take.
As far as customers are concerned, the
certiorari-triendly policy is less problematic: an
order to quash may point to the only
acceptable action. Remedy may therefore be
high for customers. The importance of this
point will be apparent below.
Costs
It is common knowledge that judicial review
is costly. Potential consumers will incur hefty
expenses - it cost on average £50,000 to bring
a judicial review case in 1995.15 In addition to
legal expenses, judicial review also tends to
increase the overall costs of regulation.
A consensus-driven system of utility regu¬
lation operates in the United Kingdom. An
application for judicial review flies in the face
of the "negotiate but do not litigate" prin¬
ciple. Dragging a Director General to court
will rearrange relations between regulators
and regulatees - a phenomenon known as
"juridification". Increased judicial review will
slow down the regulatory machinery,16 which
is bad news for the regulatees as regulation
will be more time consuming and, conse¬
quently, more expensive. Thus judicial review
is likely to put regulatory costs up.
8 © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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This point does not apply to the other group
of consumers. Unlike licensees, customers do
not negotiate with regulators on a day-to-day
basis. The fact that the regulatory process may
slow down does not disturb them. As such,
the increase in regulatory costs is not a cause
for concern for customers. Furthermore, some
customers may receive state aid when
challenging the validity of regulatory orders.
For example, the Smiths and Ms Sherlock
were dependent on DHSS benefit and were
presumably on legal aid; judicial review was
available on a free-of-charge basis in the Smith
and Sherlock and Morris cases.
The final point is that the more applications
for. judicial review there are, the more
expensive utility regulation will be. Cost is
likely to go up. Licensees will get the lion's
share of regulatory costs as they will have
high Capp; but Capp is low for customers. In
fact, some customers may get legal aid to
impugn the validity of regulatory orders.
Conclusion
The main points of this article may be restated
briefly. (1) Probability tends to be low for
applicants. (2) Remedy would be high if
orders other than certiorari were granted.
For the time being Rapp is low for licensees
as judges pursue a cerboran-friendly policy.
The granting of other prerogative orders or
declaration are more the exception than the
rule. (3) Cost is high for licensees and low for
customers.
According to the formula set forth above,
potential consumers will opt for judicial
review if (Papp - Preg)Rapp is greater than
cost. As was mentioned aoove, probability is
low, and will remain so; high P would
open the floodgates for judicial review
applications. Flence, the left-hand side of
the formula may be bigger than Capp if
(i) remedy is high, or (ii) cost is low.
The final points, therefore, are:
Licensees - cost is high. Thus, they will
only apply for judicial review if remedy is
high. Flowever, Rapp is actually low, and
certiorari is the preferred form of order.
Remedy would be high for licensees if
mandamus or declaration were granted
more frequently.
Customers - cost is low, and remedy is
high here. Customers are usually com¬
plaining of past grievances which an
order to quash may redress effectively.
The economic analysis would conclude
that the certiorari-friendly policy may dis¬
courage licensees from seeking judicial
review, who would have more incentives to
turn to the court for help if judges were
inclined to make orders of mandamus and /or
declaration. The judiciary's practice con¬
cerning the form of orders granted will
influence the future number of applications
for judicial review.
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